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UNIVERSITY  Of  CALIFORNIA 


THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 


The  Truth  about  the  Treaty 


By 

ANDRE  TARDIEU) 


Foreword  by 

EDWARD  M.  HOUSE 

Introduction  by 
GEORGES  CLEMENCEAU 


ffif 


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FOREWORD 

There  are  others  who  may  be  able  to  write  as  accurately  and 
as  interestingly  concerning  events  which  led  up  to  the  World  War 
and  the  war  itself,  but  there  is  no  Frenchman,  save  Clemenceau, 
who  can  write  with  so  much  authority  concerning  the  Peace  Treaty, 
signed  at  Versailles,  June  28,  1919,  as  Andre  Tardieu. 

M.  Tardieu  gets  nothing  second-hand.  He  was  a  participant 
in  the  events  of  which  he  writes.  As  a  member  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  he  knew  the  currents  of  French  political  life,  and  he 
can  write  understandingly  of  the  causes  leading  up  to  the  great 
conflict.  As  an  officer  in  the  French  Army,  he  can  speak  authori- 
tatively of  that  glorious  page  in  history  of  which  he  was  a  part. 

This  training  served  him  well  when  he  was  called  to  assume  a 
foremost  role  in  the  making  of  the  peace.  No  man  worked  with 
more  tireless  energy,  and  none  had  a  better  grasp  of  the  delicate 
and  complex  problems  brought  before  the  Congress.  He  was  not 
only  invaluable  to  France,  but  to  his  associates  from  other  coun- 
tries as  well.  He  was  in  all  truth  the  one  nearly  indispensable 
man  at  the  Conference. 

Therefore,  if  one  would  know  of  those  fateful  days  in  Paris 
when  the  Allies  of  France  had  gathered  from  the  ends  of  the  earth 
to  have  their  reckoning  with  the  Central  Powers,  it  would  be  well 
to  read  The  Truth  about  the  Treaty,  for  here  it  is  told  by  him 
who  knows. 

EDWAKD  M.  HOUSE. 

New  York,  March  3,  1921. 


INTRODUCTION 

My  Dear  Friend : 

It  was  near  your  heart,  in  face  of  the  virulent  attacks  on  our 
Peace  Treaty,  to  set  up  the  truth  in  print. 

If  I  applaud,  it  is  not  that  I  think  there  is  need  to  defend  the 
men  who  made  it.  For  when  all  the  criticism  was  in,  nearly 
every  candidate  sought  their  endorsement  before  going  to  the  polls. 
But  what  a  misery  to  reduce  to  personal  concern,  the  immensity 
of  the  interests  at  stake.  Alas!  Nothing  is  less  easily  forgiven 
than  success, — above  all  when  it  touches  your  critic  in  a  tender 
spot. 

Shall  I  add  that  an  exact  notion  of  duty,  coupled  with  the  pride 
of  responsibility  borne  in  the  war  which  the  Treaty  was  to  close 
in  triumph,  forbade  us  to  bring  into  the  negotiations  men  whose 
views  we  had  thus  far  never  shared.  Hence,  disappointments 
which  sooner  or  later  were  to  find  tongue. 

Then  enforcement  entrusted  to  new  hands,  in  the  midst  of 
grave  difficulties,  opened  the  door  to  recrimination.  You  know 
the  old  saying :  ' '  It  is  a  bad  workman  who  blames  his  tools. ' ' 

The  common  people  were  quick  to  see  that  violence  in  attack 
is  not  enough  to  redeem  failures  in  time  of  stress.  The  deadly 
parallel  was  all  that  was  needed  to  enlighten  those  whose  least 
excuse  was  not  always  that  they  were  blind. 

That  is  why,  dear  friend,  it  cost  me  so  little — I,  who  was 
looking  on  from  the  bank — to  turn  away  from  this  turmoil,  telling 
you  the  while  that  the  nation — having  seen  how  great  the  trial — 
would  continue  its  confidence  to  those  who  had  won  it  bravely 
and  honestly. 

You  agreed  with  me.  But  you  were  in  the  melee  and  claiming 
the  right  and  duty  to  defend  our  common  cause,  you  justly  thought 
that  it  became  you  and  your  comrades  to  stand  and  meet  the  eager 
horde  of  assailants.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  you  have  not  spared 
yourself.  This  book  bears  witness  to  that. 

"Without   waiting   for  time  to   put  all  things  in   place,   you 


INTRODUCTION 

wanted  even  now  to  pave  the  way  for  the  coming  of  justice.  Well 
may  you  be  proud.  You  have  so  well  laid  the  ax — as  Demosthenes 
would  say — to  the  heart  of  the  iron  thicket  that,  before  the  battle 
js  well  joined,  its  fate  is  sealed. 

Soon  events — foreseen  and  unforeseen — were  to  bring  to  your 
support  the  weight  of  facts  made  vivid  in  the  full  light  of  day. 

This  book  prompted  by  your  bold  heart  is  above  all  an  act  of 
real  wisdom.  For  nothing  presses  more  at  all  times  than  to  light 
the  path  of  our  Democracy,  if  it  is  to  be  able  to  govern  itself 
instead  of  merely  substituting  one  abuse  of  power  for  another. 

Parliament — Public  Opinion!  Because  the  supreme  power 
theoretically  rests  with  them,  there  is  great  need  that  the  brush- 
wood be  cleared  from  around  the  things  that  are  done  with  a 
reason. 

Our  institutions  are  the  best  in  the  world.  To  work  them  the 
best  men  in  the  world  are  none  too  good,  above  all  if  they  are  to 
be  made  of  full  effect. 

Love  of  theory  has  perchance  made  us  too  exacting  of  our 
public  bodies, — fallible  because  merely  human.  Tossed  hither  and 
yon,  by  honest  conviction  as  well  as  by  sordid  interest,  our 
"rulers,"  at  the  mercy  of  the  current,  seek  the  fair  way  without 
always  finding  it.  To  aid  them  it  is  enough  to  bring  them  light — 
ever  more  light — and  to  be  without  pity  for  the  things  that  hide. 
But  mind  you  never  wait.  Be  quick  with  the  counter-thrust  of 
contradiction.  For  the  will  of  to-day,  as  Machiavelli  says,  is  the 
nail  on  which  to-morrow's  action  hangs. 

It  is  true.  To  maintain  Parliament  in  the  straight  path  of  a 
power  uncertain  in  its  scope  a  free  Press  can  be  of  decisive  value. 
You  have  used  it  to  wonderful  purpose.  And  yet  how  comes  it 
that  in  our  democracies  the  Press  leaves  itself  open  to  the  suspicion 
that  it  shuts  its  eyes  to  more  or  less  veiled  attempts  upon  pure 
right?  The  Press  has  weapons  enough  for  its  defense. 

Here — as  a  supreme  safeguard — the  inadequately  prepared 
exercise  of  popular  sovereignty  finds  its  place.  But  for  its  thunder 
to  be  real  and  not  of  the  stage,  there  is  need  for  efficient  prepara- 
tion now  lacking.  If  man  always  acted  as  he  speaks,  he  would 
seem  too  near  to  God. 

But  as  we  now  stand — rejoice  thereat — when  France  really 
needs  to  make  herself  heard,  I  doubt  not  that  she  will  do  it  with 
a  loud  voice. 

In  the  matter  of  Versailles,  any  wide-spread  misunderstanding 


INTRODUCTION 

may  have  disastrous  consequences  before  long.  So  you  were  more 
than  right,  dear  friend,  to  wish  that  no  excuse  remain  to  those 
who,  not  having  had  things  made  plain  to  them,  may  try  to  feign 
that  they  do  not  understand.  You  have  not  left  the  least  cloak  to 
ignorance,  not  even  excess  of  artlessness,  if  that  fault  can  be 
imputed  (especially  in  assemblies)  to  our  day  and  generation. 

Behold!  You  have  done  that  which  was  near  your  heart,  you 
have  done  it  to  the  applause  of  all  who  are  not  deterred  by  private 
passion  from  the  plain  quest  for  the  Truth. 

The  assailants  have  fallen  back  in  disorder,  some  of  them  giv- 
ing vent  to  exaggerations  which  brand  them  with  their  habitual 
discredit;  others  less  bold  who  inspired  them  have  completed  the 
rout  by  the  ostentatious  appropriation  of  some  of  your  own  views. 

How  could  I  have  doubted  the  issue,  I  who  saw  you  in  the  days 
of  sore  trial  bearing  bravely — aye,  even  gaily — the  heavy  burden 
of  your  great  responsibilities?  Happy  days  when  our  opponents 
were  those  provided  by  the  nature  of  things,  days  in  which  we 
gave  for  the  victory  of  peace  the  same  full  measure  of  effort  that 
war  had  demanded  of  us. 

All  around  you,  around  your  co-workers,  there  was  a  constant 
search  for  knowledge,  a  constant  appeal  to  all  sources  of  light. 
Each  of  you  compiling,  questioning,  discussing,  trying  out  on  me 
and  on  others  the  strength  of  your  arguments.  You  were  prepar- 
ing yourself  by  toil  and  labour  for  the  arduous  debates  in  which 
your  splendid  fighting  spirit  was  met  by  gainsayers  worthy  of 
your  cause  as  of  their  own.  Ever  ready  for  the  fray,  never  down- 
hearted, ill-satisfied  with  a  half  success,  ever  seeking  steel, — that 
is  what  I  saw  of  these  much  abused  negotiators. 

In  those  days  you  did  not  foresee  the  bitter  diatribes  even  then 
being  whetted  in  silent  pent-up  rage  by  men  too  slow  to  discover 
that  all  agreements  are  reached  by  compromise,  and  that  a  war 
won  by  four  could  not  end  in  a  peace  dictated  by  one  alone.  What 
would  you?  If  some  to  think  well  of  themselves  need  to  think  ill 
of  others. 

Perhaps  what  astonishes  most  is  that  so  many  famed  opponents 
were  forced  to  confine  themselves  to  criticism  of  such  or  such  an 
article,  each  seeking  to  outbid  the  other  without  ever  having  seemed 
to  realize  that  the  question  as  a  whole — a  question  of  political  and 
social  history — had  to'  be  taken  up  at  the  place  where  war  had 
broken  it  off  and  followed  along  new  lines  of  international  unity 
to  permit  the  Europe  of  the  future  to  live  and  prosper. 


INTRODUCTION 

When  one  confines  the  field  of  debate  to  suit  one 's  convenience, 
it  is  easy  to  wallow  in  invective  but  hard  to  pretend  to  the  under- 
standing of  a  diplomatic  instrument  which,  renewing  as  it  does 
from  the  ground  up,  all  questions  of  world  policy,  beggars 
description. 

All  these  Treaties  of  Peace  to  which  so  many  famous  person- 
ages set  their  names,  without  in  some  cases  having  laboured  on 
them  overmuch,  were  studied,  drafted,  built  up  free  from  the 
supervision  of  the  modern  Argus,  beneath  the  inspiration  of  a 
master  whose  decisions  were  lauded  before  he  had  made  them. 

Whatever  resentment  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  has  aroused,  at 
least  no  one  has  been  able  to  say  that  its  ratification  was  not 
obtained  by  full  knowledge  and  consent. 

The  ancient  struggles  for  domination  had  always,  till  then,  been 
settled  by  conquests  of  territory.  Germany  victorious,  the  Treaty 
could  be  but  a  question  of  her  capacity  for  depradation.  Ger- 
many vanquished,  right  resumed  full  sway  and  the  victors  were 
forced  to  disentangle  themselves  from  the  myriad  difficulties  that 
might  had  been  unable  to  overcome.  What  an  undertaking !  And 
however  incompletely  realized,  what  audacity  to  have  even 
attempted  it! 

The  most  irreconcilable  opposition  might  have  found  there  food 
for  thought.  It  deemed  it  easier  to  raise  its  demand  indiscrimi- 
nately on  all  clauses,  and  then  finally  contented  itself  with  a  slack- 
ening of  the  terms  we  had  succeeded  in  imposing.  Where  is  this 
to  end?  I  should  have  thought  it  inconceivable  that  a  treaty 
could  be  enforced  otherwise  than  by  the  fulfillment  of  the  under- 
takings written  in  the  bond. 

Bernhardi  it  is  who  said  that  war  is  only  the  continuation  of 
the  pursuit  of  peace  aims  by  other  means.  I  can  see  in  that  noth- 
ing but  the  brutal  assertion  of  a  fact.  After  the  awful  war  forced 
upon  us,  can  our  peace  policy  be  other  than  the  necessary  sequel 
of  the  policy  of  forbearance  which  put  all  civilized  peoples  on  our 
side  the  day  that  the  Germans  went  so  far  as  to  try  to  do  away 
with  the  right  of  France  to  live? 

We  have  won  this  war  not  by  our  worth  alone,  but  by  the 
splendid  aid  of  our  trusty  Allies.  This  asset  must  remain  to  us 
and  we  must  give  way  a  little  on  both  sides  in  a  spirit  of  friendship, 
not  with  ill  temper  that  but  lessens  the  price  of  consent  and  allows 
mortal  hurts  to  subsist  where  agreement  with  good  grace  would 
have  brought  full  measure  of  achievement. 


INTRODUCTION 

Remember  with  what  joy  we  hailed  the  sound  of  the  first 
Allied  gun.  This  does  not  mean  that — after  untold  sacrifice  made 
for  ourselves  assuredly  but  no  less  profitable  to  our  associates  who 
fought  for  their  own  salvation  as  well  as  for  ours — we  are  reduced 
to  submit  meekly  to  the  law  of  our  friends.  No !  We  did  not  save 
our  just  rights  by  war,  to  end  by  giving  them  up  in  peace. 

But  the  past  grips  us  still.  Even  at  the  moment  of  the  Armis- 
tice, we  could  see  arising  here  and  there  thoughts  different  indeed 
from  those  which  filled  our  minds  when,  at  Doullens  or  Abbeville, 
our  whole  energies  bent  on  the  next  stand,  we  asked  ourselves  the 
dread  question:  Paris  or  Calais? 

"Waterloo  and  Sedan,  to  go  back  no  further,  forced  upon  us  the 
painful  care  of  a  policy  of  reparation.  While  others  filled  with 
the  hope  of  new  things  might  allow  themselves  to  be  led  away  to 
the  renewal  of  the  past  precautions  against  a  France  grown  over- 
strong.  There  could  be  no  greater  folly.  But  is  not  the  return 
to  the  past  always  the  first  impulse  of  countries  whose  power  is 
founded  upon  the  force  of  tradition?* 

Nothing  is  more  significant  in  this  respect  than  the  book  of 
Mr.  Keynes — one  of  the  representatives  of  Great  Britain  at  the 
Conference  of  Paris.  With  some  knowledge  of  economics  but 
neither  imagination  nor  character,  Mr.  Keynes  (who  was  not  alone 
in  his  opinion)  unrelentingly  opposed  "the  abusive  exactions 
of  the  Allies"  (read:  of  France  and  of  her  delegates  whose  most 
elementary  demands  prevailed  only  with  great  difficulty)  in  the 
name  of  an  alleged  regard  for  "the  capabilities  of  Germany." 
One  can  imagine  how  Berlin  welcomed  the  aid  thus  tendered. 
What  encouragement  for  all  organized  German  resistance  to  the 
Treaty,  to  read  from  the  pen  of  a  former  British  delegate  that  we 
had  "shamelessly  exaggerated  the  claims  of  our  devastated 
regions." 

These  reproaches  and  many  others  as  brutally  violent,  of  which 
I  should  have  said  nothing  if  their  author  without  counting  the 
cost  had  not  thought  to  serve  his  cause  by  making  them  public, 
show  clearly  enough  to  what  pitch  certain  minds  had  wrought 
themselves. 


*A  tiny  instance  can  give  some  idea  of  the  difficulties  of  agreement  on 
all  points.  For  France  to  obtain  the  right  to  subject  to  military  service,  for 
the  exclusive  defense  of  her  own  territory,  the  natives  of  the  countries  over 
which  she  obtained  a  mandate,  it  was  necessary  to  assert  the  contrary  prin- 
ciple and  it  was  only  at  the  end  of  a  year  that  (see  the  texts)  a  right  of 
interpretation  was  implicitly  recognized  to  us  which  amounted  to  nothing 
less  than  the  formal  negation  of  the  professed  agreement.  As  to  an  express 
recognition,  it  was  always  energetically  refused  to  us. 


INTRODUCTION 

Perchance  our  French  opponents  will  have  the  grace  to  see 
that  we  could  not  have  both  "betrayed"  the  Allies  to  the  profit 
of  France,  as  Mr.  Keynes  says;  and  France  to  the  profit  of  the 
Allies  as  they  themselves  allege. 

Without  entering  here  into  the  consequences  of  theories  of 
universal  interdependence  which,  before  any  satisfaction  had  been 
given  us,  would  afford  the  Germans  the  economic  opportunity  they 
need  to  resume  their  frustrated  attempt  at  domination,  I  confine 
myself  to  noting  that,  though  disapproved  of  by  Mr.  Keynes  as 
excessive  and  by  some  Frenchmen  as  insufficient,  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  is  equally  binding  on  all  who  signed  it. 

This  is  so  true  that  our  French  opponents,  after  urging  the 
Treaty's  rejection  or  seeking  to  discredit  it,  have  come  by  a  sudden 
somersault,  to  demand  the  rigorous  enforcement  of  the  pact  they 
so  loudly  condemned,  holding  their  peace  the  while  when  they 
see  its  terms  gradually  slackened  to  our  detriment,  under  German 
bluster. 

I  note  the  fact  and  none  the  less  maintain  according  to  Bern- 
hardi  himself  that  this  Treaty,  like  all  treaties,  is  and  can  only  be 
a  prolongation  of  war  activities  until  complete  fulfillment.  This 
cannot  be  challenged  unless  it  is  desired — which  no  one  has  ever 
suggested — to  wipe  out  the  German  defeat.  Mr.  Keynes  himself 
does  not  go  as  far  as  that. 

Our  Allies  must  accept  the  facts.  We  are  victorious  by  their 
aid.  They  are  victorious  by  ours.  And  our  common  victory  can 
only  produce  and  maintain  its  full  effect  in  peace  by  the  continua- 
tion of  our  common  undertakings. 

It  was  not  as  warriors  victorious  in  any  ordinary  military 
success  that  our  soldiers  appeared  in  the  great  war,  that  triumphal 
arch  which — risen  out  of  a  great  dream  of  domination  now  buried 
in  the  annals  of  history — gave  passage  at  last  to  the  standards  of 
arms'  noblest  conquest — a  peace  of  justice  and  of  honour. 

If  I  dare  to  say  it,  it  was  the  glamour  of  hope  in  presence  of 
the  miracle  of  Waterloo  reversed:  Wellington  coming  to  our  aid 
to  break  the  onslaught  of  Bliicher;  while  France,  by  the  side  of 
America  aroused,  broke  with  the  spirit  of  military  hegemony 
which  had  passed  from  Napoleon  to  Bismarck  and  was  to  be  for- 
ever crushed. 

So  many  cruel  mistakes,  so  many  atrocious  miseries,  so  many 
hopes  frightfully  blasted,  the  whole  whoredom  of  man's  past  suf- 
fering stretched  out  under  the  gaze  of  the  noble  dead  along  an 


INTRODUCTION 

avenue  of  heroic  splendors  blazing  with  the  glory  of  France  radiant 
and  redeemed.  And  the  men  of  France  followed  the  lighted  way 
towards  the  new  duties  of  regenerated  mankind. 

However  this  peace  of  miracles  remained  to  be  fashioned  with 
our  hands,  after  we  had  seen  it  with  our  eyes.  And  for  who  was 
able  to  retain  this  vision,  the  miracle  of  the  war  won  demanded 
an  even  greater  miracle — the  miracle  of  peace  organized. 

Alas,  my  dear  Tardieu,  the  only  certain  miracles  are  those 
which  we  can  ourselves  perform.  And  if  we  would  perform  them, 
we  must  first  get  rid  of  that  state  of  mind  in  which  the  past 
struggles  instinctively  in  spite  of  ourselves  to  overcome  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  present. 

During  the  war,  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  the  anniversary  of 
American  independence,  as  the  United  States  troops  paraded  in 
front  of  the  statue  of  Washington,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  to  me, 
smiling : 

"Do  you  realize  that  you  have  made  me  assist  in  the  celebra- 
tion of  England's  greatest  defeat?" 

"And  if  your  national  pride  still  makes  you  regret  the  defeat," 
I  answered,  "I  feel  sure  that  you  do  not  regret  this  day.  What 
harm  has  come  to  you  from  this  American  independence  which  I 
see  every  day  becoming  more  attractive  to  Canada,  Australia  and 
New  Zealand,  who  have  freely  enlisted  in  the  block  of  the  four 
great  Allies?  There  have  been  heavier  accounts  by  far  settled 
between  your  flag  and  mine.  And  yet  it  is  with  all  my  heart  that 
every  day  I  salute  your  flag  at  the  front." 

Thus  we  taught  each  other  the  new  spirit  of  the  future  while 
waiting  for  the  work  of  applying  it.  Let  us  take  care  not  to  begin 
by  weaknesses  cloaked  under  acceptable  names.  Let  us  beware 
above  all  of  the  weaknesses  of  a  policy  of  procrastination. 

Our  beaten  enemies  have  admirable  qualities  of  action  which 
they  employed,  under  a  master,  from  Sadowa  to  Versailles,  to  the 
most  relentless  advantage.  Scruples  are  utterly  foreign  to  them 
as  was  made  so  clear  by  the  recreant  band  of  their  ninety-three 
intellectuals  and  moral  leaders.  They  thought  to  grasp  the  realiza- 
tion of  a  dream  of  atrocious  brigandage  in  which  victory  would 
excuse  every  crime,  and  the  probabilities  are  that  they  would  have 
conquered  us  in  peace  but  for  the  mad  act  which  forced  military 
resistance  upon  us.  Are  they  any  better  than  their  acts?  The 
future  alone  can  tell,  but  the  answer  may  be  inferred  from  the 
&eid  test  of  actual  beginnings. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  start  was  not  a  happy  one  with  von  Brockdorff-Rantzau 
who,  draped  in  brutish  insolence,  came  to  accuse  us  of  "hating'' 
Germany  because  we  did  not  offer  our  necks  to  her  executioners. 
Since  then  the  policy  of  Germany  has  merely  been  to  gather  up 
every  chance  weapon  that  could  enable  her  to  evade  the  Treaty. 
Audacity  and  guile  naturally  increased  under  the  encouragement 
of  manifestations  like  that  of  Mr.  Keynes  or  of  the  series  of  unholy 
concessions  from  which  Germany  has  been  led  to  deduce  that  her 
signature  at  Versailles  binds  her  only  subject  to  further  discussions. 

The  hour  of  supreme  warning  came  when  the  heads  of  the  Allied 
Governments  were  told  to  their  faces  by  a  German  delegate  that, 
before  they  could  usefully  discuss,  they  "must  cure  themselves  of 
the  sickness  of  victory. ' '  And  the  Conference  didn  't  break  up !  And 
the  disavowal  of  the  delirious  swine  was  not  even  demanded!  At 
least  may  this  true  Boche  receive  our  thanks  for  his  shameless 
frankness  which  dispels  any  illusions  about  the  German  case. 

So  on  which  side  is  there  continuity  of  purpose?  On  which 
side  vacillation? 

What  people  is  it  that,  abased  and  divided,  having  touched  the 
bottom  of  the  abyss,  and  unable  to  conceive  any  other  ideal  than 
the  abuse  of  force — the  shattered  remnants  of  which  litter  the 
earth — still  finds  within  itself  a  rebound  of  warped  "  dignity  "- 
of  savage  insolence  to  defy  its  victors  and  to  prepare  openly  for 
a  mad  revenge  which  without  saving  it,  will  throw  the  world  into 
a  new  catastrophe? 

And  what  people  is  it  that  united  for  the  victory  of  right, 
having  displayed  the  highest  virtues  in  the  most  extreme  peril — 
have  allowed  themselves  to  be  flouted  with  impunity  by  a  pros- 
trate foe — without  any  remedy  being  offered  but  exhortation  to 
patience  and  kind  promises  that  one  day  moral  courage  will  come 
into  its  own? 

And  yet  each  day  of  dangerous  tolerance  increases  the  forces 
of  evil,  and  snatches  opportunities  from  the  happy  outcome  so 
dearly  bought.  Can  one  have  forgotten  what  was  the  stake  between 
ourselves  and  Germany — what  defeat  would  have  cost  us,  and 
what  peace  must  assure  to  us! 

The  crowning  or  the  overthrow  of  all  the  hopes  aroused  by 
victory,  that,  after  all,  is  the  issue  which  is  being  decided  before 
our  very  eyes.  Must  we  perhaps  to-morrow  return  to  the  bloody 
battles  whose  cycle  broken  by  us  may,  by  our  weakness,  be 
reformed  against  us? 


INTRODUCTION 

The  country  made  no  mistake  about  it.  Not  for  a  single 
moment  did  it  take  the  bait  of  belittlement  which  would  have  led 
to  the  renunciation  of  the  glorious  conquests  of  the  present  for 
the  will-of-the-wisp  of  words  cunningly  pieced  together.  The 
meaning  of  the  elections  was  plain.  The  people  of  France  had 
judged. 

And  so  also  the  Germans,  but  in  how  different  a  manner. 

If  they  have  as  yet  been  unable  to  fathom  the  depth  of  their 
irredeemable  downfall;  if  they  have  as  yet  been  unable  to  discern 
the  real  meaning  of  the  crowning  act  of  the  great  tragedy,  they 
still  feel  surging  within  them  the  deep  sources  of  a  life  of  work  and 
of  will.  Their  trouble  is  that  they  see  the  future  only  through 
the  blood-red  mists  of  a  civilization  grafted  upon  the  survival  of 
barbarism.  If  they  can  make  themselves  over,  they  will,  little  by 
little,  attain  the  position  to  which  they  are  justly  entitled  in  the 
world.  If  they  cannot,  the  victors,  whether  they  realize  it  or  not, 
must  continue  to  mount  close  guard  over  lands  whose  borders  have 
become  as  President  Wilson  said,  "the  frontiers  of  freedom." 

The  maintenance  of  these  frontiers  which  was  the  constant  aim 
of  French  effort  at  the  Conference,  is  of  no  small  moment.  It 
took  the  convulsions  of  a  Russia  thrown  far  out  of  her  orbit  and 
threatening  Warsaw  to  reveal  to  minds  wilfully  closed,  the  funda- 
mental issues  of  the  Polish  question.  Once  more  the  historic  brav- 
ery of  Poland  stood  the  test.  It  was  none  the  less  fortunate  that 
the  Red  Army  quickly  reached  the  end  of  its  supplies  and  found 
itself  abandoned  by  the  Allies  when  its  own  Government  was 
unable  to  renew  them. 

How  many  European  questions  are  pending,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  others ! 

First  the  most  urgent.  If,  in  the  matter  of  balance  of  power, 
some  have  not  sinned  by  excess  of  foresight,  is  not  that  an  added 
reason  why  public  men  should  keep  a  watchful  eye  upon  those  sec- 
tors whence  clouds  may  arise  upon  the  horizon? 

Watchfulness  for  a  day  is  not  what  is  wanted.  Who  can  meas- 
ure the  convulsions  which  this  war  has  caused,  or  predict  a  time 
limit  for  the  evolution  of  ever  changing  world  conditions?  Con- 
sider for  example  the  century-long  efforts  to  build  up  this  Europe 
of  ours  which  has  fallen  in  ruins. 

But  what  avails  it  to  discuss  the  most  intricate  problems,  the 
solution  of  which,  always  more  or  less  a  matter  of  chance,  may  lead 
to  cruel  mistakes,  if  personal  quarrels  magnified  by  misunder- 


INTRODUCTION 

standings  are  to  decide  questions  whose  dangers  are  light-heartedly 
to  be  left  to  a  future  pregnant  with  the  unknowable. 

What  avails  it,  having  multiplied  the  means  of  prevision,  hav- 
ing conquered  the  right  of  self-government  by  skilfully  devised 
political  adjustments,  to  shut  one's  eyes  to  urgent  developments 
through  fear  of  momentary  embarrassments.  "What  avails  it  to 
seek  (oh,  how  keenly)  the  honour  of  responsibilities,  only  to  shed 
them  at  the  first  encounter  whether  from  faint  heart  or  unavow- 
able  parliamentary  interest? 

"What  avails  it  to  be  content  with  appearances,  if  we  are  to  see 
in  changes  of  system  nothing  more  than  the  triumph  of  mere  words  ? 

What  avails  it  to  have  set  ourselves  up  in  the  places  of  the 
kings  of  old,  if  we  are  to  deny  our  ideals  by  our  acts  ? 

These  questions  handed  down  from  our  fathers,  we  shall  trans- 
mit to  our  sons  who  will  not  fail  to  pass  them  on  to  posterity  for 
ends  the  tangled  skein  of  which  will  not  soon  be  unravelled. 

And  yet  we  must  live  and,  if  all  things  remain  pending  in  this 
world  where  naught  is  completed  except  by  continual  evolution, 
the  first  requisite  of  life  is  to  make  sure  in  the  present  day  of 
those  things  whose  lawful  development  is  to  determine  one  by  one 
the  moments  of  destiny. 

This  is  the  pressing  duty  of  our  day.  The  Treaty  signed  is 
but  a  fluttering  scrap  of  paper  unless  it  is  enforced.  To  achieve 
this  we  put  everything  in  action.  For  what  result  ?  That  is  what 
it  is  time  to  know. 

War  can  lead  to  the  domination  of  arms,  as  peace  can  lead  to 
the  slackening  of  our  will.  Man  being  wont  to  oppose  himself  to 
man  by  combinations  of  strength,  the  natural  temptation  to 
encroach  upon  one's  neighbor  entails  a  righteous  resistance  where 
the  forces  of  each  are  measured.  The  strongest  in  this  world — by 
that  I  mean  the  best — will  be  the  most  vigilant,  the  best  prepared 
to  defend  themselves  against  every  evil  enterprise,  the  readiest  to 
aid  their  harassed  neighbor  who,  in  turn,  will  come  to  their  aid. 

With  or  without  treaty  that  is  our  common  law;  and  Boche 
treachery  is  but  a  renewed  invitation  to  us  to  be  on  our  guard.  If 
there  are  sentinels  who  slumber  or  allow  themselves  to  be  taken 
unawares,  the  people  who  have  all  at  stake  must  react  in  their  own 
defense.  When  I  ask  that  public  opinion  be  awakened,  it  is  because 
too  often  those  who  have  wielded  power  have  wielded  it  only  to 
put  public  opinion  to  sleep.  Would  you  behold  public  opinion  at 
work  and  at  the  same  time  judge  those  who  are  at  such  pains  to 
deter  it?  Remember  the  great  tragedy  of  the  Second  Punic  War. 


INTRODUCTION 

When  Varro  bowed  down  by  defeat  at  Canna  found  himself 
under  the  walls  of  Rome,  he  was  met  by  the  Senate  and  the  people 
came  to  congratulate  him  on  not  having  despaired  of  the  Republic. 
In  this  hour  of  mortal  anguish,  everything  was  great  in  the  city 
of  defeat.  Some  met  the  extreme  peril  with  dauntless  courage, 
others  imposing  silence  on  legitimate  anger,  found  in  supreme 
responsibility  a  grand  revolt  and  last  great  effort;  salvation  was 
the  reward  of  a  miracle,  than  which  none  finer  has  ever  been  seen. 

Rome  knew  such  greatness  that  the  infinite  abjection  of  its 
decadence  has  never  been  able  to  tarnish  the  memory  thereof.  Was 
ever  a  moment  when  this  people,  of  which  history  is  so  replete, 
gave  a  more  marvelous  exhibition  of  moral  splendour  and  of 
triumphant  confidence  in  the  strength  of  its  will  power? 

It  is  at  such  junctures  that  hearts  are  made  manifest.  The 
weak  and  the  strong  are  at  one.  Rome  wills  it.  Not  a  murmur  is 
heard.  Of  complaints,  recriminations,  evil  insinuations,  not  a 
whisper.  Not  a  tremour  of  weakness.  Not  even  an  idle  word.  The 
strong-souled  and  feeble-hearted  alike  are  proof  against  the  ter- 
rors of  disaster. 

The  nation  which  by  surfeit  of  weakness  had  brought  this  day 
to  pass,  is  the  same  which  in  the  midst  of  the  catastrophe  suddenly 
found  itself  again.  All  that  they  were  and  all  that  they  had  was 
given  to  the  State.  And  Fabius,  who  had  seen  Varro  preferred 
to  him,  who  after  having  been  accused  of  cowardice  because  he 
was  unwilling  to  risk  battles  like  that  which  so  nearly  wiped  Rome 
off  the  face  of  the  earth,  Fabius  marched  in  the  parade  which 
brought  to  the  vanquished  leader  the  homage  of  a  sublime  faith 
that  Varro  victorious  would  have  awaited  in  vain.  A  great  wave 
of  super-human  will-power  has  swept  away  all  hesitations,  all  the 
errors,  all  the  miseries  and  crimes  which  go  to  rot  in  the  discard  of 
history,  leaving  behind  only  the  resistless  forces  of  rebirth.  The 
episode  assumes  such  grandeur  that  the  halo  of  Rome  melts  into 
the  apotheosis  of  mankind.  One  is  proud  to  be  a  man,  if  man  no 
matter  whence  he  come,  or  where  he  goes,  can  rise  so  high. 

But  I  have  strayed  far  from  our  critics  and  from  the  surly  atti- 
tude which  it  has  pleased  some  of  them  to  adopt.  Will  it  be  urged 
that  victory  accounts  for  many  shortcomings — tempts  many  to 
depart  from  "the  street  called  straight"  by  the  assurance  it  gives 
of  the  future — whereas  the  extremity  of  misfortune  may  give  rise 
to  the  highest  reactions?  That  is  too  easy  a  way  out.  Far  greater 
than  the  duel  between  Carthage  and  Rome,  portentous  indeed 
though  it  was,  is  the  drama  of  domination  fought  out  between 


INTRODUCTION 

modern  Germany  and  the  nations  who  were  able  to  save  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  world.  An  old  saying  alleges  that  one  is  never  so 
vanquished  nor  so  victorious  as  one  seems.  If  Rome  took  her 
revenge,  Hannibal  has  often  been  charged  with  having  lent  her 
the  support  of  his  strategy. 

Who  indeed  in  the  hour  of  victory  can  say  what  its  scope  will 
be?  Who  indeed  when  the  sun  set  over  Austerlitz  could  have 
foreseen  its  rise  over  Moscow  and  Waterloo?  Victories  in  them- 
selves are  but  the  brutal  crushing  of  one  military  force  by  another. 
The  conquerors  must  show  themselves  capable  of  improving  their 
victory.  For  that  men  and  time  are  needed. 

No  one  suggests  that  the  discontented  have  not  found  weak 
spots  in  our  victory.  The  underlying  causes  of  all  alliances  con- 
spire— no  matter  what  one  says  or  does — to  rise  to  the  light  of  day. 
Should  this  not  have  been  guarded  against,  more  especially  as  the 
Government  was  bound  to  secrecy  ?  And  as  the  peace  of  to-morrow 
could  be  based  only  on  the  confidence  of  the  country  in  the  means 
provided  by  the  Government  of  victory,  who  could  be  so  blind  as 
to  undermine  it  to  the  point  of  attempting  to  ruin  in  the  minds  of 
the  victors  the  very  means  of  regeneration,  the  ' '  rigorous  enforce- 
ment" of  which  is  now  being  clamorously  urged? 

Finally  were  there  not,  as  to-day,  Germans,  beaten  but  not 
crushed,  ready  by  a  rare  blending  of  shameless  trickery  and  pug- 
nacity to  aspire  to  hegemony?  Could  the  belittlement  of  victory, 
could  the  heightening  of  the  morale  of  defeat  serve  any  useful  pur- 
pose? Alas,  the  attempt  has  already  borne  fruit  so  abundant  that 
I  fear  to  make  things  worse  by  casting  up  the  account.  To-day, 
as  yesterday,  as  to-morrow,  no  continuation  of  success  can  be 
expected  save  from  the  interior  discipline  of  peoples  worthy  of 
conceiving  and  of  realizing  the  new  order  of  a  just  peace  of  labour. 

Vanquished,  our  lot  under  Ludendorff  would  not  have  differed 
from  that  of  Rome  under  Hannibal.  Victorious,  we  have  assumed 
our  responsibility  in  the  most  noble  effort  to  achieve  a  lasting 
peace  by  the  sole  forces  of  Right.  To  one  and  all  such  a  state 
was  well  worth  a  general  effort  of  self-restraint  instead  of  the  old 
rush  to  divide  the  spoils  between  those  who  had  overcome  the 
enemy. 

The  future  will  decide.  The  mastery  rests  with  him  who  wills 
most  strongly  and  most  enduringly.  Ambition  is  of  worth  but  by 
its  aim.  The  higher  the  aim,  the  nobler  the  character,  the  stronger 
the  will  must  be.  Neither  nobility  of  aspiration  nor  strength  of 


INTRODUCTION 

courage  can  be  lacking  to  France.  Fixity  of  ideas,  method  and 
continuity  of  purpose  have  been  the  three  things  most  lacking  in 
our  history.  Can  we  not  derive  from  the  trials  of  these  times  the 
strength  to  enhance  the  glories  of  war — inadequate  to  nourish  a 
nation — by  a  superior  use  of  those  attainments  of  peace  which  so 
often  were  the  glory  of  our  past? 

To  make  sure  of  the  future,  we  must  forge  it  ourselves.  Ham- 
mers and  anvils  are  there.  How  about  our  brawn? 

These  ideals  are  all  your  own,  my  dear  friend,  and  they  radiate 
in  your  pages  from  the  light  of  well-ordered  facts.  I  thank  you 
once  again  for  having  served  them  well. 

Your  good  friend, 

G.  CLEMENCEAU. 

To  M.  ANDR£  TARDIEU, 
PARIS 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

I  GERMAN   AGGRESSION       ...>-...     y 

II  THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE       .     •.     -.-     .     .• 

III  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE       .     .•     .;     ...     . 

IV  THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY      ....:. 
V  THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE       .     .     .     .     . 

VI  TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE       .     y    >     •     y    y     • 

VII  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE      .     .     >     >     .     .     •.     -. 

VIII  THE  SARRE  BASIN       .     .    -y    x    B    R    >     •     • 

IX  WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY      .     •.     .:    v     .     . 

X  How  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID     .     >:    >     .     > 

XI  GERMAN  UNITY      .     .     .     .     ...... 

XII  RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE  OF  FRANCE     . 

XIII  How  THE  PEACE  is  BEING  ENFORCED 

XIV  FRANCE;  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 


The  Truth  about  the  Treaty 

CHAPTEE  I 

GERMAN   AGGRESSION 

NEVER  was  an  international  crime  more  flagrant  than 
Germany's  attack  on  France  of  August  2,  1914;  never  one 
more  deliberately  planned. 

I  can  still  see  Baron  von  Schoen,  the  Kaiser's  Ambassa- 
dor, standing  on  the  steps  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay  as  with 
feigned  regret  he  takes  leave  of  M..  de  Margerie,  now 
French  Ambassador  at  Brussels  but  then  Political  Director 
at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  German  Repre- 
sentative bows  deprecatingly.  He  seems  to  say,  as  his 
Master  said  a  few  weeks  later,  "I  did  not  will  all  this." 
Yet  at  that  very  moment  and  without  any  declaration  of 
war,  German  troops  had  already  (thirty-four  hours  pre- 
viously) crossed  our  frontier  and  invaded  our  soil.  This 
very  invasion  had  been  planned  for  half  a  century. 

In  1871,  Germany  had  torn  from  us  Alsace-Lorraine, 
the  flesh  of  our  flesh,  two  of  the  most  French  of  the  French 
provinces  bound  by  every  tie  to  all  our  past ;  two  provinces 
which  for  centuries  had  given  us,  had  given  France — the 
oldest,  most  closely  knit  and  most  responsive  of  nations — 
generals  and  statesmen,  men  of  science  and  of  letters. 
Germany  refused  to  heed  the  cry  of  despair  raised  at  Bor- 
deaux by  their  representatives.  By  ' 'blood  and  iron,"  to 
quote  Bismarck,  she  had  sealed  her  victory  and  welded  her 
unity  with  the  rape  of  our  provinces  of  which  she  made 
the  bulwark  of  her  power  at  our  very  door.  Five  and 
twenty  years  later,  Bismarck  cynically  boasted:  "We  did 
not  conquer  Alsace  and  Lorraine  because  their  people 


2      THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

loved  us,  or  turned  their  thought  to  Germany.  That  did 
not  matter  to  us.  Their  annexation  was  a  geographical 
necessity.  It  is  quite  presumptuous  to  ask  us  to  worry 
whether  the  Alsacians  and  Lorrainers  want  or  do  not  want 
to  be  German.  That  is  none  of  our  business."  Neither 
hesitation  before;  nor  repentance  after. 

This  unhallowed  gain  won  by  sheer  might,  does  not 
suffice  to  Germany,  or  rather  to  retain  it  she  has  to  have 
something  more.  Hence  the  policy  which  forty-three  years 
later  led  to  another  war,  by  a  succession  of  events  the  very 
logic  of  which  is  its  most  crushing  condemnation.  Ger- 
many seeks  not  only  to  keep  the  territory  stolen  from 
France,  but  to  make  secure  by  arms  her  domination  of  the 
Continent  rendered  possible  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort. 
For  this  it  is  not  enough  that  France  shall  be  conquered 
and  despoiled ;  she  must  be  isolated  and  paralyzed  as  well. 
It  is  not  enough  that  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  piety  of  whose 
popular  attachment  for  France  was  unconquerable,  shall 
live  beneath  the  Prussian  yoke;  the  political  structure  of 
Europe  must  be  such  that  never  in  any  manner  or  at  any 
time  shall  German  domination  be  challenged.  To  build  up 
this  domination,  as  well  as  to  defend  it  in  case  it  were  ever 
threatened,  every  means  will  be  employed — not  excepting 
war.  Half  a  century  of  history  has  here  its  source. 

As  early  as  1875,  this  settled  determination  reveals 
itself  by  the  threat  of  a  fresh  aggression.  France  is  recov- 
ering too  rapidly.  To  complete  her  ruin  is  a  duty  to  Ger- 
many and  to  mankind.  The  awakening  of  Russia  and 
Great  Britain,  conscious — too  late — of  the  mistake  they 
made  in  1870,  foils  Bismarck  who  vents  his  disappointment 
in  bitter  jests,  but  sets  to  work  at  once  to  prevent  its  recur- 
rence. Two  Powers  exerting  their  influence  in  favour  of 
France  have  been  able  to  hold  him  in  check ;  against  France 
therefore  he  determines  to  group  forces  which  will  give  him 
undisputed  control  of  Europe  and  cement  his  victory  for 
ever.  On  October  7,  1879,  he  signs  a  Treaty  with  Austria- 


'Speech  at  Friedrichsruhe,  April  24,  1895. 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  3 

Hungary.  On  May  20,  1882,  one  with  Italy.  Germany  is 
now  at  the  head  of  a  coalition  of  170,000,000  men  which 
from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean  commands 
Europe  and  cuts  it  in  two.  She  is  the  arbiter  of  a  peace 
which  she  both  imposes  and  guarantees.  From  the  treaties 
on  which  it  is  based  this  coalition  borrows  a  defensive 
appearance ;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  its  aims  are  offensive  and 
it  is  ready  to  attack.  To  render  France's  isolation  more 
complete,  supplementary  pledges  are  secured  from  quarters 
whence  they  were  least  to  be  expected.  Russia,  defeated  at 
the  Congress  of  Berlin  by  Bismarck's  iron  will,  promises  on 
March  21,  1884,  and  on  November  18,  1887,  to  remain  neu- 
tral if  Germany  is  attacked  by  a  third  Power.  Great 
Britain,  losing  sight,  in  her  colonial  controversies  with 
France,  of  the  controlling  necessities  of  her  foreign  policy, 
signs  extra-European  agreements  in  quick  succession  with 
Germany,  and  lends  a  ready  ear  to  inspirations  from  Ber- 
lin. An  unyielding  armour  is  thus  encased  around  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort  to  ensure  the  retention  of  its  terri- 
torial and  political  advantages.  Germany  is  the  centre  of 
Europe  and  plays  off  all  her  other  neighbors  against  the 
one  she  cannot  forgive  herself  for  having  spared  in  1870. 

Never  did  France  live  more  bitter  years;  never  did 
country  so  placed  show  so  much  restraint  or  such  calm 
dignity.  M.  Clemenceau  said  in  1919:  "Just  think,  for 
fifty  years  we  were  the  wounded  hero.  Wounded  heroes 
are  all  very  fine  but  people  go  their  way  and  pass  by  on 
the  other  side  looking  on  them  with  pity."  Such  was  the 
plight  of  France.  Imprudence  would  have  been  criminal; 
for  we  were  alone.  Surrender  would  have  been  infamous ; 
for  the  future  was  in  our  keeping.  To  realize  the  ordeals 
through  which  we  passed  to  win  the  right  to  Victory,  our 
British  and  American  friends  must  study  this  period  of 
our  history.  As  our  national  life  revives,  Jules  Ferry  seeks 
an  outlet  for  it  and  our  activity  makes  itself  felt  in  the 
Colonies.  From  1882  to  1888,  the  Tricolor  of  peace,  order 
and  liberty  floats  over  Tunis,  South- Algeria,  Senegal,  the 
Soudan,  Dahomey,  the  Congo,  Madagascar,  Djibouti,  Ton- 


4      THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

kin  and  Annam.  At  times  Bismarck  feigns  to  view  our 
colonial  advance  without  offense,  even  to  encourage  it. 
But  how  brutally  he  reminds  us  again  and  again  that 
naught  is  permitted  to  us  without  his  consent. 

Every  year  sees  Alsace-Lorraine  atrociously  hazed; 
frontier  incidents  precipitated  by  the  Imperial  police ;  mili- 
tary laws  ostentatiously  passed.  Germany,  it  is  declared, 
will  enforce  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  so  long  as  a  single 
German  remains.  "With  that,"  it  is  added,  "all  is  said." 
Bismarck,  who  in  1870  scorning  his  Sovereign's  reticence 
had  openly  declared  that  he  was  making  war  not  only  on 
Napoleon  III  but  on  France  herself,  spares  his  victim  no 
insult:  we  are  envious,  turbulent,  quarrelsome  people; 
worthless;  a  herd  of  thirty  million  Cafers:  "Scratch  the 
Frenchman,"  he  said,  "and  you  will  find  the  Turco." 
Year  by  year,  we  are  lectured  on  "German  forbearance" 
as  if  it  were  nearly  exhausted.  The  Imperial  "War  budget 
is  increased  by  fifty  million  marks ;  the  Army  by  seventy 
thousand  men.  "We  Germans  fear  God,  and  naught  else 
in  the  world!"  France  and  Europe  are  warned  that  they 
have  a  master.  It  is  in  vain  that,  obedient  to  Gambetta's 
advice,  we  hide  our  sorrow  deep  within  our  hearts  "never 
speaking  of  it."  It  is  in  vain  that  we  bear  the  cross  of 
our  country's  humiliation  silently, — in  the  oppressive 
peace  imposed  upon  us.  Germany  is  not  content  with  what 
she  has  conquered;  to  military  victory  she  is  determined 
with  proud  boasting  to  add  political  supremacy. 

Firm  as  was  her  will  not  to  unloose  war,  it  was  inevit- 
able that  France  should  aspire  to  breathe  freely  once  more. 
It  was  no  less  inevitable  that  Europe,  while  keeping  the 
peace,  should  wish  it  established  on  other  bases.  Follow- 
ing all  periods  of  hegemony,  no  matter  who  profited 
thereby — Charles- Quint,  Louis  XIV,  Frederick  the  Great 
or  Napoleon — the  same  thing  has  happened:  political  bal- 
ance has  been  restored.  This  law  makes  itself  felt  for  the 
first  time  in  1892  with  the  Franco-Russian  alliance.  It  is 
a  precious  guarantee  for  France  which  thus  emerges  from 
the  solitude  nobly  endured  for  twenty  years;  at  the  same 


GEEMAN  AGGRESSION  5 

time,  it  guarantees  the  German  conquests;  for  it  is  con- 
cluded on  the  basis  of  territorial  status  quo  and  far  from 
raising  any  hopes  that  our  wrongs  may  be  righted,  it 
secures  Germany's  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  It  is  a 
further  proof  of  France's  attachment  to  peace.  It  is  not 
the  only  one.  During  the  ensuing  years,  the  same  attach- 
ment prompts  France  to  enter  into  colonial  agreements  with 
various  Powers  for  the  settlement  of  old  disputes  and  to 
pave  the  way  for  friendly  agreements  in  an  unchanged 
Europe :  conventions  with  Italy  in  1900,  with  Great  Britain 
in  1904,  with  Spain  the  same  year;  conventions  of  limited 
scope  in  which  France — as  in  the  Eussian  alliance — found 
proof  of  the  prestige  she  had  regained,  but  which  contained 
neither  provocation  nor  threat  against  any  Power. 

From  the  first,  this  rebirth  of  European  political  activ- 
ity outside  of  Germany,  directed  not  against  her  but 
against  her  hegemony,  found  the  German  Government  de- 
termined to  dominate  or  to  destroy  the  forces  which  were 
regrouping.  For  Bismarck  and  his  successors  it  did  not 
suffice,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out,  to  keep  the  con- 
quered territories;  it  was  essential  that  German  political 
supremacy  should  remain  unchallenged  in  a  divided 
Europe.  On  the  morrow  of  the  Franco-Eussian  alliance, 
Germany  had  hoped  to  gain  admittance  and  events  in  the 
Far  East  in  1895 — through  the  joint  action  of  the  three 
Cabinets  of  Berlin,  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg — had  justi- 
fied this  expectation.  But  as  time  passed  and  other  agree- 
ments ensued  from  which  Germany  continued  to  be 
excluded,  a  policy  of  reprisals  took  the  place  of  the  concilia- 
tory opportunism  hitherto  practised.  The  Kaiser  seeks 
"to  safeguard  the  monument  reared  by  his  unforgettable 
grandfather."  The  Austro-Hungarian  alliance  is  still  in 
existence ;  as  is  also  the  Italian.  Germany,  no  matter  what 
she  says  to  justify  herself,  is  not  "isolated."  But  France 
by  political  honesty  and  efficiency  has  regained  the  initia- 
tive in  international  affairs,  and  this  initiative  in  itself  is 
an  insult  to  German  greatness  as  conceived  by  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  and  their  subjects. 


6      THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Among  all  the  "opportunities"  which  presented  them- 
selves— I  borrow  the  word  from  Prince  von  Billow — Ger- 
many is  henceforth  on  the  look-out  for  the  one  which  will 
enable  her  to  prove  that  her  vaunted  supremacy  is  still 
intact.  By  "pressure  and  counter-pressure" — another  of 
Prince  von  Billow's  charming  phrases — she  strives  to 
paralyze  or  undo  that  which  has  been  done  without  her. 
Like  a  gambler  who  has  won  heavily,  she  will  hesitate  for 
ten  years  to  stake  the  sum  total  of  her  assets.  She  will  be 
threatening  when  circumstances  seem  to  favour  her; 
cautious  when  her  luck  turns.  She  will  speak  of  war  with- 
out declaring  it  and  boast  of  "dry  powder"  and  the 
"sharpened  sword"  so  long  as  she  retains  hope  that  her 
ends  may  be  achieved  by  political  manoeuvres.  But  the 
day  she  realizes  that  Europe,  even  while  consenting  to  the 
heavy  sacrifices  entailed,  is  determined  to  free  itself  from 
German  tutelage  and  to  order  its  own  life  without  looking 
to  Berlin  for  guidance,  then,  unhesitating  and  unswerving, 
she  will  with  cold  calculation  complete  her  preparations 
and  at  her  own  hour  hurl  herself — leaders  and  people  of  a 
single  heart — into  the  "fresh  and  joyous"  war! 

The  plan  unfolds  in  1904  when  Russia,  at  war  with 
Japan,  is  condemned  to  inaction  in  Europe.  The  surrender 
of  Port  Arthur  on  January  1,  1905,  deals  the  first  blow  to 
Russian  power  in  the  Far  East;  on  February  11,  Herr 
von  Kuhlmann,  the  German  Charge  d 'Affaires  in  Morocco, 
presents  his  French  colleague  with  a  formal  protest  against 
the  Anglo-French  agreement  of  April  8,  1904,  though 
Prince  von  Billow,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  had  twice  de- 
clared the  year  before  that  "he  had  no  objection  to  make 
to  it  as  far  as  German  interests  were  concerned."  On 
March  10, 1905,  the  Russian  Armies  sustain  a  bloody  defeat 
at  Moukden ;  on  the  twelfth  of  the  same  month,  the  Kaiser 
announces  his  visit  to  Tangiers  which  marks  the  opening 
of  the  Moroccan  controversy  with  France.  On  May  27, 
Admiral  Rodjestvenski's  fleet  is  annihilated  at  Tsousima; 
on  June  12,  the  menace  to  France  becomes  so  acute  that 
the  French  Government  by  accepting  the  resignation  of 


M.  Delcasse,  its  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  acknowledges 
that;  Germany  has  won  the  first  round.  For  nearly  ten 
years,  under  varying  aspects,  we  shall  see  the  same  thing. 
In  1906  Germany  drags  us  to  Algeciras.  Because  of  her 
Moroccan  interests?  No,  but  to  furnish  a  striking  demon- 
stration that,  the  moment  she  opposes  it,  the  Anglo-French 
agreement  becomes  inoperative  and  sterile.  Again  in  1908 
she  tries  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  us  in  Morocco,  this  time 
over  three  deserters  from  the  Foreign  Legion.  This  same 
year,  she  threatens,  Eussia  in  order  to  detach  her  from 
Serbia  and  obliges  her  to  accept,  without  more  ado,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In 
1911,  she  despatches  a  war-ship  to  the  Moroccan  coast  and 
forces  upon  us  a  settlement  which,  if  it  increases  our  free- 
dom of  action  in  the  Cherifian  Empire,  costs  us  part  of  the 
French  Congo.  It  is  the  policy  of  continuous  tension  and 
of  chronic  provocation. 

These  succeeding  outbursts  bring  Germany  little  or  no 
gain.  Neither  in  1905,  nor  in  1906,  nor  in  1908,  nor  in  1911, 
does  she  manage  to  secure  a  foothold  in  Morocco;  any 
more  than  she  succeeds  in  1908  and  1909  in  eliminating 
Russian  influence  from  the  Balkans  despite  concessions 
wrung  from  St.  Petersburg.  Likewise,  and  on  each  occa- 
sion more  signally,  she  fails  in  her  master  design  of 
destroying  the  agreements  entered  into  without  her. 
Neither  the  Franco-Russian  alliance,  nor  the  understand- 
ings of  France  with  Great  Britain  and  Italy  are  dissolved. 
They  survive  Algeciras  as  well  as  Agadir.  Moreover 
beneath  the  German  menace  certain  of  the  understandings 
grow  and  change  their  character.  They  are  not  yet  alli- 
ances, but  they  are  already  much  more  than  mere  settle- 
ments of  controversies.  During  the  crisis  of  1911,  one  of 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  speeches  quite  plainly  forecasts  the 
possibility  of  that  common  action  which  the  aggression  of 
1914  is  to  bring  into  being  three  years  later  and  which  had 
been  rendered  more  possible  by  the  rapprochement  between 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  after  1907.  Italy  does  not  with- 
draw from  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  constantly  abused  and 


8      THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

overridden  on  the  strength  of  a  Treaty  which  had  brought 
neither  guarantees  nor  promises  to  her  vital  interests  in 
the  Mediterranean,  she  cherishes  plans  for  the  future  which 
the  war,  in  1915,  is  to  bring  to  a  head.  Even  the  United 
States  itself  is  brought  face  to  face  at  the  Conference  of 
Algeciras  with  Germany's  insidious  efforts  towards  politi- 
cal domination  and  sides  with  France  against  the  proposals 
of  Berlin  which  President  Roosevelt  declares  to  be 
"inacceptable." 

In  1911,  the  general  failure  of  German  diplomacy  is  as 
obvious  as  her  local  rebuff  in  Morocco.  The  Imperial 
Minister  of  Colonies  resigns  as  a  protest,  but  he  is  not  the 
only  one  who  is  dissatisfied.  Germany,  the  scope  and 
rapidity  of  whose  economic  development  has  been  marvel- 
ous, is  the  prey  of  political  disappointment.  She  has  kept 
Alsace-Lorraine.  She  has  maintained  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  and  the  Italian  alliances.  She  is  sure  of  Turkey  where 
her  Ambassador  is  the  real  ruler ;  sure  of  Roumania  where 
a  Hohenzollern  is  on  the  throne;  sure  of  Bulgaria  whose 
Czar  believes  only  in  Might.  Yet  despite  these  formidable 
assets  she  perceives,  in  the  Franco-Anglo-Russian  align- 
ment which  she  has  strengthened  with  her  own  hands,  the 
visible  limitation  of  her  power.  On  three  or  four  occasions 
when  she  has  raised  her  voice — and  raised  it  loudly — this 
group  has  answered  her,  answered  her  in  moderate  and 
conciliatory  tones.  In  1905,  1906,  1908,  1909,  1911,  these 
answers  had  been  invariably  pacific  and  composing.  But 
on  the  one  hand,  France  is  no  longer  alone ;  on  the  other, 
Europe  is  divided  into  two  camps  which,  however  formi- 
dable the  German  power,  might  if  necessary  measure  their 
strength.  William  the  First's  "monument"  which  the 
Kaiser  had  sworn  to  maintain,  is  thus  threatened  with 
ruin.  ,0n  all  sides  and  by  all  means,  the  latter  has  sought 
to  shore  it  up  and  restore  it  by  diplomacy;  everywhere  he 
finds  the  road  to  hegemony  blocked. 

Henceforth  the  die  is  cast  and  cast  for  war.  Three 
years  are  needed  to  bring  to  a  point  of  absolute  perfection 
the  military  machine  so  carefully  built  up  and  trained 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  9 

since  the  victory  of  1871:  three  years  to  bring  in  and 
convince  the  "junior  partners"  whose  support  is  indispens- 
able for  such  an  enterprise;  three  years — as  in  1867 — to 
find  a  favourable  opportunity  which  will  make  possible  the 
overthrow  in  a  few  weeks,  by  a  few  stunning  blows  of 
adversaries  less  wrell  prepared  and  less  well  armed;  three 
years  and  Germany  returning  to  what  one  of  her  Princes 
called  the  " national  industry"  will  seek  by  war  to  re-estab- 
lish that  power  which  peace  had  not  abolished,  but  had 
rightly  limited. 

II 

This  "call  to  arms"  decided  upon  in  cold  blood  by  the 
German  Government  was  to  find  the  adversaries  of  yester- 
day and  of  to-morrow  in  widely  divergent  postures.  The 
one,  France,  profoundly  attached  to  peace,  so  long  as  it  no 
longer  meant  servitude,  and  confident  in  its  duration ;  the 
other,  Germany,  physically  and  spiritually  intent  on  war. 
I  have  roughly  sketched  the  political  events  of  forty  years ; 
but  the  historian  is  false  to  his  task  who  does  not  seek 
beneath  the  surface  for  those  underlying  impulses  which 
animate  national  will.  Behind  the  governments  directing 
the  moves,  where  stood  the  people? 

The  France  of  1911,  faithful  guardian  of  the  traditions 
of  the  race,  honest,  brave  and  free,  differed  somewhat  from 
the  France  that  had  known  defeat.  To  the  generation 
branded  by  disaster  another  generation  had  succeeded 
which,  not  having  suffered  directly  from  defeat,  sometimes 
failed  to  recognize  its  causes  and  its  consequences.  The 
"spirit  of  revenge,"  so  often  invoked  by  Germany  as  an 
excuse  for  her  provocation,  no  longer  existed.  Had  it,  in 
the  real  sense  of  the  word,  ever  existed?  It  is  doubtful. 
A  few  noble  minds  and  brave  hearts  like  Paul  Deroulede ; 
a  few  momentary  outbursts  had  at  certain  hours  given 
tangible  form  to  this  feeling.  But  the  nation  as  a  whole — 
whether  it  be  praised  or  blamed  therefor — was  foreign  to 
these  movements  as  facts  have  shown.  Boulangism,  born 
of  internal  discontent  rather  than  of  great  international 


10     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

aspirations,  had  been  but  a  brief  flash  in  the  pan.  The 
memory  of  Alsace-Lorraine  lived  in  our  hearts  but  how 
were  the  lost  provinces  to  be  recovered?  Before  the  Eus- 
sian  alliance,  we  had  been  too  isolated  to  challenge  the 
status  quo;  afterwards,  we  were  bound  to  respect  it.  Years 
had  passed  without  a  single  act  of  revenge.  Hope  remained, 
a  religion  which  no  one  surrendered.  But  between  hope 
and  reality  peace  endured  at  first  and  then,  accepted,  reared 
a  wall. 

The  men  of  my  generation  who  reached  maturity  about 
1900,  faced  this  painful  problem  with  the  patriotism  of 
resignation.  Those  amongst  them  who  had  closely  studied 
history  had  little  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  resignation  to 
span  the  moral  abyss  created  by  Bismarck  between  France 
and  Germany.  But  by  far  the  greater  number,  allowing 
themselves  to  live  with  the  times,  paid  little  heed  to  the 
warnings  of  the  past.  The  courtesies  of  the  German  Em- 
peror in  our  days  of  national  mourning — the  deaths  of 
Carnot  and  of  Mac-Mahon,  the  burning  of  the  Charity 
Bazaar — and  in  the  days  of  our  national  pride,  such  as  the 
Exhibition  of  1900,  were  not  without  effect.  German  pene- 
tration of  France,  of  which  the  ever  rising  tide  of  emigra- 
tion was  but  a  minor  means,  proceeded  everywhere  with 
extraordinary  thoroughness.  Our  financiers  were  becom- 
ing accustomed  to  sleeping  partnerships  in  which — as  in 
the  Bagdad  matter — French  money  furnished  German 
direction  with  a  bond  capital  for  which  the  regular  pay- 
ment of  dividends  was  but  a  very  inadequate  return.  Our 
Socialists,  hoodwinked  by  the  material  and  political  pros- 
perity of  German  Socialism,  were  content  after  the  Congress 
of  Amsterdam  to  be  the  minor  brethren  of  the  Marksist 
order.  Our  conservatives,  to  whom  imperial  diplomacy 
laid  assiduous  siege  in  the  salons,  were  not  insensible  to 
the  fascination  of  social  order  as  exemplified  by  the  Ger- 
man Empire.  There  was  infiltration  in  every  strata  of 
French  society. 

No  one,  it  is  true,  would  have  dared  to  propose  an 
alliance  which  honour  and  prudence  equally  forbade.  Not 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  11 

only  would  such  an  undertaking,  necessarily  based  upon 
recognition  of  the  fait  accompli,  have  obliged  France  to 
subscribe  anew  to  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort, — and  that 
without  the  excuse  of  those  who  in  1871  had  signed  be- 
neath the  mailed  fist.  But  in  addition  this  surrender  would 
have  involved  a  breach  of  faith  which  the  country  would 
have  refused  to  accept ;  a  breach  of  faith  which  would  have 
been  the  negation  of  forty  years  of  effort  and  the  betrayal 
of  that  policy  of  peace  and  balance  which  will  remain  the 
imperishable  glory  of  the  Third  Republic;  a  breach  of 
faith  in  proclaiming  by  an  abrupt  reversal  of  our  alliances 
the  instability  of  our  democracy;  a  breach  of  faith  in  sub- 
stituting for  friends  who  had  treated  us  as  equals  an  ally 
who,  unconsciously  perhaps  and  by  sheer  historic  tradition, 
would  sooner  or  later  have  become  a  master.  But  if  no  one 
spoke  of  an  alliance,  many  yielded  to  the  temptation  of 
extending  special  agreements  such  as  those  which  the  desire 
for  peace  had  prompted  the  French  Government  to  enter 
into  in  1905,  1906,  1909  and  1911.  As  early  as  1890  the 
aged  Jules  Simon  under  the  spell  of  the  young  Emperor 
had  returned  from  the  Labor  Conference  of  Berlin  with 
the  hope  of  such  a  thing,  and  in  the  following  years  those 
of  our  fellow  country  men  who  at  the  Kiel  regattas  and 
elsewhere  had  fallen  beneath  the  sway  of  Imperial  seduc- 
tion were  over  ready  to  recommend  this  form  of  morganatic 
Franco-German  alliance.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  con- 
tinual provocation  of  Germany  in  Morocco  and  the  Near 
East  from  1905  on,  there  is  little  doubt  that  before  long 
the  idea  of  a  rapprochement  would  have  made  headway. 

Besides  the  political  evolution  of  our  Republic  held  us 
aloof  from  all  idea  of  war.  Not  that  the  Republic — despite 
the  difficulties  of  its  birth  in  the  throes  of  defeat,  despite 
the  handicap  of  a  constitution  drafted  by  its  enemies — 
would  have  been  incapable  of  having  a  foreign  or  a  military 
policy:  the  war  of  1914  furnished  a  triumphant  answer  to 
the  doubts  of  reaction  on  these  scores  by  showing  that 
France  could  count  both  on  the  support  of  free  peoples 
and  upon  the  services  of  an  Army  which  at  the  Marne  single 


12     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

handed  checked  the  German  onslaught.  It  is  none  the 
less  true  that  the  spirit  of  democracy — the  soul  of  all  our 
laws  since  1877  and  the  practical  expression  of  the  individ- 
ualist philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century — is  in  its  very 
essence  a  spirit  of  peace.  Peace  in  its  highest  expression 
which  proclaims  the  right  both  of  individuals  and  of  na- 
tions to  live  and  be  respected ;  lasting  peace  because  politi- 
cal power  entrusted  to  the  majority  insures  the  welfare  of 
the  greatest  number  and  because  legislation  inspired 
thereby  is  repugnant  to  preparation  for  war  and  the 
increase  of  armaments. 

France,  the  most  warlike  of  nations  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle, had  in  peace  lost  her  military  habit  of  mind.  At  the 
top,  painful  controversies,  like  the  Dreyfus  case,  had 
brought  about  a  cleavage  between  the  political  leaders  and 
the  military  chiefs;  at  the  bottom  the  easy  leisure  of  na- 
tional existence  provoked  frequent  protests  against  the 
obligations  imposed  by  the  military  training  of  the  nation. 
In  1905,  at  the  very  moment  when  Germany  was  beginning 
to  rattle  her  sabre,  the  term  of  compulsory  service  had 
been  reduced  by  a  third.  Three  years  later,  in  1908,  an 
even  worse  imprudence  had  reduced  the  period  of  instruc- 
tion of  the  reserves,  a  measure  in  flagrant  contradiction 
with  the  former,  as  the  shorter  the  time  spent  in  the  initial 
training  of  recruits  the  more  thorough  and  complete  should 
be  the  instruction  given  to  the  reserves.  In  a  word  no  one 
believed  war  possible.  No  one  believed  it  possible  because 
its  atrocities  were  repugnant  to  men's  ordinary  vision. 
No  one  believed  it  possible  because  no  one  wanted  war,  and 
that  being  the  case  nobody  believed  that  others  wanted  it* 
Not  a  Frenchman  would  have  supported  his  Government  in 
a  war  of  aggression.  Too  many  Frenchmen  made  the  mis- 
take of  judging  Germany  by  what  France  was,  and  of  sup- 
posing Germany  incapable  of  that  which  they  knew  France 
herself  to  be  incapable  of.  Anyone  who  recalled  the  past 
in  order  to  throw  light  upon  the  future  and  to  dispel  a 
dangerous  sense  of  security  met  with  disapproval.  I  have 
a  right  to  say  this  and  to  recall  that  for  ten  years  it  was 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  13 

my  own  experience.  It  took  ten  years  of  German  threats 
and  blackmail  to  make  the  French  Government,  in  1913, 
take  precautionary  measures  which,  being  hurriedly  impro- 
vised, were  naturally  imperfect  and  incomplete.  France, 
full  of  optimism  and  faith  in  the  progress  of  mankind, 
would  not  listen  to  talk  of  war. 

France  would  not  listen  to  talk  of  war  for  another  rea- 
son. Conscious  of  her  past  defeat,  and  unconscious  of  her 
present  strength,  France  inclined  to  the  belief  that  war 
would  only  bring  fresh  reverses.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
Moroccan  crisis  and  in  the  course  of  its  evolution,  there 
were  not  lacking  political  men  and  parties  who  proclaimed 
that  ' '  France  was  not  ready, ' '  dangerous  talk  in  a  country 
where  the  public  mind  is  prone  to  believe  bad  news  rather 
than  good.  The  Frenchman  is  not  loath  to  speak  ill  of 
other  peoples,  even  when  they  are  his  friends;  but  he  is 
even  readier  to  speak  ill  of  himself.  It  has  often  been 
remarked  that  in  1914  America  and  Great  Britain  knew 
very  little  about  us  and  did  not  even  suspect  the  reserves 
of  energy  and  of  abnegation  which  the  war  called  forth. 
If  America  and  Great  Britain  did  not  know  France,  their 
excuse  is  that  France  did  not  know  herself.  Eead  the 
French  papers  from  1900  to  1914  and  see  if  you  can  find 
the  slightest  hint  of  the  splendid  picture  that  the  following 
months  are  to  present, — it  is  not  there.  Petty  quarrels  of 
politicians  and  parties,  magnified  by  the  Press,  distorted 
the  view  not  only  of  foreigners  but  of  Frenchmen  as  well. 
The  true  France  was  hidden.  Ignorance  of  one's  strength 
leads  men  to  seek  the  path  of  least  resistance.  People  said 
and  economists  taught  that  "war  was  impossible."  Peo- 
ple also  said,  "Of  war,  we  will  have  none."  Thus  one  sees 
why  all  our  compromises  with  Germany,  painful  though 
they  were,  met  with  the  approval  of  the  great  majority, 
both  in  Parliament  and  in  the  country.  Thus  one  sees  why 
France,  by  reason  alike  of  her  qualities  and  of  her  faults, 
was  so  deeply  attached  to  peace  at  the  very  moment  when 
Germany  had  decided  upon  war.  If,  in  1914,  Germany 
had  wanted  peace  she  would  as  in  previous  years  have 


14     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

found  France  ready  to  enter  into  the  necessary  agreements. 
If  Germany  had  wanted  peace,  France  more  than  any  other 
nation  would  have  helped  her  to  preserve  it.  But  Ger- 
many wanted  war! 

Germany  wanted  war  and,  here  again,  we  must  go  be- 
neath and  beyond  the  will  of  Governments  to  reveal  and 
examine  the  soul  of  the  governed.  War  is  the  very  basis 
and  origin  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  beliefs  which  go 
to  make  up  modern  German  patriotism.  War  created  the 
German  ideal  which  proved  strong  enough  to  place  the 
whole  of  Germany  under  Prussian  control  in  less  than  fifty 
years.  Conceived  in  the  imagination  of  politicians,  his- 
torians and  poets,  it  needed  the  iron  hand  of  a  Prussian 
junker  to  give  it  practical  shape.  Then  the  Hohenzollerns, 
who,  thanks  to  the  genius  of  Bismarck,  made  themselves 
the  servants  as  well  as  the  beneficiaries  of  this  ideal, 
fashioned  it  in  their  own  image.  There  is  a  German  pa- 
triotism; as  France  knows  but  too  well  after  1870  and 
1914.  But  this  German  patriotism  is  essentially  different 
from  French  patriotism.  Our  patriotism  holds  France 
sacred  as  the  emblem  of  traditions  many  centuries  old  and 
woven  even  more  of  memories  of  peace  than  of  recollec- 
tions of  war.  German  patriotism  holds  war  sacred. 
Patriotism  to  them  is  first  and  foremost  the  emblem  of 
profit  accruing  from  war  and  the  recognition  of  war  as 
the  origin  of  power  and  of  wealth.  Saxons,  Hessians  and 
Bavarians — more  particularly  their  Princes — may  at  times 
have  mourned  the  loss  of  ancient  liberties  surrendered  to 
Prussia;  but  when  Saxons,  Hessians  and  Bavarians  com- 
pared their  erstwhile  poverty  to  the  prosperity  they  de- 
rived from  the  Empire  they  felt  that  they  were  German  and 
nothing  but  German.  The  spirit  of  nationality  is  not,  in 
Germany  as  it  is  in  France,  the  common  faith  of  men  who 
for  centuries  have  lived  under  a  common  law;  it  is  an  asso- 
ciation of  material  interests  which  has  passed  from  bank- 
ruptcy to  prosperity  and  intends  to  safeguard  the  main- 
spring of  its  opulence.  German  patriotism,  which  a 
hundred  years  ago  was  an  ideal  conception  of  its  philoso- 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  15 

phers,  has  since  1870  been  based  upon  materialism.  Ger- 
many means,  to  the  people  of  the  South  as  to  those  of  the 
North,  increased  well-being,  growing  markets,  rising  wages 
and  soaring  dividends.  It  means  also  attachment  to  the  rule 
of  Might  and  remembrance  of  the  sudden  appeal  to  force 
which  brought  about  this  change,  of  the  victorious  war 
without  which  success  would  have  been  impossible.  Thus 
the  idea  of  war  is  inseparable  in  the  German  mind  from 
the  idea  of  country.  Deep  down  in  the  heart  of  every 
thinking  German  who  knows  his  history,  the  "fatherland" 
stands  for  war. 

This  moral  unity  pervades  every  class  of  society.  Con- 
sider the  Socialists  whose  doctrines  should  make  them  op- 
posed to  war,  especially  to  a  war  of  aggression.  The 
prosperity  of  labour  due  to  the  Empire  and  to  war  is  so 
closely  bound  to  both  that,  the  day  the  Empire  will  decide 
on  war — the  most  flagrantly  aggressive  war — the  whole 
Socialist  party  will  follow  and  it  will  need  our  Marne  vic- 
tory to  remind  even  a  small  minority  of  its  tenets.  Why! 
Because  more  than  any  other  party,  by  reason  of  its  num- 
bers, it  is  vitally  interested  in  the  success  of  Germany  & 
Co.,  because  it  has  not  forgotten  the  origins  of  Imperial 
success  and  because  it  pins  its  faith,  for  the  protection  and 
development  of  the  acquired  assets,  upon  those  who  first 
made  it  great.  From  German  labour  let  us  pass  to  the 
intellectuals.  Here  the  spirit  of  military  discipline  rivals 
that  existing  in  the  trade-unions,  which  in  turn  is  no  wit 
less  than  that  flourishing  in  the  barracks.  One  day  in  1905, 
Prince  von  Billow,  then  Imperial  Chancellor,  said  to  me: 
"In  France  your  Universities  are  schools  of  debate  and  of 
political  and  social  criticism.  In  Germany  our  Universities 
are  the  strongholds  of  fanatical  nationalism."  Nothing 
could  be  more  accurate.  Material  advantages  which  trans- 
formed German  Socialism  into  an  Imperial  party  stamp 
the  same  character  upon  German  intellectualism.  Higher 
education  no  less  than  trade-unionism  is  at  the  service  of 
an  ideal  born  beneath  a  spiked  helmet. 

Turn  now  to  Germany's  book-of-hours  for  1911,  writ- 


16 

ten  by  Bernhardi,  a  soldier  save  the  mark!  "It  is  enough 
to  examine  with  unflinching  eyes  the  function  of  the  sword 
and  its  terrible  effects  to  see  clearly  that  war  is  a  task 
which  divine  in  itself  is  as  necessary  as  eating  and  drink- 
ing." So  much  for  the  principle,  now  for  its  application: 

"We  cannot  by  any  means  avoid  war and  we  must  by 

no  means  delay  it  unduly  but  on  the  contrary  provoke  it  in 
the  most  favourable  circumstances. ' '  However  this  soldier 
had  invented  nothing.  As  early  as  1848,  the  Parliament  of 
Frankfort,  the  first  manifestation  of  German  unity,  cheered 
the  bombardment  of  Prague  by  the  Austrians  and  some 
years  later  Treitschke,  the  master  of  German  historical 
science,  wrote:  "It  is  not  fitting  that  Germans  should  re- 
peat commonplaces  of  peace  apostles  nor  that  they  should 
shut  their  eyes  to  the  harsh  necessities  of  our  times.  Yes, 
our  age  is  an  age  of  war,  an  age  of  iron.  The  triumph  of 
the  strong  over  the  weak  is  the  inexorable  law  of  life." 
There  is  the  doctrine.  France  has  never  known  any  such, 
and  this  in  itself  suffices  to  distinguish  the  two  peoples. 

The  political  spirit  thus  formed  is  simply  one  of  raison 
d'etat.  It  was  in  1801  that  Metternich,  who  knew  what  he 
was  talking  about,  showed  Prussia  "emancipated  from  all 
sense  of  duty,  exploiting  the  misfortunes  of  others,  without 
the  slightest  regard  for  her  obligations  or  her  promises." 
Cast  your  eyes  down  the  line  of  Bismarck's  successors. 
M^ght  always  placed  above  Eight,  with  Germany  applaud- 
ing. The  elegant  skepticism  of  a  von  Bulow — by  far  the 
most  distinguished  of  the  lot — is  but  a  mask.  In  Might  he 
trusts !  It  is  upon  the  presumption  that  none  will  dare  to 
defy  German  power  that  he  rests  his  whole  diplomacy,  all 
the  while  proclaiming  it  devoted  to  peace.  But  the  day 
when  the  others  neither  will  nor  can  give  way  any  further, 
it  will  be  war,  and  war  is  thus  in  fact  at  the  very  basis  of 
the  system, — war  and  contempt  for  Eight!  Biilow,  a  true 
disciple  of  Bismarck,  declares :  "In  the  hard  world  in  which 
we  live,  one  must  be  either  anvil  or  hammer."  His  choice 
is  quickly  made.  Kuhlmann, — a  pupil  of  von  Biilow, 
echoes  the  same  sentiments:  "I  have  waged  relentless  war 


GEKMAN  AGGRESSION  17 

upon  principles.  They  are  justifiable  in  morals,  but  not 
in  politics.  Here  it  is  a  question  of  aims,  not  of  means." 
Germany,  be  it  not  forgotten,  listens  to  all  this  and 
applauds. 

And  to  sum  up  this  cynical  profession  of  faith  this 
is  how  the  last  Chancellor — Bethmann-Hollweg,  a  mediocre 
and  for  that  very  reason  a  thoroughly  representative  offi- 
cial,— expresses  himself:  "Necessity  knows  no  law."  The 
unanimous  approval  which  this  axiom  elicited  in  August, 
1914,  shows  that  Germany,  industrious  and  painstaking  but 
wrought  up  by  that  "moral  wickedness"  of  which  Nietzsche 
speaks  as  "flowing  in  her  veins  with  the  blood  of  her  an- 
cestors," the  whole  of  Germany  was  long  since  ready  to 
accept  it.  From  1870  on,  the  German  received  training  for 
war  from  the  cradle  up,  training  for  war  at  his  mother's 
knee,  training  for  war  at  school,  in  the  university,  in  the 
Army,  training  for  war  in  every  walk  of  life.  Germany 
turned  towards  war,  as  flowers  turn  towards  the  sun. 

In  France  there  were  some  who  took  heart  saying,  "Ger- 
many is  too  rich  to  make  war."  A  poor  understanding 
indeed  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  her  wealth.  Germany 
has  accumulated  prodigious  wealth  in  less  than  half  of  a 
century.  But  this  result  too  rapidly  attained  has  not  been 
unaccompanied  by  crises.  The  first  had  fallen  in  1901, 
memorable  year  of  bankruptcies  and  failures.  In  1911  and 
the  following  months  the  situation  although  less  critical 
remained  tense,  so  tense  indeed  that  more  than  one  Ger- 
man, familiar  with  history  and  remembering  the  great 
impetus  given  by  victory  in  1870,  began  to  believe  the 
normal  play  of  competition  to  be  neither  the  best  nor  the 
surest  means  to  conquer  markets,  settle  balances  and  feed 
the  Treasury.  Such  Germans  saturated  with  their  national 
traditions  looked  upon  war  as  business ;  just  as  their  Gov- 
ernment conducted  business  as  if  it  had  been  war.  Thus 
grew  up  that  close  union  of  politics  and  economics  which 
is  so  typical  of  the  German  public  mind.  Some  dreamed  of 
dominating  an  enslaved  Europe;  others — like  Wagner's 
"Nibelung" — lusted  for  the  possession  of  gold.  Both  were 


18 

agreed  that,  at  certain  hours  of  a  nation's  life,  victorious 
war  offers  the  shortest  cut  both  to  domination  and  to  gold. 
On  the  one  hand  the  intellectuals  of  the  Universities — all 
ready  to  draft — remember  the  ninety-three  and  their  odious 
manifesto  of  1914 — the  philosophical  justification  of  a  war 
of  plunder;  on  the  other  the  great  captains  of  industry 
equally  ready  to  furnish  the  military  chiefs  with  the  ele- 
ments of  the  famous  plan  for  the  destruction  of  French 
factories.*  Bernhardi's  call  was  answered  by  the  six  great 
industrial  concerns  of  Germany  who  several  months  later 
demanded  "the  annexation  of  all  the  special  iron  ore  of 
Briey,  including  the  fortresses  of  Longwy  and  Verdun, 
without  which  the  mining  region  could  not  be  protected, ' '  as 
well  as  the  coal  basins  of  the  North  of  France.  "For," 
they  very  frankly  added,  "the  possession  of  coal  is  at  least 
as  important  as  that  of  iron  ore." 

Such  the  Germany  of  1911.  She  is  unanimous.  The 
notion  of  war,  rejected  by  all  other  nations  as  the  last 
vestige  of  a  bygone  age,  is  ever  present  in  her  mind.  One 
finds  it  everywhere  associated  vaguely  but  intimately  with 
their  every  conception  of  national  and  international  life. 
It  presents  itself  to  them  with  all  the  glamour  of  the  past, 
all  the  hopeful  promise  of  the  future.  Whenever  the  Gov- 
ernment decides  to  pass  from  the  notion  to  the  act  of  war, 
the  whole  people  will  unhesitatingly  follow.  This  is  what 
happened  in  1914.  Blind  indeed  must  he  have  been  who, 
three  years  earli er,  did  not  see ! 

Besides  where  was  the  risk?  War,  Germany's  national 
industry,  could  but  be  victorious,  for  France  was  not  an 
adversary  to  be  feared.  I  said  just  now  that  before  the 
war  France  did  not  know  herself;  but  how  much  less  did 
Germany  know  France.  I  know  no  instance  of  political 
information  so  totally  and  utterly  false  as  that  which  the 
Imperial  German  Government  collected  concerning  us  dur- 
ing the  ten  years  prior  to  the  war.  This  lack  of  under- 
standing appeared  in  the  suggestions  which  the  Emperor 
and  his  satellites  sometimes  ventured  to  let  fall  in  the  ears 


•See  Chapter  IX,  page  281. 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  19 

of  French  visitors:  "Let  us  be  friends.  Let  us  unite  your 
graces  to  our  might."  Germany,  dupe  of  her  desires, 
deeply  despised  France.  She  believed  France  divided, 
weak  and  corrupt.  For  Germany  the  pleasure  resorts  of 
Paris — mostly  frequented  by  Germans — seemed  by  com- 
parison with  her  self-estimated  virtue  to  be  typical  of 
"Modern  Babylon."  Our  military  and  other  shortcomings 
were  exaggerated  by  the  reports  of  diplomats  seeking  to 
curry  favour  by  judging  us  harshly.  War  appealed  to  the 
majority  of  Germans,  when  they  thought  of  it,  as  much  by 
the  profit  they  expected  to  derive  from  it  as  by  the  small- 
ness  of  the  risk  which  attached  to  it  in  their  eyes.  War 
against  an  ill-armed  and  misgoverned  France  would  be, 
for  a  people  in  partnership  with  God,  nothing  more  than  a 
military  parade  enhanced  by  the  prospect  of  much  loot. 
Eevolution  would  break  out  at  the  first  battle.  France, 
as  everyone  knew,  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Socialists  and 
the  Socialists  would  refuse  to  fight!  A  striking  example 
indeed  of  the  illusion — both  as  to  the  strength  of  parties 
and  as  to  the  innermost  thoughts  of  men — into  which  blind 
pride  had  led  the  most  highly-trained,  most  methodical  and 
most  self-confident  machine  the  world  has  ever  known. 
The  Kaiser — whose  uncle  Edward  VII  once  dubbed  "the 
bold  coward"  in  my  hearing — found  solace  in  this  illusion 
which  stilled  his  morbid  hesitations.  It  deprived  the  Ger- 
man people  of  the  only  brake  which  might  perhaps  have 
checked  them  on  their  warlike  course.  Believing  no  obstacle 
stood  in  the  path  of  her  conquering  destiny,  Germany 
thirsted  for  war  and  was  ready  to  throw  herself  into  it  on 
a  sign  from  above. 

Such  the  contrast,  on  the  eve  of  Armageddon,  between 
two  national  characters:  France  seeking  peaceful  develop- 
ment by  her  well-ordered  genius  for  liberty;  Germany,  to 
use  M.  Clemenceau's  virile  words,  "enslaving  herself  to 
enslave."  The  time  was  at  hand  once  more  for  the 
onslaught  of  the  "Alamans"  on  the  "Franks."  All  Ger- 
many— herein  lies  the  magnitude  of  her  crime — was  psycho- 


20     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

logically  ready  for  war,  even  for  war  of  aggression.    The 
day  its  masters  called,  Germany  would  rise  as  one  man! 

Ill 

In  the  autumn  of  1911,  Germany  passes  from  decisions 
to  acts.  The  Imperial  budgets  record  them.  The  figures 
throw  light  upon  the  facts. 

For  twenty  months,  laws  of  aggression  follow  one  an- 
other in  quick  succession.  I  have  told  what  France  did  in 
1905  and  1908  to  reduce  her  military  charges.  Germany 
will  reply  to  this  reduction  by  an  increase  of  her  own.  Yet 
she  is  already  ahead  of  us.  From  1902  to  1913,  she  spent 
104  per  cent,  more  on  armament  than  did  France :  2,200  mil- 
lions as  against  980  millions.  Her  military  expenditures 
always  exceeded  ours — by  121  millions  in  1902,  by  306  mil- 
lions in  1906  (they  will  exceed  them  by  800  millions  in 
1914).  From  1900  to  1910,  the  head  of  every  German 
family  has  paid  25  per  cent,  more  towards  the  upkeep  of 
the  Army  than  the  head  of  every  French  family.  Taking 
the  increase  of  military  expenditure  of  the  six  great 
European  powers  between  1883  and  1913  we  find  the  fol- 
lowing percentages : 

France    70% 

Italy   108% 

Austria     111% 

Eussia    114% 

England     153% 

Germany    227% 

It  is  in  these  circumstances  that  a  first  law  is  voted  in 

1911,  under  guise   of   technical   improvements,   entailing 
however  an  increase  of  20,000  men  in  the  regular  Army 
and  an  expenditure  of  167  millions.    Ten  months  later  in 

1912,  a  second  law  is  passed  tending  to  keep  the  regular 
Army  constantly  on  a  footing  so  nearly  that  of  war  that  an 
attack  can  be  launched  in  a  few  hours,  and  providing  for 
new  units,  the  creation  of  two  new  Army  Corps,  fifty  bat- 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  21 

talions  of  technical  troops,  an  increase  of  the  regular  Army 
by  40,000  men  and  an  expenditure  of  650  millions.  This 
second  law  is  hardly  promulgated  than  a  third  is  introduced 
and  passed.  This  time  the  increase  is  70,000  men  a  year,  or 
for  any  Army  serving  two  years  a  total  addition  of  140,000 
bringing  the  total  effectives  of  the  regular  Germany  Army 
up  to  900,000.  This  was  a  costly  operation.  It  meant  a 
capital  expenditure  of  1,250  million  francs  and  an  annual 
charge  of  275  millions. 

That  alone  should  suffice  to  demonstrate  the  plan  of 
aggression,  but  here  is  proof  decisive.  These  burdens, 
which  Germany  imposes  upon  herself,  coincide  with  a 
financial  situation  which  makes  them,  if  not  impossible,  at 
least  very  hard  to  bear.  At  the  very  time  when  within  a 
space  of  thirty  months  the  Imperial  Government  has  bur- 
dened itself  with  a  capital  expenditure  of  nearly  1,500  mil- 
lions and  an  additional  annual  expenditure  of  nearly  1,000 
millions,  its  budget  is  in  deficit  of  550  million  marks  for 
1911-1912.  For  three  years  it  has  been  seeking  fresh  taxes 
but  can  find  none,  this  vain  search  having  led  only  to  the 
resignation  of  the  Minister  of  Finance.  The  pressure  is 
so  great  that  it  is  decided  to  resort  to  an  exceptional  tax 
on  capital,  justifying  it  by  recalling  1813,  the  very  mention 
of  which  in  itself  throws  light  upon  the  situation,  the 
secret  intention  and  the  future  plan.  Placed  side  by  side 
with  its  financial  policy,  the  military  policy  of  Germany  as- 
sumes its  full  meaning.  To  the  huge  gaps  in  the  budget, 
others  are  added  with  no  sure  means  of  filling  either.  Why? 
Because  Germany  is  already  determined  to  throw  the  sword 
into  the  balance  and  call  upon  her  "national  industry"  to 
restore  her  finances.  Like  the  gambler  who,  when  the 
game  is  up,  pulls  his  gun. 

The  hypocritical  search  for  pretexts  begins  at  once. 
France,  alarmed  at  the  disparity  between  her  Army  of 
450,000  men  and  that  of  900,000  which  the  laws  of  1911, 1912 
and  1913  assure  to  Germany,  votes  the  three  years  service 
and  a  slight  increase  in  armaments.  Immediately  the  Pan- 
German  Press  denounces  this  " provocation."  I  can  still 


22     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

hear  Baron  von  Stumm,  who  had  been  pleased  till  then  to 
play  at  conciliation,  remarking  dryly  during  a  dinner  at  the 
Dutch  Legation  in  July,  1913,  that,  "If  France  presumes  to 
challenge  Germany's  right  to  be  stronger  than  she  is,  it 
must  be  that  she  desires  war. ' '  Ludendorf  f ,  then  a  colonel, 
draws  up  a  report  on  the  methods  to  be  pursued  in  arous- 
ing national  enthusiasm  and  shifting  the  responsibilities: 
He  writes: 

The  people  must  be  made  to  believe  that  our  armaments  are  an 
answer  to  the  armaments  and  to  the  policy  of  France.  They  must 
be  accustomed  to  the  thought  that  an  aggressive  war  by  us  is  neces- 
sary to  meet  the  provocations  of  our  enemies.  "We  must  act  with 
prudence  to  awaken  no  suspicion. 

Moltke,  assuming  humanitarian  airs,  deplores  the  reign- 
ing spirit  of  unrest  and  says  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians 
that  "it  must  be  put  an  end  to."  Put  an  end  to?  And  this 
is  how  according  to  Ludendorf f's  report: 

In  the  next  European  war,  the  small  nations  must  be  forced  to 
follow  us  or  they  must  be  crushed. 

Under  certain  conditions  their  armies  and  their  fortresses  can 
be  rapidly  reduced  or  neutralized, — which  would  probably  be  the 
case  with  Belgium  and  Holland — so  as  to  shut  out  our  enemy  in  the 
West  from  territories  which  could  be  used  as  a  base  for  operations 
against  our  flank. 

This  will  be  a  vital  question  for  us.  Our  aim  must  always  be  to 
take  the  offensive  with  greatly  superior  forces  from  the  very  start. 

In  order  to  do  so,  we  shall  have  to  concentrate  a  great  army, 
followed  by  strong  formations  of  landwehr  which  would  force  the 
armies  of  the  small  nations  to  follow  us  or  remain  inactive  in  the 
theatre  of  war, — or  would  crush  them  in  case  of  armed  resistance. 

From  now  on,  the  military  leaders  are  not  alone  in  the 
secret  of  this  aggressive  plan.  The  Governments  of  the 
German  States  are  informed  that  France  is  to  be  attacked 
through  Belgium.  The  Bavarian  Legation  at  Berlin,  in  a 
report  which  Kurt  Eisner  made  public,  wrote: 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  23 

Germany  cannot  respect  Belgian  neutrality.  The  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  has  declared  that  even  English  neutrality  would  be 
too  high  a  price  to  pay  for  respecting  that  of  Belgium.  For  an 
offensive  war  against  France  is  possible  only  through  Belgium. 

The  plan  decided  upon  and  the  sword  ready,  there 
remains  only  an  opportunity  to  find.  The  assassination  of 
the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  furnishes  it ;  and  less  than 
five  weeks  will  suffice  to  bring  about  the  explosion.  Every- 
thing is  ready  and  in  its  place ;  everything  is  prepared  so 
that  no  possibility  of  averting  war  remains.  Here  again 
we  have  German  proofs  to  present  in  the  opening  pages  of 
this  book  on  France  and  Peace.  Not  forgetting  the  Kaiser 's 
letter  to  his  Chancellor  of  July  28,  1914,  in  which  William 
II  demands  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary— war  with  Russia  in  other  words — here  is  Bethmann- 
Hollweg's  Note  of  August  3  in  which  he  says: 

"We  were  aware  that  the  eventual  acts  of  hostility  by  Austria 
against  Serbia  might  bring  Russia  on  the  scene  and  drag  us  into  a 
war  in  conjunction  with  our  Ally. 

But  we  could  not,  knowing  that  the  vital  interests  of  Austria 
were  at  stake,  either  advise  our  Ally  to  a  condescension  incompati- 
ble with  her  dignity,  or  refuse  her  our  support  at  this  difficult 
juncture. 

The  confession  is  full:  it  was  needless.  For  events 
speak  for  themselves  and  in  the  fatal  week  show  Germany 
as  eager  to  avoid  the  maintenance  of  peace  as  her  future 
adversaries  were  to  safeguard  it.  Not  only  Germany  does 
nothing  that,  as  Count  Brockdorff-Rantzau  expresses  it  in 
his  Memorandum  of  May  29,  1916,  "would  have  prevented 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  from  taking  irrevocable 
decisions,"  but  she  systematically  neglects  every  oppor- 
tunity of  avoiding  war  which  France,  Great  Britain  and 
even  Russia  offer  her.  She  supports  neither  M.  Sazonow's 
request  for  an  extension  of  time  to  Serbia  for  her  answer, 
nor  the  Czar's  suggestion  that  the  controversy  should  be 
submitted  to  the  Hague  Court  of  Arbitration ;  nor  his  pro- 


24     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

posal  to  refrain  from  all  military  acts  of  a  threatening 
nature  while  the  conversations  are  in  progress.  Far  more 
on  July  31,  it  is  Germany  who  exerts  pressure  on  hesitating 
Austria  to  precipitate  the  latter 's  action.  The  same  day,  it 
is  Germany  who  instructs  its  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg to  take  the  irreparable  step  which  is  to  plunge  the 
world  into  war. 

Here,  once  more  but  no  less  damning,  is  the  conclusive 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  evidence^  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky,  German  Ambassador  at  the  Court  of  St.  James, 
referring  to  his  Government,  writes :  l '  The  war  was  helped 
on."  Count  Szoeggeny,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
as  early  as  July  25  summarizes  his  information  as  fol- 
lows: "  Delay  in  beginning  military  operations  is  looked 
upon  here  as  a  great  danger,  on  account  of  the  interven- 
tion of  other  Powers.  We  are  urgently  advised  to  begin 
immediately  and  to  place  the  world  in  the  presence  of  a 
fait  accompli."  The  same  Ambassador  on  July  27  declares 
himself  charged  by  the  German  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs to  acquaint  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  that, 
if  Germany  is  obliged  by  courtesy  to  transmit  to  Vienna 
a  British  offer  of  mediation,  she  is  on  the  other  hand 
11  absolutely  opposed  to  the  consideration  of  any  such 
proposal. ' ' 

Finally  it  is  the  Bavarian  Minister  in  Berlin  who,  two 
weeks  before  the  declaration  of  war,  reveals  on  July  18 
Germany's  diabolical  plan  in  all  its  details:  This  docu- 
ment demonstrates  how  an  ambition  can  bring  about  the 
death  of  millions  of  men : 

The  step  upon  which  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  has  decided  at  Bel- 
grade and  which  will  consist  of  the  sending  of  a  Note  will  be  taken 
on  the  25th  inst. 

The  postponement  of  this  action  to  that  date  is  explained  by  the 
wish  to  await  the  departure  of  MM.  Poincare  and  Viviani  from 
St.  Petersburg,  in  order  to  make  it  more  difficult  for  the  Powers  of 
the  Entente  to  agree  upon  a  counter-proposal. 

Until  then  pacific  sentiments  will  be  simulated  at  Vienna  and  to 


GERMAN  AGGRESSION  25 

this  end  the  Minister  of  "War  and  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
will  both  be  given  leave  of  absence  at  the  same  time. 

An  efficacious  action  has,  on  the  other  hand,  been  exercised  on 
the  newspapers  and  on  the  stock-exchange. 

It  is  recognized  in  Berlin  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment has  acted  skilfully.  The  only  complaint  made  is  that  Count 
Tiza  who  was  probably  at  first  opposed  to  strong  methods  has 
partly  disclosed  the  plan  in  his  speech  to  the  Chamber. 

And  after  summarizing  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  to 
be  sent  to  Serbia,  the  Bavarian  Minister  adds: 

For  the  acceptance  of  these  demands  a  delay  of  forty-eight 
hours  will  be  granted. 

It  is  clear  that  Serbia  cannot  accept  these  demands  which  are 
incompatible  with  her  dignity  as  a  Sovereign  State.  The  conse- 
quence will  therefore  be  war.  In  Berlin  they  are  altogether  of 
opinion  that  Austria  should  take  advantage  of  the  favourable 
moment  even  if  there  is  danger  of  ulterior  complications. 

They  believe  that  Austria's  hour  of  destiny  has  struck  and  in 
consequence  to  the  question  presented  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  they  replied  without  hesitation  that  they  agreed  upon 
any  action  which  the  latter  may  decide  upon,  even  if  a  war  with 
Russia  is  to  result. 

Bismarck,  on  a  like  occasion,  had  forged  the  telegram 
from  Ems, — child's  play  compared  to  this.  Furthermore  it 
is  not  the  end,  and  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  plan  we  shall 
see  reproduced  the  same  trickery  which  marked  its  prepara- 
tion. France,  to  avoid  any  incident,  lias  withdrawn  its  fron- 
tier forces  ten  kilometers  from  the  border.  Germany,  on 
the  first  and  second  of  August,  before  any  declaration  of 
war,  takes  advantage  of  this  to  violate  French  and  Belgian 
territory  as  she  had  already  violated  the  territory  of  Lux- 
emburg. To  justify  her  action  she  accuses  French  avia- 
tors of  having  thrown  bombs  on  the  railroad  near 
Nuremberg.  On  April  3,  1916,  the  municipal  authorities 
of  that  city,  in  accord  with  the  district  military  authorities, 
will  declare  that  all  reports  published  on  this  subject  are 
" manifestly  false,"  and  three  years  later  Count  Brockdorff- 
Rantzau,  confessing  the  lie  in  turn,  will  merely  express  the 


26     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

regret  that  Germany,  in  declaring  war  upon  France, 
"should  have  unwittingly  made  use  of  information  which 
it  had  not  had  time  to  verify." 

. . .  .The  Armies  are  in  contact.  I  have  shown  France 
patient  and  without  fault,  Germany,  eager  for  the  fray, 
prepared  to  herald  the  Dawn  of  Blood.  All  Germany,  on 
August  2, 1914,  is  up  and  ready  for  the  work  of  death.  The 
Imperial  Chancellor — mediocre  though  he  be — has  risen 
without  effort  to  the  level  of  German  tradition  to  lay  down 
the  principle  of  "Necessity"  and  in  consequence  to  assert: 
"We  were  obliged  to  disregard  the  justified  protests  of 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg."  The  Reichstag's  answer? 
A  unanimous  vote  of  approval!  Liebknecht  himself — 
who  will  repent  only  later — is  at  one  with  Reventlow.  The 
entire  Socialdemokratie  suddenly  discovers  on  this  national 
occasion  that  it  has  a  Pan-German  soul.  Nor  does  it  take 
pains  to  "verify  reports."  Light-heartedly  it  breaks  the 
pledge  which  its  envoy  Muller  had  brought  to  the  French 
Socialists  on  July  31;  it  wipes  away  the  kiss  of  Judas 
which  in  Brussels  on  the  same  day  Haase  had  given  to 
Jaures. 

Psychological  unanimity,  the  elements  of  which  I  have 
analyzed,  transforms  itself  into  unanimous  action.  All, 
conservatives  and  liberals  alike,  hope  for  a  quick  solution : 
France  crushed  in  three  weeks;  "nacli  Paris"  realized  by 
the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality;  an  easy  counter-blow 
against  Russia,  and  then  against  England  who  has  entered 
into  the  business  for  "a  scrap  of  paper."  No  German 
doubts  success,  nor  questions  the  means  employed.  At 
this  hour  and  for  this  work,  national  unanimity  is  com- 
plete. War — brief  war,  cruel  war,  fruitful  war — is  the 
national  programme.  No  one  resists  the  temptation.  Col- 
lective hypnosis  transforms  the  crime  against  Right  and 
against  Humanity  into  a  duty.  Seventy  million  Germans 
claim  from  their  leaders  a  full  share  of  their  responsibility. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  WAB  AND  THE  ARMISTICE 

ALL  her  Allies  have  paid  tribute  to  the  greatness  of  the 
part  played  by  France  in  the  war.  Geography  and  his- 
tory alike  ordained  it.  The  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
deprived  France  of  the  only  guarantee  which  was  hers  by 
international  law.  For  weeks  and  months,  she  was  the  sole 
protection  of  the  western  Powers.  Had  France  been  beaten 
at  the  Marne,  the  world  would  have  fallen  under  the  Ger- 
man yoke.  By  her  victory  she  saved  it. 

If  France  was  able  to  play  so  great  a  part,  it  was  due  to 
the  extraordinary  union  into  which  the  German  aggression 
had  welded  her  whole  people  in  a  few  hours,  and  to  the 
military  virtues  displayed  by  her  eight  million  soldiers  all 
through  the  atrocious  strain  imposed  by  fifty-two  months 
of  invasion.  When  the  troop  trains  left  to  carry  her  forces 
to  the  frontier,  men's  souls  were  stirred  by  passionate  love 
for  France,  passionate  longing  for  justice  and  passionate 
confidence  in  victory.  War  declared  by  Germany  stunned 
France  for  a  moment  and  then  aroused  her  wrath.  The 
whole  nation  revolted  at  the  thought  of  its  long  patience 
so  ill  rewarded.  It  rose  strong  in  the  justice  of  its  cause. 
The  proud  spirit  of  France  awoke.  Puisqu'il  fallait  y  alter, 
on  irait  and  with  how  whole  a  heart.  France  would  for 
ever  have  shrunk  from  the  responsibility  of  war.  War 
forced  by  aggression  upon  a  free  people,  strong  in  their 
own  right — that  was  something  for  which  men  could  die. 

The  troop  trains  passed  bedecked  with  flowers.  On 
them  was  chalked  the  slogan  "a  Berlin"  and  from  them 
hung  in  effigy  figures  capped  with  spiked  helmets.  Be- 
neath the  August  sun  bare-chested  artillerymen  lovingly 

27 


28     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

caressed  their  guns  and  bandied  jest  and  laughter  with  the 
comely  maidens  who  flocked  to  the  stations  to  cheer  them. 
Thus  after  a  fortnight  of  concentration  we  started  for  Bel- 
gium. We  said  of  the  Germans,  "Where  are  they?"  We 
sought  the  enemy.  Surely  we  should  soon  find  him.  In 
the  compact  villages  of  the  Borinage  and  in  the  thickets  of 
Belgian  Luxemburg  the  shock  came.  By  evening  a  great 
silence  had  fallen  over  our  decimated  regiments.  We  had 
thrown  ourselves  in  the  open  against  an  enemy  we  had  not 
yet  learned  to  know.  Now  we  knew.  Machine  guns  con- 
cealed in  cellers  had  mowed  down-  our  columns.  Heavy 
artillery  hidden  away  in  the  folds  of  the  Hauts-Faings  had 
overwhelmed  our  lines  with  murderous  high  explosives. 
Barbed  wire  and  trenches  had  proved  too  much  for  our 
valour.  France's  furious  onslaught  had  been  broken  by 
German  stratagems. 

Then  came  the  day  of  the  retreat.  Retreat?  Whither? 
For  what  reason  ?  No  one  knew.  Retreat  with  all  its  physi- 
cal strain,  with  all  its  moral  strain  far  harder  to  bear! 
Effort  without  enthusiasm;  weariness  of  soul  added  to 
weariness  of  body.  At  times  the  order  came  for  us  to  stand 
and  fight.  The  old  spirit  returned.  On  the  Meuse  and  at 
Guise  the  enemy  paid  the  price  of  such  awakenings.  But 
at  nightfall  our  victorious  troops,  their  confidence  re- 
stored, heard  once  more  the  order  to  retire.  To  win  and 
to  withdraw.  To  win  and  leave  the  field  of  battle  after 
having  driven  Germans  from  it  was  cruel  and  refined  tor- 
ture, hardest  of  all  for  Frenchmen.  Not  once  but  again 
and  again  it  was  inflicted  upon  us.  We  got  so  that  we 
could  no  longer  reason.  We  felt  that  we  were  following 
the  funeral  of  France  along  endless  roads  leading  drearily 
towards  the  south.  On  September  5,  an  order  was  read 
calling  on  us  to  attack.  We  listened,  but  faith  was  lacking. 
We  said  to  one  another.  "We  are  going  to  attack  to-mor- 
row morning.  We  shall  win,  but  to-morrow  night  we  shall 
again  withdraw." 

We  fought  furiously  nevertheless  to  vent  upon  tihe 
Boche  the  rage  that  was  in  our  hearts.  We  kept  it  up  that 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  29 

evening — then  through  the  night — then  through  the  next 
day !  We  were  very  weary,  but  we  were  no  longer  retreat- 
ing! After  two  days,  we  found  that  we  were  advancing. 
At  first  no  one  believed  it.  How  could  the  soldier  under- 
stand? But  soon  the  joy  of  making  headway  spread 
through  the  ranks — we  were  advancing.  Of  that  there  could 
be  no  doubt.  So  we  "had'*  them.  En  avant!  In  fagged 
and  silent  columns,  we  passed  through  villages  and  over 
plains.  Victory  was  ours!  Victory  born  in  pain,  in  toil, 
in  doubt !  It  was  only  later  that  we  understood !  The  idea 
of  Victory  pieced  itself  together  bit  by  bit,  as  we  pushed 
the  enemy  back  to  the  north.  We  had  been  told  to  die 
where  we  stood  rather  than  give  way.  We  had  been  asked 
nothing  more.  But  of  a  sudden  as  we  fought  we  felt  within 
our  grasp  the  fickle  Goddess  of  Victory  who  for  three 
weeks  had  eluded  us.  We  had  been  the  Army  of  Hlusions. 
We  had  been  the  Army  of  Retreat.  From  now  on,  we 
were  the  Army  of  Confidence.  The  name  of  Joffre  was  in 
the  hearts  of  his  soldiers. 

But  before  reaching  the  end,  we  had  more  than  four 
years  to  wait.  At  first  we  had  hoped  it  would  be  only  a 
few  weeks.  After  the  Marne,  Ypres,  a  titanic  struggle 
less  known  but  not  less  great,  had  strengthened  our  hopes. 
We  expected  to  leave  the  trenches  in  the  spring.  It  was 
the  first  winter.  We  thought  it  would  be  the  only  one  and 
bore  it  as  a  short  and  nasty  test  of  our  patience.  Four 
winters  instead  of  one  passed.  As  early  as  1915,  the  men 
in  the  trenches  realized  that  it  would  go  on  like  this  so  long 
as  strength  of  material  was  not  added  to  the  strength  of 
numbers  and  courage.  The  men  higher  up  were  slower 
to  understand.  We  attacked  often.  We  never  broke 
through.  Neither  did  the  enemy.  We  lived  face  to  face, 
rifle  in  hand,  between  attacks.  There  were  local  engage- 
ments in  1915.  Then  came  1916  and  Verdun.  Verdun,  the 
supreme  test  after  so  many  tests — Verdun,  where,  as  at 
the  Marne,  France  saved  the  world  on  land  as  the  British 
fleet  saved  it  on  the  seas.  Once  more  Germany  believed 
she  could  force  the  road  to  Paris.  Six  months  of  carnage 


SO     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

closed  it  to  her.  Our  defensive  victory  made  possible 
Italian  success  in  Galicia  and  Bukowina ;  made  possible  the 
coming  in  of  Roumania,  so  ill  exploited ;  made  possible  the 
counter-offensive  on  the  Somme,  the  first  which  inspired 
Ludendorff  with  fear  of  the  future.  Verdun  did  some- 
thing more.  Verdun  won  the  fight  for  material  and  after 
two  years  hammered  into  bureaucratic  brains  the  long 
ignored  but  sovereign-importance  of  rapid-fire.  From 
Verdun  dates  the  beginning  of  intensive  output  without 
which  final  victory  would  have  been  impossible. 

Truly  was  it  long!  The  loophole  through  which  one 
peered  at  the  ragged  sandbags  of  a  Boche  trench ;  the  fir- 
ing bank  where  one  sat  in  the  mud  while  a  comrade 
watched;  the  icy  water  in  which  one's  feet  froze;  the 
slimy  shelter  where  straw  rotted ;  the  fatigue  duty  and  the 
trench  work ;  the  bringing  up  of  grenades  and  grub ;  then 
billets  in  desolated  villages;  inspections  and  reviews;  all 
the  burdens  of  barrack  life, — such  with  death  at  the  end 
was  the  lot  of  all — officers  and  men  alike.  In  1917,  an 
offensive — badly  prepared  and  badly  directed,  both  by 
the  High  Command  and  by  the  Government, — for  the  first 
time  brings  discouragement  and  disquiet  into  our  ranks. 
Petain,  the  saviour  of  Verdun,  restores  order  in  men's 
souls.  He  gives  back  to  us  that  Admirable  Army  of  na- 
tional sacrifice  in  which  officers  and  men  are  ready  to  die 
for  one  another.  Time  hangs  heavy.  But  we  feel  new 
things  stirring  in  the  air.  A  menace ;  that  of  the  onslaught 
of  enemy  troops  released  by  the  Russian  revolution.  A 
hope ;  that  of  a  mighty  young  nation  which  beyond  the  seas 
is  getting  ready  to  bear  its  share  of  battle.  Our  energies 
grow  taut.  Our  hearts  take  on  new  courage.  We  feel  the 
thrill  of  moral  force  added  to  material  force.  The  year 
1918  begins.  Once  again,  in  this  last  year  as  in  the  first 
the  French  Army  is  to  save  the  day.  Twenty-four  of 
Petain 's  divisions  are  hurled  into  the  gap  caused  by  the 
German  thrust  against  Gough's  Army.  Two  months  later, 
the  French  Army  in  turn,  taken  by  surprise  at  the  Chemin 
des  Dames,  is  thrown  back  to  the  Marne.  This  danger 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  31 

overcome,  our  troops  are  at  a  fighting  edge.  National  in 
spirit  as  in  origin,  the  French  Army  has  acquired  the 
technical  qualities  of  professional  armies.  It  has  experi- 
ence, it  has  self-possession,  it  has  adaptability  and  it  has 
science.  It  is  ready  for  the  war  of  movement  now  inaugu- 
rated by  the  fluctuations  of  the  battle  front.  The  lack  of 
training  from  which  so  many  troops  suffered  at  the  start 
has  disappeared.  War  material  is  in  abundance.  Confi- 
dence reigns.  The  stern  and  serious  spirit  of  war  is  at  its 
height.  It  is  no  longer  as  in  1914  an  army  of  heroic  youth 
rushing  light-hearted  into  danger.  It  is  an  army  of  men — 
for  youth  matures  rapidly  in  the  school  of  war — who  do 
their  duty  calmly  and  do  it  to  the  end.  It  is  the  Army  of 
Victory. 

France  behind  the  lines  was  worthy  of  fighting  France. 
She  furnished  in  full  measure  that  effort  without  which 
the  heroism  of  her  soldiers  would  have  been  vain.  She  too 
did  her  full  duty.  When  war  began — the  first  great 
European  war  in  forty-three  years — both  France  and  Ger- 
many had  to  face  the  surprise  of  fire:  our  75 's  inflicted 
losses  on  the  Germans  which  their  General  Staff  had  not 
foreseen.  Their  heavy  artillery  for  months  smashed  the 
morale  of  our  Armies.  To  tell  the  truth  no  one  was  really 
ready — France  even  less  than  Germany — to  meet  the  de- 
mands a  successful  war  of  artillery  was  going  to  make. 
Our  manual  of  attack  in  1913  said:  " Ground  is  won  by 
infantry."  Three  years  later  our  experience  dearly 
bought  proclaimed:  "Ground  is  won  by  artillery."  Both 
perhaps  were  exaggerations,  but  the  fact  remains  none  the 
less  that  the  French  Army  lacked  the  support  in  attack 
and  the  protection  in  defense  which  quick-firing  heavy 
artillery  affords  and  that  its  field  artillery  perfect  in 
design  was  woefully  short  of  ammunition.  When  we  went 
to  war,  we  had  1,300  rounds  per  gun,  later  on  there  were 
days  when  the  expenditure  was  4,000  rounds  per  gun.  We 
had  counted  on  a  production  of  15,000  three-inch  shells  a 
day  and  the  total  expenditure  on  certain  days  reached 
400,000.  In  1916,  to  demolish  a  yard  of  enemy  trench,  it 


32     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

took  407  kilogrammes  of  "75"  shells,  203  kilogrammes  of 
trench  shells,  704  kilogrammes  of  heavy  shells  and  128 
kilogrammes  of  high  explosive  shells.  The  lessons  of 
battle  obliged  us  first  to  keep  our  field  artillery  supplied, 
then  to  create  quick  firing  heavy  batteries.  A  doubly 
onerous  task  in  almost  impossible  circumstances.  All  our 
iron  and  steel  plants  were  near  our  frontiers,  and  invasion 
had  robbed  us  of  them!  The  Germans  estimated  that  our 
loss  in  this  way  would  be  60,000  workmen  out  of  112,000, 
40  per  cent,  of  our  coal,  80  per  cent,  of  our  coke,  90  per 
cent,  of  our  iron,  70  per  cent,  of  our  pig  iron,  80  per  cent, 
of  our  steel,  80  per  cent,  of  our  machinery.  The  estimate 
was  correct.  What  did  we  do? 

The  story  of  this  prodigious  effort  has  never  been  writ- 
ten. We  had,  in  1914,  3,696  pieces  of  75.  Despite  loss  and 
destruction,  we  had  6,555  when  hostilities  ceased.  As  to 
heavy  artillery,  the  supply  rose  from  288  pieces  in  1914  to 
5,477  in  1918.  In  other  words,  we  increased  our  field  artil- 
lery by  77  per  cent,  and  our  heavy  artillery  by  1,943  per 
cent.  One-tenth  of  this  latter  increase  was  obtained  by 
reconstruction  of  old  pieces,  nine-tenths  by  new  construc- 
tion. All  our  artillery  combined  in  1914  had  less  than  five 
million  shells.  The  monthly  output  at  the  end  of  the  war 
exceeded  nine  millions. 

So  much  for  round  figures.  Now  for  details.  In  1914, 
the  production  of  75 's  was  negligible  and  there  was  no 
regular  service  of  repair.  In  October,  1918,  our  workshops 
were  turning  out,  for  this  caliber  alone,  550  new  tubes  and 
573  repaired,  593  new  brakes  and  195  repaired,  267  new 
carriages  and  114  repaired.  To  these  must  be  added  shells, 
more  shells  and  ever  more  shells.  The  battle  of  Champagne 
and  Artois  in  1915,  lasting  two  months,  cost  us  seven  and 
a  half  million  75  shells — an  average  of  121,000  a  day.  The 
battle  of  Verdun  and  the  Somme  in  1916 — lasting  ten 
months — cost  us  more  than  forty-three  million  75  shells — 
an  average  of  144,000  a  day.  The  offensive  of  1918,  lasting 
four  months,  cost  us  nearly  thirty-three  million  shells,  an 
average  of  272,500  a  day.  We  met  this  increasing  expendi- 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  33 

ture.  The  output  of  75  shells  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
was  theoretically  13,000  a  day,  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was 
6,000.  It  rose  to  150,000  a  day  in  October,  1915,— to  173,000 
in  August,  1916, — to  203,000  in  the  following  November,  to 
233,000  in  May,  1917,  which  level  is  maintained  and  even 
exceeded  to  the  end  of  the  war.  This  increase  of  produc- 
tion— 3,782  per  cent. — was  obtained  under  almost  hopeless 
conditions  brought  about  by  invasion.  It  is  to  the  everlast- 
ing honour  of  our  Government,  of  our  Parliament  and  of 
our  industry  that  they  were  able  to  achieve  it,  in  spite  of 
everything. 

But  to  the  first  weapon,  the  75 — the  use  of  which  was 
developed  so  tremendously, — it  was  necessary  to  add  the 
war  weapons  of  modern  warfare,  the  105,  155  short,  155 
long,  220,  270,  280,  370,  420.  Here  everything  had  to  be 
built  up  from  the  bottom.  Up  to  the  very  eve  of  war, 
experts  had  discussed  the  question  of  quick  firing  heavy 
artillery  in  scientific  papers  to  no  result.  When  war  broke 
out,  we  had  104  pieces  of  quick  firing  155  's — and  that  was 
all.  But  follow  the  expenditure  from  battle  to  battle: 
Champagne  and  Artois  in  1915  (two  months)  cost  us  510,- 
000  rounds  of  155,  or  8,500  a  day,  and  5,400  rounds  of  220, 
or  900  a  day.  Verdun  and  the  Somme  in  1916  (ten  months) 
cost  us  5,280,000  rounds  of  155,  or  17,600  a  day,  and  413,000 
rounds  of  220,  or  1,343  a  day.  The  Aisne  in  1917  (two 
months)  cost  us  2,700,000  rounds  of  155,  or  45,000  a  day, 
and  237,000  rounds  of  220,  or  3,900  a  day.  For  the  offen- 
sive of  1918,  the  expenditure  reached  6,530,000  rounds  of 
155  or  54,416  a  day.  I  sum  up  these  figures  in  the  fol- 
lowing table. 

DAILY  EXPENDITURE  OF  AMMUNITION 

75            155  220 

Champagne  and  Artois 1915    121,000      8,500  900 

Verdun  and  the  Somme 1916    144,000  17,600  1,343 

Aisne    1917    265,000  45,000  3,900 

Offensive  of  1918    272,500  54,416  , . , , 


34     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

This  heavy  expenditure  of  heavy  shells,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  75 's,  was  completely  covered  by  production.  The 
daily  output  of  155 's,  which  did  not  even  exist  in  Septem- 
ber, 1914,  had  grown  to  3,600  in  September,  1915,  to  30,000 
in  October,  1916,  to  39,000  in  July,  1918.  The  output  of 
220 's  rose  from  460  in  September,  1915,  to  2,100  in  Septem- 
ber, 1916,  and  to  3,400  in  April,  1917.  The  total  increase 
was  3,782  per  cent,  for  the  75 's,  was  983  per  cent,  for  the 
155 's,  and  639  per  cent,  for  the  220 's.  And  all  this,  I  re- 
peat and  insist,  was  after  invasion  had  robbed  us  of  about 
85  per  cent,  of  our  pre-war  iron  and  steel  metallurgic 
resources. 

The  following  table  gives  the  daily  productions^ 

DAILY  PRODUCTION  OF  MUNITIONS 

75  155        220 

Third  Quarter  of  1914 6,000      

Third  Quarter  of  1915 . , 150,000  3,600       460 

Last  Quarter  of  1916 203,000  30,000    2,100 

End  of  War,  June  1917  to  Nov.  1918 . 233,000  39,000    3,400 

If  we  take  into  account  other  sizes  than  the  75,  the  155 
and  the  220,  we  have  during  the  last  period  of  the  war,  a 
total  daily  production  of  330,000  shells,  and  for  the  entire 
war  a  total  production  of  300  million  projectiles. 

I  do  not  want  to  prolong  this  enumeration.  Let  me 
merely  add  that,  in  September,  1914,  our  Armies  had  140 
aeroplanes  in  action  and  that  in  October,  1918,  they  had 
3,609 ;  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  we  were  producing 
62  a  month  and  at  the  end  2,068.  I  note  that  in  December, 
1916,  we  had  8  tanks  and  on  the  day  of  the  Armistice  3,400. 
Finally,  let  me  emphasize  the  point  that  this  production 
for  the  needs  of  the  French  Army  did  not  exhaust  our 
manufacturing  capacity,  for  we  furnished  our  various 
Allies  with  7,000  guns,  10,663  aeroplanes,  and  400  tanks. 
Thus,  after  three  and  a  half  years  of  war  and  invasion,  we 
were  able  to  lend  the  splendid  American  Army  that  assist- 
ance without  which  their  entry  into  action  might  have 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  35 

been  indefinitely  delayed.  Not  to  mention  the  2,500  offi- 
cers, the  25  instruction  camps,  and  the  135,000  hospital  beds 
placed  at  their  disposal,  we  furnished  the  Americans  with 
4,000  guns,  4,000  aeroplanes,  240  tanks.  On  the  day  of  the 
Armistice,  of  the  U.  S.  Army's  war  material  then  in  line, 
France  had  manufactured  100  per  cent,  of  the  75 's,  100 
per  cent,  of  the  155 's,  howitzers,  100  per  cent,  of  the  tanks, 
81  per  cent,  of  the  aeroplanes,  75  per  cent,  of  the  long  guns. 
All  of  the  65  million  rounds  of  75  and  155  shells  used  by 
the  American  artillery  came  from  French  factories.  Of 
the  14  million  tons  of  supplies  which  they  used  in  Europe, 
half,  or  7  millions,  came  from  France. 

Such  was  our  material  contribution.  What  of  our  con- 
tribution in  man  power?  Despite  her  low  birth  rate  France 
did  not  hesitate  before  the  mortality  of  'war  and — by  means 
of  a  Spartan  system  of  mobilization — always  kept  her 
forces  up  to  the  maximum. 

3,781,000  men  in  August,  1914, 
4,978,000  men  in  July,  1915. 
4,677,000  men  in  July,  1916. 
4,327,000  men  in  September,  1917. 
4,143,000  men  in  November,  1918. 

In  November,  1918,  we  had  362,000  more  men  in  line 
than  in  1914,  and  yet  our  losses  from  the  beginning  had 
been  2,594,000  men— 1,364,000  killed,  740,000  severely 
wounded,  and  490,000  prisoners.  Throughout  the  war,  we 
bore  the  brunt  of  the  enemy's  attacks  on  the  Western 
front.  We  held  three-fourths  of  this  front  up  to  the  spring 
of  1917.  At  that  time  the  British  Army  was  facing  42  Ger- 
man divisions,  the  French  Army  82.  Our  line  reduced 
about  this  time  by  50  kilometers,  was  increased  by  another 
80  kilometers  after  the  German  push  on  General  Gough's 
Army  in  March,  1918.  Up  to  the  war  of  movement  in 
1918,  the  German  Army  always  maintained  its  maximum 
density  on  the  Western  front — 1,293  battalions  out  of  1,692 
in  November,  1914;  1,456  battalions  out  of  2,316  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1917,  and  it  was  always  the  French  sector  that  bore 


36     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  brunt  of  the  burden  on  the  Western  front.  If,  for 
example,  taking  the  first  35  months  of  the  war  (August, 
1914,  to  August,  1917)  and  the  number  of  enemy  battalions 
in  line,  we  figure  the  total  German  strength  deployed  as 
4  on  the  Belgian  front,  it  was  8  on  the  British  front,  22 
on  the  Russian  front  and  35  on  the  French  front. 

I  have  told  our  industrial  effort  and  our  human  sacri- 
fice. There  remains  the  story  of  our  French  genius.  I  am 
not  one  of  those  small-minded  Frenchmen  who  believe  that, 
in  order  to  be  great,  France  must  needs  be  ungrateful.  I 
have  always  said  that  France  could  not  have  won  without 
her  Allies.  And  I  have  always  counted  on  our  Allies'  sense 
of  justice  to  recognize  that  without  France  they  could  not 
have  waged  the  war.  Have  I  not  the  right  to  add  that 
besides  her  contribution  in  war  material  and  her  contribu- 
tion in  man  power,  France  made  the  splendid  contribution 
of  her  genius?  The  war  full  of  surprises  was  pregnant 
with  its  own  lesson.  Success  came  to  those  who  from  this 
lesson  were  able  to  unriddle  their  course  of  action.  No  cut- 
and-dried  doctrine  stood  the  test  of  events.  The  doctrine 
of  the  war  shaped  itself  from  day  to  day  in  the  turmoil  of 
accumulated  happenings,  reserving  the  crown  of  victory  to 
him  who  could  coordinate  its  ever  changing  demands.  But 
whether  for  artillery — strategic  plans,  barrage  fire,  plung- 
ing fire,  liaison,  range-finding,  signalling;  whether  for 
infantry;  transformation  of  equipment,  specialization  of 
missions,  organization  of  terrain,  accompanying  aviation, 
acceleration  of  reliefs,  attacks  by  infiltration;  passage 
through  the  lines,  defense  by  withdrawal  to  second  line 
positions, — France  during  the  whole  war  was  the  laboratory 
of  the  Powers.  Nothing  was  more  natural;  for  under  the 
cruel  stress  of  defeat  we  had  more  deeply  studied  these 
problems.  How  could  one  not  recall  that  it  was  a  French 
mind  that  conceived  and  carried  out  the  strategic  plan 
which  led  to  final  victory;  that  substituted  for  local  and 
intermittent  attacks  which  had  wasted  both  sides  for  four 
years  the  general  and  continuous  attack  along  the  whole 
front  ?  How  could  one  not  write  here  the  name  of  Marshal 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  37 

Foch?  Von  Kluck  said  in  1914,  "I  have  failed  to  take 
Paris,  but  they  will  never  take  Vouziers. ' '  They  continued 
to  fail  to  take  Paris.  But  we  took  Vouziers.  Ludendorff 
notwithstanding,  French  genius  triumphed  over  German 
brains ! 

French  genius  triumphed  not  only  on  the  field  of  battle 
but  in  the  conception  and  organization  of  war.  It  was 
from  France  that  went  forth  the  first  and  most  pressing 
appeals  for  that  military  and  economic  unity  of  command 
which,  in  1918,  turned  the  long-wavering  scales  in  favour  of 
the  Allies.  From  the  end  of  1916,  the  French  Parliament 
had  made  insistence  upon  unity  of  command  the  essential 
article  of  its  programme.  On  October  5, 1917,  M.  Loucheur, 
Minister  of  Armament  in  the  Painleve  Cabinet,  had  se- 
cured its  endorsement  by  the  French  "War  Committee. 
Several  weeks  later,  not  without  hesitation  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain,  the  War  Council  of  Versailles  was  created. 
It  was  a  step  forward.  But  that  was  not  enough.  As  soon 
as  he  assumed  the  reins  of  government  in  November,  1917, 
M.  Clemenceau  set  to  work  to  obtain  more  and  better.  I 
had  informed  him  that  he  could  count  on  President  Wil- 
son's aid.  On  the  other  hand  opposition  was  still  manifest 
in  London  and  when  during  a  brief  stay  in  Paris  at  the  end 
of  1917  I  publicly  declared  that  the  American  and  French 
Governments  were  agreed  on  the  necessity  of  a  unity  of 
command,  several  English  newspapers  protested.  On  the 
eve  of  my  departure  for  New  York,  on  December  30,  1917, 
I  had  a  last  talk  with  M.  Clemenceau.  I  said  to  him: 

"They  are  going  to  talk  to  me  again  over  there  about 
unity  of  command.  And  no  doubt  they  will  ask  me,  'Who  I ' 
What  shall  I  say?" 

M.  Clemenceau  replied:  "Foch." 

Three  months  after,  in  the  last  week  of  March,  1918, 
the  British  Army  commanded  by  General  Gough  was 
broken  and  flung  back  on  Amiens.  On  March  23,  the  bom- 
bardment of  Paris  by  long  range  guns  began.  The  break- 
ing of  the  Franco-British  front  brought  us  back  to  the 
darkest  days  of  1914.  From  the  very  first  moment  of  the 


38     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

crisis,  M.  Clemenceau 's  mind  was  made  up.  From  the 
extremity  of  the  danger  he  would  snatch  the  solution 
sought  in  vain  for  so  many  months.  To  German  unity  of 
command  he  would  oppose  Allied  unity  of  command. 

I  have  told  above  how  on  March  26,  General  Petain  sent 
up  twenty-four  divisions  to  fill  the  gap  created  between 
our  Allies  and  ourselves.  At  four  o'clock,  the  same  day 
after  a  meeting  held  at  Marshal  Petain 's  headquarters  at 
Compiegne  between  MM.  Poincare,  Clemenceau  and  Louch- 
eur  who  had  motored  from  Paris  with  General  Foch  and 
Lord  Milner  representing  Great  Britain,  it  had  been 
decided  to  discuss  the  question  at  another  conference  the 
next  day.  Who  would  be  present  at  the  conference?  M. 
Clemenceau  at  once  designated  Marshal  Foch.  It  was 
later  decided  that  General  Petain  would  come  also.  After 
the  meeting  M.  Clemenceau  took  Lord  Milner  aside.  He 
begged  him  insistently  to  bring  to  bear  on  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  all  the  pressure  of  his  great  authority  in  support  of 
a  reorganization  of  the  Allied  command.  The  battle  of 
Amiens  was  at  stake.  Lord  Milner  promised  his  assistance. 

On  March  26,  everybody  met  at  Doullens.  "While  Gen- 
eral Haig  was  talking  with  Generals  Byng  and  Plumer, 
MM.  Poincare,  Clemenceau  and  Loucheur  were  in  the 
Place  du  Marche  with  General  Foch.  The  latter,  in  rapid 
and  vigorous  sentences,  outlined  the  situation  and  the  rea- 
sons for  not  giving  way  to  despair.  He  said: 

"We  will  not  withdraw.  We  will  fight  where  we  are. 
We  must  not  indicate  a  line  of  retreat,  or  everyone  will 
take  it.  We  must  hang  on — we  must  hold  fast.  We  must 
not  give  up  another  metre  of  ground.  Remember 
October,  1914." 

M.  Clemenceau  listens.    He  mutters: 

"C'est  un  bougre!" 

Minutes  fly, — everyone  waits  around  eating  sandwiches 
taken  from  General  Petain 's  car.  At  noon  Lord  Milner 
arrives.  Again  very  briefly  M.  Clemenceau  talks  to  him 
— one  feels  what  he  is  saying — and  Milner  goes  in  alone  to 
General  Haig  with  whom  he  talks  ten  minutes.  At  twenty 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  39 

minutes  past  twelve  the  general  conference  begins.  After 
a  statement  of  the  situation  in  which  by  his  clarity  and 
confidence  General  Foch  wins  the  admiration  of  all,  the 
measures  to  be  adopted  for  the  organization  of  the  com- 
mand before  Amiens  are  taken  up.  It  is  at  this  moment 
that  General  Haig  pronounces  the  following  words — I  cite 
textually  from  the  notes  of  one  who  was  present — the  echo 
of  his  conversation  with  Lord  Milner: 

"If  General  Foch  will  consent  to  give  his  advice,  I  shall 
be  very  glad  to  follow  it." 

There  is  no  question  yet  of  unity  of  command.  M. 
Clemenceau  is  not  satisfied.  He  rises  and  takes  Lord  Mil- 
ner off  to  a  corner  of  the  room ;  then  General  Petain ;  then 
General  Foch.  These  are  brief  a  parte  talks,  in  which 
short  words  are  exchanged.  The  idea  is  suggested  to  at- 
tach General  Foch  to  General  Petain  and  entrust  him  with 
liaison  with  the  British. 

M.  Clemenceau  answers  sharply: 

"That's  not  what  we  are  talking  about!  What  Foch 
needs  is  an  independent  post  from  which  he  can  control." 

General  Petain,  a  fine  soldier,  interjects  at  once: 

"Everything  you  decide  will  be  well  done." 

Then  M.  Clemenceau  sits  down  again.  He  takes  pen- 
cil and  paper.  He  writes,  and  as  he  writes  he  reads  aloud. 
He  uses  first  the  formula  which  everyone  has  used  since 
the  morning  to  define  the  battle  which  had  to  be  won  before 
Amiens : 

"General  Foch.  is  charged  by  the  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments with  coordinating  the  British  and  French  operations  before 
Amiens. ' ' 

Here  General  Foch  stops  the  President: 
"Better  make  it  on  the  Western  front." 
M.  Clemenceau  answers: 
"Of  course  you  are  right!" 

And  he  scratches  out  the  last  words  for  which  he  sub- 
stitutes "on  the  Western  front."  Then  he  goes  on: 


40     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY' 

"He  (General  Foch)  will  come  to  an  understanding  to  this 
effect  with  the  two  Commanders-in-Chief  who  are  invited  to  fur- 
nish him  with  all  necessary  information." 

It  is  now  past  one  o'clock.  Everybody  goes  to  lunch 
together  at  the  old  Doullens  Hotel  Les  Quatre  Fils  Aymon. 
On  the  threshold  of  the  dining-room,  M.  Loucheur,  who  sees 
success  in  sight  for  the  idea  he  had  supported  before  the 
"War  Council  on  the  previous  fifth  of  October  and  who  for- 
merly as  an  artillery  lieutenant  had  served  under  the 
orders  of  the  new  "co-ordinator,"  meets  the  latter  and 
says  laughingly: 

"Well,  General,  so  you  have  got  your  paper  now?" 

General  Foch,  laughing  back,  says: 

"Yes,  and  a  fine  time  to  give  it  me." 

Lunch  is  quickly  over,  and  forty  minutes  later  General 
Foch  leaves  for  British  Headquarters  at  Dury  to  take  up 
his  task.  His  task,  the  most  difficult  of  all  tasks,  despite 
the  burning  desire  of  all  to  succeed  and  to  stop  the  enemy's 
advance.  For  military  life,  with  its  simple  formulae  of 
command  and  obedience,  lends  itself  reluctantly  to  com- 
binations of  this  kind  which  are  outside  its  normal  sphere. 
For  several  weeks — as  was  inevitable — General  Foch 
"coordinated  more  by  negotiation  than  by  command." 
Racing  from  one  Headquarters  to  another — advising — sug- 
gesting— insisting — at  times  even  hustling — he  gained 
inch  by  inch  the  theoretic  authority  with  which,  thanks  to 
M.  Clemenceau,  the  crisis  of  March  26  had  endowed  him. 
More  was  needed.  A  few  days  later  M.  Clemenceau  accom- 
panied by  M.  Loucheur  met  Generals  Foch,  Fayolle,  and 
Debeney  at  Breteuil  in  the  Oise.  It  was  agreed  that  the 
situation  was  improved.  Then  M.  Clemenceau  said  to 
General  Foch. 

"You  are  doing  very  good  work.  But  you  do  not  com- 
mand enough.  I  have  just  come  from  Haig.  I  have  talked 
with  him.  I  want  you  to  go  the  whole  hog  and  give 
orders." 

On  April  3,  a  new  conference  enabled  M.  Clemenceau 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  41 

to  secure  for  his  point  of  view  the  seal  of  official  sanction. 
General  Foch  carries  away  from  the  conference  a  new 
paper  which  is  an  actual  brevet  of  command.  There  is  no 
longer  any  question  of  coordination.  Henceforth  General 
Foch  is  to  have  "the  strategic  direction  of  military  opera- 
tions on  the  "Western  front."  The  Commanders-in-Chief  of 
each  of  the  Allied  nations  are  to  retain  "the  tactical  con- 
duct of  operations"  with  the  right  of  appeal  to  their  Gov- 
ernments if  they  deem  it  necessary.  This  clear  definition 
despite  the  restriction  mentioned  has  a  most  satisfactory 
effect.  All  the  Commanders-in-Chief  show  the  utmost  will 
to  obey  and  cooperate. 

The  front  stiffens  and  hope  again  runs  high.  But  on 
May  27,  there  is  a  new  catastrophe ;  the  Chemin  des  Dames. 
The  French  front  had  broken.  Our  troops  are  thrown  back 
to  the  Marne.  It  is  a  bad  start  for  unity  of  command.  On 
June  2,  M.  Clemenceau  in  the  Chamber  defends  it  abso- 
lutely in  the  face  of  the  most  violent  criticism.  He  says : 

These  soldiers,  these  splendid  soldiers  have  leaders,  excellent 
leaders,  great  leaders — leaders  worthy  of  them  in  every  respect. . . 

I  shall  reassert  this  as  often  as  I  have  to,  to  make  myself  heard, 
because  it  is  my  duty,  because  I  have  seen  these  leaders  at  work. 

These  men  are  now  fighting  the  hardest  battle  of  the  war  and 
are  fighting  it  with  a  heroism  which  I  can  find  no  words  worthy 
to  express. 

And  shall  we — for  a  mistake  which  may  have  been  made  in 
such  or  such  a  sector,  or  even  may  not  have  been  made  at  all — 
shall  we,  before  even  knowing,  demand  explanations!  Shall  we, 
while  the  battle  is  raging,  go  to  a  man  who  is  worn  out,  a  man  so 
tired  that  hig  head  droops  over  his  maps  as  I  have  seen  in  awful 
moments,  and  ask  this  man  why  on  such  and  such  a  day  he  did  such 
or  such  a  thing  f 

Drive  me  from  this  tribute  if  that  is  what  you  ask — For  I  will 
not  do  it. 

Not  satisfied  with  continuing  his  full  support  to  the  man 
he  had  picked  out  from  the  very  first  months  of  the  war, 
M.  Clemenceau  continues  his  effort  to  increase  this  man's 
authority.  On  June  26  he  decides  that  the  right  given  at 


42     THE  TKUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Beauvais  to  the  Allied  Commanders-in-Chief  to  appeal  to 
their  Governments  shall  be  abolished  as  far  as  the  French 
Armies  are  concerned  and  that  their  Commander-in-Chief 
shall  be  purely  and  simply  placed  under  the  orders  of  Gen- 
eral Foch.  On  June  30,  complying  with  a  desire  frequently 
and  forcefully  expressed  by  the  latter,  he  removes  the  Chief 
of  Staff  of  the  French  Armies  and  appoints  General  Buat 
to  this  post.  In  August,  M.  Clemenceau  suggests  to  the 
Cabinet  the  elevation  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the 
dignity  of  Marshal  of  France.  Thus,  from  the  first  day 
to  the  last,  a  single  thought  had  dominated  the  actions  of 
the  French  Government.  From  the  first  day  to  the  last, 
France  and  her  Prime  Minister  had  willed  the  unity  of 
command  realized  in  the  person  of  the  great  soldier  whose 
unquestioned  genius  ensured  its  acceptance.  History  will 
tell  how  great  the  part  played  in  our  common  victory  by 
this  decision  to  which  all  our  Allies  adhered. 

I  should  be  woefully  remiss  if  I  did  not  add  one  more 
word.  I  have  spoken  of  French  genius.  But  France  is  also 
great  of  heart.  This  it  was  that  made  our  brotherhood  of 
arms.  Forty-three  per  cent,  of  all  the  men  of  France  were 
mobilized.  Thus  our  military  commanders  governed  half 
of  our  male  population.  They  governed  them  with  tender 
care.  They  were  sparing  of  their  soldiers '  lives.  They  took 
full  advantage  of  the  increasing  potentialities  of  modern 
engines  of  war.  At  Charleroi  and  the  Marne  we  lost  5.41 
per  cent,  of  the  forces  engaged ;  during  the  first  six  months 
of  1915,  2.39  per  cent. ;  during  the  second  six  months,  1.68 
per  cent.;  during  the  first  six  months  of  1916,  1.47  per 
cent.,  and  during  the  last  six  months  of  the  same  year,  1.28 
per  cent.  Our  losses  fell  in  1917  to  .46  per  cent,  of  the 
forces  engaged  and  in  1918  in  our  final  effort  they  did  not 
exceed  .75  per  cent.  A  splendid  showing  indeed.  But  this 
is  not  all.  France  more  than  any  other  country,  despite  the 
demands  of  her  war  industry  and  thanks  to  a  firm  and 
just  policy,  maintained  a  high  percentage  of  her  fighting 
men  in  the  divisions  in  line — 86  per  cent,  in  1914,  and  74 
per  cent,  in  1918.  France  also  had  the  secret  of  inspiring 


43 

mutual  affection  between  her  officers  and  men.  France 
understood — and  here  again  in  justice  I  must  write  the 
name  of  Marshal  Petain — that  a  democracy  in  arms  fight- 
ing a  five-year  war  is  undeserving  of  the  rigid  discipline 
that  can  be  imposed  upon  a  professional  army  fighting  a 
five-months  war.  France  understood  the  inestimable 
value  of  mutual  sacrifice  whereby  officers  and  men  are 
welded  together;  of  "that  subtle  bond  which  makes  of  dis- 
cipline a  personal  and  a  living  thing,  consciously  or  instinc- 
tively accepted  out  of  gratitude  or  admiration  or  love — a 
bond  the  more  binding  because  unforced  and  forged  in  the 
heart  of  the  soldier."  The  French  Army — thanks  to  the 
spiritual  union  of  men  and  officers;  thanks  also  to  her 
admirable  non-coms.,  sprung  from  the  ranks  of  the  nation, 
the  epic  artisans  of  the  victorious  effort  planned  by  their 
leaders — has  no  need  like  the  German  Army  of  being 
picked  over  in  order  to  find  shock  troops.  The  French 
Army  remained  itself  all  through  the  war,  adapting  itself 
to  successive  changes  each  of  which  was  a  fresh  test  of  its 
endurance. 

Just  as  in  1914,  it  had  been  almost  the  sole  bulwark  of 
civilization  with  its  22  Army  Corps,  its  26  Reserve  Divi- 
sions, its  10  Divisions  of  Cavalry,  against  the  onslaught  on 
an  Empire  of  Prey  with  a  man  power  of  fourteen  million 
men,  so  to  the  very  end,  by  the  side  of  its  great  Allies,  the 
French  Army  did  what  it  had  to  do.  What  praise  could  be 
higher?  Puisqu'il  fallait  y  aller,  on  irait.  This  saying 
of  our  French  peasant — whom  I  like  so  many  others  had 
the  honour  of  leading  into  action — magnificently  sums  up 
our  ideal  of  war.  With  it  I  will  end  this  brief  sketch  of 
what  France  in  arms  contributed  of  her  own  free  will  to 
Victory. 

II 

The  Armistice  of  November  11,  1918,  was  an  uncondi- 
tional surrender  on  the  part  of  Germany.  This  was  clear 
at  the  time  it  was  signed,  in  the  minds  of  those  who  imposed 
it  and  of  those  upon  whom  it  was  forced.  It  was  the  logical 


44     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

outcome  of  the  military  and  political  history  of  the  four 
preceding  months. 

In  the  first  week  of  July,  1918,  Admiral  von  Hintze— 
appointed  by  the  Kaiser  to  be  Secretary  of  State  in  the 
Imperial  Office  of  Foreign  Affairs — wishing  to  be  accur- 
ately informed  as  to  the  military  situation  before  taking 
up  his  duties,  left  for  the  front. 

At  Avesnes  he  met  General  Ludendorf f  and  asked  him : 
"In  the  present  offensive  are  you  certain  to  defeat  the 
enemy  completely  and  decisively  ? ' ' 

General  Ludendorf  f  replied  without  hesitation: 
"My  answer  to  your  question  is  an  unqualified  'Yes.' 
At  that  moment  everything  seemed  to  justify  the  assur- 
ance of  ,the  First  Quartermaster  General  of  the  German 
Army.  In  March  a  lightning  stroke  had  broken  General 
Gough's  Army  and  thrown  the  Allies  back  to  the  gates  of 
Amiens.  In  May  another  push  had  broken  the  French  line 
at  the  Chemin  des  Dames  and  carried  the  enemy  to  the 
banks  of  the  Marne.  The  bombardment  of  Paris  was  the 
visible  sign  of  German  victory.  Thousands  of  British 
and  French  prisoners,  to  say  nothing  of  enormous  stores 
of  war  material,  had  been  captured.  The  German  High 
Command  was  busy  circulating  among  its  troops  that  this 
was  the  final  offensive,  "the  peace  offensive."  The 
enemy  was  powerfully  equipped  for  it:  1,456  battalions — 
266  more  than  in  1916 — made  up  a  total  of  207  divisions. 
Of  these  207  divisions,  130  were  in  line  and  77  in  reserve. 
Of  the  latter,  only  twenty  recently  withdrawn  from  battle 
needed  refilling.  Twenty-six  had  been  reinforced  and 
thirty-one  were  fresh.  Before  dawn  on  July  15  the  offen- 
sive was  launched  in  the  direction  of  Reims.  By  the  sev- 
enteenth it  had  been  halted  between  our  first  and  second 
lines.  On  the  eighteenth  the  Armies  of  Mangin  and 
Degoutte  counter-attacked  on  the  German  flank.  On  the 
nineteenth  the  enemy  recrossed  the  Marne.  By  August  4 
they  had  been  thrust  over  the  Vesle.  On  the  eighth,  farther 
north  near  Amiens,  three  German  Divisions  withdrew  in 
disorder,  almost  routed  before  the  Allied  attack  began. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  45 

Note  well  these  events.  They  mark  the  beginnings  of  Vic- 
tory and  Armistice. 

On  August  13  a  numerous  company  arrives  at  German 
General  Headquarters  at  Spa.  Besides  the  Kaiser,  there 
are  gathered  there  the  Crown  Prince,  Field  Marshal  von 
Hindenburg  and  General  Ludendorff ,  Count  Von  Hertling, 
Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  and  Admiral  von  Hintze,  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs.  On  the  following  evening,  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  and  his  Minister,  Count  Burian  arrive. 
A  Crown  Council  is  to  be  held  on  the  fourteenth.  Late  on 
the  thirteenth  von  Hintze  takes  General  von  Ludendorff 
aside  and  questions  him  as  he  had  done  a  month  before  on 
the  general  situation.  Ludendorff  replies: 

1  'In  July  I  told  you  that  I  was  certain  by  the  present 
offensive  of  breaking  the  enemy's  will  to  fight  and  of 
forcing  them  to  make  peace.  Now  I  am  no  longer  certain 
of  this. " 

"In  that  case,"  asks  the  Minister,  "how  do  you  imagine 
the  war  can  be  continued  ? ' ' 

"We  are  still  able  by  defensive  operations  to  paralyze 
the  enemy's  will  to  fight  and  thus  bring  them  little  by  little 
to  make  Peace." 

In  a  word,  instead  of  the  crushing  triumph  counted  upon 
in  July,  the  German  High  Command  now  pins  its  hope  of 
success  in  the  weariness  of  the  Allies.  The  Crown  Council 
meets  the  next  day  and  General  Ludendorff  voices  the  same 
attenuated  hope. 

"A  major  offensive,"  he  declares,  "is  no  longer  pos- 
sible. We  must  confine  ourselves  to  a  defensive  strategy 
combined  with  local  offensives.  Thus  we  may  hope  event- 
ually to  paralyze  the  enemy's  will  to  fight." 

The  Kaiser  gives  his  opinion.  It  is  "to  watch  for  a 
favourable  moment  for  coming  to  terms  with  the  enemy." 
His  Chancellor  agrees  with  him,  recommending  that  "steps 
be  taken  at  the  opportune  moment  to  arrive  at  an  under- 
standing." This  moment  is  to  be  that  of  "the  first  success 
on  the  Western  front."  In  other  words  to  await  develop- 
ments, without  undue  haste.  Von  Hintze,  less  confident  in 


46     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  success  of  defensive  strategy,  asks  to  be  given  imme- 
diate authority  "to  initiate  the  work  of  peace  by  diplo- 
matic means."  By  this  he  means  "a  reduction  of  the  war 
aims  heretofore  proclaimed."  TJiis  proposal  is  unani- 
mously rejected.  Marshal  Hindenburg  declares: 

"We  shall  succeed  in  maintaining  ourselves  upon 
French  soil  and  thus  we  shall  eventually  subject  the  enemy 
to  our  will." 

So  it  is  no  longer  a  question  as  it  was  a  month  before 
of  "nach  Paris."  But  successes  in  France  are  still  hoped 
for.  They  are  confident  of  remaining  on  French  soil. 
While  there  they  hope  to  pave  the  way  for  negotiations 
which  will  lead  to  an  advantageous  peace.  In  consequence, 
the  powers  given  to  von  Hintze  for  the  preparation  of 
diplomatic  negotiations  are  strictly  limited  by  "the  main- 
tenance of  the  war  aims  established  in  view  to  victory" 
and  by  the  expectation  of  the  favourable  opportunity  which 
will  be  created  by  the  next  success.* 

From  August  14  to  September  20,  events  both  political 
and  military  were  to  disturb  these  hopeful  expectations. 
The  "local  successes"  did  not  come  off,  on  the  contrary 
five  times  in  five  weeks  the  Allied  forces  advanced.  The 
Franco-British  attack  which  near  Amiens  throws  back  the 
Germans  to  their  old  Chaulnes-Ribecourt  front.  The 
Franco-British  attack  which  from  the  eighteenth  to  the 
twenty-sixth  of  August  reaches  the  Bapeaume-Perrone- 
Nesles-Noyon  line.  The  Franco-British  attack  which  from 
August  30  to  September  10  throws  back  the  enemy  from 


*The  foregoing  account  makes  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  insist  oa  the 
legend  of  "Peace  was  possible  as  early  as  1917."  As  is  well  known,  M. 
Aristide  Briand,  formerly  French  Premier,  was  approached  in  the  middle  of 
1917  by  a  Belgian,  Baron  Copp6e  with  so-called  Peace  proposals  from  Baron 
von  Lancken,  who  bears  so  heavy  a  responsibility  for  the  martyrdom  of  Bel- 
gium. M.  Aristide  Briand,  in  laying  these  overtures  before  M.  Ribot  who  had 
succeeded  him  as  Premier,  appeared  to  believe  that  they  were  serious  and 
would  lead  to  the  restitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  M.  Ribot  on  the  contrary 
thought  that  ' '  it  was  a  trap. "  It  is  clear  from  the  quotations  and  facts  given 
above  that  as  late  as  the  beginning  of  July,  1918,  Germany  intended  to  make 
only  a  peace  with  "the  maintenance  of  the  war  aims  established  in  view  to 
victory,"  that  is  to  say  a  peace  of  annexation  and  not  of  restoration.  The 
•official  evidence  of  Admiral  von  Hintze,  the  Kaiser 's  foreign  Minister,  and  the 
documents  quoted  above  settle  the  question. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  47 

the  Vesle  to  the  Aisne  and  farther  north  almost  to  the 
Hindenburg  line.  The  Franco-British  attack  which  from 
September  18  to  22  pierces  this  line  between  Cambrai  and 
Saint-Quentin.  The  Franco-American  attack  which  from 
September  12  to  15  reduces  the  St.  Mihiel  salient.  By  Sep- 
tember 20  the  enemy  has  lost  nearly  all  the  ground  he  had 
gained  from  March  to  June.  His  forces  have  severely  suf- 
fered. He  has  engaged  163  divisions  of  which  75  have 
been  in  line  two  or  three  times.  He  still  has  68  divisions 
in  reserve  which  is  nine  less  than  in  June,  but  of  these  only 
21  are  fresh  divisions — ten  less  than  in  June.  To  keep  up 
the  effectives  of  these  units  in  the  absence  of  sufficient 
reinforcements,  he  has  had  to  break  up  16  divisions  and  use 
them  as  replacements. 

At  the  same  time  political  difficulties  have  begun.  On 
the  evening  of  the  fourteenth  of  August  and  on  the 
fifteenth,  at  Spa,  the  Emperor  Charles  of  Austria  and  Count 
Burian,  expressed  the  opinion  that  direct  overtures  for 
peace  should  be  made  as  soon  as  possible.  We  have  noted 
the  decisions  arrived  at  by  the  German  Crown  Council  on 
the  fourteenth.  The  Kaiser,  the  Chancellor,  the  Generals 
protest  against  the  suggestion  of  their  Allies.  They  hold 
that  such  a  step  should  only  be  taken  later  on  and  that  then 
it  should  only  be  taken  through  neutral  channels  and  not 
directly.  The  Austrians  departed  unconvinced  and,  on  the 
twenty-first,  telegraphed  a  plan  for  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
belligerents  after  having  tried  to  obtain  for  this  plan  the 
support  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  Excitement  runs  high 
in  Berlin  and  at  Spa.  The  discussion  continues  three 
weeks.  From  September  3  to  5,  von  Hintze  and  his  under 
Secretary  of  State,  von  Stumm,  go  to  Vienna  to  preach 
resistance.  They  seek  delay — at  least  till  the  German  Army 
shall  have  finished  the  strategic  withdrawal  which  is  under 
way.  Hindenburg  intervenes  on  the  tenth  with  a  telegram 
disapproving  the  Austrian  plan  for  a  direct  appeal ' 'harm- 
ful to  our  arms  and  to  our  peoples."  On  the  other  hand 
he  accepts  "the  intervention  of  a  neutral  power  with  a 
view  to  an  immediate  negotiation. ' '  Note  the  change  com- 


48     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

pared  to  the  decisions  of  August  14.  Direct  proposals  of 
peace  will  not  be  made,  but  a  neutral  will  be  asked  to  sug- 
gest it  immediately.  The  Austrians  persist  nevertheless 
in  their  idea  and  on  September  13  launch  their  Note.  Ger- 
many, at  the  same  time,  seeks  the  neutral  who  will  under- 
take the  mission.  The  search  is  long  and  vain.  On  Sep- 
tember 21,  Ludendorff  telegraphs  from  the  great  General 
Headquarters  that  it  might  be  possible  to  get  in  touch  with 
the  United  States.  It  is  a  confused  and  anxious  period. 
Anxiety  and  confusion  are  made  worse  on  the  twenty-sixth 
by  news  that  Bulgaria  intends  to  conclude  a  separate  peace. 
Germany  decides  to  send  troops  there.  But  it  is  already 
too  late  and  on  the  twenty-ninth  the  Bulgarian  Armistice 
is  signed  at  Salonica.  Chancellor  von  Hertling  had 
declared  on  September  3  at  the  Council  of  Ministers: 

"We  must  say  to  our  enemies,  'You  see  that  you  cannot 

beat  us but  we  are  always  ready  as  we  have  told  you 

unequivocally  on  several  occasions  to  conclude  a  peace  full 
of  honour.'  " 

The  succession  of  Allied  victories,  the  Austrian  mani- 
festations, the  Bulgarian  Armistice  completely  change  this 
situation.  Is  Germany  ready  to  sue  for  peace — not  offer 
it?  That  is  how  the  question  now  presents  itself.  Listen 
to  the  answer. 

This  answer  comes  from  a  quarter  whence  even  yester- 
day it  was  the  least  expected  and  in  a  form  which  aggra- 
vates its  astounding  nature.  It  is  the  first  of  October.  It 
is  one  o  'clock  in  the  afternoon.  General  Ludendorff  sends 
for  the  two  liaison  officers  of  the  Chancellery  at  Great 
General  Headquarters,  Baron  von  Grunau  and  Baron  von 
Lersner,  and  says  to  them : 

"I  beg  you  to  transmit  an  urgent  request  with  a  view  to 
the  immediate  despatch  of  our  offer  of  peace.  To-day  the 
troops  are  holding,  but  one  cannot  foresee  what  may  hap- 
pen to-morrow." 

Half  an  hour  later  at  1:30  p.  M.  Marshal  Hindenburg 
intervenes,  and  referring  to  the  report  that  a  new  Chancel- 
lor will  be  appointed  that  evening  or  the  next  day,  says : 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  49 

"If  the  formation  of  the  Government  remains  the  least 
in  doubt  and  is  not  certain  for  this  evening  between  seven 
and  eight  o'clock,  I  am  of  opinion  that  it  is  necessary  this 
very  night  to  send  our  declaration  to  the  foreign 
Governments." 

At  two  o'clock  the  liaison  officers  confirm  the  preced- 
ing declarations.  Baron  von  Grunau  adds: 

"My  impression  is  that  everyone  here  has  lost  his 
'  self -control. '  " 

He  goes  off  to  the  Emperor  who  agrees  with  him  that, 
in  order  to  take  steps  for  peace,  it  is  necessary  to  await  till 
the  new  Government  has  been  formed.  But  General 
Ludendorf  f  insists : 

"We  are  still  in  honourable  posture.  But  our  line  may 
be  broken  through  at  any  moment  and  then  our  peace  offer 
will  arrive  at  the  most  unfavourable  moment.  I  have  the 
sensation  of  playing  a  game  of  Chance.  At  any  moment 
and  at  any  point,  a  division  may  fail  in  its  duty." 

At  nine  o  'clock  that  night,  he  demands  that  to  the  offer 
of  peace  shall  be  added  a  request  for  the  designation  of 
the  point  of  meeting  for  the  negotiation  of  the  Armistice. 
He  even  goes  so  far  as  to  give  the  names  of  the  men  who 
will  form  the  Armistice  Commission  including  an  Austrian 
and  a  Turk.  At  midnight  he  reiterates: 

"The  offer  of  peace  must  be  transmitted  immediately 
from  Berne  to  Washington.  The  Army  cannot  wait  an- 
other forty-eight  hours." 

Panic  reigns.  Events  prove  this:  for  the  Army,  which 
according  to  the  General  "cannot  wait  another  forty-eight 
hours,"  will  continue  to  fight  without  let-up  till  November 
11.  This  panic  seems  to  be  due  to  three  reasons.  The  first 
is  that  the  military  situation,  although  not  hopeless,  is  bad. 
The  second  is  that  the  Great  General  Staff,  so  overbearing 
three  months  ago,  is  anxious  to  share  its  responsibility  with 
civilians.  The  third  is  that  like  many  Germans  the  Great 
General  Staff  cherishes  extraordinary  illusions  about  the 


50     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

terror  Germany  inspires,  the  weakness  of  President  Wil- 
son, the  divisions  among  the  Allies,  and  the  nature  of  the 
terms  it  will  be  possible  to  obtain.  Prince  Max  of  Baden — 
who  that  very  evening  had  become  Chancellor  of  the  Em- 
pire and  head  of  a  Cabinet  chosen  with  the  approval  of  the 
Reichstag — receives  an  avalanche  of  alarmist  telegrams 
on  taking  up  his  duties.  He  becomes  indignant  and  insists 
upon  getting  information  before  taking  action.  A  repre- 
sentative of  the  Great  General  Staff — Major  von  dem 
Bussche — explains  the  situation  on  October  2.  He  is  less 
pessimistic  than  his  Chief  but  reserved  and  embarrassed, 
on  the  whole  far  from  reassuring.  Among  other  things 
he  says : 

"The  Entente,  by  attacking  along  the  whole  front, 
obliged  us  to  scatter  our  reserves.  Of  the  divisions  on  the 
Eastern  front  which  were  intended  for  the  Western  front, 
seven  were  immobilized  by  the  events  in  Bulgaria.  The 
enemy  has  placed  in  action  a  great  many  more  tanks  than 
was  expected.  The  German  troops  have  fought  well.  But 
the  strength  of  our  battalions  has  fallen  to  540  men — and 
that  despite  the  breaking  up  for  replacements  of  22  divi- 
sions, equal  to  66  regiments.  No  reinforcements  are  in 
sight.  The  Allies,  on  the  contrary,  thanks  to  the  Ameri- 
cans, are  in  a  position  to  make  good  their  losses ....  The 
German  Army  is  still  strong  enough  to  withstand  the  enemy 
for  months,  to  win  local  successes  and  to  force  the  Entente 
to  make  fresh  sacrifices.  But  the  High  Command  believes, 
as  far  as  man  can  judge — there  is  no  longer  any  possibility 
of  forcing  the  enemy  to  make  peace." 

The  Chancellor  would  like  to  have  at  least  eight  days 
respite.  General  Ludendorff,  for  all  answer,  demands 
twice  in  succession  the  text  of  the  peace  offer.  The  Chan- 
cellor asks  questions:  "For  how  long  can  the  Army  hold 
the  frontiers?  Does  the  great  General  Staff  expect  the 
front  to  give  way?  If  so,  when?  Does  it  realize  that,  if 
peace  negotiations  are  initiated  under  the  pressure  of  a 
critical  military  situation,  it  may  lead  to  the  loss  of  the 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  51 

Colonies,  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  of  the  Polish  provinces!" 
To  these  questions,  there  is  only  one  reply  made,  on  Octo- 
ber 3,  under  the  signature  of  Marshal  Hindenburg  who  in 
Berlin  on  that  day  sends  the  following  letter  to  the 
Chancellor : 

The  Supreme  Command  of  the  Army  maintains  its  demand, 
formulated  on  Sunday,  September  29,  1918,  for  an  immediate  offer 
of  peace  to  our  enemies. 

As  the  result  of  the  breakdown  of  the  Macedonian  front  and  of 
the  reduction  of  reserves  it  has  led  to  on  the  Western  front,  as  a 
result  also  of  the  impossibility  in  which  we  are  to  make  good  the 
very  losses  that  have  been  inflicted  on  us  in  the  fighting  of  the  past 
ten  days,  there  no  longer  remains  any  hope — as  far  as  man  can 
judge — of  forcing  the  enemy  to  make  peace. 

The  enemy  on  its  side  is  daily  throwing  fresh  reserves  into  the 
struggle.  Nevertheless  the  German  Army  remains  firm  and  vic- 
toriously repulses  all  attacks.  But  the  situation  becomes  more 
critical  every  day  and  may  force  the  High  Command  to  take 
measures  the  consequence  of  which  will  be  very  serious. 

Under  the  circumstances  it  is  better  to  cease  the  struggle  to  save 
the  German  people  and  their  Allies  from  useless  losses. 

Every  day  lost  costs  us  thousands  of  brave  soldiers. 

The  Chancellor  yielded  to  this  pressure,  and  on  October 
5  telegraphs  through  the  Swiss  Government  to  President 
"Wilson  to  beg  him  to  summon  the  belligerents  to  peace 
negotiations  upon  the  basis  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  and  to 
put  an  end  to  bloodshed  by  the  immediate  conclusion  of  an 
Armistice.  Everybody,  except  Prince  Max  von  Baden,  the 
Vice-Chancellor  von  Payer,  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
Solf,  seems  to  believe  that  by  itself  this  cable  will  suffice  to 
relieve  the  crisis.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Germany  by  send- 
ing this  despatch,  delivers  herself  into  the  hands  of  the 
Allies.  The  situation  from  now  on  to  the  eleventh  of  No- 
vember is  to  develop  with  the  relentless  logic  of  triumphant 
Fate. 


52     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY, 

III 

On  October  6  the  Ministers  hold  a  meeting.  They  would 
like  to  hear  other  generals  besides  General  Ludendorff. 
Von  Payer  says : 

"We  must;  Ludendorff 's  nerves  are  no  longer  equal  to 
the  strain." 

It  is  decided  to  seek  the  intervention  of  the  Kaiser — 
for  the  resignation  of  the  First  Quartermaster  General  is 
feared  if  an  attempt  is  made  to  consult  his  subordinates. 
On  October  8  President  Wilson  replies  to  the  German  Note 
of  the  fifth.  It  is  a  brief  reply  which  throws  the  recipients 
into  consternation  they  cannot  conceal.  No  conversation 
is  possible,  declares  the  President,  either  on  peace  or  on  an 
armistice  until  preliminary  guarantees  shall  have  been  fur- 
nished. These  are  the  acceptation  pure  and  simple  of  the 
bases  of  peace  laid  down  on  January  8,  1918,  and  in  the 
President's  subsequent  addresses;  the  certainty  that  the 
Chancellor  does  not  speak  only  in  the  name  of  the  consti- 
tuted authorities  who  so  far  have  been  responsible  for  the 
conduct  of  the  war;  the  evacuation  of  all  invaded  terri- 
tories. The  President  will  transmit  no  communication  to 
his  associates  before  having  received  full  satisfaction  on 
these  three  points. 

The  German  Ministers  hold  a  council  again.  There  are 
successive  conferences  on  the  ninth,  the  tenth,  the  eleventh 
and  the  twelfth.  General  Ludendorff  is  present  at  the 
first.  The  Ministers  make  him  feel  that  the  responsibility 
for  the  present  situation  is  his  and  therefore  his  also  the 
responsibility  for  the  answer  which  must  be  prepared.  He 
addresses  them  at  length.  He  begins  with  a  long  historical 
disquisition;  ends  in  a  profuse  and  contradictory  sea  of 
words.  At  times  he  is  reassuring: 

"I  see  no  immediate  danger  for  the  Lorraine  frontier. 
The  Ehenish  provinces  can  be  held  for  a  long  time  yet. 
Once  we  are  back  on  our  own  frontier  the  Army  will  be  able 
to  repulse  any  enemy  attack." 

At  times  he  gives  way  to  alarmist  outbursts: 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  53 

"The  danger  of  a  break  through  is  always  there.  I  do 
not  fear  it.  But  it  is  possible.  Yesterday  its  success  hung 
upon  a  thread.  The  Armies  must  have  rest." 

But  of  positive  conclusions  none.  He  maintains  that 
the  offer  of  peace  and  even  more  so  the  Armistice  are  indis- 
pensable, but  as  to  the  attitude  to  be  taken  in  presence  of 
the  conditions  which  are  attached  to  the  one  and  to  the 
other  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  not  a  word  that 
is  clear  or  plain : 

"We  cannot  give  up  German  fortresses.  The  demand 
for  the  evacuation  of  Metz  would  be  contrary  to  our 
honour.  I  do  not  fear  a  catastrophe.  But  I  am  anxious  to 
save  the  Army  so  as  to  be  able  to  have  it  still  as  a  means 
of  pressure  during  the  peace  negotiations." 

Here  perhaps  we  have  the  true  inwardness  of  his 
thoughts.  To  negotiate  and  gain  time  to  recuperate,  so  as 
if  need  be  to  break  off  afterwards.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
German  General  Staff,  during  this  period,  sought  a  sus- 
pension of  arms  rather  than  a  definite  peace.  On  the  ninth, 
it  still  thought  that  it  could  obtain  it.  Hence  its  interven- 
tions in  the  preparation  of  the  reply;  hence  its  attempts 
at  equivocation  and  ruse.  The  reply  was  sent  on  the  twelfth 
in  the  name  of  Germany  and  of  Austria-Hungary.  Ger- 
many accepts  the  Fourteen  Points  and  assumes  that  its 
Allies  will  do  likewise;  the  Chancellor,  in  full  accord  with 
the  Reichstag,  speaks  in  the  name  of  the  Government  and 
of  the  German  people;  Germany  is  disposed  to  "accede  to 
the  proposals  of  evacuation" — that  is  where  the  rub  comes 
— but  she  thinks  they  ought  to  be  the  object  of  preliminary 
negotiations  and  suggests  the  appointment  of  a  mixed  com- 
mission to  deal  with  this  matter.  If  the  Allies  lend  them- 
selves to  this,  Germany  is  saved  for  the  time  being.  She 
will  be  able  to  withdraw  her  material  to  the  rear  and 
regroup  her  forces.  Pending  the  meeting  of  the  mixed 
Commission  and  during  the  protracted  discussion  of 
evacuation, — "methodical  evacuation"  as  Hindenburg  said 
— she  will  have  the  time  to  rebuild  an  army.  The  Ministers 
agree  to  this  draft.  But  they  are  careful  to  obtain  from 


54     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Marshal  Hindenburg  and  General  Ludendorff  their  ap- 
proval in  writing.  The  manoeuvre,  unskilled  though  it  be, 
inspires  hope  in  all. 

Then  comes  the  thunderbolt.  President  Wilson  refuses 
to  fall  into  the  trap  and  crossing  swords  in  earnest  presses 
his  attack  to  the  utmost  in  the  Note  of  October  14.  A  mixed 
Commission  for  evacuation?  No!  These  are  matters 
which  like  the  Armistice  itself  "must  be  left  to  the  judg- 
ment and  advice  of  the  military  advisers  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Governments."  Besides  no  Armistice  is  pos- 
sible if  it  does  not  furnish  "absolutely  satisfactory  safe- 
guards and  guarantees  of  the  maintenance  of  the  present 
military  supremacy  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States  and 
of  its  Allies. "  Besides,  no  Armistice  "so  long  as  the  armed 
forces  of  Germany  continue  the  illegal  and  inhuman  prac- 
tices which  they  still  persist  in."  Finally  no  Armistice  so 
long  as  the  German  nation  shall  be  in  the  hands  of  the  mili- 
tary power  which  has  disturbed  the  peace  of  the  world.  As 
to  Austria-Hungary,  Germany  has  no  interest  therein  and 
the  President  will  reply  directly.  In  a  single  page  the 
whole  poor  scaffolding  of  the  German  Great  General  Staff 
is  overthrown.  The  Armistice  and  peace  are  not  to  be 
means  of  delaying  a  disaster  and  of  preparing  revenge. 
On  the  main  question  itself  the  reply  must  be  Yes  or  No ! 
If  it  is  no,  war  will  continue,  as  it  has  gone  on  for  the 
last  three  months,  by  Allied  victories.  If  it  is  yes,  the  mili- 
tary capitulation  must  be  immediate  and  complete  by  the 
acceptance  pure  and  simple  of  terms  which  will  be  fixed  by 
the  military  advisers  of  the  Allies  alone. 

This  time  the  Germans  understand.  As  Colonel  Heye 
of  the  German  General  Staff  will  say  a  few  days  later,  on 
October  17,  "One  realizes  that  it  is  a  question  of  'to  be  or 
not  to  be,'  "  and  the  military  shrink  back  fearful  of  the 
consequences  of  their  pressing  insistence  on  October  1. 
As  soon  as  Mr.  Wilson's  answer  is  known,  General  Luden- 
dorff has  telegraphed  to  hasten  the  return  of  troops  from 
the  Near  East — the  usefulness  of  which  had  seemed  to  him 
questionable  on  the  ninth — and  has  suggested  that  an  ap- 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  55 

peal  should  be  made  to  the  German  people — the  outcome 
of  which  he  had  declared,  on  the  same  day,  would  be 
ridiculous.  On  the  seventeenth,  he  arrives  in  Berlin  and 
appears  before  the  Government.  The  Chancellor  reminds 
Ludendorff  rather  sharply  that  fifteen  days  previously  he 
had  been  obliged,  much  against  his  will,  to  do  the  General's 
bidding  and  demands  an  explanation.  Ludendorff  becomes 
overbearing : 

"I  have  already  said  to  you,  Mr.  Chancellor,  that  I 
consider  a  break  through  possible,  but  not  probable.  If 
you  question  me  I  can  conscientiously  only  give  you  this 
reply.  I  do  not  fear  a  break  through.  If  I  am  given  rein- 
forcements I  look  upon  the  future  with  confidence.  If 
the  Army  holds  for  four  weeks  and  winter  arrives,  we 
shall  be  out  of  difficulty.  The  offensive  strength  of  our 
enemies  has  recently  been  very  weak.  If  our  battalions 
were  at  normal  strength,  the  situation  would  be  saved. 
Neither  aviation  nor  tanks  alarm  me.  If  the  Armistice 
negotiations  were  to  begin,  the  undertaking  to  evacuate 
occupied  territory  would  alone  and  in  itself  constitute  a 
real  aggravation  of  our  military  situation.  Already  the 
mere  fact  that  it  is  spoken  of  has  had  untoward  conse- 
quences. Yesterday  and  the  day  before  the  enemy  has 
made  little  progress.  We  ought  to  say  to  our  enemies  be- 
fore accepting  conditions  which  are  too  hard,  'Come  and 
take  them  by  force. '  ' ' 

Such  glaring  contradictions  exasperated  the  Ministers, 
especially  Secretary  of  State  Solf  who  reminds  General 
Ludendorff  of  his  appeals  of  October  1.  The  reply  is: 

''Why  didn't  you  send  me  long  ago  the  reinforcements 
about  which  you  are  talking  to-day?" 

And  Colonel  Heye  adds: 

"When  the  Great  General  Headquarters  decided  to 
make  an  offer  of  peace,  it  believed  that  an  honourable 
peace  could  be  concluded.  But  we  must  accept  the  decisive 
battle  if  the  conditions  imposed  upon  us  touch  our  honour." 

Mr.  Solf  replies : 


56     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

"If  a  refusal  breaks  off  the  negotiations  with  Wilson, 
will  you  take  the  responsibility?" 

"Yes,"  answers  the  General. 

They  separate  without  coming  to  a  decision  and  on  the 
twentieth  Ludendorff  pushes  forward  Marshal  Hinden- 
burg  who  writes  an  embarrassed  epistle  of  which  this  is 
the  essential  phrase : 

If  we  were  beaten,  our  situation  which  is  bad  would  not  be 
appreciably  worse  than  if  we  now  accept  the  terms  it  is  sought  to 
impose  upon  us ...  We  cannot,  I  insist,  give  up  submarine  war- 
fare without  compensation.  It  is  better  to  fight  to  the  last  man  to 
save  our  honour. 

These  are  only  words.  They  are  without  effect,  for  the 
High  Command  has  lost  its  face.  It  talks,  it  writes:  no 
one  believes  it.  Baron  von  Lersner,  liaison  officer  at  Ger- 
man Headquarters,  telephones  a  few  days  afterwards : 

The  great  General  Staff  is  furious.  But  basing  myself  upon  the 
long  experience  I  have  of  it  I  can  only  place  you  on  your  guard  in 
the  most  pressing  manner  against  the  possibility  of  having  faith  in 
its  promises,  and  I  recommend  that  you  do  not  allow  yourself  to  be 
turned  away  from  the  policy  of  peace  which  we  have  adopted.  The 
military  situation  is  to-day  every  bit  as  desperate  as  it  was  three 
weeks  ago.  No  improvement  is  to  be  looked  for  and  the  invasion  of 
our  territory  is  only  a  question  of  weeks  or  at  the  very  best  of  a  few 
months. 

The  truth  is  that  it  is  Ludendorff  who  is  wrong  and 
Lersner  who  is  right.  Since  September  20,  Marshal  Foch, 
who  had  regained  the  initiative  on  July  18,  has  exploited 
his  success.  Three  concentric  and  uninterrupted  attacks 
on  a  wide  front  have  deeply  modified  the  strategic  situa- 
tion. In  the  north,  from  September  18  to  October  18,  the 
enemy  has  been  driven  from  the  Belgian  coast,  from  the 
region  of  Lille,  from  the  basin  of  Lens  and  has  been 
forced  to  establish  himself  behind  the  Tervueren  Canal, 
the  Scheldt  and  the  Northern  Canal.  In  the  center  from 
September  27  to  October  19,  the  Hindenburg  line  has 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  57 

everywhere  been  broken  through  and  the  enemy  is  thrown 
back  beyond  the  Sambre  Canal,  the  Oise  and  the  Serre.  In 
Champagne  and  in  Argonne  a  hard  and  arduous  battle 
brings  us,  between  September  16  and  October  12,  up  to  the 
Aisne  and  the  Aire.  On  October  20  the  German  Armies 
from  the  Sea  to  the  Meuse  are  everywhere  in  retreat.  In 
four  weeks,  they  have  had  to  engage  139  divisions  out  of  a 
total  of  191.  They  have  only  seven  fresh  divisions  in 
reserve  and  forty-four  are  utterly  worn  out.  The  average 
strength  of  the  companies  is  only  fifty  men,  although  40 
per  cent,  of  the  battalions  have  been  reduced  from  four 
companies  to  three.  Two-thirds  of  their  divisions  have 
been  almost  constantly  in  line  since  September  1.  They 
are  short  seventy  thousand  reinforcements  every  month, 
although  the  class  of  1920  is  already  called  to  the  colours. 
War  material  cannot  be  renewed.  Compared  to  June 
there  are  25  per  cent,  less  machine  guns,  17  per  cent,  less 
field  pieces,  and  26  per  cent,  less  heavy  artillery.  The 
lateral  railways  which  from  one  end  of  the  front  to  the 
other  permit  transports  of  men  and  material,  the  v oies 
de  rocade,  of  which  the  German  staff  made  so  fruitful  a 
use  during  the  war,  are  no  longer  at  their  disposal — four  of 
the  secondary  lines  and  one  principal  line  are  wholly  or  in 
part  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies.  Those  which  remain  are 
almost  blocked  with  supplies  and  evacuations,  so  much  so 
that  in  the  three  first  weeks  of  October  it  has  only  been 
possible  to  displace  three  divisions  laterally,  instead  of 
nineteen  so  moved  in  May.  Remember  also  that  an  enor- 
mous amount  of  war  material  is  scattered  all  along  the 
front  and  behind  it.  To  save  this,  Germany  has  abandoned 
the  opportunity  that  a  rapid  retreat  might  have  afforded. 
Besides,  this  retreat  is  difficult  for  the  forces  which  are 
at  a  distance  from  the  German  frontier,  that  is  to  say  for 
the  group  of  Armies  of  the  German  Crown  Prince  and  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  130  divisions  in  all  that  have 
only  a  zone  of  75  kilometers  in  width  through  which  to  with- 
draw. Finally  the  morale  is  low,  very  low,  Hopes  had 
run  so  high  in  July!  The  Great  General  Staff  says  it  is 


58     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  fault  of  the  Government  which  has  not  the  interior  well 
in  hand.  The  Government  is  right  in  replying  that  it  is 
rather  the  fault  of  events. 

The  Generals  have  demanded  the  Armistice,  the  Minis- 
ters take  them  at  their  word  because  they  believe  with  von 
Lersner  that  "the  invasion  of  German  territory  is  only  a 
matter  of  weeks  or  at  most  of  a  few  months."  Invasion: 
A  word  that  for  a  hundred  years  Germany  has  been  wont 
to  apply  only  to  its  adversaries.  It  becomes  the  obsession 
of  the  Government.  Capitulation  on  terms  to  be  fixed  by 
the  victors  alone  in  accordance  with  President  Wilson's 
decision.  Or  invasion  with  the  sole  resources  of  a  levee 
en  masse  peculiarly  problematical  in  a  country  that  has 
already  called  14,000,000  men  to  the  colours.  But  there  is 
no  other  alternative.  The  Ministers  make  their  choice. 
They  will  capitulate. 

After  a  week  of  consideration,  of  hesitation,  of  ex- 
changes with  the  Great  General  Staff  on  which  they  are 
determined  to  pin  the  initial  responsibility,  the  Ministers 
are  to  reply  011  October  21  to  the  American  Note  of  the 
fourteenth.  This  time  there  can  be  no  playing  on  words, 
no  talk  of  negotiation,  for  it  is  only  a  question  of  submis- 
sion. Evacuation  of  occupied  territory?  The  demand  is 
accepted.  Armistice?  Germany  recognizes  that  its  terms 
must  be  left  to  the  appreciation  of  the  competent  military 
authorities.  Illegal  acts  committed  by  the  German  forces? 
These  are  destructions  necessary  in  a  retreat  and  per- 
mitted by  international  law ;  strict  instructions  will  never- 
theless be  given  that  private  property  shall  be  respected. 
Torpedoings?  Not  deliberate;  orders  however  have  been 
sent  to  the  commanders  to  spare  passenger  ships.  Sup- 
pression of  the  arbitrary  power?  It  is  already  accom- 
plished; the  Cabinet  is  responsible  to  Parliament;  the 
Constitution  will  be  revised;  the  Government  is  free  from 
any  military  or  irresponsible  influence.  This  time  Ger- 
many bound  hand  and  foot  is  rivetted  to  Wilsonian 
dialectics.  Since  she  does  not  break,  she  gives  herself  up. 
The  President  takes  good  note  thereof  on  October  23,  in 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  59 

announcing  that  having  received  all  the  undertakings  de- 
manded in  his  preceding  Messages,  he  has  informed  his 
Associates.  And  once  again  so  that  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
he  repeats  the  fundamental  conditions  from  which  Ger- 
many cannot  escape. 

1.  The  Armistice  will  be  concluded  only  if  the  military 
advisers  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  deem 
it  possible  from  the  military  point  of  view. 

2.  The  only  Armistice  which  can  be  suggested  to  the 
Associated  Governments  will  be  an  Armistice  that  will 
render  impossible   (where  are  the  German  hopes  of  the 
beginning  of  October!)   any  resumption  of  hostilities  by 
Germany  and  leave  the  Associated  Powers  in  a  position 
to  enforce  any  arrangements  that  may  be  entered  into. 

3.  The  peoples  of  the  world  have  and  can  have  no 
confidence  in  the  word  of  those  who  have  hitherto  been 
the  masters  of  Germany.    Nothing  could  be  gained  by  not 
stating  these  essential  conditions. 

On  October  21,  Germany  had  admitted  her  defeat.  It 
remained  for  the  Allied  Governments  to  fix  the  conditions 
of  their  victory  and  the  bases  of  their  security. 

IV 

On  October  23  President  Wilson  who,  since  the  fifth, 
has  remained  in  daily  contact  with  the  European  Govern- 
ments and  has  given  out  his  correspondence  with  Ger- 
many, day  by  day,  communicates  this  correspondence 
officially  to  his  associates  and  asks  them  two  questions : 

1.  Regarding  the  peace,  and  in  view  of  the  assurances 
given  by  the  Chancellor,  are  the  Associated  Governments 
ready  to  conclude  peace  on  the  terms  and  according  to  the 
principles  already  made  public? 

2.  Regarding  the  Armistice  and  if  the  reply  to  the 
previous  question  is  in  the  affirmative,  are  the  Associated 
Governments  ready  to  ask  their  military  advisers  and  the 
military  advisers  of  the  United  States  to  submit  to  them 
the  necessary  conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  by  an 


60     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Armistice  such  as  will  protect  absolutely  the  interests  of 
the  peoples  concerned  and  to  assure  to  the  Associated  Gov- 
ernments unlimited  power  to  safeguard  and  impose  the 
details  of  the  peace  to  which  the  German  Government  has 
consented,  provided  always  that  the  military  advisers  con- 
sider such  an  armistice  possible  from  a  military  point  of 
view? 

I  do  not  believe  that  ever  problem  was  more  clearly 
defined. 

First,  the  question  of  principle; — do  the  commanding 
generals  believe  that  from  a  military  point  of  view  hostili- 
ties can  be  suspended,  or  do  they  believe  on  the  contrary 
that  they  should  be  continued? 

Second,  the  question  of  execution.  If  the  Armistice  is 
possible  and  desirable,  what  are  the  conditions  necessary 
to  prevent  Germany  from  beginning  the  war  again  and  to 
permit  the  Allies  to  impose  their  terms  of  peace? 

It  is  to  the  military  authorities  that  Mr.  "Wilson  asks 
that  these  two  questions  shall  be  submitted.  It  is  to  them 
that  he  entrusts  in  this  matter  the  sovereign  rights  of  the 
Governments.  M.  Clemenceau  is,  on  this  point,  in  com- 
plete agreement  with  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
To  stop  the  hostilities  otherwise  than  on  the  express  advice 
and  in  the  manner  fixed  by  the  chiefs  who  have  had  the 
responsibility  of  the  military  operations  would  be  con- 
trary to  all  the  principles  which  have  inspired  his  war 
policy.  In  the  name  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies, 
over  which  he  presides,  he  therefore  transmits  the  corre- 
spondence to  Marshal  Foch,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who 
by  virtue  of  his  position  and  his  responsibility  is  to  answer 
the  two  questions  asked. 

On  October  25,  Marshal  Foch  summons  to  Senlis,  Gen- 
eral Petain,  Marshal  Haig,  General  Pershing  and  General 
Gillain,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Belgian  Army.  The  latter 
however  is  delayed  and  does  not  attend  the  meeting.  The 
Commander-in-Chief  reads  the  correspondence  to  them  and 
asks  their  advice.  None  of  them  proposes  to  refuse  the 
Armistice.  On  the  terms  of  the  Armistice  their  opinions  are 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  61 

divided.  Field  Marshal  Sir  Douglas  Haig  speaks  first.  In 
his  view  the  Armistice  should  be  concluded  and  concluded 
on  very  moderate  terms.  The  victorious  Allied  Armies  are 
extenuated.  The  units  need  to  be  reorganized.  Germany 
is  not  broken  in  the  military  sense.  During  the  last  weeks 
her  Armies  have  withdrawn  fighting  very  bravely  and  in 
excellent  order.  Therefore,  if  it  is  really  desired  to  con- 
clude an  armistice — and  this  in  his  view  is  very  desirable — 
it  is  necessary  to  grant  Germany  conditions  which  she  can 
accept.  That  is  to  say  the  evacuation  of  the  invaded  ter- 
ritory in  France  and  Belgium  as  well  as  Alsace-Lorraine, 
and  the  restitution  of  the  rolling  stock  taken  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  from  the  French  and  Belgians.  If  more  is 
demanded,  there  is  a  risk  of  prolonging  the  war,  which  has 
already  cost  so  much,  and  of  exasperating  German  national 
feeling,  with  very  doubtful  results.  For  the  evacuation  of 
all  invaded  territories  and  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  sufficient 
to  seal  the  victory. 

General  Pershing  says  that,  as  Chief  of  the  American 
Army  in  France,  he  desires  first  to  hear  what  General 
Petain  has  to  say  and  to  give  his  opinion  afterwards. 
General  Petain  is  of  opinion,  that  if  an  armistice  is  con- 
cluded, it  must  be  a  real  armistice  complying  fully  and 
completely  with  the  definition  laid  down  by  President  Wil- 
son in  his  Note  of  October  23;  an  armistice  making  it 
impossible  for  the  enemy  to  resume  hostilities  and  per- 
mitting the  Allies  to  impose  their  own  terms  of  peace.  For 
that,  two  things  are  essential:  the  first  is  that  the  German 
Army  should  return  to  Germany  without  a  cannon  or  a 
tank,  and  with  only  its  carrying  arms.  To  attain  this,  he 
makes  practical  suggestions.  The  specification  of  a  time 
for  withdrawal  so  short  that  it  will  be  materially  impos- 
sible for  the  enemy  to  carry  away  his  war  material.  In 
addition  to  the  evacuation  by  the  Germans  of  all  invaded 
territory  and  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  occupation  by  the 
Allied  Armies  not  only  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  but  of 
a  zone  fifty  kilometers  wide  on  the  right  bank ;  at  the  same 
time  the  delivery  of  5,000  locomotives  and  100,000  cars 


62     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

should  be  demanded.  General  Petain  adds  however  that, 
although  these  conditions  are  indispensable  in  his  opinion, 
it  is  hardly  expected  that  the  Germans  will  accept  them. 

General  Pershing  in  a  few  words,  says  that  he  agrees 
with  General  Petain.  Marshal  Foch  thanks  his  guests  for 
their  suggestions  which  he  will  consider.  The  conference 
ends.  The  next  day,  October  26,  Marshal  Foch  communi- 
cates his  final  conclusions  to  M.  Clemenceau  by  letter. 
Extracts  of  this  letter  have  been  published.  It  is  well  to 
quote  it  here  in  its  entirety  as  far  as  the  Western  front  is 
concerned. 

After  haying  consulted  the  Commanders-in-  Chief  of  the  Amer- 
ican, British  and  French  Armies,*  I  have  the  honour  to  make 
known  to  you  the  military  conditions  under  which  can  be  granted 
an  armistice  ' '  capable ' '  of  protecting  absolutely  the  interests  of  the 
nations  concerned  and  assuring  to  the  Associated  Governments 
unlimited  power  to  safeguard  and  impose  the  conditions  of  Peace 
to  which  the  German  Government  has  consented. 

I.  Immediate  evacuation  of  all  territory  invaded  contrary  to 
law:  Belgium,  France,  Alsace-Lorraine,  Luxemburg. 

Immediate  repatriation  of  their  inhabitants. 

Surrender  of  part  of  the  enemy  war  material  in  the  evacuated 
regions. 

This  evacuation  to  be  effected  with  a  degree  of  speed  that  will 
make  it  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  remove  a  large  part  of  the  war 
material  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  now  there ;  that  is  to  say  in  the 
following  delays : 

At  the  end  of  four  days  the  German  troops  must  have  with- 
drawn beyond  the  first  line  on  the  accompanying  map ; 

At  the  end  of  four  more  days  they  must  be  beyond  the  second 
line; 

At  the  end  of  a  further  period  of  six  days  they  must  be  beyond 
the  third  line ; 

Belgium,  Luxemburg  and  Alsace-Lorraine  will  thus  be  liberated 
within  a  total  time  of  fourteen  days; 

The  time  limits  will  run  from  the  day  of  the  signature  of  the 
Armistice. 


*The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Belgian  Army  summoned  at  the  same  time  as 
the  Commanders-in-Chief  could  not  on  account  of  the  distance  reach  my  II.  Q. 
in  time. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  63 

In  any  case  the  total  material  left  behind  by  the  enemy  must 
amount  to : 

5,000  cannon  (half  heavy,  half  field  pieces)*. 

30,000  machine  gunst. 

3,000  minnenwerfer. 

To  be  delivered  where  they  now  are  in  a  manner  to  be  later 
determined. 

The  Allied  troops  will  follow  up  in  these  regions  the  progress  of 
the  evacuation  which  will  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  reg- 
ulations to  be  later  determined. 

II.  Evacuation  of  the  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
by  the  enemy  Armies. 

The  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  will  continue  to  be 
administered  by  the  local  authorities  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Allied  Armies  of  occupation. 

The  Allied  forces  will  assure  the  occupation  of  this  territory  by 
garrisons  holding  the  principal  Rhine  crossings  (Mayence,  Co- 
blenz,  Strassburg),  with  at  these  points  bridgeheads  of  thirty  kilo- 
meters radius  on  the  right  bank. 

Holding  also  the  strategic  points  of  the  region.  A  neutral  zone 
will  be  established  on  the  right  bank  on  the  river  running  parallel 
to  the  river  and  forty  kilometers  to  the  east  of  it  from  the  Swiss  to 
the  Dutch  frontiers. 

The  evacuation  by  the  enemy  of  the  Rhine  territories  must  be 
completed  within  the  following  time  limits : 

Up  to  the  Rhine,  eight  days  over  and  above  the  time  limits  set 
above  (that  is  to  say  twenty-two  days  in  all  from  the  signature  of 
the  Armistice). 

Beyond  the  neutral  zone;  three  additional  days  (twenty-five 
days  in  all  from  the  signature  of  the  Armistice). 

III.  In  all  the  territories  evacuated  by  the  enemy  there  must 
be  no  destruction  of  any  kind  and  no  harm  must  be  done  to  the 
persons  or  property  of  the  inhabitants. 

IV.  The  enemy  must  deliver  under  conditions  to  be  determined 
5,000  locomotives  and  150,000  cars  in  good  running  order.:}: 


*0r  about  one-third  of  the  artillery  of  the  German  Army. 

tOr  about  half  the  machine  guns  of  the  German  Army. 

JOf  these  amounts  2,500  locomotives  and  135,000  cars  represent  the  rolling 
stock  carried  off  from  France  and  Belgium,  the  surplus  is  needed  for  the 
service  of  the  railroads  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 


64     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

V.  The  German  High  Command  must  be  bound  to  reveal  the 
position  of  all  mines  or  retarded  mines  laid  in  the  evacuated  ter- 
ritories and  to   assist  in  their  location  and   destruction   under 
penalty  of  reprisals. 

VI.  The  compliance  by  the  enemy  with  these  conditions  will 
occupy  a  total  of  twenty-five  days.     In  order  to  guarantee  its 
execution,  the  blockade  will  be  maintained  during  this  period.    It 
is  only  at  the  expiration  of  this  delay  and  after  these  conditions 
have  been  fulfilled  that  the  sending  of  food  supplies  to  the  enemy 
can  be  authorized  on  conditions  to  be  determined  by  separate 
agreement. 

VII.  Allied  prisoners  to  be  returned  in  the  shortest  possible 
time  in  a  manner  to  be  determined  later. 

This  letter  calls  for  no  comment.  Marshal  Foch  has 
taken  counsel  and  considered.  He  has  put  to  himself  the 
question  he  urged  upon  his  pupils  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre. 
"What  is  the  object?"  To  break  the  fighting  strength  of 
Germany;  to  oblige  Germany  to  submit  to  conditions  of 
peace  whatever  they  may  be.  In  order  to  make  sure  of  this, 
can  we  confine  ourselves  to  Marshal  Haig's  suggestions? 
No;  for  the  German  Army  after  evacuating  the  invaded 
territories,  which  it  would  leave  with  the  honours  of  war, 
would  find  itself  entire  and  whole  inside  its  own  frontiers 
and  remain  a  danger  to  the  Allies.  Is  it  necessary  to  avert 
this  danger  to  deprive  the  enemy  of  all  his  war  material? 
No ;  it  will  be  sufficient  to  take  that  without  which  he  can- 
not resume  hostilities,  and  in  addition  to  hold  the  Rhine 
with  bridgeheads  at  its  principal  crossings.  In  the  absolute 
freedom  of  judgment  which  the  Allied  Governments  sol- 
emnly conferred  upon  him,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
decides  that  this  is  what  is  necessary  and  sufficient.  The 
opportunity  is  also  to  be  afforded  him  within  the  next  few 
days  of  developing  his  views  and  explaining  on  what  his 
decision  is  based. 

Between  October  23  and  26,  the  heads  of  the  European 
Governments  and  their  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  have 
all  gathered  in  Paris.  On  the  twenty-fourth  Mr.  House 
joins  them  six  weeks  ahead  of  President  Wilson.  The 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  65 

meetings  begin  at  once.  They  have  not  yet  the  official 
character  they  will  assume  on  the  thirty-first  when  the 
Supreme  Council  meets  at  Versailles.  Generally  the  meet- 
ings are  held  in  the  mornings  at  Mr.  House's  place  in  the 
rue  de  1'Universite;  in  the  afternoons  at  M.  Clemenceau's 
office  in  the  Ministry  of  "War  or  at  Mr.  Pjchon's  at  the 
Quay  d'  Orsay.  The  position  on  the  various  fronts  (the 
Armistice  with  Austria-Hungary  is  momentarily  expected) 
and  the  terms  of  the  German  Armistice  are  the  subject  of 
the  discussions  in  which  Marshal  Foch  on  several  occasions 
takes  part.  Some  do  not  find  these  terms  severe  enough. 
Thus  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  representing  the  United 
States  on  the  Inter-allied  Military  Council,  would  prefer  a 
shorter  and  in  some  respects  a  more  rigorous  text.  In  his 
opinion  two  clauses  would  be  sufficient :  total  disarmament 
and  complete  demobilization.  This  would  make  it  quite 
certain  that  Germany  could  not  resume  hostilities.  This 
would  force  her  in  advance  to  submit  to  all  peace  condi- 
tions. General  Bliss,  after  a  remarkable  exposition  of  his 
views,  summarizes  them  as  follows  in  a  Note  which  he 
hands  to  one  of  the  members  of  the  Supreme  Council.* 

For  the  reasons  stated  above  I  suggest : 

I.  That  the  Associated  Powers  demand  the  complete  disarma- 
ment and  demobilization  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the 
enemy,  leaving  only  to  him  such  internal  force  as  may  be  con- 
sidered necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  order  in  enemy  territory. 
This  implies  the  evacuation  of  all  invaded  territories  and  their 
evacuation  not  by  armed  or  partially  armed  men  but  by  disarmed 
men. 

The  German  Army  thus  deprived  of  its  arms  cannot  fight,  and 
being  demobilized  cannot  again  be  called  together  for  the  objects 
of  this  war. 

II.  That  the  Associated  Powers  inform  the  enemy  that  there 
will  be  no  diminution  of  their  war  aims  which  will  be  submitted  to 
a  full  and  reasonable  discussion  between  the  nations  associated  in 
the  war  and  that,  even  if  the  enemy  himself  is  given  a  hearing,  he 


'Outside  of  the  exchange  of  views  between  the  military  advisers,  this 
proposal  was  not  officially  submitted  by  the  American  delegates  to  the  heads 
of  the  Governments. 


66     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

will  have  to  submit  to  everything  that  the  Associated  Powers  shall 
finally  decide  to  be  necessary  to  assure  now  and  in  the  future  the 
Peace  of  the  World. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  naval  matters  the  representa- 
tives of  Great  Britain  do  not  consider  sufficient  the 
delivery  of  150  submarines  demanded  by  Marshal  Foch  and 
think  that  nearly  all  the  battle-ships  and  cruisers  ought  to 
be  surrendered  also.  It  is  in  these  circumstances  that  the 
final  discussion  from  October  27  to  31,  begins.  I  repro- 
duce its  salient  passages. 

True  to  the  mission  entrusted  to  him  by  President  Wil- 
son, Mr.  House  first  of  all  asks  Marshal  Foch  the  following 
questions : 

* '  Tell  us,  M.  le  Marechal,  purely  from  the  military  point 
of  view  and  without  regard  to  any  other  consideration, 
whether  you  would  rather  that  the  Germans  should  reject 
or  accept  the  Armistice  on  the  lines  we  have  just  agreed 
upon. ' ' 

Marshal  Foch  answers: 

"The  only  aim  of  war  is  to  obtain  results.  If  the  Ger- 
mans sign  an  armistice  on  the  general  lines  we  have  just 
determined  we  shall  have  obtained  the  result  we  seek. 
Our  aims  being  accomplished,  no  one  has  the  right  to  shed 
another  drop  of  blood." 

In  other  words,  the  Commander-in-Chief  is  of  opinion 
that  if  the  Germans  accept  the  conditions  laid  down  in  his 
letter  of  October  23 — and  he  still  has  his  doubts  upon  this 
point — it  is  necessary  to  conclude  the  Armistice  and  cease 
the  war  without  hesitation.  The  Commander-in-Chief 
goes  even  further  and,  replying  to  the  suggestions  of  Gen- 
eral Bliss  and  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  to  others  of  the 
same  nature,  firmly  insists  on  the  danger  of  additional 
demands.  He  says: 

"Nothing  is  easier  than  to  propose  and  even  to  impose 
conditions  on  paper.  It  is  simple  and  logical  to  demand 
the  disarmament  of  the  German  Armies  in  the  field.  But 
how  will  you  make  sure  of  it  ?  Will  you  pass  through  the 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  67 

German  Armies  and  occupy  before  them  the  Rhine  cross- 
ings? Demobilization?  I  am  willing.  But  do  you  intend 
to  occupy  the  whole  of  Germany  ?  For  if  we  do  not  occupy 
the  whole  of  Germany,  we  shall  never  be  certain  that 
demobilization  has  been  carried  out.  As  for  the  German 
surface  fleet,  what  do  you  fear  from  it  ?  During  the  whole 
war  only  a  few  of  its  units  have  ventured  from  their  ports. 
The  surrender  of  these  units  will  be  merely  a  manifesta- 
tion, which  will  please  the  public  but  nothing  more.  Why 
make  the  Armistice  harder,  for  I  repeat  its  sole  object  is  to 
place  Germany  hors  de  combat." 

And  Marshal  Foch  adds: 

"What  will  you  do  if  the  Germans  after  having  ac- 
cepted the  severe  and  ample  conditions  that  I  propose, 
refuse  to  subscribe  to  the  additional  humiliations  you  sug- 
gest? Will  you  on  that  account  run  the  risk  of  a  renewal 
of  hostilities  with  the  useless  sacrifice  of  thousands  of 
lives?" 

That  was  the  whole  question.  Would  harsher  terms 
prolong  the  war?  For  how  many  months?  What  would 
be  the  risks  ?  Colonel  House  and  Lloyd  George  were  anxious 
— as  was  also  M.  Clemenceau — to  obtain  the  maximum,  so 
long  as  the  military  authorities  considered  the  maximum 
necessary.  On  October  29  they  ask  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  reply  to  these  points.  And  Marshal  Foch  answers : 

"I  am  not  in  a  position  and  no  one  is  in  a  position  to 
give  you  an  accurate  forecast.  It  may  last  three  months, 
perhaps  four  or  five.  Who  knows?  However  if  I  cannot 
fix  a  date,  I  can  reply  to  the  main  question.  On  the  main 
question  I  say  this :  the  conditions  laid  down  by  your  mili- 
tary advisers  are  the  very  conditions  which  we  ought  to 
and  could  impose  after  the  success  of  our  further  opera- 
tions. So  if  the  Germans  accept  them  now,  it  is  useless  to 
go  on  fighting." 

On  October  31,  the  heads  of  Governments,  assisted  by 
Marshal  Foch,  decide  upon  the  final  text  to  be  submitted 
to  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies  which  is  to  meet  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  same  day.  This  text  adopts  all  the 


68     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

proposals  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  with  a  few  additions 
and  specifications  of  details,  the  foremost  of  which  are: 

The  surrender  of  2,000  fighting  and  bombing  planes,  and  firstly 
all  the  D  7  's  and  all  the  night  bombing  machines. 

In  all  German  territory  evacuated  by  the  enemy  all  military 
installations  of  whatever  nature  to  be  delivered  intact. 

Ways  and  means  of  communication  of  all  kinds,  railways, 
waterways,  roads,  bridges,  telegraphs,  telephones,  to  be  left  undam- 
aged. All  the  civilian  and  military  employees  actually  working 
them  to  remain. 

The  right  of  requisition  shall  be  exercised  by  the  Allied  Armies 
and  the  United  States  Armies  in  all  occupied  territory.  The 
upkeep  of  all  the  troops  of  occupation  in  the  Ehine  districts 
(excluding  Alsace-Lorraine)  shall  be  charged  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment. 

German  prisoners  of  war  to  be  returned  only  after  the  signature 
of  Peace  preliminaries. 

Delivery  to  the  Allies  of  10,000  motor  trucks. 

The  railways  of  Alsace-Lorraine  shall  be  handed  over  together 
with  all  personnel  and  material. 

On  October  31  at  three  o'clock  the  Supreme  Council 
meets  at  Versailles.  There  are  present  Clemenceau, 
Pichon,  Lloyd  George,  Balfour,  Orlando,  Sonnino,  House, 
Venizelos,  Vesnitch,  Marshal  Foch,  Admiral  Wemyss, 
Generals  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  Bliss  and  De  Robilant.  M. 
Clemenceau  calls  on  Marshal  Foch  who  explains  the  mili- 
tary position  created  by  the  victories  of  the  last  months. 
He  describes  the  position  of  the  German  Army,  after  hav- 
ing stated  its  losses.  He  says : 

"An  Army  which  for  three  months  has  been  forced  to 
retreat,  and  which  can  no  longer  react  is  a  beaten  Army. 
But  all  the  same  it  persists  in  methodical  destruction, 
accepting  battle  everywhere. 

"The  military  disorganization  of  the  enemy  is  an  un- 
doubted fact.  But  the  struggle  goes  on  and  continues." 

After  the  Germans,  the  Allies.  Marshal  Foch 
expresses  himself  thus : 

"On  our  side  despite  the  approach  of  winter  we  can 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  69 

continue  this  battle  on  its  400  kilometers  front.  The  effec- 
tives of  our  Army  permit  this.  The  British  and  French 
Armies  have  certainly  suffered  but  they  can  go  on.  The 
American  Army  is  still  fresh  and  its  reserves  are  arriving 
every  day.  The  morale  of  the  troops  is  excellent.  This 
enables  us  to  go  on,  if  the  enemy  so  desires,  till  complete 
victory  is  won." 

No  one  asking  to  be  heard  in  discussion  of  Marshal 
Foch's  point  of  view  which  is  already  well  known  from  the 
preceding  meetings,  the  Austrian  Armistice  is  next  taken 
up  and  occupies  the  remainder  of  the  meeting  of  October  31. 
On  November  1  another  meeting  is  held,  followed  by  two 
others  on  the  second  and  fourth,  the  greater  part  of  which 
is  devoted  to  the  German  Armistice.  As  a  whole,  except 
for  few  aggravations,  the  plan  of  the  Commander-in-Chief 
is  adopted  purely  and  simply,  for  the  Western  as  for  the 
Eastern  front. 

On  the  naval  clauses  the  discussion  is  more  prolonged. 
Despite  the  objections  put  forward  by  Marshal  Foch  at 
previous  meetings  the  Council  of  Admirals  insists  that  the 
greater  part  of  the  German  surface  fleet  must  be  sur- 
rendered and  interned.  It  is  curious  to  note  that  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  who  had  opposed  none  of  the  land  clauses, 
expresses  fear  that  the  demands  of  the  naval  experts  may 
prolong  the  war  to  no  purpose.  He  asks  that  the  decision 
be  put  off  at  least  till  Austria  has  capitulated. 

"We  must  ask  ourselves,"  he  says,  "whether  we  want 
to  make  peace  at  once  or  to  continue  the  war  for  a  year.  It 
may  be  very  tempting  to  take  a  certain  number  of  ships. 
But  that  is  not  the  main  issue.  At  present  each  of  our 
Armies  is  losing  more  men  in  a  week  than  at  any  time  dur- 
ing the  first  four  years  of  war.  We  must  not  lose  sight  of 
that.  If  Austria  gives  in,  we  shall  know  where  we  are.  By 
Monday  we  shall  be  better  able  to  say." 

And  so  the  discussion  is  resumed  on  November  4  when 
the  following  text  is  adopted: 

The  German  surface  war-ships  which  shall  be  designated  by  the 


70     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Allies  and  the  United  States  shall  forthwith  be  disarmed  and  there- 
after interned  in  neutral  ports  or  failing  them,  Allied  ports. 

There  remains  a  grave  question  put  forward  by  the 
French  delegation.  The  Question  of  Reparations.  At 
the  meeting  of  November  2,  M.  Clemenceau  starts  the 
discussion : 

"I  would  like  to  return  now  to  the  question  of  Repara- 
tions and  of  damages.  It  would  not  be  understood  with 
us  in  France  if  we  did  not  insert  a  clause  in  the  Armistice 
to  this  effect.  All  I  am  asking  for  is  the  addition  of  three 
words,  '  Reparations  for  damages'  without  further 
comment. ' ' 

The  following  discussion  ensues: 

M.  Hymans:  "Would  that  be  a  condition  of  armistice?" 

M.  Sonnino:  "It  is  rather  a  condition  of  peace." 

M.  Bonar  Law:  "It  is  useless  to  insert  in  the  conditions 
of  armistice  a  clause  that  cannot  be  rapidly  fulfilled." 

M.  Clemenceau :  "  I  only  want  to  lay  down  the  principle. 
You  must  not  forget  that  the  French  people  is  one  of  those 
which  have  suffered  most.  They  would  not  understand 
if  we  did  not  make  some  allusion  to  this  matter." 

Mr.  Lloyd  George:  "If  you  are  going  to  deal  with  the 
reparation  of  damages  on  land,  you  must  also  mention  the 
question  of  reparations  for  the  ships  sunk." 

M.  Clemenceau:  "That  is  all  covered  by  my  three 
words:  'Reparations  for  damages.'  I  beg  the  Council  to 
understand  the  feeling  of  the  French  people." 

M.  Vesnitch:  "And  of  the  Serbian...." 

M,  Hymans:  "And  of  the  Belgian " 

Mi.  Sonnino:  "And  of  the  Italian  people  also " 

Mr.  House:  "As  this  is  a  matter  of  importance  to  all, 
I  propose  the  adoption  of  M.  Clemenceau 's  addition." 

Mr.  Bonar  Law:  "It  is  already  mentioned  in  our  letter 
to  President  Wilson.  It  is  useless  to  repeat  it." 

Mr.  Orlando:  "I  accept  it  in  principle  although  no  men- 
tion has  been  made  of  it  in  the  conditions  of  the  Austrian 
Armistice." 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  71 

The  addition  of  "Reparations  for  damages "  is  then 
a'dopted.  M.  Klotz  suggests  that  the  addition  be  preceded 
by  the  words  "with  the  reservation  that  any  future  claims 
by  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  remain  unaffected." 
This  is  decided.  The  Allied  Governments,  now  agreed  on 
everything  the  Armistice  is  to  contain,  are  in  a  position  to 
reply  to  President  Wilson 's  telegram  of  October  23.  They 
therefore  request  Mr.  House  to  communicate  to  the  Presi- 
dent the  conditions  which  have  been  agreed  upon  with  two 
reservations.  This  communication  is  made  in  the  follow- 
ing terms: 

The  Allied  Governments  have  given  careful  consideration  to 
the  correspondence  which  has  passed  between  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  the  German  Government. 

Subject  to  the  qualifications  which  follow  they  declare  their 
willingness  to  make  peace  with  the  Government  of  Germany  on  the 
terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the  Address  of  the  President  to  Con- 
gress on  January  8,  1918,  and  the  principles  of  settlement  enun- 
ciated in  his  subsequent  address. 

They  must  point  out,  however,  that  clause  2,  relating  to  what  is 
usually  described  as  the  "Freedom  of  the  Seas"  is  open  to  various 
interpretations  some  of  which  they  could  not  accept.  They  must 
therefore  reserve  to  themselves  complete  freedom  on  this  subject 
when  they  enter  the  Peace  Conference. 

Furthermore  in  the  conditions  of  peace  laid  down  in  his  address 
to  Congress  on  January  8,  1918,  the  President  declared  that  the 
invaded  territories  must  be  restored  as  well  as  evacuated  and  freed 
and  the  Allied  Governments  feel  that  no  doubt  ought  to  be  allowed 
to  exist  as  to  what  this  provision  implies.  By  it  they  understand 
that  compensations  will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all  damage  done 
to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by  the 
aggression  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea  and  from  the  air. 

Mr.  Wilson  is  at  the  same  time  asked  to  notify  the  Ger- 
man Government  that  it  can  send  a  duly  accredited  pleni- 
potentiary to  Marshal  Foch  who,  assisted  by  a  British 
Admiral,  would  be  authorized  to  act  in  the  name  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments. 


72     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

V 

In  what  state  of  mind  is  this  decision  to  find  Germany? 
I  have  already  shown  that  after  her  Note  of  October  21 
and  the  American  reply  of  October  23  she  was  bound  with- 
out escape  to  submit  to  the  conditions  of  the  Allies.  The 
days  which  follow  make  this  abundantly  clear.  The  Ger- 
man Great  General  Staff  continues  to  be  exasperated. 
Herr  von  Payer,  who  had  been  there  on  the  twenty-sixth, 
asserts  that  he  was  repeatedly  told,  "We  are  not  beaten. 
We  must  not  capitulate."  It  is  true  that  to  his  question, 
"What  chances  shall  we  have  of  making  a  better  peace  if 
we  go  on?"  he  gets  no  definite  answer,  unless  it  is  that 
"Clemenceau  is  in  disagreement  with  Foch  about  the 
conditions"  and  that  "Foch  by  urging  moderate  condi- 
tions shows  the  high  opinion  he  still  has  of  German  power 
of  resistance."  The  Ministers  question  other  Generals, 
Gallwitz,  Mudra,  who  declare  themselves  confident,  but 
furnish  no  grounds  for  their  hopes.  Everything  goes  to 
smash.  On  the  twenty-sixth,  Ludendorff  resigns  and  his 
resignation  is  accepted.  On  the  twenty-seventh,  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria  announces  that  he  is  going  to  make  a 
separate  peace.  On  the  thirtieth  he  asks  for  an  armistice, 
announcing  it  is  true  that  if  the  conditions  are  too  severe 
"he  will  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  Austrian  Germans." 
On  the  twenty- seventh,  the  German  Government  had 
already  telegraphed  to  President  Wilson  that  it  was  await- 
ing his  proposals. 

On  November  5,  General  Groner,  Ludendorff  'a  suc- 
cessor, acknowledges  that  the  military  situation  has  grown 
worse.  For  Marshal  Foch  is  continuing  his  concentric 
advance;  the  Armies  of  the  North  moving  towards  Brus- 
sels, the  British  Armies  towards  the  Ardennes,  the  French 
Armies  towards  Givet,  the  Americans  towards  Mezieres 
and  Sedan.  The  Germans  from  November  4  to  9  lose  the 
banks  of  the  Scheldt  on  a  wide  front  and  are  overwhelmed 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse.  To  finish  them  the  Allied 
High  Command  prepares  an  offensive  in  Lorraine  which 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  73 

with  Sarrebourg  for  its  objective  will  hurl  twenty-eight 
divisions  of  infantry,  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  six  hun- 
dred tanks  and  an  enormous  force  of  artillery  against  five 
or  seven  mediocre  German  divisions.  When  on  November 
6  the  American  Note  of  the  fifth  arrives  announcing  that 
in  accordance  with  the  conditions  stipulated,  Marshal  Foch 
is  ready  to  receive  the  German  plenipotentiaries,  they  are 
appointed  the  same  day  and  set  out  the  next.  The  Emperor 
abdicates. 

The  rest  is  known.  The  meeting  of  the  two  Armistice 
Commissions  at  Rethondes  on  the  morning  of  the  eighth 
in  the  train  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Allied 
Armies ;  the  attempt  by  Erzberger  to  transform  the  capitu- 
lation into  a  negotiation : 

"We  have  come  to  receive  your  proposals  with  a  view 
to  arriving  at  the  conclusion  of  an  Armistice. " 

Marshal  Foch  cuts  him  short  with : 

"I  have  no  proposals  to  make.  Do  you  ask  for  an 
Armistice?" 

"We  ask  for  an  Armistice." 

"Very  well.  The  conditions  decided  upon  by  the  Allied 
Governments  will  be  read  to  you." 

These  seventy-two  hours  of  delay  passed  quickly.  On 
November  10,  Secretary  of  State  Solf  makes  known  by 
wireless  that  "the  German  Government  accepts  the  condi- 
tions imposed."  The  eleventh  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, the  protocol  is  signed.  It  is  the  same  as  the  text 
adopted  on  November  4  by  the  Supreme  Council  at  Ver- 
sailles. For  technical  reasons,  Marshal  Foch  has  granted 
to  Erzberger  three  slight  modifications:  25,000  machine 
guns  instead  of  30,000;  1,700  aeroplanes  instead  of  2,000; 
5,000  motor  trucks  instead  of  10,000 ;  in  addition  to  a  prom- 
ise of  prompt  measures  to  insure  food  supply.  On  Novem- 
ber 11,  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Armistice  takes 
effect  on  the  whole  front.  The  same  day  all  the  nations 
which  had  fought  for  Liberty  and  Justice  celebrated  the 
signature. 

Such  in  its  logical  evolution  was  the  origin  of  the  Armis- 


74     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

tice  of  November  11.  Misconception  born  of  ignorance 
cannot  withstand  the  light  of  facts.  Linked  together  in 
cause  and  effect  the  facts  throw  their  critical  light  upon 
the  accumulation  of  legends  and  make  the  truth  stand  out. 
Absent  from  France  in  America  from  October  17  to  Novem- 
ber 20,  in  place  of  personal  reminiscences  I  have  consulted 
all  the  written  and  oral  testimony.  The  German  documents 
are  taken  from  the  official  account  published  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Reich,  the  authenticity  of  which  has  been 
challenged  by  none  of  those  concerned.  None  of  the  texts 
reproduced  here  can  be  disputed.  My  account  is  true  and 
I  believe  it  to  be  complete. 

What  remains  of  the  fiction  believed  by  so  many  of  an 
Armistice  secretly  determined  upon  by  an  American  dic- 
tator ;  submitted  to  by  the  European  Governments ;  imposed 
by  their  weakness  upon  the  victorious  Armies  despite  the 
opposition  of  the  Generals?  The  Armistice  was  discussed 
in  the  open  light  of  day.  President  Wilson  only  consented 
to  communicate  it  to  his  associates  on  the  triple  condition 
that  its  principle  be  approved  by  the  military  authorities 
and  its  clauses  would  be  drawn  up  by  them;  that  it  be  im- 
posed upon  the  enemy  and  not  discussed  with  him;  that  it 
be  such  as  to  prevent  all  resumption  of  hostilities  and 
assure  the  submission  of  the  vanquished  to  the  terms  of 
peace.  So  it  was  that  the  discussion  went  on  with  Berlin 
till  October  23,  and  in  Paris  from  that  date  till  November 
5.  It  was  to  the  Commander-in- Chief  that  final  decision 
was  left  not  only  on  the  principle  of  the  Armistice  but  upon 
its  application.  He  it  was  who  drew  up  the  text.  And  it 
was  his  draft  that  was  adopted.  The  action  of  the  Govern- 
ments was  limited  to  endorsing  it  and  making  it  more 
severe.  That  is  the  truth: — it  is  perhaps  less  picturesque 
but  certainly  more  in  accord  with  common  sense. 

May  it  in  truth  be  said,  after  what  I  have  just  written 
of  the  German  crises  in  October,  that  Marshal  Foch  made 
a  mistake  in  not  exacting  more  than  he  did — and  that  no 
matter  what  we  had  asked  the  people  in  Berlin  would  have 
accepted  everything  just  as  they  accepted  the  surrender  of 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  ARMISTICE  75 

their  Navy?  Of  course  this  can  always  be  asserted.  I 
would  point  out,  however,  that  criticism  foretelling  the  past 
is  not  hard  to  level  against  action  which  had  to  take  the 
future  into  account.  To  pass  judgment  on  the  decisions 
taken  in  October,  1918,  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Armies  of  the  Entente,  and  approved  afterwards  by  the 
Governments,  it  is  necessary  to  place  one's  self  in  his  posi- 
tion of  knowledge.  The  official  German  documents  which 
I  am  able  to  insert  in  this  work  had  not  then  been  published. 
The  facts  they  relate  were  not  then  known.  Nothing  was 
known  of  the  extraordinary  panic  which  on  October  1 
had  seized  the  Great  General  Staff;  nothing  was  known 
either  of  its  unavoidable  consequences.  Marshal  Foch  was 
sure  of  victory  and  he  said  so.  He  added  that  the  condi- 
tions fixed  by  him  on  October  26  were  the  very  conditions 
which  we  should  have  been  able  to  dictate  after  the  success 
of  further  operations.  But  having  done  that,  he  fulfilled 
his  duty  in  refusing  to  fix  an  exact  date  as  to  the  duration 
of  German  resistance,  the  strength  of  which  in  critical 
junctures  continued  to  be  shown — contrary  to  the  provi- 
sions of  Ludendorff — up  to  the  very  day  of  the  Armistice. 
He  also  fulfilled  his  duty  in  refusing  to  take  chances  with 
the  morale  of  the  troops  and  of  the  peoples,  by  confining 
himself  to  what  he  considered  to  be  necessary  and  suf- 
ficient. It  is  easy  two  years  afterwards  to  decide  that  the 
war  would  only  have  lasted  a  week  longer.  Marshal  Foch 
could  not  guarantee  that.  Nobody  even  to-day  could  guar- 
antee it  absolutely.  A  few  days  before  the  Armistice  one 
of  our  Army  Commanders  said  to  a  public  man : 

"We  are  going  to  take  up  our  positions  for  another 
winter. ' ' 

The  responsible  Chief  would  have  none  of  "another 
winter"  which  he  did  not  consider  essential  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  victory.  The  Governments  determined  to  impose 
everything  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  exacted  but  did 
not  feel  justified  in  demanding  more.  Moreover,  the 
problem  was  to  place  Germany  in  a  position  in  which 
she  could  not  begin  the  war  again — she  was  not  able  to 


76     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

begin  it  again ;  the  problem  was  to  force  Germany  to  sign 
the  Peace, — she  signed  it.  Events  have  thus  shown  that 
Marshal  Foch  was  right.  The  Armistice  marked  the  capitu- 
lation of  the  enemy,  a  capitulation  which  was  an  uncondi- 
tional surrender. 


CHAPTEE  III 

THE  PEACE   CONFEKENCE 

THE  work  which  awaited  the  framers  of  the  Peace  was 
as  great  and  as  unprecedented  as  the  war  which  was  to  be 
brought  to  a  close. 

Great  and  unprecedented  in  its  scope :  for  the  first  time 
in  history  entire  nations  had  fought.  Seventy  million  men 
had  been  mobilized,  thirty  million  had  been  wounded  and 
nearly  ten  million  had  died.  Nothing  in  the  past  could 
compare  with  it.  The  dead  alone  outnumbered  all  the 
Armies  of  Napoleon.  Great  and  unprecedented  in  its  com- 
plexity: nation  having  fought  nation,  there  had  been 
brought  into  play  the  sum  total  of  all  national  forces :  agri- 
cultural, industrial,  commercial  and  financial.  All  these 
potent  factors  of  international  life  had  to  be  taken  into 
account  in  making  the  Treaty.  Read  over  the  great  peace 
treaties  of  the  past, — for  the  most  part  child's  play  com- 
pared to  this!  Frontier  changes  limited  to  a  few  frag- 
ments of  the  map  of  Europe ;  indemnities  of  a  few  millions 
— the  five  thousand  millions  exacted  in  1871  from  France 
were  looked  upon  at  the  time  as  a  financial  monstrosity 
and  a  gross  abuse  of  power;  economic  clauses  in  which  the 
victor  imposed  upon  the  vanquished  the  most  favoured 
nation  clause !  A  peace  treaty  had  certain  classic  outlines 
which  were  filled  in  according  to  more  or  less  settled 
traditions. 

The  map  of  the  world  had  to  be  remade,  and  under  what 
conditions!  Germany's  persistent  savagery  had  left  more 
ruins  in  the  victorious  countries  than  the  invasions  of  the 
barbarians  had  ever  made  in  the  lands  they  overran  and 
conquered.  The  resources  of  all  the  belligerents  had  been 

77 


78     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

equally  exhausted  by  the  duration  of  the  struggle,  and  as 
the  damages  rightly  demanded  by  the  creditors  rose,  the 
capacity  for  payment  of  the  debtors  fell.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
had  said  in  1918,  ''Germany  shall  pay  for  everything." 
When  the  Conference  met,  it  was  of  necessity  obliged  to 
ascertain  how  much  and  in  what  manner  Germany  could 
pay.  And  ways  had  to  be  devised  to  extend  the  time  of 
payment ;  for  it  was  quite  evident  a  country  no  matter  how 
rich  could  not  pay  hundreds  of  millions  in  a  few  months 
and  no  matter  how  criminal  could  not  have  undergone  so 
prolonged  a  strain  without  diminishing  its  resources.  The 
execution  of  the  peace  terms  thus  became  not  a  matter  of 
months  but  of  years.  It  implied  a  lasting  union  of  the 
forces  which  had  won  the  war.  Not  the  victors  alone  but 
the  whole  world  had  to  be  given  the  certainty  that  Germany 
would  not  repeat  her  offense.  The  fundamental  aims  of 
Liberty  and  Justice  which  for  fifty-two  months  had  fur- 
nished the  moral  strength  and  stimulus  of  the  nations  in 
arms  had  to  be  realized.  Finally  the  unity  of  the  Allies 
which  had  led  to  their  victory  had  to  be  maintained  and 
made  closer  so  that  they  might  be  as  well  prepared  for 
common  action  in  the  future  as  they  had  been  in  the  past. 
Failing  this,  the  Peace  would  be  lacking  in  the  essential 
factor  that  had  won  the  Victory. 

The  history  of  the  war  foreshadowed  the  nature  of  the 
peace  as  much  by  the  official  acts  of  Governments  as  by 
the  spontaneous  expression  of  public  opinion.  "When 
France  knew  that  she  was  being  attacked  by  Germany,  she 
proclaimed  her  war  aims  with  a  single  voice.  They  were 
the  defense  of  her  frontiers,  the  redemption  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  the  maintenance  of  national  liberty  as  op- 
posed to  a  policy  of  aggression  and  domination.  In  the 
Parliament  and  in  the  Press  there  was  not  a  discordant 
note.  France  had  bought  this  unanimity,  the  essential  con- 
dition of  success,  with  forty-three  years  of  anguish.  It 
was  the  memory  of  those  dark  days  which  gave  substance 
to  France's  conception  of  Peace  and  War.  Attacked  once 
more  France  was  once  more  going  to  fight  for  Right.  Such 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  79 

is  our  entry  into  the  war, — now  for  the  other  nations.  Ser- 
bia, having  made  every  possible  concession,  cannot  tolerate 
the  substitution  of  another  Power  for  her  own  on  her  own 
soil.  Eussia  refusing  to  renounce  the  Slav  gospel  by 
abandoning  Serbia  to  Austria's  extortion.  Belgium  spurn- 
ing the  cynical  offer  to  betray  her  word  and  her  friends. 
Great  Britain  too,  accepting  the  challenge  to  keep  faith 
with  a  " scrap  of  paper."  Group  these  facts,  link  them  to 
the  past,  compare  them  with  Germany's  aggression  and  her 
methods,  " Necessity  knows  no  law."  It  is  a  conflict  be- 
tween two  opposing  principles.  On  one  side  the  nations 
who  put  their  faith  in  Might,  on  the  other  those  who  believe 
in  Right.  On  one  side  the  peoples  who  seek  to  enslave, 
on  the  other  the  free  peoples  who,  whether  they  defend 
themselves  against  aggression  or  whether  they  come  to  the 
assistance  of  those  attacked,  are  ready  to  sacrifice  their 
lives  to  remain  independent,  masters  of  their  own  affairs 
at  home  and  of  their  destinies  abroad. 

The  war  lasted  and  grew  greater.  Each  passing  hour 
emphasized  and  confirmed  its  original  character.  In  1915 
Italy  joins  the  Allies  after  laying  down  the  conditions  on 
which  she  leaves  the  Triple  Alliance.  Why?  Because 
from  Trentino  to  Trieste  she  has  heard  the  voices  of  the 
irredenti  calling.  In  1916  Roumania  comes  in.  Why?  Be- 
cause from  beyond  the  plains  of  Transylvania  the  lament 
of  Magyarized  Roumanians  had  crossed  the  Carpathian 
Mountains.  In  1917,  Greece  comes  in.  Why?  Because  on 
the  borders  of  Macedonia,  of  Thrace  and  of  Asia  Minor 
she  had  felt — despite  the  German  leanings  of  her  King — 
the  soul  of  ancient  Hellas  stirring.  The  breath  of  liberty 
passes  everywhere.  For  half  a  century  Alsace-Lorraine 
had  been  the  symbol  and  the  flaming  torch  of  the  oppressed. 
From  East  to  West  all  who  believed  in  the  liberation  of 
the  oppressed  and  in  the  right  of  peoples  to  self-determina- 
tion rallied  to  the  echoes  of  the  Marne  and  of  Verdun.  As 
time  passed  the  circle  of  our  supporters  widened.  And 
then  came  the  democracy  of  the  United  States.  When  she 
entered  the  struggle,  her  war  aims  were  indefinite  but  in 


80     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

a  few  weeks  she  too  understood  and  had  a  clear  conception 
of  what  she  was  fighting  for.  From  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific  the  word  went  forth.  We  are  going  to  fight  in 
Europe.  Against  what?  Against  Autocracy  and  Militar- 
ism. For  what?  For  Justice  and  the  Liberty  of  Nations. 
Words,  mere  words,  answer  the  " realists."  Yes,  mere 
words,  but  words  for  which  millions  of  soldiers  stand  ready 
to  die.  Words  which  are  a  living  force.  Words  which 
from  France  have  spread  to  the  new  world  and  have  mo- 
bilized the  hearts  of  the  people  without  which  there  can 
be  no  military  mobilization  in  a  democracy.  We  were  fight- 
ing for  our  ideal  and  for  our  frontier.  America  had  no 
frontier  to  defend  but  she  adopted  our  ideal  and  made 
it  hers. 

That  is  why — be  it  pleasing  or  not,  a  cause  for  congrat- 
ulation or  regret — the  war  of  1914  had  a  meaning  and  an 
aim  of  its  own  before  any  Government  had  made  a  declara- 
tion. From  the  first  day  of  the  German  aggression,  it 
was  a  war  of  peoples  and  of  nationalities.  A  war  for  popu- 
lar and  national  rights.  Such  it  remained  to  the  very  end. 
That  was  why,  in  the  closing  months,  Polish  Czecho-Slova- 
kian  and  Croatian  regiments  sprang  from  the  soil.  That  is 
why  millions  of  men  made  the  last  great  sacrifice.  That  is 
why  the  Peace  was  to  be  the  peace  of  free  nations,  of 
nations  liberated  from  the  forces  of  oppression.  The  peo- 
ples had  spoken.  The  Governments  in  Europe  and  in 
America  did  but  register  their  will.  All  declarations  of 
"war  aims" — invariably  and  identically — reflected  the 
clear  convictions  and  simple  principles  which  led  the  Armies 
into  battle. 

The  first  of  these  declarations  dates  from  the  thirtieth 
of  December,  1916.  It  is  handed  in  the  name  of  all  the  Allies 
to  the  American  Ambassador  by  M.  Aristide  Briand  in 
reply  to  a  German  Note  transmitted  by  the  neutrals.  What 
does  it  contain?  First  of  all  the  principle  that  "the  Allied 
Governments  are  united  for  the  defense  of  the  liberties  of 
peoples."  Then  the  assertion  "No  peace  is  possible  until 
assurances  are  given  that  reparations  will  be  made  for  the 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  81 

rights  and  liberties  that  have  been  violated:  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  nationality  and  of  freedom  of  small  states  will 
be  recognized  and  that  some  settlement  definitely  eliminat- 
ing the  causes  that  have  so  long  menaced  the  nations, 
establishes  the  only  effective  guarantee  for  the  world's 
safety."  The  rights  of  peoples,  reparations,  League  of 
Nations, — such  is  the  Allies'  reply  in  three  lines. 

The  second  declaration  was  on  the  tenth  of  January, 
1917.  Again  it  is  a  Note,  handed  in  the  name  of  all  the 
Allies  to  the  American  Ambassador  by  M.  Aristide  Briand 
in  reply  to  a  question  of  President  Wilson.  The  principle 
is  the  same,  but  it  is  defined  in  greater  detail. 

1.  Restoration  of  Belgium,  Serbia  and  Montenegro  and  of  the 
damages  they  have  sustained. 

2.  Evacuation  of  the  invaded  territory  of  France,  Russia  and 
Roumania  with  full  reparations. 

3.  Reorganization  of  Europe,  guaranteed  by  a  stable  regime, 
based  upon  the  respect  of  nationality  and  the  right  of  all  peoples, 
great  and  small,  to  pursue  their  economic  development  in  full 
security  and  upon  territorial  and  international  conventions  guar- 
anteeriiig  land  and  sea  frontiers  against  unwarranted  aggression. 

4.  Restitution   of   provinces   or   territories    previously   taken 
from  the  Allies  by  force  or  against  the  will  of  the  inhabitants. 

5.  Liberation   of    Italians,    Slavs,    Roumanians   and    Czecho- 
slovaks from  foreign  domination. 

6.  Liberation    of    the    population    subjected    to    the    bloody 
tyranny  of  the  Turks;  rejection  out  of  Europe  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  as  foreign  to  western  civilization. 

7.  The   intentions    of   his   Majesty   the    Emperor   of   Russia 
towards  Poland  are  clearly  indicated  in  the  proclamation  which  he 
has  just  addressed  to  his  Armies. 

8.  The  Allies  have  never  aimed  at  the  extermination  of  the 
German  peoples  or  at  their  disappearance  as  a  political  entity. 

Bear  these  eight  points  in  mind.  We  shall  meet  them 
again.  Six  months  later,  after  a  long  debate,  the  French 
Parliament  in  turn  deems  it  necessary  to  declare  its  war 
aims  in  two  formal  resolutions.  On  June  5,  1917,  the 
Chamber  adopts,  by  467  votes  to  52,  the  following: 


82 

The  Chamber  endorsing  the  unanimous  protest  made  in  1871  to 
the  National  Assembly  by  the  representatives  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
torn  against  her  will  from  France,  declares  that  the  war,  imposed 
on  Europe  by  the  aggression  of  German  Imperialism,  must  lead  to 
the  liberation  of  invaded  territory,  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  the  mother  country  and  to  just  reparation  of  damages. 

Foreign  to  all  thought  of  conquest  or  enslavement  of  foreign 
people,  the  Chamber  trusts  that  the  efforts  of  the  Army  of  the 
Kepublic  and  her  Allies  will  permit,  after  Prussian  militarism  is 
overthrown,  the  securing  of  lasting  guarantees  of  peace  and  inde- 
pendence from  great  and  small  nations  alike  by  association  in  a 
League  of  Nations,  already  in  preparation. 

The  following  day,  June  6, 1917,  the  Senate  unanimously 
votes  a  similar  resolution: 

The  Senate  convinced  that  lasting  peace  can  be  secured  only  by 
the  victory  of  the  Allied  Armies ; 

Asserts  the  will  of  France,  true  to  her  alliances,  faithful  to  her 
ideal  of  independence  and  liberty  for  all  peoples,  to  pursue  the  war 
until  Alsace-Lorraine  are  restored,  crimes  are  punished,  damages 
are  repaired  and  guarantees  against  further  aggression  by  German 
militarism  are  secured. 

In  England,  in  Italy,  in  Belgium,  the  Parliaments  in 
like  terms  confirmed  the  declarations  of  their  Governments 
and  the  instinctive  desires  of  their  peoples.  All  the  Euro- 
pean Allies  are  thus  after  three  years  of  war  absolutely 
agreed  on  two  things:  the  first  that  no  peace  is  possible 
until  victory  has  been  won;  the  second,  that,  victory  won, 
the  Allies  will  demand  for  themselves  and  for  all  nations 
the  right  of  self-determination  for  all  peoples,  reparations, 
guarantees  and  a  League  of  Nations.  The  war  aims  are 
clear.  They  are  public.  Henceforth  all  men  know  what 
the  peace  of  victory  will  be.  Those,  therefore,  who  are  not 
satisfied  with  them,  can  protest.  But  no  protest  is  raised 
except  by  a  few  Socialists  who  find  these  terms  too  severe. 

Have  these  war  aims  solemnly  proclaimed  to  the  world 
been  modified  since?  Judge  for  yourself. 

On    January    6,    1918,    the    President    of   the    United 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  83 

States  in  an  address  to  the  Congress  lays  down  "a  pro- 
gramme for  world  peace,"  which  has  since  become  known 
as  the  "fourteen  points."  Much  has  been  said  about  them, 
often  by  those  who  neither  knew  when  they  were  first  for- 
mulated nor  what  they  meant.  It  is,  therefore,  relevant  to 
give  their  substance  here,  presenting  them  in  the  same 
order  as  the  eight  points  of  January,  1917. 

1.  Evacuation  and  restoration  of  Belgium  without  any  limita- 
tion of  her  sovereignty. 

2.  Evacuation  of  French  territory ;  restoration  of  the  invaded 
regions;  reparations  of  the  wrong  done  to  France  in  1871  in  the 
matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

3.  Evacuation  of  Russian  territory  and  a  settlement  leaving 
her  entirely  free  to  decide  her  own  fate. 

4.  Readjustment  of  the  Italian  frontier  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  nationality. 

5.  Opportunity  of  autonomous  development  for  the  peoples  of 
Aust  ria-  Hungary . 

6.  Evacuation  and  restoration  of  Roumania,  Serbia  and  Mon- 
tenegro with  access  to  the  sea  for  Serbia. 

7.  Limitation   of    Ottoman   sovereignty   to    regions    actually 
Turkish;  autonomy  for  all  the  other  peoples,  international  guar- 
antees for  the  freedom  of  the  Dardanelles. 

8.  An  independent  Poland  with  free  access  to  the  sea. 

9.  The  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations  giving  mutual  guaran- 
tees of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great 
and  small  states  alike. 

10.  Impartial  adjustment  of  colonial  claims. 

11.  Exchange  of  guarantees  for  the  reduction  of  armaments. 

12.  Elimination  as  far  as  possible  of  economic  barriers;  com- 
mercial equality  for  all  nations. 

13.  Freedom  of  the  seas. 

14.  Open  diplomacy;  no  secret  international  agreements  of 
any  kind. 

When  on  Jannary  9  this  declaration,  identical  in  mean- 
ing— especially  as  far  as  France  is  concerned — with  the 
previous  declarations  of  the  Allies,  was  known  in  Europe, 
it  met  with  nothing  but  approval  and  support.  Parlia- 
ments and  Press  alike  interpreted  it  as  a  further  pledge  of 


84     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

America's  unity  of  purpose,  which  everyone  recognized  to 
be  essential  on  the  eve  of  the  great  battle  of  the  spring. 
French  men  saw  in  it  also  the  first  public  recognition  of 
their  right  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  without  a  plebiscite.  Thus 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  far  from  modifying 
the  war  aims  of  the  European  Allies,  confirmed  and  de- 
fined them.  The  divergence  which  later  on  it  was  attempted 
to  establish  between  the  former  and  the  latter,  vanishes  in 
presence  of  a  perusal  of  the  documents.  The  Fourteen 
Points  contain  no  contradiction  of  the  previous  programmes 
of  peace.  On  the  contrary  they  reiterate  them.  The  United 
States  did  not  conceive  a  peace  different  from  that  which 
Europe  demanded.  She  defined  in  similar  terms  claims 
that  were  identical.  No  modification  of  the  course  fol- 
lowed was  caused  by  her  declaration.  The  only  result  was 
greater  and  more  complete  unity. 

On  October  6,  1918,  Germany  sued  for  peace.  After 
three  weeks  of  correspondence,  made  public  day  by  day, 
President  Wilson  informed  Germany  that  the  Allies  were 
ready  to  conclude  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  terms  set  out 
above.  Such  the  clear  straight  road  which  led  from  the 
formulation  of  Europe's  war  aims  in  1916  and  1917  and 
their  endorsement  by  the  United  States  in  1918  to  the 
Armistice  in  the  beginning  of  November,  1919,  and  to  peace. 
Never  had  a  policy  been  clearer,  more  open,  and  more 
coherent.  Everybody,  before  even  the  negotiations  began, 
knew  the  objective  sought.  The  peace,  with  all  its  prin- 
ciples and  all  its  consequences,  appeared  clearly  before  the 
eyes  of  the  nations,  long  ere  it  was  drawn  up  and  signed 
by  the  negotiators. 

In  other  words,  the  peace  was  born  of  the  origin  and 
character  of  the  war  itself.  It  was  willed  by  the  peoples 
before  being  formulated  by  the  Governments.  It  was  for- 
mulated by  the  Governments  as  early  as  the  end  of  1916 
in  harmony  with  the  instinct  of  the  peoples  and  when,  at 
the  beginning  of  1918,  the  United  States  in  turn  declared 
its  conception  of  the  peace  it  only  emphasized  principles 
which  neither  America  nor  anybody  else  could  have  varied, 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  85 

for  they  were  of  the  very  nature  of  things  and  dictated  by 
circumstances.  Such  being  its  source,  the  peace  could  not 
be  a  peace  of  conquest  and  of  imperialism.  If  it  was  not 
a  peace  of  conquest,  it  is  not  because  of  the  Fourteen 
Points,  nor  because  Mr.  Wilson  forced  his  will  upon 
Europe,  nor  because  the  Allied  Governments  bowed  before 
America  through  weakness  or  lack  of  foresight.  It  is  be- 
cause Mr.  Wilson  in  his  Fourteen  Points,  his  speeches,  like 
the  Allies'  declarations  of  1916  and  1917,  like  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  French  Parliament  of  the  same  year,  had 
merely  obeyed  the  dictates  of  history,  had  merely  regis- 
tered the  will  of  the  warring  peoples:  it  is  because  the 
Peace  of  Victory,  offspring  of  the  war,  had  necessarily  to 
confirm  and  not  to  repudiate  the  ideals  for  which  the  war 
was  fought. 

The  peace  derives  its  whole  character  from  this  una- 
nimity of  purpose.  And  if  in  all  of  its  chapters — whether 
they  deal  with  frontiers  or  with  new  States,  whether  they 
deal  with  reparations  or  the  internal  affairs  of  nations — 
this  character  reappears,  one  may  regret  and  disapprove, 
if  one  is  of  a  Bismarckian  or  of  an  imperialist  turn  of  mind, 
but  nobody  has  the  right  to  be  astonished.  For  all  through 
the  war,  all  the  Allies  without  exception,  obedient  to  the 
peoples '  will,  had  constantly  proclaimed  that,  when  victory 
was  won,  the  peace  would  be  made  exactly  as  it  was  made. 

II 

Agreement  on  the  principles  of  the  peace  was  com- 
plete, even  before  the  negotiations  began;  but  to  what 
extent  was  there  agreement  upon  their  application?  In 
other  words  what  had  been  the  technical  preparation  for 
the  peace  ? 

Here  again  truth  is  singularly  different  from  the  artifi- 
cial picture  which  political  passion  has  conjured  up  to  mis- 
lead the  people.  The  peace  was  prepared  as  far  as  it 
possibly  could  be  during  the  war.  But  this  possibility  had 
its  limitations  which  cannot  be  forgotten.  In  France  pre- 


86     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

liminary  studies  had  been  begun  by  the  various  depart- 
ments of  the  Government  dealing  with  the  clauses  which 
interested  them  particularly.  These  studies  were  then 
coordinated  by  three  special  bodies.  The  first,  the  Comite 
d 'Etudes,  presided  over  by  Ernest  Lavisse,  the  great  his- 
torian, and  composed  of  university  men  and  scientists,  had 
presented  memoranda  supported  by  maps  and  statistics  on 
all  territorial  questions  relating  to  Europe  and  the  Near 
East.  The  geographical,  ethical,  historical  and  political 
factors  of  these  problems  were  thus  collected  and  criticized 
in  a  manner  which  does  honour  to  French  science.  An- 
other committee,  presided  over  by  Senator  Jean  Morel, 
had  drawn  up  exhaustive  notes  on  the  principal  economic 
problems  which  the  Peace  Treaty  was  to  solve.  Finally, 
from  December,  1918,  to  the  end  of  January,  1919,  I  was 
entrusted  by  M.  Clemenceau  with  the  task  of  bringing 
together  for  the  purposes  of  revision  the  members  of  the 
Comite'  d 'Etudes  and  the  representatives  of  the  various 
Government  departments  to  formulate  definite  conclusions 
which  were  reduced  to  writing  and  served  as  a  basis  for 
the  French  proposals.  Great  Britain,  which  had  caused  a 
similar  study  to  be  made  by  the  General  Staff,  the  Admir- 
alty and  the  War  Trade  Intelligence,  was  in  possession 
also  of  abundant  material.  For  the  United  States,  the 
Inquiry  Boards  which  were  under  the  direction  of  Mr. 
House,  had  undertaken  from  1917  on,  an  examination  of 
the  peace  problems  with  the  assistance  of  distinguished  pro- 
fessors, financiers  and  lawyers.  Anxious  to  insure  the 
greatest  possible  unity  between  the  French  and  American 
viewpoints  during  the  Conference,  I  had  from  the  outset 
established  a  daily  liaison  between  the  Inquiry  Boards  and 
the  corresponding  services  of  the  French  High  Commission 
which  were  under  M.  Louis  Aubert.  In  addition,  as  early 
as  October,  1918,  five  weeks  before  the  Armistice,  I  had 
sent  Professor  de  Martonne,  the  general  secretary  of  the 
Comite  d  'Etudes,  to  the  United  States  where  he  had  com- 
pared our  preparatory  documents  with  those  of  the  Inquiry 
Boards  and  reached  entire  agreement  on  many  points. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  87 

Could  more  have  been  done?  To  preliminary  studies 
made  in  common,  could  common  conclusions  have  been 
added?  Would  it  not  have  been  the  surest  way,  when  the 
hour  of  peace  struck,  to  gain  time  and  to  hasten  the  settle- 
ment? This  has  been  asserted  with  that  unruffled  disre- 
gard for  past  realities  which  too  often  marks  retrospective 
criticism.  As  long  as  the  war  lasted,  the  Powers,  it  is 
true,  refrained  from  settling  in  detail  the  clauses  of  the 
Peace  Treaty.  Mere  incuriousness  ?  No,  but,  impossibil- 
ity. The  war  almost  to  the  very  end  was  hard  to  wage 
and  of  uncertain  issue.  In  July,  1918,  with  the  enemy  on 
the  Marne  and  Paris  under  bombardment,  was  victory 
really  certain?  In  order  to  win,  the  whole  effort — and 
what  an  effort  it  was — had  to  be  concentrated  on  turning 
the  inter-allied  machine  which  it  had  taken  three  years  to 
build  up  and  still  moved  creakily.  The  public  knew  noth- 
ing of  these  daily  difficulties  in  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  united  action — so  much  talked  about  and  so 
incompletely  realized.  But  those  who  lived  through  them 
cannot  forget.  They  know  too  what  caution  was  neces- 
sary to  solve  these  difficulties  as  well  as  to  avert  them. 

Anyone  who  took  part  in  the  inter-allied  discussions  of 
July,  1918,  on  the  Salonica  expedition,  on  the  transport  of 
the  American  troops  or  on  the  number  of  British  divisions 
in  France  knows  full  well  how  risky  would  have  been — 
how  dangerous  even  to  victory — a  parallel  discussion  of 
peace  terms.  It  was  not  easy  to  get  the  Allies,  even  when 
they  were  bound  by  a  common  danger,  to  pull  together  for 
an  immediate  purpose.  What  would  it  have  been,  if  at  the 
same  time  one  had  stirred  up  and  intensified  by  discussion 
those  divergencies  of  views  which  the  peace  was  to  bring 
out?  Never  was  the  truth  of  the  old  common  sense  saying 
that  each  thing  must  be  done  in  its  turn  and  that  every- 
thing cannot  be  done  at  once,  more  clearly  demonstrated. 
By  attempting  to  wage  war  and  make  peace  at  the  same 
time,  there  was  no  certainty  of  achieving  the  peace,  but 
there  was  a  very  great  risk  of  losing  the  war.  It  was  not 
attempted,  and  it  is  well  that  it  was  not.  Was  it  even  pos- 


88     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

sible,  working  as  we  were  in  uncertainty  and  in  circum- 
stances which  changed  daily  and  whose  course  was  shaped 
by  our  pursuit  of  victory  and  by  that  alone?  Those  who 
from  the  serene  aloofness  of  their  arm-chairs  have 
answered  the  question  in  the  affirmative,  merely  show  their 
ignorance  of  the  real  conditions  of  war.  Those  on  whose 
shoulders  lay — at  such  a  heavy  hour — the  responsibility  of 
Government  know  that  the  attempt,  doomed  to  failure, 
would  have  been  nothing  short  of  criminal  imprudence. 

The  Conference  meets.  The  men  and  the  materials  are 
gathered.  The  work  awaits.  What  method  shall  be  fol- 
lowed? In  the  early  part  of  January,  the  French  delega- 
tion had  proposed  a  general  plan  of  procedure  which  M. 
Clemenceau  had  asked  me  to  prepare.  This  plan  was  as 
follows : 

I 

PRINCIPLES  AND  METHODS 

The  task  of  the  Conference  in  bringing  the  war  to  an  end  is  vto 
prepare  the  new  bases  of  international  relation  on  the  general  lines 
laid  down  in  President  "Wilson's  Message  of  January  8,  1918,  and 
in  his  speech  of  September  27,  1918,  as  well  as  in  the  reply  of  the 
Allies  of  November  5,  1918. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  order  of  discussion  might  be  as 
follows : 
I.     Guiding  Principles : 

a.  Open  diplomacy. 

b.  Freedom  of  the  seas. 

c.  International  economic  relations. 

d.  Guarantees  against  the  return  of  militarism  and  limitation 
of  armaments. 

e.  Responsibilities  for  the  war. 

f .  Restitution  and  reparations. 

g.  Solemn  repudiation  of  all  violations  of  international  law 
and  of  the  principles  of  humanity. 

h.  The  right  of  nations  to  self-determination,  together  with  the 
right  of  minorities. 

i.     An  international  organization  for  arbitration. 
j.    Statutes  of  the  League  of  Nations. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  89 

II.  Territorial  Problems : 

Delimitation  of  frontier  between  belligerents — new  states  cre- 
ated and  neutral  countries  in  accordance  with : 

a.  The  right  of  self-determination  of  peoples. 

b.  The  right  of  nations  weak  or  strong  to  equality  in  law. 

c.  The  rights  of  ethical  and  religious  minorities. 

d.  The  right  to  guarantees  against  an  offensive  return  of  mili- 
tarism, adjustment  of  frontiers,  military  neutralization  of  certain 
zones,   internationalization   of   certain   means   of   communication, 
liberty  of  the  seas,  etc ... 

III.  Financial  Problems : 

Determination  of  the  financial  responsibility  of  the  enemy  in 
accordance  with  the  rights  of  pillages  and  devastated  regions : 

a.  Restitutions. 

b.  Reparations. 

c.  Guarantees    of    payment    endorsed    by    an    international 
organization. 

IV.  Economic  Problems: 

Establishment  of  a  system  which  shall  ensure  for  the  time  being 
to  those  nations  which  have  suffered  most  from  the  aggression  of 
the  enemy  equitable  guarantees  to  be  secured  by  an  international 
control  of 

a.  Exports. 

b.  Imports. 

c.  Ocean  freights 

and  preparing  for  the  future 

a.  An  economic  basis  for  international  relations. 

b.  Economic  penalties  to  be  enforced  by  the  League  of  Nations 
for  the  maintenance  of  Peace. 

V.  Promotion  of  the  League  of  Nations : 

Once  these  three  types  of  problems  have  been  solved  in  the  order 
and  in  accordance  with  the  principles  stated  above  the  two  aims  to 
be  achieved  will  have  been  attained  together. 

a.  The  war  will  have  been  put  an  end  to. 

b.  The  principal  foundations  of  the  League  of  Nations  will  be 
laid. 

It  will  then  remain  to : 

a.  Provide  for  the  League's  maintenance. 

b.  Codify  such  measures  resulting  from  the  guiding  principles 
stated  in  the  first  paragraph,  which  may  not  have  been  covered  by 
the  treaty  clauses  dealing  with  territorial,  financial  and  economic 


90      THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

problems    (for  instance  open  diplomacy,  arbitrary  and  interna- 
tional organization,  etc. . . ) 

II 

PROPOSED  ORDER  FOR  EXAMINATION  OF 
TERRITORIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PROBLEMS 

Among  the  territorial  and  political  problems,  distinction  must 
be  made  between : 

Those  which  must  be  solved  first. 

Those  whose  solution  is  only  secondary,  because  facilitated  by 
rulings  made  on  the  first. 

Those  for  the  solution  of  which  delay  is  preferable. 

Taking  the  above  into  account,  the  examination  might  proceed 
in  the  following  order. 

I.  Territorial  Settlement  with  Germany. 

This  is  the  essential  problem  dominating  all  others  and  its  solu: 
tion  will  react  upon  the  entire  rulings  of  the  Treaty. 

The  French  Government  has  already  drawn  up  a  preliminary 
proposal  on  this  matter  stating  the  principles,  which  might  serve 
as  a  point  of  departure  for  the  discussions  of  the  powers. 

A  general  clause  will  contain  Germany's  preliminary  accept- 
ance of  rulings  to  be  fixed  later  by  the  Allies  and  all  the  other 
states. 

II.  Organization  of  Central  Europe : 

Questions  presented  by  the  disappearance  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  the  Constitution  of  different  States  resulting  from  the  former 
double  monarchy. 

a.  Recognized  States 
Poland 
Bohemia 

b.  States  in  formation 
Jugo  Slavia 
Magyars 
German  Austria 

III.  Oriental  Questions: 

a.  Liberation  of  nationalities  oppressed  by  the  former  Otto- 
man Empire: 

Armenia 
Syria  and  Cicilia 
Arab  States 
Palestine 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  91 

b.  The  question  of  Constantinople  is  a  separate  matter. 

c.  Delimitation  of  the  frontiers  of  the  Ottoman  State. 

The  maintenance  of  a  Turkish  State  is  justified  by  the  existence 
of  a  population  mostly  Turkish  in  the  western  and  central  portions 
of  the  peninsular  of  Asia  Minor.  This  population  desires  to  be 
governed  by  a  national  government  and  the  principles  of  the  Allies 
oblige  them  to  take  into  account  the  expressed  wish  of  the  people. 

IV.  Status  of  the  Balkan  Peoples : 

Frontiers  of  Bulgaria,  Roumania,  Greece  and  Serbia.  This  is 
one  of  the  most  complicated  questions  and  a  subject  of  the  keenest 
controversy.  It  would  seem  preferable  to  deal  with  it  after  the 
settlement  of  the  great  German,  Austrian  and  Oriental  problems 
the  settlement  of  which  will  clear  away  some  of  the  difficulties  and 
give  the  Powers  greater  freedom  of  action. 

V.  Russian  Problems : 

By  dealing  with  this  last,  the  nationalities  will  be  given  time  to 
organize  at  least  partially,  to  make  known  their  wishes  under  more 
normal  conditions  and  to  proceed  to  the  necessary  agreements 
between  the  various  ethical  groups. 

The  variety  of  subjects  calling  for  the  attention  of  the 
heads  of  the  delegations  and  the  instinctive  repugnance  of 
the  Anglo-Saxons  to  the  systematized  constructions  of  the 
Latin  mind  prevented  the  adoption  of  our  proposal  which 
only  partially  served  to  direct  the  order  of  work.  The 
Conference  created  its  various  organizations  one  after  the 
other  instead  of  building  them  all  up  beforehand.  Perhaps 
it  was  a  mistake,  but  in  any  case  France  was  not  to  blame. 
At  the  end  of  a  very  few  weeks  the  whole  organization  was 
moving.  I  simply  indicate  its  main  outlines, 

I.  Executive  Bodies : 

a.  A  general  Secretariat 

b.  A  supervising  Committee  of  the  Powers 

c.  A  drafting  Committee 

II.  Commissions  and  Committees : 
League  of  Nations 

Responsibilities  for  the  war  and  penalties  with  three  sub- 
committees 

a.  Criminal  acts 

b.  Responsibility  for  the  war 


92     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

c.     Responsibility    for   violations    of   the    rules   and    customs 
of  war 

Reparations  for  damages  with  three  sub-committees 

a.  Valuation  of  damages 

b.  Capacity  and  means  of  payment 

c.  Measures  of  security  and  guarantees 
International  labour  legislation 

International  regulation  of  ports,  waterways  and  railways  with 
two  sub-committees 

a.  Transit  problems 

b.  River  labours  and  railway  regulations 
Financial  questions  with  five  sub-committees 

a.  Immediate  requirements 

b.  Currency  questions 

c.  Enemy  debts 

d.  Inter-allied  problems  and  plans  of  the  financial  section  of 
the  League  of  Nations 

e.  Payment  of  Austrian-Hungarian  coupons 
Economic  question  with  nine  sub-committees 

a.  Permanent  commercial  relations 

b.  Customs  regulations,  taxes  and  restrictions 

c.  Navigation 

d.  Unfair  competition 

e.  Industrial  ownership 

f .  Pre-war  contracts 

g.  Liquidation  of  enemy  stocks. 

h.     Foreign  (former  enemy)  nations 
i.    Abrogation  and  renewal  of  treaties. 
Aeronautics  with  three  sub-committees 

a.  Military  sub-commission 

b.  Technical  sub-commission 

c.  Legal  commercial  and  financial  sub-commission 
Central  committee  on  territorial  questions 
Committee  on  Alsace-Lorraine 

Committee  on  the  Sarre  Basin 

Commission  of  Czecho-Slovakian  affairs 

Commission  of  Polish  affairs  with  two  sub-committees 

a.  Inter-allied  mission  to  Poland 

b.  Commission  of  Teschen 

Commission  of  Roumanian  and  Jugo-Slav  affairs 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  93 

Commission  of  Greek  and  Albanian  affairs 

Commission  of  Belgian  and  Danish  affairs 

Commission  of  Colonial  affairs 

Commission  of  sub-marine  cable  matters 

Drafting  Committee  for  military,  naval  and  aerial  clauses 

Inter- Allied  Military  and  Naval  Committee 

Supreme  Economic  Council  with  six  sections 

a.  Blockade 

b.  Finance 

c.  Haw  materials 

d.  Ocean  freights 

e.  Food  supplies 

f.  Means  of  communication 

These  fifty-eight  groups  included  in  addition  to  the 
plenipotentiaries  and  the  heads  of  Government  depart- 
ments, men  representing  every  type  of  human  activity, 
lawyers,  financiers,  historians,  manufacturers,  business 
men,  administrators,  professors,  journalists,  soldiers  and 
sailors  who  brought  a  wide  personal  experience  to  every 
problem  along  with  the  results  of  the  preliminary  studies 
in  which  nearly  all  of  them  had  participated.  These  com- 
missions, albeit  organized  as  occasion  demanded  from  day 
to  day,  responded  none  the  less  to  the  requirements  of  effi- 
cient organization.  A  very  large  amount  of  work,  in  com- 
mittee meetings  and  in  reports,  was  furnished  by  them.  On 
every  question  a  scrupulously  fair  hearing  was  given  to 
all  interested  parties  as  often  as  they  desired.  More  than 
fifteen  hundred  committee  meetings  were  held,  often  sup- 
plemented by  local  investigations.  It  is  the  conscientious 
effort  of  these  men  that  Mr.  Keynes  has  sought  to  ridicule 
in  his  book  on  the  Conference.  "The  poisonous  morass  of 
Paris, "  to  cite  but  one  of  the  least  violent  of  his  epithets, 
has  naught  to  fear  from  his  invective.  Earely  was  a  politi- 
cal undertaking  more  honestly  and  more  scrupulously 
prepared.  I  may  add  that  despite  the  heat  of  certain  de- 
bates all  those  who  took  part  in  it  have  retained  one  for 
another  a  great  mutual  esteem,  the  esteem  of  men  of  good 
faith  and  good  will  who  in  "a  great  adventure,"  as  Mr. 


94     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

House  used  to  say,  had  dedicated  their  minds  and  their 
hearts  to  the  most  difficult  of  tasks.* 

Complaint  has  been  made,  that  on  some  points,  and  not 
the  least  important,  the  recommendations  of  the  Commis- 
sions were  not  adopted  by  the  heads  of  Governments.  That 
is  true.  But  could  it  possibly  have  been  otherwise  ?  Here 
again  I  appeal  to  realities.  The  peace  was  a  political 
structure  built  by  political  bodies,  known  as  nations.  Be- 
sides it  was  the  Peace — that  is  to  say  a  work  of  harmony 
following  on  a  period  of  strife.  Two  consequences  resulted 
therefrom,  consequences  too  easily  forgotten  now  that  the 
danger  is  passed.  The  first  was  that  technical  considera- 
tions had  sometimes  to  give  way,  when  the  time  came  for 
decision,  to  considerations  of  general  policy  over  which 
the  experts  had  no  control.  The  second  was  that  to  reach 
decision  unanimity  was  necessary.  The  Peace  Conference 
was  not  a  deliberative  assembly  in  which  a  majority  could 
carry  disputed  points.  Its  conclusions,  whatever  they 
were,  called  for  the  agreement  of  all.  This  agreement 
could  only  be  reached  by  sacrifices  freely  consented  by 
each.  Does  anyone  realize  the  immense  difficulty  of  attain- 


*I  shall  not  waste  time  in  this  book  on  the  insults  addressed  by  Mr. 
Keynes  to  France,  her  representatives  and  her  policy.  I  confine  myself  to 
noting  once  for  all  that  this  writer,  whose  contentions  do  not  withstand  exam- 
ination in  the  light  of  the  facts  here  set  forth,  condemns  himself  both  by  the 
violence  of  his  words  and  the  contradiction  of  his  acts.  The  violence  of  his 
words?  Here  are  a  few  samples:  "Nightmare;  empty  and  arid  intrigue; 
puppet-show;  Carthaginian  peace;  the  hot  and  poisoned  atmosphere  of  Paris; 
the  treacherous  halls  of  Paris;  the  morass  of  Paris;  insincerity;  systematic 
destruction;  Germany's  outlawry;  spoliation;  imperial  aggrandisements; 
ridiculous  and  injurious  provisions;  the  policy  of  reducing  Germany  to  servi- 
tude for  a  generation,  of  degrading  the  lives  of  millions  of  human  beings,  of 
depriving  a  whole  nation  of  happiness;  a  destructive  blow  at  the  so-called 
international  law;  some  preach  in  the  name  of  justice;  cavern;  sophistry  and 
Jesuitical  exegesis;  dishonourable  to  the  Allies  in  the  light  of  their  professions; 
dishonesty;  the  grossest  spectacle;  food  for  the  cynic;  imbecile  and  senseless 
greed;  unveracity;  crushing  policy;  policy  of  pretence;  so  contorted,  so  miser- 
able negotiation ;  shame ;  false  statement,  breach  of  engagements  and  of  inter- 
national morality  comparable  with  the  invasion  of  Belgium;  one  of  the  most 
outrageous  acts  of  a  cruel  victor  in  civilised  history. ' '  When  a  man  is  right  he 
does  not  write  thus.  As  to  Mr.  Keynes'  acts  I  will  merely  say  this:  "Mr. 
Keynes  was  attached  as  an  expert  to  the  British  delegation  up  to  June  9,  1919, 
that  is  to  say  for  six  months.  Long  before  this  date  the  Treaty  drawn  up  with 
his  collaboration  contained  all  the  features  for  which  he  has  since  criticized  it 
so  virulently.  So  he  would  have  been  better  inspired  if  he  had  resigned  a  few 
months  sooner  instead  of  abusing  to  the  end  the  confidence  of  those  he  waa 
preparing  to  insult. ' ' 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  95 

ing  indispensable  agreement?  In  my  district  just  outside 
Paris  there  is  a  bridge  built  in  the  days  of  tolls.  To  do 
away  with  this  irksome  tithe  only  the  consent  of  the  two 
communes  interested  in  the  traffic  is  necessary;  and  yet 
for  twenty  years  it  has  been  sought  in  vain.  For  results 
to  be  attained  from  the  work  of  the  Conference  it  was 
necessary  that  on  every  question  the  greatest  nations  of 
the  world  should  arrive  at  substantial  accord.  The  mere 
statement  of  this  condition  gives  the  measure  of  the 
difficulty. 

These  men,  whose  unanimity  was  demanded  by  circum- 
stances, represented  nations  separated  by  centuries  of  his- 
tory. Great  Britain  and  France,  to  mention  but  these,  had 
been  at  war  between  1688  and  1815  for  sixty-one  years  out 
of  a  hundred  and  twenty-seven.  All  the  others  had  each 
in  its  own  country  and  in  its  own  interest  lived  different 
lives  which  had  given  birth  to  conflicting  interests.  Im- 
mediate conflicts  reduced  to  figures  in  economic  and  finan- 
cial problems  where  one  could  not  have  more  unless  the 
other  had  less.  Other  conflicts,  less  immediate  but  far 
deeper,  in  public  morals  where  the  diversity  of  traditions 
had  given  birth  to  widely  divergent  conceptions  and  to 
irreconcilable  contradictions  of  feeling  and  of  thought.  It 
was  the  dead  of  ages  speaking  and  they  did  not  all  speak 
the  same  language.  M.  Clemenceau  and  those  who  helped 
him  direct  the  negotiations  for  France  had  personal  expe- 
rience of  this  dangerous  divergence  of  national  tempera- 
ments. He  characterized  it  in  these  words,  which  I 
reproduce : 

The  state  of  mind  of  our  Allies  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as 
our  own,  and  when  we  are  not  in  agreement  with  them,  it  is  unjust 
to  blame  those  who  do  not  succeed  in  convincing  them  or  to  blame 
them  for  evil  intentions  which  are  not  in  their  hearts. 

"What  are  you  going  to  do  about  it?  Each  of  us  lives  encased 
in  his  own  past.  Auguste  Comte  said  that  we  live  dead  men's  lives 
and  it  is  true. 

We  are  encased  by  the  past  which  holds  us  in  its  grip,  and  spurs 
us  forward  to  new  efforts.  Neither  an  Englishman,  nor  I,  nor 


96     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

anyone  will  cast  off  his  historial  way  of  seeing  things  and  of  think- 
ing because  he  has  contracted  a  temporary  alliance  with  a  foreign 
country. 

...  I  had  to  do  with  these  difficulties  during  the  war.  Take 
unity  of  command.  Unity  of  command  was  achieved  by  several 
stages.  Everybody .  did  his  bit.  But  the  difficulty  of  bringing 
unity  of  command  into  being  was  much  less  than  the  difficulty  of 
making  it  work,  and  that  because  of  the  different  states  of  mind  I 
have  just  mentioned. 

The  Peace  Conference  has  only  inherited  states  of  mind  from 
the  various  conferences  of  Versailles  and  from  the  meetings  which 
preceded  it. 

How  can  a  man  be  expected  to  renounce  his  past  when  he  is 
sacrificing  the  blood  of  his  countrymen  to  uphold  it  ? 

Men  retain  their  virtues  and  their  faults  together.  You  must 
take  them  as  they  are.  They  are  what  they  are.  They  have  a  past 
as  we  have  a  past.  As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  merely  because  they 
differ  from  me  even  on  very  serious  questions,  I  do  not  feel  called 
upon  to  break  with  them  as  has  been  suggested. 

There  is  the  master  difficulty.  One  could  not  break  off ...  or 
only  in  such  a  manner  that  public  opinion  would  immediately  and 
unanimously  lay  the  blame  on  those  who  broke  off . . . 

...  It  is  said  that  when  one  is  French,  the  right  thing  is  to  say, 
"I  demand,"  and  if  the  others  refuse,  to  break;  it  was  also  said, 
' '  The  right  thing  is  to  go  before  Parliament. ' ' 

A  fine  reception  I  should  have  had,  and  how  right  Parliament 
would  have  been  to  receive  me  ill. 

There  should  be  no  surprise  at  the  resistance  we  have  encoun- 
tered. The  one  said  or  thought,  "I  am  English";  the  other 
thought,  "I  am  American."  Each  had  as  much  right  to  say  so  as 
we  had  to  say  we  are  French.  Sometimes  it  is  true,  they  made  me 
suffer  cruelly.  But  such  discussions  must  be  entered  into  not  with 
the  idea  of  breaking  off,  or  smashing  the  serving  tables  and  the 
china  as  was  Napoleon's  wont,  but  with  the  idea  of  making  one's 
self  understood. 

That  is  why  those  who  had  the  responsibility,  and  there- 
fore the  authority,  gradually  made  such  concessions  as 
were  necessary  to  final  agreement.  That  is  why  the  recom- 
mendations of  commissions — some  of  which  besides  had 
not  succeeded  in  reaching  unanimity — were  sometimes 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  97 

brushed  aside.  France,  I  have  the  right  to  recall  it,  almost 
always  supported  the  opinions  of  the  experts.  At  the  same 
time  no  country  did  more  than  France  to  pave  the  way  for 
the  necessary  agreements.  Technical  preparations,  politi- 
cal unanimity,  these  were  the  two  poles  between  which  the 
Conference  revolved.  There  were  deviations  from  one  to 
the  other.  The  straight  line  was  not  always  followed.  Let 
him  who  could  have  done  better,  cast  the  first  stone !  The 
truth  is  that  on  the  one  hand  the  essential  factors  were 
studied  with  a  care  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  the  great 
Congresses  of  history;  and  on  the  other  that  the  decisions 
based  thereon,  when  debated,  were  dominated  by  a  spirit  of 
harmony  inherited  by  peace  from  war — that  the  sacrifices 
made  were  honourable  concessions  to  the  common  purpose. 
On  the  one  hand  the  commissions'  laborious  workshops 
where  the  materials  were  produced  and  stored ;  on  the  other, 
the  "Big  Four" — a  mysterious  Power  used  to  scare  popu- 
lar credulity  and  who  only  exercised  however  the  legal 
authority  with  which  the  nations  had  invested  them.  There 
is  the  Conference  of  Paris. 

For  the  convenience  of  controversy,  the  story  was  widely 
circulated  of  the  most  formidable  Treaty  in  history  hur- 
riedly improvised  and  thrown  together  by  four  fallible  and 
ill-informed  men,  closeted  in  a  dark  room,  imposing  upon 
the  world  their  whim  as  law.  The  time  has  come  to  meet 
this  fable  with  the  facts.  The  Treaty  was  studied,  prepared 
and  discussed  for  six  long  months  by  fifty-eight  technical 
commissions  on  which  sat  the  foremost  specialists  of  each 
country  which  held  1,646  meetings.  The  conclusions  of  these 
commissions,  verified  by  twenty-six  local  investigations, 
were  discussed  from  January  10  to  June  28  by  three  bod- 
ies :  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  which  held 
thirty-nine  meetings ;  the  Council  of  Ten  which  held  seventy- 
two  meetings  and  the  Council  of  Four  which  held  one 
hundred  and  forty-five  meetings.  These  three  councils 
also  gave  hearings  to  the  chairmen  of  the  technical  com- 
missions, and  all  the  representatives  of  Allied  or  neutral 
countries  interested.  Finally  when  at  the  beginning  of 


98     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

May,  the  texts  were  settled  upon,  the  cabinets  of  the  various 
Powers  were  called  into  consultation. 

Such  were  the  general  conditions  of  the  work  of  the 
Conference.  I  come  now  to  the  conditions  in  which  its 
decisions  were  arrived  at ;  that  is  to  say  to  the  very  origin 
of  this  unprecedented  Treaty  which,  after  fifty-two  months 
of  war,  restored  peace  to  the  world. 

Ill 

I  have  just  mentioned  the  various  groups  who  made 
these  decisions:  Council  of  Foreign  Ministers,  Council  of 
Ten,  Council  of  Four.  Why  so  many?  Why  so  interlock- 
ing? The  former  a  question  of  procedure,  the  latter  a 
question  of  principle.  Both  need  answer. 

And  first  of  all  why  did  not  all  the  Powers  summoned 
to  Paris  take  part  in  the  elaboration  of  the  Peace  ?  There 
were  twenty-seven  Allied  Powers  and  four  Enemy  Powers. 
The  admission  of  the  latter  to  the  preparatory  discussions 
was  not  even  suggested.  There  remained  the  Allies. 
Could  they  all  be  asked  to  sit?  Evidently  not.  First  be- 
cause it  would  have  been  a  regular  parliament,  the  debates 
of  which  would  have  been  interminable ;  then  also  because 
the  positions  of  the  various  countries  were  not  equal.  The 
Big  Nations  have  been  accused  of  thrusting  the  smaller 
ones  aside.  But  not  to  mention  those  who,  without  any 
act  of  war,  had  merely  broken  off  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany,  nor  those  who,  having  declared  war,  had  fur- 
nished no  military  effort,  could  it  be  maintained  that,  in 
the  difficult  work  of  giving  expression  to  victory,  the 
right  of  initiative  should  not  be  in  some  measure  dependent 
upon  the  sacrifices  made?  Among  the  victors  some  had 
given  everything,  their  soil,  their  blood,  their  treasure,  not 
only  to  defend  their  own  liberties  but  to  win  liberty  for 
others.  These  latter  on  the  contrary,  despite  the  endurance 
of  long  sufferings,  owed  their  resurrection  entirely  to 
the  former.  A  classification  was  thus  essential,  and  how 
can  one  challenge  the  justice  of  the  distinction  made,  by  a 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  99 

protocol  pregnant  with  reality,  between  the  Powers  of  gen- 
eral and  those  of  restricted  interest  ?  It  enhanced  the  clear- 
ness and  moderation  of  the  debates.  Moreover  it  was  only 
just.  Those  who  had  borne  the  fearful  burden  of  war  were 
entitled  to  the  privilege  of  determining,  in  accordance  with 
the  war  aims  accepted  by  all  and  in  the  interest  of  all,  the 
general  lines  of  the  peace.  M.  Clemenceau  at  the  second 
plenary  sitting  of  the  Conference,  January  25,  1919, 
dealt  with  the  question  frankly  on  the  occasion  of  a  discus- 
sion on  the  composition  of  the  commissions. 

"Sir  Eobert  Borden,"  he  said,  "head  of  the  Canadian 
delegation,  has  in  very  friendly  manner  reproached  the 
Great  Powers  with  having  made  the  decision.  Yes,  we 
decided  in  the  matter  of  the  commissions;  as  we  decided 
to  call  the  present  Conference ;  and  as  we  decided  to  invite 
the  representatives  of  interested  nations. 

"I  make  no  secret  of  it.  A  Conference  of  the  Great 
Powers  is  being  held  in  an  adjoining  room.  The  Five  Great 
Powers  whose  action  it  is  desired  should  be  justified  before 
you  to-day,  are  in  a  position  to  furnish  that  justification. 

"A  few  moments  ago,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great 
Britain  reminded  me  that  the  day  the  war  came  to  a  close, 
the  principal  Allies  had  twelve  million  soldiers  fighting  on 
the  fields  of  battle.  That  is  a  title. 

"We  have  lost,  killed  and  wounded,  by  millions,  and  if 
we  had  not  had  present  to  our  minds  the  great  question 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  we  might  have  been  selfishly 
led  to  consult  ourselves  alone.  Who  can  say  that  we  should 
not  have  been  justified? 

"Such  was  not  our  wish.  We  called  together  the  en- 
tire assembly  of  the  interested  nations.  We  called  them 
together  not  to  impose  our  will  upon  them,  not  to  make 
them  do  that  which  they  do  not  want,  but  to  ask  their 
cooperation.  That  is  why  we  invited  them  here.  Yet  we 
must  ascertain  how  this  cooperation  is  to  be  organized. 

"Experience  has  taught  me  that  the  more  numerous 
committees  are,  the  less  chance  there  is  of  getting  things 
done.  Now,  behind  us  stands  a  very  great,  very  august, 


100     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

and  at  times  very  imperious  force  called  public  opinion. 
It  will  not  ask  us  if  such  or  such  a  state  was  represented 
on  such  or  such  a  commission.  That  is  of  no  interest  to 
anybody.  Public  opinion  will  ask  us  what  we  have  done. 
It  is  my  duty  to  direct  our  work  so  that  we  may  get  things 
done." 

Thus  ordered,  the  Conference  deprived  no  one  of  the 
right  of  being  heard.  All  the  countries  represented,  no 
matter  how  small,  participated  in  the  labours  of  the  com- 
missions, either  as  members  or  as  witnesses.  All  were 
heard  by  the  Great  Powers,  and  the  number  of  these  hear- 
ings exceeds  three  hundred.  But  the  direction  of  the  work 
remained  in  the  hands  of  those  who  had  won  the  war.  It 
was  thus  that  on  January  12,  1919,  the  body  known  as  the 
Council  of  Ten  met ;  it  was  composed  of  the  heads  of  Gov- 
ernments and  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  United 
States,  the  British  Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan.  This 
Council  sat  twice  daily  from  January  12  to  March  24,  deal- 
ing both  with  the  peace  and  with  such  urgent  problems 
of  world  politics  as  could  not  be  left  unsolved:  application 
and  renewals  of  the  Armistice,  food  supplies  for  Europe; 
Russian  affairs.  The  Council  listened  to  the  claims  of  the 
small  nations.  It  settled  the  clauses  of  the  disarmament  of 
Germany.  That  having  been  done,  it  suddenly  realized 
that  six  weeks  had  passed,  that  the  end  was  not  yet  in  sight 
and  that  with  its  ten  members  assisted  by  several  dozen 
experts  no  headway  was  being  made.  Little  by  little  every- 
body had  got  into  the  habit  of  making  speeches.  Matters 
were  constantly  being  adjourned.  That  perfect  frankness 
essential  to  obtain  results  was  difficult  in  the  presence  of 
so  large  an  audience.  When  anything  leaked  out,  each  del- 
egation blamed  the  other  for  it.  These  were  the  reasons — 
and  there  was  none  other — why  it  was  decided  to  narrow 
the  circle.  Thus  the  Council  of  Four,  increased  to  five  when 
the  Japanese  delegate  was  present,  was  formed  and  it  was 
assisted  in  some  of  the  less  important  matters  by  the  Coun- 
cil of  Five  made  up  of  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
To  what  obscure  mano3uvres  has  the  formation  of  these 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  101 

two  committees  not  been  attributed?    I  have  given  the  real 
reasons.    They  are  self-sufficient. 

This  was  the  heroic  period  of  the  Conference;  by  rea- 
son both  of  the  importance  of  the  problems  under  discus- 
sion and  of  the  extraordinary  intensity  of  the  effort  put 
forth.  From  March  24  to  May  7,  the  whole  Treaty  was  put 
into  shape:  territorial,  financial,  economic  and  colonial 
clauses  alike.  Every  morning  and  every  afternoon,  the 
four  men  met  together,  usually  on  the  ground  floor  of  the 
Hotel  Bischoffsheim.  In  the  garden  an  American  "dough- 
boy" stood  sentry,  wearing  the  insignia  of  the  Conference, 
white  scales  on  a  blue  ground.  At  other  times  the  meetings 
were  held  at  the  Ministry  of  War  in  M.  Clemenceau's  dark 
and  comfortless  office.  Habit  had  created  its  own  laws. 
In  the  afternoon  each  man  took  the  same  seat  he  had  occu- 
pied in  the  morning.  Sir  Maurice  Hankey,  Secretary  of 
the  British  War  Cabinet,  and  Professor  Mantoux,  head  in- 
terpreter of  the  French  delegation,  were  the  only  others 
present.  The  plenipotentiaries  and  the  experts  came  only 
from  time  to  time.  The  tone  was  conversational.  Neither 
pomp  nor  pose.  Signor  Orlando  spoke  but  little;  Italy's 
interest  in  the  Conference  was  far  too  much  confined  to 
the  question  of  Fiume,  and  her  share  in  the  debates  was 
too  limited  as  a  result.  It  resolved  itself  into  a  three- 
cornered  conversation  between  Wilson,  Clemenceau  and 
Lloyd  George — an  amazing  contrast  of  the  three  most 
widely  different  natures  that  it  is  possible  to  conceive. 
Always  sincere  and  straightforward,  these  interviews  were 
at  times  almost  tragic  in  their  solemn  simplicity  and  would 
then  relax  into  something  approaching  gaiety  when  agree- 
ment was  in  sight.  History  will  record  with  approval  that 
even  in  the  most  difficult  hours  the  "Four"  always  spoke 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 

I  shared  their  life  too  closely  to  be  able  to  judge  them. 
Who  better  than  I  knows  their  shortcomings?  I  have  no 
taste  to  blame  them ;  for  I  saw  them  give  the  very  best  of 
their  great  minds  to  their  task,  and  what  more  can  one  ask? 
I  have  no  right  to  praise  them.  I  shall  but  try  to  redress, 


102     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

in  as  few  words  as  may  be,  the  wrong  done  by  the  out- 
rageous pen  of  a  subordinate  and  disgruntled  employee.  I 
shall  brush  aside  the  legend  that  one  of  these  three  men 
hoodwinked  the  others.  In  France  it  has  been  said  that 
Clemenceau  was  the  dupe  of  Wilson  and  of  Lloyd  George ; 
in  the  United  States  that  Wilson  was  the  plaything  of 
Lloyd  George,  and  in  England  Mr.  Keynes  has  written  that 
M.  Clemenceau  turned  the  trick  alone.  This  childish  and 
contradictory  explanation,  convenient  to  politicians,  must 
be  abandoned.  The  exaggerated  honour  or  the  insult  which 
it  implies  to  the  three  leaders  must  be  repudiated.  The 
truth  is  that  from  the  first  day  to  the  last,  with  a  deep 
desire  to  reach  agreement,  the  discussion  proceeded  foot 
by  foot.  I  have  already  explained  why. 

The  discussion  between  men  whose  national  and  individ- 
ual temperaments  were  utterly  opposed  was  naturally 
exceedingly  keen.  President  Wilson  discussed  like  a  col- 
lege professor  criticizing  a  thesis,  sitting  bolt  upright  in 
his  armchair,  inclining  his  head  at  times  towards  his 
advisers,  developing  his  views  with  the  abundant  clearness 
of  a  didactic  logician.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  argued  like  a 
sharp-shooter,  with  sudden  bursts  of  cordial  approval  and 
equally  frequent  gusts  of  anger,  with  a  wealth  of  brilliant 
imagination  and  copious  historical  reminiscences;  clasping 
his  knee  in  his  hands,  he  sat  near  the  fireplace,  wrapped  in 
the  utmost  indifference  to  technical  arguments,  irresistibly 
attracted  to  unlooked-for  solutions,  but  dazzling  with  elo- 
quence and  wit,  moved  only  by  higher  appeals  to  perma- 
nent bonds  of  friendship,  and  ever  fearful  of  parliamentary 
consequences.  As  for  M.  Clemenceau,  his  part  in  the  discus- 
sion was  thoroughly  typical  and  in  very  many  instances 
his  views  prevailed.  His  arguments  instead  of  being  pre- 
sented by  deductive  reasoning  like  those  of  Mr.  Wilson  or 
of  exploding  incidentally  like  those  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George — 
proceeded  by  assertions  weighty,  rough-hewn  and  insistent, 
but  clothed  with  gentle  words  that  did  him  credit  and 
refulgent  with  emotion  which  at  times  was  overpowering. 
Mr.  Keynes  has  had  the  face  to  find  fault  with  him  for 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  103 

seeking  first  of  all  to  place  France  beyond  the  reach  of 
German  aggression:  it  is  the  criticism  of  a  man  who  has 
understood  nothing  of  the  history  of  Europe  during  the 
past  fifty  years  and  whose  insular  egoism  cannot  grasp 
what  invasion  means. 

This  period  of  history  is  closed.  Most  of  the  men  who 
dominated  it  are  retired.  This  gives  me  the  greater  free- 
dom to  say  that  the  lesson  of  the  war  was  not  lost  upon 
them,  that  despite  their  deep  differences  of  opinion  they 
were  animated  by  an  all-powerful  unity  of  purpose,  by  a 
spirit  of  real  understanding,  "We  entered  here  united," 
M.  Clemenceau  used  to  say,  "we  must  leave  here  brothers." 
France  and  her  spokesman  did  all  they  could  to  bring  this 
about.  They  had  a  hard  time  of  it.  To  give  effect  by 
common  agreement  to  the  essential  bases  of  peace — resti- 
tution, reparation  and  guarantees — what  toil  and  labour 
therein  lay!  Complete  harmony  crowned  their  work  with 
success.  It  is  easy  to  pretend  that  the  policy  of  France  was 
a  "punic"  policy:  the  mark  of  the  beast  is  upon  our  devas- 
tated region  and  tells  on  which  side  were  the  Carthagin- 
ians. It  is  easy  to  taunt  President  Wilson  with  having 
adapted  his  principles  to  the  pressing  demands  of  reality, 
although  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  were  not  his  principles 
alone  but  the  principles  of  all  of  us  and  not  one  of  them 
was  violated :  this  brand  of  sarcasm  comes  from  those  who 
in  the  solitary  seclusion  of  their  firesides  build  in  their  own 
minds  an  imaginary  world  from  which  living,  suffering  and 
achieving  humanity  is  arbitrarily  banished.  It  is  easy  to 
make  capital  out  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George 's  contradictions :  no 
one  has  suffered  more  from  them  than  France.  But  in 
justice  it  must  be  added  that  in  the  most  serious  times  those 
who  knew  how  to  talk  to  the  British  Prime  Minister  could 
always  bring  him  back  to  fundamental  principles.  The 
infinite  sensitiveness  of  his  mind,  his  passionate  love  of 
success,  led  him  to  improvise  arguments  which  did  not  al- 
ways bear  examination  or  were  too  exclusively  pro-British. 
But  when  a  man  who  enjoyed  his  respect  answered  the 
bold  suggestions  of  his  quick  brain  with  those  permanent 


104    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

truths  which  he  had  momentarily  deserted,  he  came  back 
to  them  when  the  time  arrived  for  final  decision.  These 
three  men,  for  whom  needless  to  say  I  have  not  the  same 
personal  feeling,  forced  upon  me  the  same  conviction  about 
them  all ;  the  conviction  that  in  their  unheard-of  task  they 
managed  to  maintain  and  make  even  closer  the  bonds  that 
bind  our  three  countries,  the  breaking  of  which  would  spell 
disaster  to  civilization.  They  only  did  so  with  great  dif- 
ficulty. In  their  search  for  essential  unanimity,  they  some- 
times discovered  that  they  neither  knew  one  another  well 
nor  understood  one  another  fully.  Nevertheless  they 
reached  agreement,  and  reached  it  by  open,  straight  and 
honest  paths.  This  I  assert,  and  I  assert  it  because  I  was 
there  and  others  who  have  said  the  contrary  were  not. 
And  then  there  were  minor  criticisms.  Fault  was  found 
that  the  Council  of  Four  had  no  official  secretariat.  In 
the  first  place,  all  its  decisions  were  minutely  recorded.  In 
the  second,  bureaucratic  paper-mongers  nearly  cost  us  the 
war.  Later  on,  in  1920,  they  nearly  compassed  the  *  *  sabot- 
age" of  the  Peace.  Thanks  are  due  to  those  who  discussed 
things  freely  without  thought  of  protecting  themselves  by 
and  with  a  set  of  minutes !  Fault  has  been  found  with  the 
time  spent  in  discussion.  The  Conference  of  Paris  began 
on  January  12,  1919.  The  Treaty  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Germans  on  the  seventh  of  May.  It  was  signed  on  June  28. 
There  is  no  instance  in  history  of  a  work  of  this  magnitude 
accomplished  so  rapidly.  The  Congress  of  Vienna  lasted 
fifteen  months;  the  Congress  of  Westphalia  five  years, — 
and  in  each  case  the  task  was  less.  If  my  personal  experi- 
ence of  the  negotiations  has  left  any  regret  in  my  mind,  it 
is  that  at  times  things  were  done  too  quickly.  Fault  has 
been  found  that,  contrary  to  diplomatic  tradition,  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  was  built  without  the  classic  propylaBum 
of  a  preliminary  treaty.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  bet- 
ter if  a  summary  treaty  had  followed  close  upon  the  Armis- 
tice. This  is  what  the  French  delegates  had  at  first 
proposed.  Circumstances  made  it  impossible.  These  pre- 
liminaries could  have  been  signed  neither  before  the 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  105 

fifteenth  of  February  when  Mr.  Wilson  left  for  Washing- 
ton and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  for  London,  nor  during  the 
absence  of  M.  Clemenceau  who  was  wounded  by  an  assassin 
on  the  twenty-first.  When  everybody  met  again  on  March 
15,  the  progress  made  by  the  commissions  justified  the 
hope  that  the  work  would  soon  be  finished,  as  it  was  in 
fact  six  weeks  later  when  the  Treaty  was  ready,  and  the 
idea  of  preliminaries  was  abandoned.  It  was  also  aban- 
doned for  two  other  reasons.  The  first  was  that  a  pre- 
liminary, that  is  to  say  a  provisional  and  incomplete  Peace 
would  have  encouraged  the  already  active  campaign  for 
immediate  demobilization  which  everybody  realized  was 
both  necessary  and  dangerous.  The  second  was  that  Pres- 
ident Wilson,  anxious  to  have  only  one  draft  and  not  two 
to  submit  to  the  U.  S.  Senate  and  desiring  also  not  to 
dissociate  the  ratification  of  the  Peace  from  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations,  insistently  urged  the  aban- 
donment of  preliminaries  and  the  immediate  preparation 
of  the  final  Treaty  of  Peace.  The  ratification  of  the  Treaty 
by  the  U.  S.  Senate  was  a  matter  of  so  many  and  such 
keen  apprehensions  to  the  European  Powers,  that  they  did 
not  even  think  of  disregarding  on  a  question  of  procedure 
the  formal  desire  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
That  is  why  the  preliminaries  were  abandoned  and  the 
final  treaty  prepared. 

Fault  has  also  been  found  with  the  four  heads  of  Gov- 
ernments who  have  been  accused  of  assuming  a  task  which 
was  not  theirs,  and  having  thus  delayed  the  settlement. 
"The  Armistice  was  signed  on  November  11,"  say  these 
critics,  "and  the  Conference  did  not  begin  until  January  12, 
two  months  later.  If  delegates  had  been  chosen  who  were 
neither  heads  of  States  nor  Prime  Ministers,  if  it  had  not 
been  necessary  to  wait  first  for  Mr.  Wilson  who  was 
obliged  to  prepare  for  his  departure  and  then  for  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  who  was  held  up  by  his  elections,  two  months  would 
have  been  gained.'*  Does  anyone  really  believe  that  the 
private  conversations  of  the  month  of  December  were  not 


106    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

of  importance?*  Does  anyone  really  believe  that  without 
them  certain  of  the  French  claims  which  were  opposed  by 
the  British  delegation  would  have  found  that  moral  sup- 
port in  American  quarters  which  ensured  their  ultimate 
success?  But  above  all  does  anyone  really  believe  that  it 
would  have  been  possible  to  do  the  work  that  had  to  be 
done  except  by  those  who  had  full  responsibility  and 
sovereign  power  of  decision?  Would  the  ablest  and  most 
distinguished  of  officials  been  equal  to  it?  This  question 
can  be  answered  by  experience.  Half  of  the  commissions 
when  they  really  got  to  the  heart  of  the  problems  they 
were  asked  to  solve,  hesitated  to  make  decisions  of  principle 
which  it  was  perfectly  evident  could  only  be  taken  by  the 
heads  of  Governments. 

Beyond  doubt — and  fault  was  found  with  them  for  this 
also — the  fact  that  they  were  the  heads  of  Government 
obliged  the  men  who  made  the  peace  to  give  part  of  their 
time  to  the  current  affairs  of  Europe  and  of  the  world. 
There  was  nothing  to  do  about  it ;  and  besides  does  anyone 
really  believe  that  these  current  affairs,  all  closely  linked 


*In  connection  with  these  preliminary  discussions  in  December,  1918,  it  is 
only  right  to  destroy  a  legend  which  has  found  almost  as  many  believers  as 
that  of  "peace  was  possible  in  1917"  and  which  is  quite  as  untrue.  I  refer  to 
the  so-called  deal  said  to  have  been  made  in  London  between  Mr.  Wilson  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  former  giving  up  "Freedom  of  the  Seas"  in  exchange 
for  British  support  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It  is  a  fabrication,  pure  and 
simple.  "Bomancing,"  as  M.  Clemenceau  said.  There  was  not  in  London  in 
December,  1918,  any  deal  or  negotiation  on  the  subject  of  the  "Freedom  of  the 
Seas."  Mr.  Wilson  held  that  with  the  League  of  Nations  established  there 
would  be  no  more  neutrals  and  that  the  problem  of  neutrality  discussed  for 
centuries  in  connection  with  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  no  longer  arose  and 
could  not  arise.  The  President  of  the  United  States  moreover  made  a  public 
statement  on  this  subject  in  the  spring  of  1919.  Besides  agreement  was  com- 
plete between  the  three  heads  of  the  Governments  of  the  United  States,  of 
France  and  of  Great  Britain  on  the  subject  of  the  decisive  services  rendered 
by  the  naval  power  of  Great  Britain.  M.  Clemenceau  said  so  plainly  on  Sep- 
tember 26,  1919,  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  the  following  words:  "Mr. 
Lloyd  George  said  to  me:  'Do  you  admit  that  without  the  British  fleet  you 
could  not  have  continued  the  war?'  And  I  answered:  'Yes.'  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  had  added:  'Are  you  disposed  to  prevent  us  in  case  of  war  doing  the 
same  thing  again?'  And  I  answered:  'No.'  Well  now  I  repeated  this 
conversation  to  President  Wilson.  It  did  not  in  the  least  disturb  him.  Pres- 
ident Wilson  answered  me:  'I  have  nothing  to  ask  you  which  could  displease 
or  embarrass  either  of  you. '  ' '  Already  then  Mr.  Wilson  was  convinced  that  the 
League  of  Nations  by  itself  sufficed  to  solve  the  problem.  Mr.  House  in  a 
letter  of  October,  1920,  was  so  kind  as  to  confirm  that  no  negotiation  what- 
ever took  place  on  this  subject  in  London  at  the  end  of  1918. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  107 

with  the  peace  itself,  did  not  gain  from  being  administered 
by  the  men  who  were  working  on  the  peace  ?  Europe  kept 
on  living.  Her  life  was  hard  indeed,  beset  with  material 
and  moral  difficulties.  These  difficulties  could  not  wait. 
The  food  supply  of  Europe  had  to  be  provided  for  with- 
out delay;  political  and  national  conflicts  had  to  be  settled 
forthwith;  special  bodies  to  deal  with  these  matters — like 
the  Armistice  Commission  at  Spa,  and  the  Supreme 
Economic  Council, — had  to  be  created  and  directed  and 
supervised.  No  one  but  the  heads  of  Governments  could 
do  all  this.  It  took  time  but  it  saved  time  also.  What 
would  have  happened  if  they  had  not  done  it  ?  What  would 
have  happened  if  famine  had  been  allowed  to  decimate 
Germany  and  Poland!  What  would  have  happened  if  revo- 
lution in  Hungary,  in  Bavaria  and  elsewhere  had  been 
allowed  to  run  its  course  unheeded?  So  really  there  was 
no  alternative.  Had  these  realities  been  laid  aside  for  the 
exclusive  preparation  of  the  Treaty,  the  peace  would  have 
been  delayed  and  compromised.  Theorists  may  deplore 
the  "super-government"  set  up  in  Paris  in  1919  to  their 
hearts'  content.  It  was  a  necessity. 

Such  the  work  of  the  Four.  France  may  well  be  proud 
of  the  part  she  played,  ever  firm  and  friendly.  No  one 
has  ever  stated  that  the  methods  adopted  were  all  perfect. 
But  that  they  were  adequate  to  a  tremendous  task,  is 
proved  by  the  results.  It  was  cheap  and  easy  to  caricature 
this  immense  undertaking  to  suit  one's  own  purposes.  The 
truth  stands  by  itself.  I  am  trying  to  tell  it  here. 

IV 

I  have  perhaps  waited  too  long  to  tell  it.  It  would  have 
been  better  to  have  spoken  earlier.  Another  of  the  faults 
found  with  the  Conference  of  Paris  was  that  it  surrounded 
itself  with  mystery.  I  am  inclined  to  the  belief  that,  in  this 
respect,  a  mistake  was  really  made.  I  hold  that  the  Con- 
ference was  weakened  by  its  aloofness.  Here  again  I  feel 
impelled,  even  though  I  might  prefer  otherwise,  to  relate 
exactly  how  this  came  about. 


108    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

The  representatives  of  the  Powers,  great  and  small, 
arrived  in  Paris  in  December,  1919.  An  impressive  array 
of  journalists  accompanied  them;  more  than  three  hun- 
dred from  the  United  States  alone.  The  Press,  thus 
mobilized,  had  tremendous  expectations.  Were  not  the 
events  of  yesterday  and  of  to-morrow  of  unprecedented 
importance;  had  not  the  fullest  publicity  been  promised? 
Did  not  the  first  of  the  Fourteen  Points  explicitly  accept- 
ed by  all  the  Powers  as  the  basis  of  the  peace,  read : ' '  Open 
covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after  which  there 
shall  be  no  private  international  understandings  of  any 
kind  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly  and  in 
the  public  view."  Before  negotiations  even  began,  the 
Conference  backed  water.  The  President  of  the  United 
States — he  said  it  himself — had  never  intended  open  nego- 
tiations but  only  open  debates  upon  all  decisions  arrived 
at  before  the  latter  became  final.  There  was  no  question 
of  full  publicity  of  the  negotiations.  The  first  care  of  the 
Conference  in  organizing  its  relations  with  the  Press  was 
to  strike  an  even  balance  between  the  need  for  silence  and 
the  need  for  news. 

At  once — as  early  as  January  12 — M.  Clemenceau  who 
had  supported  the  creation  of  the  Press  Club  of  the 
Champs-Elysees  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the  newspaper 
men  took  his  stand. 

* '  There  is  a  general  expectation  and  wish  by  the  public 
that  all  the  subjects  of  our  discussion  shall  be  published. 
We  have  the  greatest  interest  in  showing  the  public  the 
results  of  our  work." 

Right  then  and  before  agreement  had  even  been  reached 
on  an  official  text,  the  difficulties  began  which  for  six 
months  grew  and  multiplied  as  one  incident  followed  an- 
other. The  Conference  was  held  in  Paris.  If  it  had  not 
been,  the  French  Government  would  have  been  accused  of 
not  properly  defending  our  rights.  Because  it  was  held 
in  Paris,  the  position  of  France  was  singularly  delicate. 
A  distinguished  member  of  the  Allied  Press  said  to  me 
one  dav: 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  109 

"We  are  your  guests.  Whenever  the  Press  is  not  satis- 
fied, it  will  put  the  blame  on  you." 

This  was  true  of  the  Press.  It  was  also  true  of  all  the 
men  who  were  making  the  Peace.  They  felt  that  the  hos- 
pitality extended  to  them  by  France  entitled  them  to  special 
protection.  A  hundred  times  prior  to  the  signature  of 
Peace  from  the  greatest  to  the  last,  they  showed  this 
spirit.  The  Censorship  made  things  worse.  M.  Clemen- 
ceau  on  assuming  office  in  November,  1917,  had  said :  l '  No 
censorship  of  articles ;  they  may  attack  me  as  much  as  they 
like" — a  right  of  which  full  advantage  was  taken — "but 
suppression  of  news  dangerous  to  the  interior  and  exterior 
security  of  France."  Our  Allies  never  understood  this 
distinction.  Need  I  add  that,  if  they  were  usually  indif- 
ferent to  false  news,  items  against  which  we  could  take 
action,  they  were  unduly  sensitive  to  criticisms  and 
malicious  attacks  against  which  we  were  powerless. 

On  January  15  the  first  friction  arises.  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  complains  of  insinuations  published  in  certain 
French  newspapers.  President  Wilson  goes  even  further 
and  although  representing  a  country  in  which  censorship 
had  been  abolished  immediately  following  the  Armistice, 
asks  that  the  French  censorship  should  be  exercised  not 
only  over  the  French  newspapers  but  also  over  despatches 
sent  to  foreign  papers.  M.  Clemenceau  opposes  a  friendly 
refusal  and  the  next  day,  as  a  hint  for  forbearance,  lays 
upon  the  table  an  extract  from  the  New  York  Tribune  even 
more  lacking  in  exactness  and  courtesy.  Such  incidents  re- 
appeared frequently.  Towards  the  end  of  March,  following 
the  publication  of  articles  in  VEcho  de  Paris,  le  Journal 
and  le  Temps,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  indignantly  denounced 
these  "leaks"  and  demanded  condign  punishment.  He 
added : 

"If  this  kind  of  thing  is  to  go  on,  I  shall  cease  to  take 
part  in  the  work  of  the  Conference." 

M.  Clemenceau,  it  may  be  contended,  had  but  to  take 
him  at  his  word.  But  what  would  have  been  said  if,  with 
Germany  looking  on,  the  head  of  the  French  Government 


110    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

had  failed  to  smooth  over  incidents  of  this  kind,  or  had 
displayed  that  "impulsiveness"  for  which  he  was  always 
being  criticized  when  he  was  not  being  accused  of 
"weakness"? 

The  reasons  which  led  to  the  strict  limitation  of  news 
given  to  the  Press  during  the  discussions  of  January,  1919, 
deserve  to  be  known.  The  French  Government — which  suf- 
fered most  from  an  ill-informed  Press  which  honestly  gave 
currency  to  the  criminal  statements  of  a  dishonest  Press — 
was  the  last  to  underrate  the  importance  of  these  reasons. 
In  the  first  place  the  members  of  the  Conference  had  to 
accomplish  their  unprecedented  task  under  the  very  eyes 
of  the  enemy — for  an  armistice  is  not  peace.  The  elabora- 
tion of  a  treaty  after  a  war  which  had  brought  seventy 
million  men  to  grips  and  cost  twelve  hundred  thousand 
millions,  the  elaboration  of  a  treaty  between  twenty-seven 
nations  on  one  side  and  four  on  the  other  was  not  so  simple 
as  it  is  the  fashion  to  pretend  now  that  the  work  is  done. 
Any  false  step  might  have  led  to  disaster,  might  have  in- 
creased the  difficulties  between  the  Allies  and  Germany. 
Any  indiscretion  might  have  been  made  capital  of  in  Berlin 
as  in  Paris,  might  have  prolonged  a  task  which  all  were 
ready  to  criticize  as  too  slow,  might  have  jeopardized,  if 
not  the  result,  at  least  the  speed  of  its  accomplishment. 
Besides — and  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  remarks  on  this  subject 
were  irrefutable — the  aim  of  the  negotiations  was  agree- 
ment between  the  Allies.  How  many  historical  differences 
— as  M.  Clemenceau  so  clearly  explained  to  the  French 
Parliament — made  this  agreement  difficult;  not  as  far  as 
principles  were  concerned  but  in  matters  of  interpretation 
and  application. 

"If  the  Press,"  said  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  "intervenes  in 
the  early  stages  of  the  negotiations,  it  will  crystallize 
opinions  and  agreement  will  be  made  more  difficult. ' ' 

This  agreement,  I  repeat,  could  not  be  reached  by  a 
vote  of  the  majority, — unanimity  was  necessary;  as  it  had 
been  in  the  inter-allied  councils  of  war  where  final  deci- 
sions were  reached  by  gradual  adjustment  and  would  have 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  111 

been  impossible  if  the  exchange  of  views  had  been  paralyzed 
by  publication  from  time  to  time.  Unanimity  was  neces- 
sary so  that  to  the  very  last  moment  everyone  might  re- 
main free  to  modify  or  develop  his  thought  without  closing 
the  door  to  mutual  concessions  from  which  only  agreement 
could  come.  Finally  to  admit  the  Press  to  the  development 
of  the  negotiations  would  have  been  to  admit  politics;  it 
would  have  been  to  furnish,  week  by  week,  materials  for 
parliamentary  questions  on  the  formative  stages  of  the 
work  of  the  Conference ;  it  would  have  been  to  add  the  fuel 
of  parliamentary  controversy  to  the  flame  of  Conference 
discussions.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  although  his  majority  in 
December  had  been  overwhelming,  first  called  attention  to 
this  danger.  M.  Clemenceau,  although  he  had  received 
many  votes  of  confidence,  knew  to  what  extent  national 
problems  would  be  used  by  some  for  political  ends.  Mr. 
Wilson,  since  the  fifth  of  November,  had  been  in  a  minority 
in  his  own  Congress.  Here  again  the  highest  interests  of 
the  negotiations  counselled  prudence.  This  view  was 
adopted  by  the  heads  of  Governments. 

After  a  few  meetings,  a  line  of  action  was  settled  upon. 
On  January  16,  it  was  decided  to  consult  the  newspaper- 
men themselves  who  very  naturally  asked  to  be  admitted 
everywhere.  But  on  the  seventeenth,  it  was  decided  to 
admit  them  only  to  the  plenary  sittings,  it  being  under- 
stood that  the  discussions  between  the  Great  Powers  were 
merely  conversations  and  that  the  sittings  in  which  the 
smaller  Powers  took  part  were  private.  The  same  day,  an 
appeal  was  made  to  the  patience  of  the  Press  in  an  eloquent 
statement  which  forcefully  epitomized  the  above  argu- 
ments. On  the  other  hand  the  members  of  the  delega- 
tions were  requested  not  to  furnish  newspapermen  with  any 
information.  The  communique  issued  by  the  Secretariat 
would  alone  be  official.  The  die  was  cast. . .  .The  Confer- 
ence was  to  continue  its  weighty  task  surrounded  by  the 
indifference  or  the  hostility  of  the  Press.  Mr.  Balfour, 
Mr.  Pichon  and  I  tried  to  mitigate  the  impression  caused 
by  receiving  newspaper  men  at  stated  hours.  When  in 


112     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

March  the  discussions  were  begun  in  earnest  and  attention 
became  concentrated  on  points  of  capital  importance,  the 
Supreme  Council  asked  us  to  abandon  these  receptions. 
When  one  realizes  to  what  extent  some  of  our  statements 
had  been  misinterpreted,  and  how  delicate  the  negotiations 
had  become,  this  request  is  easily  understood.  However 
that  may  be,  the  weeks  from  March  15  to  April  30  were 
singularly  agitated  in  Press  circles.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
tried  giving  out  interviews  but  without  avail,  for  on  funda- 
mental matters  everyone's  lips  were  sealed  by  fear  of  mak- 
ing agreement  more  difficult.  The  newspapers  were 
discontented  and  made  up  for  the  inadequacy  of  their  infor- 
mation by  the  prodigality  of  their  criticism.  The  public, 
ill-informed  and  distrusted,  lost  interest  and  became 
suspicious.  This  continued  till  the  end  of  the  Conference. 
In  April  the  question  arises  whether  the  conditions  of 
peace  shall  be  published  before  being  handed  to  the  Ger- 
mans or  simultaneously.  M.  Clemenceau  insists  upon  their 
publication. 

"It  is  inadmissible,"  he  said,  "that  our  countrymen 
should  be  obliged  to  read  the  Treaty  in  the  Berliner 
Tagellatt." 

Alone  of  this  opinion,  M.  Clemenceau  is  obliged  to  give 
way  to  the  majority  and  only  a  resume  is  published.  In 
May  and  June,  the  same  question  arises.  The  United 
States  Senate  first  received  and  then  a  French  newspaper 
published  the  full  text  of  the  Treaty.  Nevertheless  it  is 
decided  to  await  the  signature.  In  July,  the  parliamentary 
debate  begins.  M.  Clemenceau  asks  for  authority  to  com- 
municate to  the  Commission  presided  over  by  M.  Viviani 
the  minutes  of  the  Committee  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Again  unanimous  refusal.  Treaties  are  public  property, 
but  the  preparation  of  treaties  must  remain  secret.  This 
will  be  known  to  history  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Conference 
of  Paris. 

I  have  stated  the  facts.  What  conclusions  or  lessons 
can  be  drawn  from  them!  It  is  necessary  first  to  clear 
away  the  objection  so  frequently  put  forth  that  "If  the  pub- 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  113 

lie  had  been  informed,  France  would  not  have  been  obliged 
always  to  give  way  to  her  Allies. "  It  must  be  cleared 
away,  because  it  is  false  that  France  always  gave  way ;  on 
the  contrary  her  views  generally  prevailed.  But  on  the 
other  hand  it  is  certain  that  silence  did  great  harm  to  the 
Treaty  in  the  public  mind.  It  harmed  it  more  in  France 
than  anywhere,  although  in  the  United  States  the  damages 
were  at  least  as  apparent.  Parliamentary  debates  were  in- 
adequate to  enlighten  the  people.  Who  reads  the  Journal 
Officiel  or  Hansard  or  the  Congressional  Record?  Besides 
a  few  speeches  were  not  sufficient  to  explain  in  detail  the 
continuous  effort  of  six  months.  Constant  publicity  would 
have  been  necessary.  Thus  the  door  was  opened  wide  to 
misstatement  and  to  falsehood.  The  paramount  necessity 
— vital  to  all  the  Allies  but  especially  vital  to  France — of 
maintaining  in  peace  the  bonds  of  friendship  forged  in 
war,  the  long  and  laborious  efforts  to  this  end,  the  sacri- 
fices made  to  it  by  all  without  exception,  were  not  under- 
stood. Political  campaigns  took  advantage  of  this 
ignorance. 

Could  more  have  been  done  ?  No,  out  of  regard  for  our 
Allies.  Neither  the  conversations  exchanged  nor  the  texts 
discussed  by  the  Conference  were  the  exclusive  property 
of  France.  To  publish,  divulge,  repeat  these  things  with- 
out the  consent  of  all  concerned  would  have  been  improper 
and  dangerous.  No  foreign  Parliament  has  advanced  any 
such  pretension.  The  House  of  Commons  asked  nothing. 
The  United  States  Senate,  despite  the  heat  of  its  political 
struggles,  did  not  take  advantage  of  its  right  to  send  a 
delegation  to  Paris.  And  when  the  French  Government 
suggested,  in  July,  that  certain  records  should  be  com- 
municated to  our  Parliamentary  Commissions,  the  Allies 
were  unanimous  in  their  friendly  but  formal  reminder  that 
the  common  rule  must  be  respected.  M.  Clemenceau  did 
not  feel  that  he  could  disregard  their  wishes  in  the  matter. 

This  may  be  regretted.  M.  Clemenceau  told  the  Cham- 
ber that  he  regretted  it.  I  regret  it  as  much  as  he  does. 
We  are  democracies,  and  democracies  must  know  in  order 


114    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TBEATY 

to  be  able  to  will.  It  is  certain  that  our  French  Democracy, 
because  it  did  not  know  enough,  was  the  defenseless  vic- 
tim of  those  who  preached  the  failure  of  the  peace.  It  is 
no  less  certain  that  when  I  go  over  each  item  and  ask  my- 
self, "Could  we  have  spoken?"  I  am  tempted  to  reply, 
"No!"  The  Treaty,  had  it  been  more  quickly  and  more 
thoroughly  explained,  would  have  been  better  understood. 
But  by  multiplying  the  echoes  of  dissension  the  danger 
would  have  been  great  that  there  would  be  no  Treaty  at  all. 
That  is  the  whole  question. 


Thus  time  passed,  from  the  end  of  December,  1918,  to 
the  beginning  of  July,  1919.  A  time  of  complexities  and  of 
difficulties,  a  time  of  overwhelming  work  and  responsi- 
bility but  also  of  inspiring  effort  and  result ;  a  time  often 
dramatic.  I  have  explained  the  inner  workings  of  the 
machine.  I  shall  now  attempt  to  show  the  extent  of  its 
output. 

Something  of  the  wild  exhilaration  of  the  Armistice 
which  soon  sobered  down  into  a  tranquil  optimism  had 
marked  the  first  meeting  of  the  Conference.  Excessive 
optimism  prevailed  as  to  agreement  on  the  application  of 
principles;  excessive  optimism  prevailed  as  to  the  power 
of  this  imposing  group  of  victors  to  control  the  actual 
course  of  events.  I  have  told  how  France  proposed  a  pro- 
gramme of  work  which  had  been  rejected  as  too  hard-and- 
fast  and  systematic.  The  Anglo-Saxons  preferred  to  deal 
with  the  most  pressing  matters  first.  So  the  Eussian 
question  was  taken  up,  with  what  naive  hopes  later  events 
have  shown.  Then  there  was  the  hopeless  failure  of  Prin- 
kipo,  vainly  prophesied  from  the  first  by  M.  Clemenceau. 
Then — all  the  while  attempting  to  disarm  Germany  and  to 
draw  up  the  pact  of  the  League  of  Nations, — we  began  to 
hold  meetings  for  information.  Interminable  statements, 
many  of  which  revealed  an  alarming  Imperialism  on  the 
part  of  the  most  recent  beneficiaries  of  victory,  were  lis- 
tened to  without  discussion.  About  this  time  the  United 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  115 

States  and  Great  Britain  both  calling  for  the  presence  of 
the  heads  of  their  respective  Governments,  Mr.  Wilson  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  to  go  away.  Five  days  later,  M. 
Clemenceau  was  struck  down  by  an  assassin  and  had  to 
retire  temporarily  with  a  bullet  in  his  lung.  It  was  a  fal- 
low and  discouraging  time,  a  time  of  difficulties  and  of 
vain  disputes  over  questions  of  procedure — modified 
Armistice,  preliminary  terms  of  Peace  or  Treaty.  How- 
ever, inside  progress  was  being  made.  The  commissions 
were  filing  their  reports  in  quick  succession.  By  the  end 
of  March,  their  work  was  about  completed.  It  was  at  this 
moment  that  the  Council  of  Four  which  met  for  the  first 
time  on  March  24,  took  up  this  material.  In  six  weeks  of 
continuous  effort,  they  were  going  to  clear  away  the  under- 
brush, lay  the  foundations  and  build  up  the  Treaty. 

Then  discussions  began.  Calm  and  unruffled  on  most 
points,  bitter  and  stormy  on  three  of  the  most  important 
to  France :  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine,  the  Sarre  Valley  and 
the  question  of  reparations.  These  three  points  took  up 
long  sittings  and  led  to  fierce  debates.  Furthermore  on 
certain  occasions  two  tendencies  began  to  appear  which 
foreshadowed  future  difficulties.  France,  usually  sup- 
ported by  the  United  States,  demanded  that  the  accepted 
principles  of  the  Peace  be  unwaveringly  applied:  restitu- 
tions, reparations,  guarantees. 

"We  were  attacked,"  said  M.  Clemenceau,  "we  are  vic- 
torious. We  represent  right,  and  might  is  ours.  This 
might  must  be  used  in  the  service  of  right." 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  did  not  say  no.  Indeed,  he  sometimes 
urged  exemplary  severity,  as  for  the  punishment  of  the 
Kaiser  and  his  accomplices  or  to  force  payment  of  the 
expenses  of  the  war.  But  at  times  also  his  parliamentary 
obsession  would  come  over  him.  Under  the  influence  of 
some  of  his  assistants — such  as  General  Smuts — or  after 
breakfasting  with  some  Labour  Leader,  he  would  arrive 
at  the  meeting  looking  glum,  and  announce,  '  *  They  will  not 
sign."  That  was  his  great  anxiety.  It  led  him  to  write 


116    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

long  Notes  in  which  he  laid  down  for  himself  and  recom- 
mended to  his  allies  a  policy  of  extreme  moderation.* 

"We  must  have,"  he  kept  repeating,  "a  German 
Government  that  will  sign.  The  one  now  in  power  is  but  a 
shadow.  If  our  terms  are  too  severe  it  will  fall.  And  then 
look  out  for  Bolshevism." 

At  the  end  of  March  this  obsession  became  so  threaten- 
ing to  the  most  vital  clauses  of  the  Treatyf  that  M.  Cle- 
menceau  felt  called  upon  to  meet  it  with  uncompromising 
directness  which  Anglo-Saxons  accept,  because  they  con- 
sider it  fair  and  which  impresses  them  far  more  than 
shifting  resistance.  On  his  instructions  I  drew  up  a  Note 
in  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  point  of  view  was  refuted 
step  by  step.  It  read: 

March  31st. 
I 

The  French  Government  is  in  complete  accord  with  the  general 
aim  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Note  to  make  a  lasting  Peace  and  for 
that  a  just  Peace. 

It  does  not  believe  on  the  other  hand  that  this  principle,  which 
is  its  own,  really  leads  to  the  conclusions  deduced  from  it  in  this 
Note. 

II 

This  Note  suggests  granting  moderate  territorial  conditions  to 
Germany  in  Europe  in  order  not  to  leave  her  after  the  Peace  with 
feelings  of  deep  resentment. 

This  method  would  be  of  value  if  the  last  war  had  merely  been 
for  Germany  an  European  war,  but  this  is  not  the  case. 

Germany  before  the  war  was  a  great  world  power  whose  ' '  future 
was  on  the  water. ' '  It  was  in  this  world  power  that  she  took  pride. 
It  is  this  world  power  that  she  will  not  console  herself  for  having 
lost. 

Now  we  have  taken  away  from  her — or  we  are  going  to  take 
away  from  her — without  being  deterred  by  the  fear  of  her  resent- 
ment— all  her  Colonies,  all  her  Navy,  a  great  part  of  her  merchant 


*See  specially  his  Note  of  March  26,  1919. 
tSee  Chapters  V,  VIII  and  IX. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  117 

Marine  (on  account  of  Reparations),  her  foreign  markets  in  which 
she  was  supreme. 

Thus  we  are  dealing  her  the  blow  which  she  will  feel  the  worst 
and  it  is  hoped  to  soften  it  by  some  improvement  in  territorial 
terms.  This  is  a  pure  illusion,  the  remedy  is  not  adequate  to  the  ill. 

If  for  reasons  of  general  policy,  it  is  desired  to  give  certain 
satisfactions  to  Germany,  it  is  not  in  Europe  that  they  must  be 
sought.  This  kind  of  appeasement  will  be  vain  so  long  as  Germany 
is  cut  off  from  world  politics. 

In  order  to  appease  Germany  (if  such  is  the  desire)  we  must 
offer  her  colonial  satisfactions,  naval  satisfactions,  satisfactions  of 
commercial  expansion.  But  the  Note  of  March  26  merely  contem- 
plates giving  her  European  territorial  satisfactions. 

Ill 

Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Note  fears  that  if  the  territorial  conditions 
imposed  on  Germany  are  too  severe,  it  will  give  an  impetus  to 
Bolshevism.  Is  it  not  to  be  feared  that  this  would  be  precisely  the 
result  of  the  action  suggested? 

The  Conference  has  decided  to  call  to  life  a  certain  number  of 
new  States.  Can  it  without  committing  an  injustice  sacrifice  them 
out  of  regard  for  Germany  by  imposing  upon  them  inacceptable 
frontiers?  If  these  peoples — notably  Poland  and  Bohemia — have 
so  far  resisted  Bolshevism,  they  have  done  so  by  the  development 
of  national  spirit.  If  we  do  violence  to  this  sentiment,  they  will 
become  the  prey  of  Bolshevism  and  the  only  barrier  now  existing 
between  Russian  Bolshevism  and  German  Bolshevism  will  be 
broken  down. 

The  result  will  be  either  a  Confederation  of  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  under  the  leadership  of  Bolshevist  Germany  or  the  enslave- 
ment of  this  same  vast  territory  by  Germany  swung  back  to  reac- 
tion after  a  period  of  general  anarchy.  In  either  case,  the  Allies 
will  have  lost  the  war. 

The  policy  of  the  French  Government  is  on  the  contrary  to  give 
strong  support  to  these  young  nations  with  the  help  of  all  that  is 
liberal  in  Europe  and  not  to  seek  at  their  expense  to  attenuate — 
which  besides  would  be  useless — the  colonial,  naval  and  commercial 
disaster  which  the  Peace  inflicts  on  Germany. 

If  in  order  to  give  to  these  young  nations  frontiers  which  are 
essential  to  their  national  life,  it  is  necessary  to  transfer  to  their 
sovereignty  Germans,  the  sons  of  those  who  enslaved  them,  one  may 


118     THE  TKUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

regret  having  to  do  this  and  do  it  only  with  measure,  but  it  cannot 
be  avoided. 

Moreover,  by  depriving  Germany  totally  and  definitely  of  her 
colonies  because  she  has  ill-treated  the  natives,  one  forfeits  the  right 
to  refuse  to  Poland  or  to  Bohemia  their  natural  frontiers  on  the 
ground  that  Germans  have  occupied  their  territory  as  the  fore- 
runners of  Pan-Germanism. 

IV 

The  Note  of  March  26  insists — and  the  French  Government  is  in 
complete  agreement — on  the  necessity  of  making  a  Peace  that  will 
appear  to  Germany  to  be  a  just  Peace. 

But  it  may  be  remarked  that  taking  German  mentality  into 
consideration,  it  is  not  sure  that  the  Germans  will  have  the  same 
idea  of  what  is  just  as  the  Allies  have. 

Finally  it  must  be  retained  that  this  impression  of  justice  must 
be  felt  not  only  by  the  enemy  but  also,  and  first  of  all,  by  the 
Allies.  The  Allies  who  have  fought  together  must  conclude  a  Peace 
which  will  be  fair  to  all  of  them. 

But  what  would  be  the  result  of  following  the  method  suggested 
in  the  Note  of  March  26  ? 

A  certain  number  of  full  and  final  guarantees  would  be  ensured 
to  the  maritime  nations  which  have  never  been  invaded. 

Full  and  final  cession  of  the  German  colonies. 

Full  and  final  surrender  of  the  German  Navy. 

Full  and  final  surrender  of  a  large  part  of  the  German  mer- 
chant Marine. 

Full  and  lasting,  if  not  final,  exclusion  of  Germany  from 
foreign  markets. 

To  the  continental  nations,  however,  that  is  to  say  to  those  who 
have  suffered  the  most  from  the  war,  only  partial  and  deferred 
solutions  are  offered. 

Partial  solutions  such  as  the  reduced  frontier  suggested  for 
Poland  and  Bohemia. 

Deferred  solutions  such  as  the  defensive  undertaking  offered  to 
France  for  the  protection  of  her  territory. 

Deferred  solutions  such  as  the  proposed  arrangement  for  the 
Sarre  coal. 

There  is  here  an  inequality  which  may  well  have  a  disastrous 
influence  on  the  after-war  relations  between  the  Allies,  which  are 
more  important  than  the  after-war  relations  between  Germany  and 
the  Allies. 


THE  PEACE  CONFEEENCE  119 

It  has  been  shown  in  Paragraph  I  that  it  would  be  an  illusion  to 
hope  to  find  in  territorial  satisfactions  given  to  Germany  a  suffi- 
cient compensation  for  the  world-wide  disaster  she  has  sustained. 
May  it  be  permitted  to  add  that  it  would  be  an  injustice  to  make 
the  weight  of  these  compensations  fall  upon  those  of  the  Allied 
nations  which  have  borne  the  brunt  of  the  war. 

These  countries  cannot  bear  the  costs  of  the  Peace  after  having 
borne  the  cost  of  the  war.  It  is  essential  that  they  too  shall  have 
the  feeling  that  the  Peace  is  just  and  equal  for  all. 

Failing  this,  it  is  not  only  Central  Europe  in  which  Bolshevism 
may  be  feared,  for  as  events  have  shown,  no  atmosphere  is  more 
favourable  to  Bolshevism  than  that  of  national  disappointment. 

V 

The  French  Government  desires  to  confine  itself  for  the  time 
being  to  these  considerations  of  general  policy. 

It  pays  full  homage  to  the  intentions  which  inspire  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  Note,  but  it  believes  that  the  considerations  which  the 
present  Note  deduces  from  it  are  in  accord  with  justice  and  the 
general  interest. 

It  is  by  these  considerations  that  the  French  Government  will 
be  guided  in  the  coming  exchange  of  views  during  the  discussion  of 
the  terms  suggested  by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  ardent;  but  he  has  a  good  heart 
and  a  keen  sense  of  justice.  After  a  few  hard  words — face 
to  face — the  distance  between  the  two  points  of  view  grew 
less  and  that  of  France  made  headway.  The  problem  of 
the  Sarre  was  the  first  to  be  solved  early  in  April  with  the 
cordial  assistance  of  the  British  Prime  Minister.  That 
of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  was  solved  on  April  22, 
despite  his  repeated  objections.  The  agreement  on  repara- 
tions was  reached  at  about  the  same  time  and  on  the  even- 
ing of  May  6  the  text  of  the  Treaty  was  delivered  by  the 
printers.  Thanks  to  steps  taken  by  France,  the  name  of 
Italy  appeared  upon  it  although  news  of  the  return  of  her 
plenipotentiaries  had  been  received  only  the  night  before. 
On  the  seventh  afternoon  the  terms  of  peace  were  solemnly 
handed  to  Count  von  Brockdorff-Rantzau.  The  German 
made  a  cold,  harsh  and  insolent  speech.  As  we  were  leav- 
ing Mr.  Lloyd  George,  exasperated,  said  to  me : 


120     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

"It  is  hard  to  have  won  the  war  and  to  have  to  listen 
to  that." 

A  few  days  passed  and  the  German  counter-proposals 
began  to  come  in.  The  first  received  were  met  almost 
without  discussion  by  negative  replies  couched  in  firm  and 
determined  language.  Already  the  Austrian  Treaty  was 
being  taken  up.  It  looked  as  though  everything  was  set- 
tled with  Germany  once  and  for  all. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  second  and  most  serious  crisis 
of  the  Conference  was  at  hand.  It  lasted  from  May  25  to 
June  16.  The  British  Cabinet  held  two  meetings  in  the 
last  week  of  May  which  renewed  and  redoubled  all  the 
fears  which  the  Prime  Minister  had  felt  in  March.  These 
fears  were  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  confined  to  him  alone. 
Even  in  France  many  who  have  since  become  uncompromis- 
ing then  favoured  concessions.  Men  repeated  "Will  they 
sign!"  And  some  suggested  a  general  back-down  in  order 
to  induce  them  to  sign.  Those  were  atrocious  days.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  thoroughly  alarmed  by  the  consequences 
either  of  a  refusal  to  sign  or  of  a  crisis  in  Germany,  sug- 
gested unthinkable  concessions  on  almost  every  point.  He 
excused  himself  for  doing  it  so  tardily.  He  spoke  of  con- 
sulting the  Commons.  The  work  of  two  months  was 
threatened  with  ruin.  M.  Clemenceau  stood  firm.  If 
there  was  to  be  a  break,  he  would  go  before  the  French 
Chamber  and  resign. 

"We  know  the  Germans  better  than  you,"  he  declared, 
"our  concessions  will  only  encourage  their  resistance  while 
depriving  our  own  peoples  of  their  rights.  We  do  not  have 
to  beg  pardon  for  our  victory." 

President  Wilson  did  not  demand  any  change  in  the 
political  clauses  of  the  Peace  and  did  not  insist  on  the 
changes  in  the  financial  clauses  which  were  suggested  by 
his  experts.  Nevertheless  no  final  decision  was  taken. 
Oppressive  hours;  exhausting  sittings  from  which  men 
emerged  Broken.  On  June  10  to  force  the  issue  I  addressed 
to  Mr.  House  the  following  letter  which  he  showed  the 
same  evening  to  President  Wilson: 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  121 

June  10,  1919. 
My  dear  friend, 

Very  grave  mistakes  have  been  made  during  the  past  week: 
there  is  only  just  time  to  repair  them. 

For  more  than  five  months  the  heads  of  Governments  and  their 
experts  have  studied  the  terms  of  the  Peace  to  be  imposed  on  Ger- 
many. They  have  reached  an  agreement  and  they  have  communi- 
cated to  the  Germans  a  text  which,  if  it  does  not  yet  bind  Count 
Brockdorff — in  any  case  unquestionably  binds  the  Allies. 

Could  the  Allies  suppose  that  this  text  would  be  satisfactory  to 
Germany?  Of  course  not.  However,  they  adopted  it.  Germany 
protests,  as  it  was  certain  she  would.  Immediately  a  modification 
of  the  text  is  undertaken.  I  say  this  is  a  confession  of  weakness 
and  a  confession  of  lack  of  seriousness,  for  which  all  the  Allied 
Governments  will  pay  dearly  in  terms  of  public  opinion!  Is  it  an 
impossible  Treaty?  Is  it  an  unjust  Treaty?  Count  Brockdorff 
believes  that  it  is.  If  we  change  it,  we  admit  that  we  think  as  he 
does.  What  a  condemnation  of  the  work  we  have  done  during  the 
past  sixteen  weeks ! 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  said, ' '  But  they  will  not  sign  and  we  shall 
have  a  thousand  difficulties."  It  is  the  argument  we  heard  so 
often  during  the  war — after  the  battle  of  the  Marne,  after  Verdun, 
after  the  German  offensive  in  the  spring  of  1918,  people  said  in  all 
of  our  countries,  "Let  us  make  peace  to  avoid  difficulties."  We 
did  not  listen  to  them  and  we  did  well.  We  went  on  with  the  war 
and  we  won  it.  Shall  we  have  less  heart  for  peace  than  we  had 
for  war  ? 

I  add  that  these  public  discussions  between  Allies  over  a  Treaty 
drawn  up  between  Allies  weaken  us  more  every  day  in  the  eyes  of 
an  adversary  who  respects  only  firmness  (see  the  reports  from 
Versailles  which  arrived  to-day). 

Thus  on  the  general  principle  my  opinion  is  this:  a  week  ago, 
we  ought  to  have  answered  the  Germans,  "We  will  change  noth- 
ing." If  we  had  only  made  this  answer,  the  Treaty  would  be 
signed  to-day.  We  did  not  do  it.  What  ought  we  to  do  now? 

As  regards  the  special  principles  about  which  amendments  are 
being  considered,  what  is  the  position? 

Reparations?  The  British  who  made  the  first  suggestion  of 
amendment  are  with  us  to-day  against  any  modification  and  it  is 
your  delegation  which  proposes  (along  with  other  changes  which 
France  cannot  possibly  accept),  a  total  figure  of  125  thousand 


122    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

inillion  francs  which  would  barely  cover  as  far  as  France  is  con- 
cerned the  two-thirds  of  the  specific  damages,  reparation  for  which 
is  imposed  on  Germany  by  a  text  of  May  7.  We  will  not  accept  it. 

League  of  Nations?  "We  have  laid  down  after  four  months  of 
study  the  conditions  in  which  Germany  may  enter  the  League. 
Are  we  going  to  change  them?  Are  we  going  to  confess  that  our 
decision  falls  before  the  observations  of  Count  Brockdorff  ?  How 
after  that  could  we  defend  the  Treaty  before  our  respective 
Parliaments  ? 

All  these  vacillations,  which  were  repeated  in  the  matters  of  the 
Sarre  and  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Khine,  were  the  results  of  the 
initial  mistake.  But  let  me  add  another  word. 

No  one  has  the  right  to  ask  France  to  accept  such  terms. 
France  has  an  unique  experience  of  Germany.  No  one  has  suffered 
as  she  has.  It  is  useless  to  think  of  persuading  France  to  accept 
such  close  cohabitation  with  Germany  in  the  near  future  in  viola- 
tion of  the  text  of  the  Covenant,  first  of  all  because  France  will  not 
accept  it  and  then  because  it  is  not  just. 

When  the  question  arose  of  giving  a  hearing  to  the  Irish,  every 
one  gave  way  to  the  British  objections.  When  the  question  arose 
of  Japan's  status  in  the  League  of  Nations,  every  one  gave  way  to 
the  American  objections.  When  dealing  with  Germany  it  is  France 
that  must  be  heard. 

But  above  all  I  would  not  have  the  moral  position  of  the  Allies 
sacrificed  to  the  Brockdorff  memorandum.  I  would  not  have  them 
subjected  to  the  unjustifiable  humiliation  of  admitting  that  the 
peace  built  up  by  them  after  more  than  four  months  of  incessant 
labour  is,  as  Germany  asserts,  an  unjust  and  impossible  peace,  for 
this  is  contrary  to  the  truth. 

Signed:    Andre  Tardieu. 

Towards  the  end  of  June  the  atmosphere  began  to  clear. 
Reason — represented  by  France — resumed  her  rights. 
The  amendments  suggested  a  fortnight  before  gradually 
vanished  one  by  one.  On  the  sixteenth  the  Allied  answer 
to  the  German  Notes  was  handed  to  Count  Brockdorff. 
Drawn  up  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George 's  own  secretary — Mr.  Philip 
Kerr — it  was  on  every  essential  point  the  eloquent  expres- 
sion of  the  ideals  which  France  had  upheld  for  five  months. 
I  will  cite  only  its  more  salient  passages : 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  123 

In  the  view  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  the  war  which 
began  on  August  1,  1914,  was  the  greatest  crime  against  humanity 
and  the  freedom  of  peoples  that  any  nation  calling  itself  civilized 
has  ever  consciously  committed. . . 

Germany's  responsibility  however  is  not  confined  to  having 
planned  and  started  the  war.  She  is  no  less  responsible  for  the 
savage  and  inhuman  manner  in  which  it  was  conducted. . . 

The  conduct  of  Germany  is  almost  unexampled  in  human  his- 
tory. The  terrible  responsibility  which  lies  at  her  door  can  be  seen 
in  the  fact  that  no  less  than  seven  million  dead  lie  buried  in  Europe 
while  more  than  twenty  million  others  carry  upon  them  the  evi- 
dence of  wounds  and  suffering  because  Germany  saw  fit  to  gratify 
her  lust  for  tyranny  by  resort  to  war. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Nations  believe  that  they  will  be  false 
to  those  who  have  given  their  all  to  save  the  freedom  of  the  world 
if  they  consent  to  treat  this  war  on  any  other  basis  than  as  a  crime 
against  humanity  and  right. . . 

Justice,  therefore,  is  the  only  possible  basis  for  the  settlement 
of  the  accounts  of  this  terrible  war.  Justice  is  what  the  German 
delegation  asks  for  and  what  Germany  has  been  promised.  Justice 
is  what  Germany  shall  have.  But  it  must  be  Justice  for  all.  There 
must  be  Justice  for  the  dead  and  wounded  and  for  those  who  have 
been  orphaned  and  bereaved  that  Europe  might  be  freed  from 
Prussian  despotism.  There  must  be  Justice  for  the  people  who  now 
stagger  under  war  debts  which  exceed  thirty  thousand  million 
pounds,  that  Liberty  might  be  saved.  There  must  be  Justice  for 
those  millions  whose  homes  and  lands,  ships  and  property  German 
savagery  has  spoliated  and  destroyed.  . . 

Not  to  do  justice  to  all  concerned  would  only  leave  the  world 
open  to  fresh  calamities.  The  Treaty  is  frankly  not  based  upon  a 
general  condonation  of  the  events  of  1914-1919,  it  would  not  be  a 
peace  of  justice  if  it  were. 

As  such  the  Treaty  in  its  present  form  must  be  accepted  or 
rejected. 

On  June  28,  at  Versailles,  in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors,  on  the 
very  spot  where  Bismarck  had  proclaimed  the  German  Em- 
pire in  1871,  MM.  Hermann  Mnller  and  Bell,  replacing 
Count  Brockdorff  who  had  resigned,  signed  the  Treaty 
identical  in  all  its  fundamentals  with  the  text  of  May  7. 
The  fight  was  won. 


124    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

In  the  succeeding  chapters  I  shall  show  what  these  fun- 
damental principles  mean  to  the  future  of  France  and  of 
Europe.  The  foregoing  reveals  one  of  the  features  which 
characterize  its  importance.  It  is  that  the  Treaty  born  of 
long  and  arduous  discussion  could  not  bring  to  all  who 
signed  it  the  realization  of  all  their  expectations.  The 
victory  had  been  the  work  of  a  coalition.  The  peace  which 
ended  the  war  was,  like  the  war  itself,  the  work  of  a  coali- 
tion, that  is  to  say,  a  compromise  in  which  all  made  sacri- 
fices and  reduced  their  demands  to  a  minimum, — a  minimum 
because  the  capacity  for  construction  is  less  than  the 
capacity  for  destruction,  a  minimum  because  the  very 
origins  of  the  war  and  the  promises  made  during  the  war 
in  view  of  peace  precluded  the  possibility  of  certain  tradi- 
tional solutions  of  annexation  and  brutality  to  which  the 
experience  of  centuries  had  accustomed  warring  peoples, 
a  minimum  because  between  so  many  Allies  justly  entitled 
to  claim  a  share  in  the  victory  it  was  inevitable  there  should 
be  in  peace  as  in  war  divergent  and  often  contradictory 
ideas  and  tendencies,  traditions  and  hopes,  sometimes  even 
ambitions. 

Thus  in  the  very  hour  when  every  national  entity 
wrought  up  by  suffering  and  by  victory  aspired  to  the  full 
satisfaction  of  their  every  hope,  the  Treaty  could  be  but 
a  compromise, — a  compromise  not  only  between  conflicting 
claims  but  a  compromise  too  between  principles  which  are 
plain  and  facts  which  are  complex — a  compromise  between 
glories  and  miseries,  between  memories  and  hopes,  between 
strength  and  weakness — an  average  of  security,  of  justice, 
and  of  solidarity  which  doubtless  did  not  realize  and  could 
not  realize  complete  security,  full  justice  nor  absolute  soli- 
darity but  which  nevertheless  contained  enough  of  security, 
enough  of  justice,  enough  of  solidarity  to  make  it  the  power 
towards  which  turn  all,  in  their  search  for  peace,  both 
those  who  have  most  severely  criticized  it  and  those  who 
have  most  inadequately  enforced  it. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  DISAEMAMENT  OF  GERMANY 

ALL  through  the  war,  the  Allies  proclaimed,  as  first 
among  their  war  aims,  the  destruction  of  German  militar- 
ism. The  instrument  of  aggression  forged  by  the  elder 
Moltke,  increased  and  strengthened  by  his  successors,  had 
filled  Germany  with  that  insensate  pride  which  inspired 
her  crime  of  1914.  German  militarism  was  as  formidable 
materially  as  it  was  morally  pernicious.  After  having 
fashioned  its  weapons,  it  built  up  its  faith.  Maker  of  rifles, 
of  machine  guns  and  of  cannons,  it  had  given  birth  to  a 
philosophy.  Defeat  had  overwhelmed  it,  but — prompt  in 
deceit — it  had  taken  pains  to  hide  defeat  beneath  the 
triumphal  arches  raised  in  all  German  towns  in  honour  of 
the  beaten  and  retreating  Army.  Had  but  the  instrument 
of  aggression  survived,  in  five  years — in  ten  years — in 
twenty  years,  it  would  have  meant  certain  war.  It  was 
necessary  to  break  it — to  break  it  in  its  three  essentials :  in 
its  organization,  in  its  man  power,  in  its  armament.  It  was 
necessary  to  wrest  from  Germany  both  the  means  and  the 
temptation  of  war ;  to  reduce  in  the  immediate  present  her 
military  state  to  the  minimum  compatible  with  the  necessi- 
ties of  her  defense  and  the  maintenance  of  order;  to  give 
in  the  future  to  peaceful  nations  the  means  of  verifying 
Germany's  compliance  with  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  im- 
posed upon  her.  An  immense  task,  which  Napoleon — the 
conqueror  of  Prussia,  occupying  all  of  its  territory — had 
attempted  without  success  but  which,  however,  it  was  the 
Allies'  duty  to  undertake  and  to  carry  through,  if  the  world 
Was  to  be  saved. 

The  Armistice  had  begun  the  disarmament  of  Ger- 

125 


126    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

many.  It  was  far  from  having  completed  it.  To  achieve 
their  aim,  the  negotiators  of  the  peace  had  a  long  way  to 
go.  I  have  already  told  why  Marshal  Foch  had  not  thought 
right  to  demand  either  the  demobilization  of  the  German 
Army  or  its  total  disarmament  in  the  field.*  I  add  that, 
even  in  the  matter  of  partial  disarmament  considered  suf- 
ficient by  the  inter-allied  High  Command,  errors  of  calcula- 
tion had  been  made.  In  the  letter  of  October  26,  1918,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  had  estimated  the  5,000  cannon  and 
the  30,000  machine  guns  the  surrender  of  which  he  demand- 
ed, as  respectively  one-third  and  one-half  of  the  enemy 
supplies,  which  means  that  at  the  moment  of  the  Armistice 
Germany  was  believed  to  have  15,000  cannon  and  60,000 
machine  guns.  But  on  January  5,  1920,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, while  asserting  that  it  had  destroyed  a  large 
part  of  its  war  material,  admitted  that  it  still  had  24,625 
cannon  or  tubes  and  41,318  machine  guns.  However  that 
may  be,  the  heads  of  the  Allied  Governments  in  the  begin- 
ning of  1918  became  alarmed  at  the  force  which  still  re- 
mained at  Germany's  disposal  and — in  the  various  renewals 
of  the  Armistice  in  January  and  February,  1919,  as  well 
as  in  the  elaboration  of  the  Treaty  itself — they  unanimously 
sought  in  conjunction  with  the  military  authorities  the 
means  of  further  disarming  Germany. 

By  January  15,  1919,  the  whole  war  material  which 
Germany  was  to  surrender  under  the  Armistice  of  Novem» 
ber  11,  1918,  was  in  the  hands  of  the  victors.  But  it  was 
clear  to  all  that  Noske,  the  Minister  of  War  of  the  German 
Reich,  was  endeavoring  in  a  thousand  ways  to  elude  the 
clauses  which  he  foresaw  would  be  inserted  in  the  Treaty. 
There  were  threatening  concentrations  of  troops  on  the 
Polish  frontier.  The  manufacture  of  war  material  con- 
tinued. Innumerable  undemobilized  units  were  kept  in 
the  depots.  New  formations  were  created  under  all  sorts 
of  pretexts : — volunteers,  surety  police,  technical  aid  corps 
and  others  galore,  who  with  their  machine  guns  and  their 
cannon  cooperated  to  a  disquieting  extent  in  the  mainte- 

*See  Chapter  II,  page  66. 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY          127 

nance  of  order.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Conference  on  Janu- 
ary 23,  1919,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  voicing  the  unanimous 
feeling,  declared  that  this  situation  could  not  be  allowed 
to  continue: 

"The  Germans,"  he  said,  "are  demobilizing  slowly. 
They  have  still  more  than  fifty  divisions.  Why  do  we  not 
make  them  demobilize  quicker  I  Why  was  this  condition  not 
imposed  on  them  in  the  Armistice  of  November  11?  Why 
not  introduce  it  next  time  when  the  Armistice  is  to  be 
renewed  on  February  16?  It  is  essential  in  some  way  or 
other  not  only  to  oblige  Germany  to  reduce  without  further 
delay,  the  number  of  men  she  has  under  arms  but  also  to 
take  from  her  the  war  material  she  still  has." 

Everyone  was  of  the  same  opinion.  But  the  formula 
remained  to  be  found.  M.  Clemenceau  recalled  the  fact 
that,  if  the  demobilization  clause  did  not  appear  in  the 
Armistice  of  November  11,  it  was  because  Marshal  Foch 
had  declared  it  to  be  impossible  of  execution,  as  it  could 
not  be  controlled.  The  following  day,  January  24,  the 
Commander-in-  Chief,  summoned  to  the  Conference,  de- 
clared : 

"We  can  insert  in  the  next  Armistice  a  clause  imposing 
upon  Germany  a  thoroughgoing  demobilization  of  men  and 
material.  But  it  will  be  very  different  to  verify  and  en- 
force, and  the  results  are  more  than  doubtful.  The  only 
means  of  pressure  is  first  of  all  for  us  to  keep  strong  forces 
mobilized  and  as  a  second  and  additional  means  there  is 
the  blockade." 

Then  began  a  period  of  laborious  effort  which  lasted 
three  weeks,  in  which  much  work  was  done  without  tangible 
result.  Three  commissions  were  appointed  one  after  the 
other  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon  this  question.  The 
first,  appointed  on  January  24,  included  besides  M. 
Loucheur,  the  Chairman,  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  Marshal 
Foch  and  Generals  Bliss  and  Diaz.  The  second,  appointed 
on  February  8  to  simplify  the  suggestions  of  the  first,  was 
composed  of  Mr.  Lansing,  Lord  Milner  and  myself.  The 
third,  presided  over  by  Marshal  Foch,  included  as  military 


128    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

members  representing  the  Supreme  "War  Council,  Gener- 
als Bliss,  Degoutte,  Thwaites,  Cavallero  and  Colonel 
Nagai;  as  civilian  members  representing  the  Supreme 
Economic  Council,  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  Norman  Davis,  Cle- 
mentel,  Crespi  and  Mori.  The  Commanders-in-Chief  of  the 
Armies  and  Navies  were  present  at  the  meeting  of  the  latter 
on  February  10. 

The  object  to  be  accomplished  by  these  various  com- 
mittees was  the  same :  to  exert  on  Germany,  at  the  time  of 
the  renewal  of  the  Armistice,  sufficient  military  and  eco- 
nomic pressure  to  force  her  to  demobilize  her  forces  and 
surrender  her  war  material.  But  it  very  quickly  appeared 
— and  this  explains  the  appointment  of  three  commissions 
in  succession — that  there  was  a  divergence  of  view  both  on 
the  means  to  be  employed  and  on  the  conditions  to  be 
imposed. 

The  French  delegates  sought  only  to  disarm  Germany 
and  to  enforce  this  whether  she  wished  it  or  not.  They 
therefore  proposed  that  the  next  Armistice  should  enforce 
the  reduction  of  the  number  of  her  divisions,  the  surrender 
of  a  further  slice  of  her  war  material,  the  Allied  control  of 
her  thirteen  principal  war  factories ;  finally  and  above  all, 
as  an  ultimate  penalty  for  non-compliance,  the  occupation 
of  the  industrial  region  of  Essen.  These  proposals  were 
advanced  both  by  M.  Loucheur  in  the  first  commission 
and  by  myself  in  the  second.  They  were  simple  and  self- 
sufficient. 

The  state  of  mind  of  our  Allies  was  more  complex.  The 
idea  of  introducing  into  a  renewal  of  the  Armistice  terms 
which  were  different  from  those  of  the  initial  Armistice, 
was  repugnant  to  some  of  them,  especially  to  the  Ameri- 
cans,— and  they  made  no  secret  of  it.  In  vain,  we  replied 
that,  if  the  Armistice  had  been  concluded  for  one  month 
only,  it  was  precisely  in  order  to  reserve  to  the  Allies  the 
right  of  changing  the  conditions.  Our  contentions  found  no 
support.  Others  sought  by  the  demobilization  of  Germany 
to  facilitate  the  repatriation  of  their  own  troops  and  the 
hastening  of  their  own  demobilization.  All  of  them,  what- 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY          129 

ever  their  reasons,  were  equally  hostile  to  a  further  occu- 
pation of  German  territory  and  agreed  in  their  conclusions 
which  were,  it  is  true,  to  oblige  Germany  to  demobilize. 
But  to  add  to  the  military  and  economic  means  of  pressure 
the  bait  of  certain  concessions  in  the  matter  of  food  sup- 
plies and  raw  material,  in  order  to  obtain  demobilization, 
would  have  transformed  the  renewed  Armistice  into  a 
species  of  bilateral  contract,  would  have  mortgaged  the 
future  conditions  of  peace  and  have  left  the  Allies  open  to 
German  blackmail. 

Thus  the  difficulties  grew.  M.  Clemenceau,  no  less 
harassed  by  Parliament  than  were  his  foreign  colleagues, 
was  as  anxious  as  anybody  to  accelerate  the  demobilization 
of  the  French  Armies  by  immediate  disarmament  of  Ger- 
many. He  was  as  anxious  as  anybody  also  that  the  Allies 
should  retain  to  the  very  end  of  the  negotiations  a  military 
force  superior  to  that  of  Germany  and  this  added  to  his  anx- 
iety to  reduce  the  strength  of  the  German  Army.  But  at  no 
price  was  he  willing  to  consent  that  this  should  be  at  the 
cost  of  losing,  while  the  war  was  still  on — for  an  armistice 
is  not  peace — the  advantage  of  the  Allies'  position  as  con- 
querors by  a  give  and  take  arrangement,  which,  before  their 
peace  conditions  had  been  accepted,  might  undermine  their 
authority. 

A  difficult  time  indeed,  as  I  have  said  above,  often  a 
painful  time,  in  which  the  head  of  the  French  Government 
was  forced,  on  four  or  five  occasions,  to  intervene  person- 
ally and  with  all  his  might  to  insure  that  the  renewal  of 
the  Armistice  would  preserve  the  character  he  was  anxious 
to  give  it  and  avert  a  dangerous  bargaining.  After  a  dozen 
meetings,  it  was  agreed  that  while  pursuing  by  some  other 
means  the  disarmament  of  Germany,  we  would  confine 
ourselves  in  the  renewal  of  the  Armistice  on  February  16 
to  making  her  feel  the  pressure  first  by  demanding  the  im- 
mediate halt — which  was  obtained — of  her  preparations 
against  Poland,  and  then  by  renewing  the  Armistice  only 
for  a  short  and  undefined  period  with  the  right  for  the 
Allies  to  bring  it  to  an  end  at  any  moment  on  three  days' 


130    THE  TBUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

notice.  No  mention  was  made  of  disarmament.  Neither 
was  any  mention  made  of  food  supplies.  Thus  was  pre- 
served in  the  document  handed  to  the  Germans  the  military 
character  of  the  Armistice. 

As  to  the  reduction  of  the  German  forces,  it  was  de- 
cided that  we  should  bring  it  about  without  further  delay 
not  by  means  of  the  Armistice  but  by  fixing  as  quickly  as 
possible  the  final  military  conditions  of  the  peace.  Imme- 
diately on  his  return  from  Treves,  on  February  17,  Mar- 
shal Foch  was  asked  to  hasten  the  study  of  these  clauses. 
In  the  last  week  of  February,  the  work  of  the  Military  Com- 
mission was  brought  to  a  close.  Its  report  was  distributed 
on  March  the  first. 

n 

We  appeared  to  be  reaching  the  end.  The  desire  to 
reach  a  conclusion  was  unanimous.  And  yet  so  great  is 
the  difficulty  of  attuning  views  based  upon  conflicting 
traditions,  interests  and  habits  of  mind  that  two  more 
weeks  passed  before  agreement  was  reached  on  a  text.  I 
lay  special  stress  upon  this  illuminating  incident.  If  the 
difficulty  was  so  great  when  no  divergence  of  principle 
separated  the  Allies,  it  can  be  judged  what  the  debates 
were  like  when  they  were  at  variance  on  the  principle. 

On  every  point  and  without  ill  intention  on  the  part  of 
anyone,  discussions  arose  over  points  of  detail  which  had 
to  be  settled  before  progress  could  be  made.  One  day,  on 
February  22, — in  the  absence  of  M.  Clemenceau,  grievously 
wounded  the  day  before  by  an  assassin — it  was  suggested 
that  the  military  clauses  as  soon  as  they  were  ready  should 
be  handed  to  Germany  without  waiting  for  the  others. 
From  his  sick-bed  the  French  Premier  answered  that  this 
was  impossible  and  in  his  name  the  French  delegation  in 
full  accord  with  Marshal  Foch  showed  that  the  military 
clauses  could  not  be  separated  from  those  which  would  fix 
the  frontiers  of  Germany,  the  situation  of  the  Ehenish 
Provinces,  the  occupation,  etc. .  Another  day,  on  March  the 
third,  it  was  maintained  that  the  disarmament  of  Germany 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY          131 

should  only  be  of  limited  duration.  An  entire  meeting  was 
necessary  to  dispose  of  this  suggestion,  Marshal  Foch  very 
pertinently  recalling  that  President  Wilson,  who  was  then 
on  the  high  seas,  had  asserted  the  "moral  right"  of  the 
Allies  to  disarm  Germany  completely.  M.  Clemenceau,  who 
had  resumed  his  place  as  President,  added: 

"We  must  know  what  we  want  and  say  it.  Otherwise 
we  are  living  in  a  dream  and  reality  will  be  avenged." 

On  another  occasion,  the  American  delegates  put  for- 
ward the  idea  of  "guaranteeing  the  neutrality"  of  a  dis- 
armed Germany.  Here  again  M.  Clemenceau  refused, 
declaring  that  he  was  not  willing  to  risk  the  life  of  a  single 
French  soldier  to  guarantee  Germany  anything.  Some  of 
these  debates  were  strenuous,  at  timee  even  dramatic.  No 
progress  was  being  made.  At  last  on  March  the  sixth  the 
discussion  of  the  report  of  the  Military  Committee  presided 
over  by  Marshal  Foch  began.  The  plan  presented  left  Ger- 
many an  army  of  200,000  men  recruited  by  conscription  on 
a  one-year  service  plan,  five  army  corps  staffs,  fifteen 
divisions,  180  pieces  of  heavy  artillery  and  600  field  pieces. 
Immediately  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  supported  by  M.  Clemen- 
ceau, put  the  vital  question : 

' '  Germany, ' '  he  says,  l '  will  train  200,000  men  a  year  or 
two  million  in  ten  years.  Why  make  her  a  present  of  a 
system  which  in  fifteen  or  twenty  years  from  now  will  give 
her  millions  of  trained  soldiers  to  mobilize?" 

To  the  objection  of  the  military  experts,  who  answered 
that  an  army  based  upon  long  term  enlistment  would  be  a 
nursery  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  replied: 

"Officers  and  non-commissioned-officers?  Germany 
as  a  result  of  the  war  has  more  than  enough  for  fifteen 
years  to  come  and  if  she  trains  200,000  men  a  year,  you 
may  be  quite  sure  that  at  the  end  of  ten  years  she  will  have 
formed  a  hundred  thousand  non-commissioned  officers." 

It  was  self-evident.  The  suppression  of  compulsory 
service  was  decided  upon ;  the  military  experts  were  invited 
to  resubmit  by  March  10  a  plan  thus  amended. 


132     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

This  plan — the  principle  of  which  the  Technical  Com- 
mission continued  to  oppose — was  submitted  on  the  day 
named  to  the  Supreme  Council.  No  more  conscription: 
twelve  years  engagements:  strength  of  140,000  men;  war 
material  reduced  in  proportion.  Immediately  and  insist- 
ently M.  Clemenceau  and  Marshal  Foch  demanded  a 
further  reduction  to  100,000  men. 

"I  insist  with  all  the  strength  at  my  command,"  said 
the  French  Premier,  "for  it  is  France  who  to-morrow  as 
yesterday  will  be  face  to  face  with  Germany." 

Agreement  was  quickly  reached.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and 
Mr.  House  despite  certain  objections  of  their  technical 
advisers  declared: 

"If  France  expresses  a  formal  opinion  in  this  matter 
neither  Great  Britain  nor  the  United  States  has  the  right 
to  oppose  her  wish." 

The  German  Army  was  therefore  limited  to  96,000  men 
and  4,000  officers  and  its  role  restricted  to  the  maintenance 
of  internal  order  and  the  policing  of  her  borders.  At  the 
request  also  of  the  French  delegation,  the  General  Staff 
was  suppressed  as  was  also  the  heavy  artillery:  the  sup- 
plies of  munitions  diminished  by  half;  an  inter-allied  com- 
mission to  supervise  disarmament  appointed;  time  limits 
for  compliance  with  the  various  clauses  fixed  as  follows: 

1.  Within  two  months  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Treaty. 

Art.  167. — Delivery  to  the  Allies  for  destruction  of  all  the  war 
material  whatsoever  exceeding  the  authorized  quantities,  as  well  as 
all  machinery  designed  for  war  manufacture,  with  the  exception  of 
such  as  may  be  recognized  as  necessary  for  the  arming  and  equip- 
ment of  the  German  military  forces  authorized. 

Art.  176. — Suppression  of  Military  Schools. 

Art.  180. — The  disarmament  of  fortifications  within  the  demili- 
tarized zone. 

Art.  198. — Demobilization  of  all  the  personnel  of  the  Air 
Services. 

Art.  202. — Surrender  of  all  the  aviation  material. 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY          133 

2.  Within  three  months  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Treaty. 

Art.  263. — The  reduction  of  the  total  effective  force  to  200,000 
men. 

Art.  168. — Prohibition  to  manufacture  arms  or  war  material  of 
any  kind  elsewhere  than  in  factories  authorized  by  the  Allies. 
Suppression  of  all  other  factories  and  arsenals. 

Art.  172. — Revelation  of  secret  processes. 

Art.  221. — Modification  of  German  military  legislation  in 
accordance  with  the  Treaty. 

3.  Within  four  months  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Treaty. 

Art.  180. — Dismantling  of  the  fortifications  in  the  demilitarized 
zone. 

4.  Before  March  31,  1920* 

Arts.  160-163. — Complete  compliance  in  all  respects  of  the  Ger- 
man Army  with  the  dispositions  of  the  Treaty  (reduction  to 
100,000  men). 

Art.  166. — Limitation  and  warehousing  of  all  munition  stocks. 

Art.  170. — Prohibition  to  import  or  export  war  material. 

Art.  171. — Prohibition  to  manufacture  poison  gases,  tanks,  etc. 

Art.  173. — Abolition  of  compulsory  service. 

Art.  175. — Status  and  number  of  officers. 

Art.  177. — Prohibition  for  schools  and  athletic  associations  to 
concern  themselves  with  military  questions  or  to  have  any  connec- 
tion with  the  Minister  of  War. 

Art.  213. — Eight  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  exercise 
supervision. 

Arts.  42  and  43. — Complete  demilitarization  of  the  Rhine 
region. 

This  was  drafted  Chapter  V  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  How- 
ever improved  it  may  have  been  by  the  debates  from  March 
3  to  12,  this  chapter  did  not  yet  provide  France — invaded 
twice  in  fifty  years — with  sufficient  security.  Further- 
more it  was  necessary  that  the  military,  if  not  the  political, 
frontier  of  Germany  be  fixed  in  such  a  manner  that  neither 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  nor  the  bridges,  nor  the  neigh- 
boring zone  of  the  right  bank  should  ever  again  be  used 

*By  decision  of  the  Supreme  Council  on  February  12,  1920,  the  date  was 
extended  to  July  1,  1920,  owing  to  the  delay  in  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Treaty  which  did  not  occur  until  January  10,  1920. 


134    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

against  France  as  the  offensive  military  base  it  had  been 
in  the  past.  It  was  also  necessary  that  once  the  military 
clauses  had  been  enforced  by  the  competent  Inter-allied 
Commissions,  any  eventual  violations  thereof  by  Germany 
should  be  made  the  object,  not  only  of  verifications  of  the 
facts,  but  also  of  official  inquiries  to  be  provided  for  by 
the  Treaty  itself.  Finally  it  was  necessary  that,  so  long  as 
Germany  should  dispose  of  several  million  men  trained  to 
war — men  who  had  actually  fought — the  occupation  of  the 
left  bank  and  of  the  bridgeheads  would  provide  our  country 
a  natural  guarantee. 

The  total  demilitarization  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
and  of  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometers  to  the  east  of  the  river  was 
accepted  from  the  first  and  was  not  made  the  object  of  any 
discussion.  The  definitive  formula  thereof  was  drafted  in 
the  clearest  terms  by  President  Wilson  in  a  Note  of  March 
28,  which  the  final  enactments  of  the  Conference  repro- 
duced almost  literally.  This  Note  was  drawn  up  as  follows : 

Stipulations  to  Be  Embodied  in  the  Treaty 

(1)  No  fortifications  west  of  a  line  drawn  fifty  kilometers 
east  of  the  Khine  (as  already  provisionally  agreed  upon  in  tihe 
military  terms). 

(2)  The  maintenance  or  assembling  of  armed  forces,  either 
permanently  or  temporarily,  forbidden  within  that  area,  as  well  as 
all  manoeuvres  and  the  maintenance  of  facilities  for  mobilization. 

(3)  Violation  of  these  conditions  to  be  regarded  as  hostile 
acts  against  the  signatories  to  the  Treaty  and  as  calculated  to  dis- 
turb the  peace  of  the  world. 

In  a  separate  Treaty  with  the  United  States. 

(4)  A  pledge  by  the  United  States,  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  Executive  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  to  come  imme- 
diately to  the  assistance  of  France  as  soon  as  any  unprovoked 
movement  of  aggression  against  her  is  made  by  Germany, — the 
pledge  to  continue  until  it  is  agreed  that  the  League  itself  affords 
sufficient  protection. 

The  question  of  the  further  control  to  be  exercised  was 
more  lengthily  discussed.  To  reduce  Germany  to  the  mili- 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY          135 

tary  status  imposed  by  the  Treaty,  commissions  were  pro- 
vided for.  But  their  role  was  temporary  and,  the  reduction 
of  German  forces  to  the  figures  of  the  Treaty  once 
achieved,  these  commissions  would  disappear.  For  the 
future  something  else  was  needed.  What  f  Not  merely  the 
ordinary  military  Intelligence  Services  possessed  by  all 
countries,  but  an  official  body  that  would  have  the  specific 
right  to  make  inquiries  in  Germany  and  to  suggest  measures 
based  on  its  investigations.  This  was  a  matter  which 
aroused  the  keenest  attention  of  the  Anglo-Saxons.  Assert- 
ing at  every  turn  their  desire  not  to  interfere  in  any  way, 
once  peace  was  signed,  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Germany, 
they  considered  that  a  permanent  right  of  control  over  her 
military  institutions  would  affect  her  sovereignty.*  Such 
was  certainly  not  the  object  of  the  French  proposal.  Still 
it  was  none  the  less  essential  that  some  kind  of  a  body 
should  be  provided  for,  with  power  to  verify  the  military 
execution  of  the  peace.  On  five  occasions,  M.  Clemenceau 
insisted  on  this  necessity  without  obtaining  a  decision.  On 
March  22,  I  handed  to  Colonel  House  a  Note  summing  up 
the  problem.  It  is  proper  that  it  should  be  published  in 
full  although  up  to  the  present  it  has  remained  secret. 

NOTE  FOR  COLONEL  HOUSE 

March  22,  1919. 

I 

The  Treaty,  in  which  is  incorporated  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  recognizes  that  the  immediate  disarmament  of 
Germany  is  necessary  and  institutes  a  control  to  make  sure  that  the 
disarmament  clauses  will  be  carried  out. 

Germany,  once  disarmed,  is  it  admitted  that  she  can  re-arm? 
That  is  the  question. 

To  this  question  a  satisfactory  reply  can  be  made  only  by  insert- 
ing in  the  Treaty  the  right  of  the  League  to  assure  itself  that 
Germany  is  not  re-arming. 


*A  proposal  to  organize  a  general  supervision  of  armaments,  presented  in 
February  by  Mr.  L6on  Bourgeois  at  the  League  of  Nations  Commission,  had 
been  rejected  by  twelve  votes  to  three. 


136     THE  TKUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

Failing  this,  the  League  would  confess  to  working  for  only  six 
months,  or  eighteen  months,  which  would  be  disastrous. 

II 

This  truth  is  easy  to  prove. 

The  League  wishes  to  compass  the  at  least  partial  disarmament 
of  its  members.  If  one  subordinates  this  disarmament  of  its  own 
members  to  the  disarmament  of  non-member  nations  without  hav- 
ing the  right  of  supervision  over  these  latter,  a  weak  instrument  is 
being  drawn  up,  dangerous  and  absurd,  and  all  the  weaker,  more 
dangerous  and  more  absurd  since  the  bad  faith  of  Germany  has 
been  the  more  clearly  established. 

It  is  said:  "The  Military  Attaches  will  exercise  this  super- 
vision." That  is  not  exact. 

In  actual  practise,  to  begin  with,  everyone  knows  that  Military 
Attaches  only  obtain  officially  such  particulars  as  it  is  desired  to 
give  them  or  those  which  are  already  public  property.  In  1914 
they  were  without  exact  knowledge  either  as  to  the  number  of  Ger- 
man Reserve  Corps  or  as  to  the  importance  of  heavy  artillery. 

"Will  it  be  said  that  the  Intelligence  Departments  could  procure 
these  particulars?  But  these  services  have  limited  means.  Fur- 
thermore one  cannot  invoke  them  without  making  them  known,  and 
their  reports  have  no  official  value  vis-a-vis  those  of  a  Foreign 
Government. 

If,  therefore,  the  League  of  Nations,  having  learned  in  one  way 
or  another  (Military  Attaches  or  Intelligence  Services)  that  Ger- 
many is  secretly  violating  the  Disarmament  clauses,  wishes  to  make 
representations  to  her  on  the  subject,  the  German  Government  will 
be  justified  in  replying,  "Your  information  is  false"  and  her 
denial  will  be  sufficient  for  the  League  to  be  disarmed. 

Will  the  League  say  to  Germany,  "Prove  that  my  information 
is  false,"  or  even,  "We  wish  to  verify." 

But  then  it  is  claiming  a  right  of  supervision  and  Germany  will 
reply :  "By  what  right ? ' ' 

That  is  what  Germany  will  reply  and  she  will  be  justified  in  so 
replying,  if  she  is  not  forced  by  the  Treaty  to  recognize  the  right  of 
verification. 

In  a  word,  if  this  right  is  not  given  by  the  Treaty,  Germany 
can  always  re-arm. 

It  will  be  objected  perhaps  that  preparations  for  war  by  a  great 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY  137 

nation  like  Germany  cannot  pass  unnoticed.  But  between  complete 
disarmament  and  complete  preparation  there  are  many  intermedi- 
ate stages  which  are  none  the  less  a  danger  and  may  more  or  less 
circumscribe  plans  to  break  up  the  future  political  status  of 
Europe. 

Where  will  the  forbearance  of  the  League  end  and  when  will  it 
begin  to  take  necessary  precautions  if  the  uncertainty  about  what 
Germany  is  doing  and  preparing  cannot  be  officially  dispelled? 

Ill 

This  situation,  perilous  because  of  Germany,  will  be  dangerous 
also  for  the  members  of  the  League. 

If  a  right  of  verification  is  not  given  to  the  League  by  the  cre- 
ation of  a  body  for  that  purpose,  what  will  happen,  in  the  case 
where  the  Governments  composing  the  League  would  not  be  in 
agreement  as  to  German  preparations? 

There  may  be  serious  divergencies  either  between  the  facts 
reported  by  their  agents  or  their  interpretation  thereof.  This  has 
happened  and  is  constantly  happening. 

How  can  the  difficulty  be  solved  ? 

Another  danger :  the  Pacifist  element  in  each  of  the  Nations  of 
the  League  will  be  quite  naturally  inclined  to  deny  reports  disturb- 
ing to  their  peace  of  mind  and  more  or  less  consciously  to  espouse 
the  cause  of  the  German  Government  which  will  deny  the  said 
reports.  Must  we  recall  the  opposition  of  these  Pacifist  elements 
at  the  time  when  Germany  armed  to  the  teeth  was  openly  making 
ready  for  the  aggression  of  1870  and  that  of  1914? 

To  sum  up,  the  situation  will  be  the  following : 

— Germany  will  deny 

— The  governments  will  discuss 

— Public  opinion  will  be  divided,  alarmed,  nervous,  and  finally, 
the  League  unarmed  will  have  brought  to  pass  in  the  world  not 
general  Peace  but  general  uncertainty  which  may  give  birth  to  all 
kinds  of  interior  and  exterior  conflicts 

It  is  important  in  this  matter  to  lay  down  the  principle  and  to 
assert  the  right. 

Let  care  be  taken  to  avoid  vexatious  proceedings  in  the  exercise 
of  after-war  supervision,  and  let  use  be  made,  as  agents  officially 
recognized  by  Germany,  of  military  attaches  or  other  agents  of  the 
League,  on  which  we  are  agreed : 

But  to  deny  the  principle  itself  of  this  right  of  supervision  by 


138    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  League  of  Nations  and  not  to  embody  it  in  the  Treaty  to  be 
signed  by  Germany,  this  would  amount  to  giving  the  whole  world 
and  our  enemies  of  yesterday  the  very  clear  impression  that  noth- 
ing durable  has  been  achieved  and  that  we  are  ever  ready  to  turn 
back  to  the  past. 

Signed:    Andre"  Tardieu. 

Days  passed — without  a  decision.  Sometimes  we  were 
told  that  our  demand  was  excessive :  sometimes  that  it  was 
useless:  always  that  such  a  provision  of  so  special  a  char- 
acter could  not  find  place  either  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  nor  in  the  Franco-British  and  Franco- 
American  Treaties  of  Guarantee.  In  a  Note  of  April  2,  we 
had  presented  the  draft  of  a  clause  worded  as-  follows : 

If  one  of  the  signatory  Powers  considers  that  Germany  has  vio- 
lated any  of  the  above  clauses  (demilitarization  of  the  left  bank  of 
the  Ehine  and  of  50  kilometers  on  the  right  bank,  and  the  military 
clauses)  it  will  have  the  right  to  bring  the  matter  before  the  Exe- 
cutive Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  which  will  at  once  pro- 
ceed to  verify  the  facts  stated.  Germany  undertakes  to  submit  to 
the  said  verification  made  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  to  facilitate 
its  execution. 

On  April  12,  in  a  Note  of  reply,  President  Wilson 
maintained  his  refusal  and  wrote : 

With  regard  to  the  added  paragraph  concerning  the  right  of  the 
signatory  Powers  to  notify  the  Executive  Council  of  the  League  of 
any  violations  of  these  regulations,  which  might  have  been 
observed,  it  is  clear  that  the  right  already  exists,  on  the  part  of 
members  of  the  League,  if  any  action  is  taken  anywhere,  which 
threatens  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world  and  that  it  would  be 
unwise  to  connect  it  with  this  special  agreement  and  treaty. 

It  was  once  again  proof  of  our  failure,  to  agree.  But 
for  the  first  time,  the  door  was  open  to  agreement.  Leav- 
ing aside  the  Treaties  of  Guarantee  we  asked  by  a  Note  of 
April  15  that  the  article  proposed  by  us  should  figure  in 
the  military  clauses  of  the  peace.  We  showed  that  it  was 
a  matter  of  necessary  precaution  and  closely  allied  to  all 
the  objects  of  the  Conference.  ^We  wrote: 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY  139 

April  15. 

What  does  France  demand?  That  the  precision  and  strength 
added  by  the  special  Franco-British- American  Treaty  to  the  gen- 
eral clauses  of  the  League  of  Nations,  in  case  of  a  German  attack 
shall  be  incorporated  in  some  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty  in  case  of 
preparation  for  such  an  attack. 

In  other  words,  it  is  a  matter  of  giving  article  XIII  of  the  Cov- 
enant, as  regards  possible  preparations  by  Germany,  the  same 
complement  as  the  special  Treaty  gives  to  article  X. 

The  British  and  American  Governments  which  have  so  justly 
understood  that  France  has  need  of  an  additional  guarantee 
against  the  realization  of  a  German  attack,  will  certainly  admit 
that  the  same  additional  guarantee  should  appear  in  the  preventa- 
tive  methods  to  be  opposed  to  this  attack. 

The  President  considers  that  it  is  not  proper  to  insert  this 
clause  in  the  special  Treaty  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  The  French  Government  is  quite  ready  to  abide  by  this 
opinion. 

But  it  insists  that,  either  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  or  in 
the  military  clauses  of  Peace,  this  provision  shall  appear. 

The  common  work  of  Governments  needs  the  ratification  of 
Parliaments  and  of  peoples.  The  clause  asked  for  will  do  much 
for  this  ratification  as  far  as  France  is  concerned. 

In  this  matter  the  position  of  the  French  Government  is  identi- 
cal with  that  which  prompted  the  American  Government  to 
introduce  an  amendment  to  the  Covenant  touching  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  This  also  is  a  question  of  public  feeling. 

The  introduction  of  such  a  provision  seems  particularly  easy. 

In  fact : 

1°  Article  X  sets  forth  that  the  members  of  the  League  under- 
take to  respect  and  preserve  against  external  aggression  the  terri- 
torial integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  all  the 
members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in  case 
of  any  threat  or  danger  of  aggression  the  Council  shall  advise  upon 
the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

To  this  general  provision  the  special  Treaties  of  Great  Britain 
and  of  the  United  States  add  a  precise  undertaking,  the  object 
being,  in  case  of  danger,  to  shorten  the  formalities  and  gain  time. 

2°  Article  XIII  provides  for  the  right  of  investigation  by  the 
Council.  The  State  under  suspicion  and  about  which  investigation 


140    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

is  to  be  made  must  submit  to  it,  if  not  by  terms  of  the  article  XVI 
it  may  be  outlawed. 

This  article  might  also  be  supplemented  by  a  precise  provision. 

Whatj  is  needed  indeed  in  the  second  case  as  in  the  first  is  to 
gain  time, — but  precision  is  not  less  necessary. 

Germany  is,  of  all  the  nations  not  members  of  the  League,  the 
only  one  capable  of  letting  loose  an  irreparable  catastrophe — 
irreparable,  if  not  as  far  as  final  victory  is  concerned,  at  least  as 
regards  the  security  of  French  soil. 

For  this  reason,  we  are  justified  in\  forcing  Germany1  by  the 
Peace  Treaty  to  submit  to  investigation  which  alone  can  prevent 
her  from  placing  France  and  the  League  in  presence  of  a  fait 
accompli. 

Our  argument  at  last  met  more  favourable  reception 
and  prevailed  on  April  17.  On  that  day  President  Wilson 
offered  to  us  a  formula  which  we  accepted  immediately. 

As  long  as  the  present  Treaty  (with  Germany)  remains  in  force, 
a  pledge  to  be  taken  by  Germany  to  respond  to  any  inquiry  that 
will  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

This  was  the  very  object  of  our  proposition.  To  avoid 
the  delay  which  might  have  been  brought  about  by  the  neces- 
sity of  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  we  merely  asked — and  it  was  consented  to  without 
discussion — that  the  Council,  in  this  case,  "would  act  by  a 
majority  vote."  After  a  month  of  efforts,  we  were  at  the 
goal.  The  general  security  of  the  world  gained  as  much 
thereby  as  the  security  of  France. 

Ill 

The  right  of  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
and  the  Treaties  of  Guarantee  with  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  were  to  complete  the  measures  taken  for  the 
common  defense  of  the  "Frontier  of  Freedom."  These 
two  problems,  by  reason  of  their  importance,  are  dealt  with 
in  special  chapters,*  wherein  is  written  the  final  upbuild- 

*See  Chapters  V  and  VI. 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY  141 

ing  of  the  work  of  defense,  the  necessity  of  which  was 
emphasized  by  the  history  of  the  last  century. 

A  new  work  this :  to  break  and  bridle  the  military  power 
of  the  most  military  people  in  the  world.  The  work  has 
been  undertaken  and  accomplished  with  courage,  and  in  a 
manner  worthy  of  our  great  soldiers.  We  have  struck  at 
the  head  by  suppressing  the  Army  Military  Staff,  the 
schools,  the  plans  of  mobilization.  We  have  struck  at  the 
base  by  suppressing  conscription  and  by  reducing  the  effec- 
tives to  100,000  men  serving  for  twelve  years.  As  to  war 
material,  we  have  suppressed  the  right  to  retain  or  to 
manufacture  heavy  artillery,  tanks,  aviation,  gas.  We 
have  allowed  only  288  field  cannon  manufactured  in  fac- 
tories chosen  by  the  Allies,  supervised  by  them,  and  of 
which  they  can  limit  the  number.  Was  it  possible  to  go 
further  without  affording  grounds  for  the  objection  often 
put  forward  by  our  Allies,  "Then,  we  must  protect  and 
safeguard  Germany." 

Doubtless  a  danger  remains:  fraud,  camouflage.  Eter- 
nal danger — which  Napoleon,  occupying  all  Germany  and 
incorporating  it  in  his  Armies,  did  not  succeed  in  doing 
away  with.  After  Jena,  Leipzig.  To  avert  it,  everything 
has  been  done  that  could  be  done.  Effectives?  Articles 
160  to  163  of  the  Treaty  give  us  arms  to  put  an  end  to  the 
cunning  dispersion  which,  under  the  names  of  Reichswehr, 
of  Sicherheitspolizei,  of  EinwolinerweJir,  of  Nothilfe,  has 
reconstituted  in  Germany  at  the  beginning  of  1920  an  army 
of  nearly  a  million  men.  War  material?  Supervision  is, 
and  will  be,  necessary.  Article  213  authorizes  us  to  this  by 
placing  our  complaints  before  the  League  of  Nations,  whose 
procedure  has  been  simplified  to  this  end.  Furthermore, 
the  clauses  relating  to  the  Rhineland — neutralization  and 
occupation — are  not  a  negligible  guarantee.  Unless  all 
Germany  is  to  be  occupied  and  administered  entirely,  could 
one,  I  repeat,  go  further? 

The  effort  accomplished  may  be  gauged  by  figures,  and 
I  have  summed  it  up  in  the  following  table : 


142    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 
SITUATION  OF  THE  GERMAN  ARMY 


Before 
Armistice 

After 
Armistice 

After 
Project 
of 
Vlarch  3 

After 
Project 
of 
March  10 

After 
the 
Treaty 

Reduc- 
tion ef- 
fected 
Columns 
1   &   & 

5,500,000 
140,000 
218 
17 
71 
7,200 
9,000 

1,300,000 
40,000 
55 
5 
7 
4,700 
6,500 

191,000 
9,000 
15 
1 
5 
180 
600 

134,000 
6,000 
11 
1 
4 
None 
432 

96,000 
4,000 
7 
None 
2 
None 
288 

98     % 
97     % 
96.7% 
100    % 
97    % 
100    % 
96.8% 

Officers    

Infaatry    Divisions  

Army   Hq.    Staffs  

Divisional    Hq.    Staffs... 
Heavy  Artillery  

Field  Artillery  

Almost  all  the  successive  reductions,  brought  out  in  this 
table,  are  the  work  of  the  French  delegation  and  particu- 
larly of  its  chief.  It  is  M.  Clemenceau  who,  from  the  first 
draft  to  the  final  text,  reduced  the  number  of  men  by  50 
per  cent.,  of  infantry  divisions  by  54  per  cent.,  of  officers 
by  56  per  cent.,  of  Army  Staffs  by  60  per  cent.,  of  heavy 
guns  by  100  per  cent.,  field  guns  by  54  per  cent.,  and  the 
amount  of  munitions  by  50  per  cent.  He  it  is  who  sup- 
pressed the  Army  Staffs  retained  by  the  military  experts. 
This  progress,  slowly  realized,  was  not  always  easy;  not 
indeed  that  there  was  not  always  entire  agreement  between 
the  Allies  on  the  necessity  of  disarming  Germany,  but  be- 
cause this  agreement  ever  easily  reached  on  negative 
measures  was  more  hesitating  in  the  case  of  positive  action ; 
and  also  because  too  often  the  shibboleths  of  technique 
were  an  obstacle  to  the  dictates  of  common  sense. 

It  is  M.  Clemenceau  also  who,  at  the  end  of  May,  when 
Count  Brockdorff-Rantzau  put  forward  his  counter-pro- 
posals, prevented  their  acceptance.  Some,  out  of  fear  of 
Bolshevism,  urged  concessions,  either  on  the  time  limit  of 
execution  or  on  stated  figures.  One  day,  the  military 
experts  proposed  to  grant  to  Germany  200,000  men  instead 
of  100,000.  On  June  8,  a  Technical  Committee  composed  of 
Field-Marshal  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  Generals  Bliss,  Desticker, 
Cavallero  and  Naro,  suggested  to  authorize  during  the  first 
three  months  that  would  follow  the  entry  of  the  Treaty  in 
force,  300,000  men  instead  of  200,000.  Unswervingly  the 
French  Government  refused,  for  the  good  of  all,  to  enter  on 


THE  DISARMAMENT  OF  GERMANY  143 

this  dangerous  path,  and  at  M.  Clemenceau's  request  the 
reply  handed  to  the  Germans  on  June  16  maintained  abso- 
lutely the  full  wording  of  the  military  clauses,  such  as  had 
been  communicated  on  May  7  previously. 

However  appreciable  this  result,  the  value  of  these  guar- 
antees has  none  the  less  been  discussed — and  how  bitterly. 
Let  us  admit  that  this  value  cannot  be  absolute ;  it  remains 
that,  compared  to  the  precedents  that  history  furnishes,  the 
situation  brought  about  by  the  Treaty  connotes  an  advance 
which  cannot  be  over-estimated;  it  remains  that  these 
guarantees  taken  as  a  whole  strengthen  and  increase  the 
importance  of  each  of  them.  Modern  wars — the  last  has 
only  proved  it  too  well — are  waged  not  by  armies  alone  but 
by  whole  nations  not  on  "the  front"  only,  but  in  "the 
rear ; "  by  the  entire  country ;  by  the  mobilization  of  all  its 
forces — man  power,  material,  financial,  naval,  industrial, 
commercial  and  moral.  The  base  of  security  under  these 
circumstances  is  to  know  whether  the  Army  left  to  Ger- 
many by  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  military  status  im- 
posed upon  her  thereby,  will  enable  her  unknown  to  the 
Allies  to  plan  and  to  accomplish  this  complete  mobilization 
of  all  the  national  forces,  which  is  the  essential  condition 
of  modern  warfare.  If  Germany  cannot  under  the  cloak  of 
her  Army  of  100,000  men  successfully  carry  out  this  com- 
plete mobilization  essential  to  success,  Germany  is  not  to 
be  feared — because  she  cannot  make  war.  To  prepare  her- 
self for  it,  she  would  be  obliged  to  resort  not  only  to  secret 
and  isolated  infringements  of  such  or  such  clauses  of  the 
Treaty,  but  to  infringe  them  in  every  direction  and  on  a 
scale  so  plain,  so  evident  and  so  glaring  that  for  her  con- 
querors of  yesterday  to  close  their  eyes  and  see  nothing, 
they  would  have  to  have  a  will  to  suicide.  Hindenburg  for 
once  spoke  the  truth  when  he  wrote: 

It  is  useless  to  speak  of  the  possibility  for  Germany  to  under- 
take a  new  war. . .  Remember  what  a  task  it  was  for  America  to 
raise  and  equip  an  army  of  a  million  men. . .  and  yet  they  had  the 
protection  of  the  Ocean,  while  they  prepared  their  artillery,  their 
munitions  and  their  aviation  material. 


144    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Germany  for  her  aviation,  her  heavy  artillery,  her  armament,  is 
not  separated  by  the  Ocean  from  her  enemies;  on  the  contrary 
these  are  already  firmly  established  in  German  territory.  Months 
would  be  necessary  to  prepare  a  new  war,  and  do  you  think  that 
the  French  would  look  on  with  their  hands  in  their  pockets  ? . . . 

A  modern  mobilization  demands  years  of  preparation — 
and  cannot  be  carried  out  in  secret.  Neither  of  these  essen- 
tials is  henceforth  in  the  hands  of  Germany  and  if  the 
military  clauses  of  the  Treaty  do  not  suppress  a  danger 
which  will  exist  as  long  as  there  will  be  at  our  gates  sixty 
million  men  who  are  proud  to  be  called  Germans,  these 
clauses  raise  against  this  danger  the  greatest  obstacles  that 
reason  can  conceive  and  accumulate  guarantees  the  like  of 
which  history  has  never  recorded.  If  these  clauses  are  en- 
forced ;  if  the  suppression  of  obligatory  military  service  is 
rigorously  maintained ;  if  the  aeroplanes,  tanks,  heavy  artil- 
lery disappear ;  if  there  remain  but  100,000  men  with  288 
field  guns,  manufactured  in  factories  chosen  by  the  Allies ; 
if  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  the  zone  of  50  kilometers  to 
the  east  of  the  river  remain  strictly  closed  to  all  German 
preparations ;  if  the  German  mobilization  instead  of  taking 
place  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  must  be  carried  out 
between  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser;  if  finally  the  national 
Intelligence  Services  on  whose  findings  the  League  of 
Nations  will  pass  and  take  action,  are  vigilant,  Germany 
will  be— for  so  long  as  all  this  is  done  with  care— incapable 
of  preparing  and  of  carrying  into  effect  that  fundamental 
act  of  war  which  is  called  the  Mobilization.  Enforced  as 
they  should  be,  the  military  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles make  this  certain. 

To  have  demanded  less  would  have  been  an  insult  to 
ouj  dead  and  a  betrayal  of  our  living. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE 

THIS  was  one  of  the  main  issues  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence. It  brought  out  more  clearly,  more  seriously  than  any 
other,  the  difference  in  national  psychology,  the  difficulty 
that  governments  and  peoples  have  in  understanding  one 
another,  albeit  they  are  loyal  Allies,  united  by  victory  and 
by  sacrifice.  The  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine 
and  of  the  bridgeheads  was  for  us  French  both  an  indis- 
pensable guarantee  for  the  enforcement  of  the  peace,  and  a 
necessary  assurance  against  invasion  such  as  had  occurred 
twice  in  fifty  years.  To  others,  associated  though  they 
were  heart  and  soul  in  our  perils  of  the  past  and  future  but 
interpreting  history  in  a  different  light,  this  occupation, 
no  matter  what  its  form  or  duration,  seemed  unjustifiable, 
useless  and  dangerous. 

As  early  as  November,  1918,  Marshal  Foch  on  purely 
military  grounds  had  addressed  a  Note  to  M.  Clemenceau, 
laying  stress  on  the  necessity  of  making  the  Ehine  the 
Western  frontier  of  Germany.  On  January  10  following, 
in  a  second  Note  which  he  handed  to  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief  of  the  Allied  Armies,  Marshal  Foch  had  developed 
his  arguments  and  summed  them  up  in  the  following 
conclusion : 

Marshal  von  Moltke  placed  the  military  frontier  of  Germany 
at  the  Khine  and  at  the  end  of  one  of  his  papers  writes:  "There 
can  be  no  doubt  about  the  ordinary  strength  of  our  theatre  of 
operations  on  the  Rhine.  One  thing  only  could  endanger  it — a  pre- 
mature offensive  by  us  on  the  left  bank  with  insufficient  forces." 
And  elsewhere  he  states:  "The  main  line  of  defense  of  Prussia 

145 


146     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

against  France  is  the  Rhine  with  its  fortresses.  This  line  is  so 
strong  that  it  is  far  from  requiring  all  the  forces  of  the  monarchy. ' ' 

To-day  this  situation  is  reversed  in  favour  of  the  coalition.  The 
coalition  cannot  renounce  its  advantages,  cannot  relinquish  its 
buckler  of  defense  in  that  region — the  Ehine — without  seriously 
compromising  its  future.  The  "Wacht  am  Rhein"  must  be  its 
slogan. 

Henceforth  the  Rhine  must  be  the  Western  frontier  of  the  Ger- 
man peoples.  Germany  must  be  deprived  of  all  access  to  or  mili- 
tary utilization  of  it,  that  is  to  say,  of  all  territorial  sovereignty  on 
the  left  bank  of  this  River — in  a  word,  of  every  facility  to  reach  by 
sudden  invasion,  as  in  1914,  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg,  the  shores 
of  the  North  Sea  and  threaten  England ;  to  move  around  France 's 
natural  defenses,  the  Rhine  and  the  Meuse;  to  conquer  her  north- 
ern regions  and  approach  that  of  Paris. 

This  is,  for  the  present  and  the  near  future,  a  guarantee  indis- 
pensable for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  because : 

1.  Of  Germany's  material  and  moral  situation. 

2.  Of  her  numerical  superiority  over  the  democratic  countries 
of  "Western  Europe. 

The  Rhine,  a  military  frontier  indispensable  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace,  which  is  the  aim  of  the  coalition,  offers  no  territo- 
rial advantage  to  any  country.  There  is  no  question  indeed  of  an- 
nexing the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  of  increasing  the  territory  of 
France  or  of  Belgium  but  simply  one  of  maintaining  on  the  Rhine 
the  common  barrier  of  security  essential  to  the  society  of  dem- 
ocratic nations.  There  is  no  question  of  entrusting  the  guardian- 
ship of  this  common  barrier  to  any  one  Power,  but  of  assuring  by 
the  moral  and  material  support  of  all  the  democratic  powers  the 
defense  of  their  lives  and  futures  by  forbidding  Germany,  once  for 
all,  to  carry  war  and  her  spirit  of  domination  across  the  river. 

Of  course  it  will  be  the  function  of  the  Peace  Treaty  to  fix  the 
status  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  not  included 
within  the  French  and  Belgian  frontiers. 

But  this  arrangement,  whatever  it  be,  must  take  into  considera- 
tion the  military  necessity  set  forth  above  and  therefore, 

1.  Absolutely  forbid  to  Germany  all  military  access  to,  or 
political  propaganda  in,  the  Rhenish  territories  of  the  left  bank, 
perhaps  even  protecting  this  territory  by  a  neutral  zone  on  the 
right  bank. 

2.  Assure  the  military  occupation  of  the  Rhenish  territories  of 
,the  left  bank  by  Allied  forces. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  147 

3.  Guarantee  to  the  Rhenish  territories  of  the  left  bank  the 
outlet  necessary  to  their  economic  activities  by  bringing  them  into 
a  customs  union  with  the  other  Western  States. 

On  these  conditions,  and  in  accordance  with  the  universally 
accepted  principle  of  the  liberty  of  peoples,  it  is  possible  to  conceive 
the  establishment,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  of  new  autonomous 
States,  governing  themselves  subject  to  the  above  reservations,  an 
arrangement  which  with  the  aid  of  a  strong  natural  frontier  the 
Rhine  will  alone  be  capable  of  assuring  Peace  to  Western  Europe. 

M.  Clexnenceau,  after  examining  these  two  documents, 
decided  to  support  their  conclusions.  He  was  even  of  the 
opinion  that  in  view  of  objections  which  preliminary  dis- 
cussions had  already  foreshadowed  it  would  be  necessary 
to  reinforce  this  thesis  with  historical  and  political  argu- 
ments, and  at  the  same  time  to  dispel  the  anxiety  and 
answer  the  adverse  criticism  which  it  seemed  to  have 
aroused.  I  was  entrusted,  therefore,  with  the  preparation 
of  a  general  Memorandum  in  support  of  our  demand.  This 
document  served  as  a  basis  for  the  whole  discussion.  It 
seems  to  me  indispensable  to  publish  it  in  full. 

February  26. 

MEMORANDUM  OF  THE  FRENCH  GOVERNMENT 

On  the  FIXATION  at  the  RHINE  of  the  WESTERN  FRONTIER 

of  GERMANY  and  on  INTER-ALLIED  OCCUPATION 

of  the  RHINE  BRIDGES. 


THE  OBJECTS  TO  BE  ATTAINED 

The  considerations  which  the  French  Government  submits  to 
the  Conference  on  the  subject  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  have  no 
selfish  character. 

They  do  not  tend  towards  annexations  of  territories.  They  aim 
at  the  suppression  of  a  common  danger  and  the  creation  of  a  com- 
mon protection. 

It  is  a  problem  of  general  interest,  a  problem  which  France,  the 
first  exposed  to  the  danger  it  is  sought  to  avert,  has  the  right  and 


148    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

duty  to  place  before  the  Conference,  but  which  directly  affects  all 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Nations  and  can  be  solved  only  by  them 
conjointly. 

The  essential  aim  which  the  Conference  seeks  to  attain  is  to  pre- 
vent by  all  just  means  that  which  has  been  from  ever  occurring 
again. 

Now,  what  happened  in  1914  was  possible  only  for  one  reason : 
Germany  because  of  her  mastery  over  offensive  preparations  made 
by  her  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  thought  herself  capable  of 
crushing  the  democracies,  France  and  Belgium,  before  the  latter 
could  receive  the  aid  of  the  Overseas  Democracies,  Great  Britain, 
the  Dominions,  and  the  United  States. 

It  was  because  this  was  possible  that  Germany  determined  to 
attack. 

It  is  therefore  this  possibility  which  must  be  done  away  with,  by 
depriving  Germany  of  the  means  which  permitted  her  to  believe  in 
the  success  of  her  plan. 

In  a  word  there  is  no  question  of  the  aggrandizement  of  any  of 
the  Allied  Nations ;  it  is  merely  a  question  of  placing  Germany  in  a 
position  where  she  can  do  no  harm  by  imposing  upon  her  conditions 
indispensable  to  the  common  security  of  the  Western  Democracies 
and  of  their  overseas  Allies  and  associates,  as  well  as  to  the  very 
existence  of  France. 

There  is  no  question  of  annexing  an  inch  of  German  soil ;  only 
of  depriving  Germany  of  her  weapons  of  offense. 

II 

THE  NECESSITY  OF  INTER-ALLIED  OCCUPATION 
OF  THE  RHINE  BRIDGES 

It  is  necessary  first  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  danger  to  be 
averted;  to  show  whom  it  threatens,  in  what  it  consists;  by  what 
means  it  can  be  suppressed. 

1.     The  danger  is  common  to  all  the  Allies. 

(a)  If,  in  1914,  the  Germans,  throwing  back  the  Belgians,  the 
French  and  the  few  British  divisions  then  in  line,  had  taken  the 
Channel  ports,  the  aid  brought  by  Great  Britain  in  1915  to  the 
common  cause  would  have  been  greatly  delayed  if  not  entirely 
prevented. 

If,  in  1918,  the  Germans  had  taken  Paris,  the  concentration  of 
the  French  Armies  south  of  the  Loire  and  the  forcing  back  of  our 
war  industries  would  certainly  have  delayed  the  landing  and  move- 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  149 

ment  by  rail  of  the  American  Army,  then  just  beginning  to  arrive, 
and  this  delay  would  have  had  consequences  of  the  utmost  gravity. 

Thus,  there  is  no  doubt,  on  two  occasions — and  it  would  be  easy 
to  furnish  other  instances — the  military  assistance  of  the  two  great 
overseas  Powers  came  very  near  being  hampered,  if  not  prevented 
entirely,  before  actually  taking  shape. 

(b)  In  order  that  this  may  never  be  so,  that  is  to  say,  in  order 
that  the  maritime  Powers  may  play  a  useful  part  on  the  Continent 
in  a  defensive  war  against  an  aggression  coming  from  the  East, 
they  must  have  the  assurance  that  French  territory  will  not  be 
overrun  in  a  few  days. 

In  other  words,  should  there  not  remain  enough  French  ports 
for  the  Overseas  Armies  to  debark  their  troops  and  war  supplies, 
should  there  not  remain  enough  French  territory  for  them  to  con- 
centrate and  operate  from  their  bases,  the  Overseas  Democracies 
would  be  debarred  from  waging  a  continental  war  against  any 
Power  seeking  to  dominate  the  Continent.  They  would  be  deprived 
of  their  nearest  and  most  natural  battleground.  Nothing  would  be 
left  to  them  but  Naval  and  Economic  warfare. 

So,  the  lesson  made  plain  by  the  last  war  is  that  a  strong  natural 
protection  on  the  East  is  a  matter  of  common  concern  to  the  West- 
ern and  Overseas  Democracies.  And  this  lesson  is  emphasized  by 
the  fact  that  Russia  to-day  no  longer  exists. 

To  decide  upon  this  protection,  let  us  first  see  whence  the 
danger  comes. 

2.  The  danger  comes  from  the  possession  by  Germany  of  the 
left  bank  and  the  Rhine  bridges. 

If  Germany  was  able  to  plan  and  execute  the  sudden  attack 
which  nearly  settled  the  outcome  of  the  war  in  five  weeks,  it  was 
because  she  held  the  left  bank  of  the  Khine  and  had  made  of  it 
against  her  neighbors  an  offensive  military  base  constantly  and 
quickly  supplied,  thanks  to  the  capacity  of  the  Rhine  bridges. 

All  military  history  since  1815  demonstrates  this  and  the  plan  is 
written  out  in  full  in  the  publications  as  well  as  in  the  acts  of  the 
German  General  Staff. 

(a)     History  first,  that  of  1870,  as  of  1914. 

In  1870,  despite  the  then  shortcomings  of  the  Prussian  system 
of  railways,  it  was  on  the  left  bank  that  the  concentration  of  the 
Prussian  troops  was  carried  out. 

This  fact  is  all  the  more  significant  because  the  Prussian  Gen- 
eral Staff  was  still  under  the  impression  of  the  reputation  of  the 


150    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

French  Army  in  attack  and  consequently,  very  cautious.  Despite 
this,  but  on  the  hypothesis  that  France  would  have  taken  the 
initiative,  Prussia  had  confined  itself  to  the  preparation  of  a  plan 
of  concentration  farther  east  but  always  on  the  left  bank. 

In  other  words,  she  had  no  thought  of  using  the  river  as  a  pro- 
tection ;  and,  in  any  contingency,  she  looked  upon  it  as  the  offensive 
base  indispensable  to  the  execution  of  a  plan  of  attack.  It  is  known 
that  in  fact,  thanks  to  its  concentration  on  the  left  bank,  the  Prus- 
sian Army  invaded  France  in  less  than  three  weeks. 

In  1914,  the  same  situation  produced  the  same  results.  But 
things  moved  faster,  thanks  to  the  enormous  developments  of  facili- 
ties. Germany,  massed  once  more  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
(and  much  nearer  to  the  French  frontier  than  in  1870,  because  of 
the  perfection  of  her  railway  system)  was  in  a  few  hours  able  to 
carry  the  war  to  Belgium  and  to  France,  and  in  a  few  weeks  to  the 
very  heart  of  France. 

Before  even  the  declaration  of  war  Germany  invaded  a  region 
from  which  France  drew  90  per  cent,  of  her  iron  ore,  86  per  cent, 
of  her  pig  iron,  75  per  cent,  of  her  steel,  while  95  out  of  the  127 
blast  furnaces  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

This  situation  permitted  Germany  to  multiply  her  war 
resources,  while  depriving  France  of  her  most  necessary  means  of 
defense.  It  nearly  resulted  in  the  taking  of  Paris  in  1914,  of  Dun- 
kirk, Calais  and  Boulogne  six  weeks  later. 

All  this  was  possible  only  "because,  at  our  very  gates,  at  a  few 
days'  march  from  our  capital,  Germany  had  the  most  formidable 
offensive  military  base  known  to  history. 

(b)  This  military  base  she  has  had  for  a  century  and  in  pur- 
suit of  a  policy  of  aggression  which  has  never  varied — and  which 
had  as  its  objective  the  bridgeheads  of  the  Sarre  in  1815,  of  the 
Khine  and  of  the  Moselle  in  1870,  and  of  the  Meuse  in  1914 — has 
constantly  reinforced  it,  openly  asserting  that  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  was  indispensable  to  her  for  that  purpose. 

During  the  negotiations  at  the  Conference  of  Vienna,  Gneisenau 
and  Grolman  already  indicated  that  the  "main  concentration  of 
the  Prussian  Army  must  take  place  between  the  Rhine  and  the 
Moselle." 

"Won  over  by  their  insistence,  Castlereagh  wrote  to  Wellington 
on  October  1,  1815 :  "Mr.  Pitt  was  altogether  right  when,  as  early 
as  1805,  he  wanted  to  give  Prussia  more  territory  on  the  left  bank 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  151 

of  the  Rhine,  and  thus  put  her  in  closer  military  contact  with 
France." 

In  1832,  Boyen  repeated  that  the  point  of  concentration  must  be 
Treves. 

In  1840,  Grolman,  reiterating  the  same  idea,  declared  the  first 
objective  of  German  concentration  to  be  an  offensive  in  Lorraine 
and  in  Champagne. 

The  same  idea  prompted  Moltke's  plan  of  operations  against 
France  in  1870.  It  is  this  same  plan  that  Germany  carried  out  in 
1914  on  an  unprecedented  scale  and  with  unprecedented  violence. 

Finally,  need  we  recall  that  in  November,  1917,  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  declared  in  an  address  to  the  German  Fatherland  League, 
that ' '  without  the  possession  of  the  left  bank,  Germany  would  have 
been  unable  to  pass  her  Armies  through  a  neutral  Belgium  f ' ' 

(c)  Such  being  the  doctrine  Germany  translated  into  action 
by  organizing  for  military  purposes  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and 
the  bridges  which  are  the  key  to  that  organization. 

With  this  in  view  she  built  fortresses,  concentration  camps, 
finally  and  above  all,  a  railway  system  powerfully  equipped  for 
attack  and  linked  by  the  Rhine  bridges  with  the  whole  railway 
system  on  the  right  bank,  which  also  was  laid  out  for  the  same  pur- 
poses of  attack.  The  fortifications  of  the  Rhine  and  of  its  left  bank 
comprised  in  addition  to  the  fortified  districts  of  Metz-Thionville 
and  Strassburg-Molsheim  (whose  role  will  disappear  with  the 
return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France)  the  Rhine  fortresses — 
Cologne,  Coblenz  and  Mayence — crossing  points  for  the  strategic 
railways,  and  vast  entrenched  camps  (supplies,  equipment,  bar- 
racks, and  factories  and  workshops,  etc.). 

The  training  camps,  like  that  of  Malmedy,  were  suitable  for 
transformation  into  concentration  camps — an  easy  way  of  concen- 
trating troops  under  pretense  of  training  in  the  neighborhood  of  a 
peaceful  or  even  neutral  state  (France,  Belgium,  Luxemburg). 

The  railway  system  is  of  still  wider  significance.  A  glance  at 
the  map  of  German  railways  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  will 
show  that  nine  great  independent  transportation  highways  con- 
verge towards  the  bridges  and  continue  across  them  to  the  left 
bank. 

Eight  of  these  nine  highways  run  between  Duisburg  and  Ras- 
tatt,  flooding  the  French  frontier  with  troops  and  preparing  the 
way  for  aggression. 

It  is,  therefore,  obvious  that  the  plan  of  aggression,  conceived 


152    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

and  prepared  as  early  as  1815,  and  twice  executed — in  1870  and 
1914 — was  based  upon  the  transportation  capacity  of  the  Rhine 
bridges.  Without  the  left  bank,  and  above  all,  without  the  bridges 
— the  second  feeding  the  first — aggression  would  not  have  been 
possible. 

(d)  And  this  is  so  true,  that,  as  early  as  1909,  General  von 
Falkenhausen,  in  his  book  Der  Grosse  Krieg  der  Jetztzeit, 
showed  that  by  her  mastery  of  the  bridges,  Germany  could  wage 
war  in  enemy  territory  even  supposing  that  the  French,  British 
and  Italian  Armies  had  utilized  before  the  opening  of  hostilities 
the  territories  of  Holland,  Belgium,  Luxemburg  and  the  Rhine,  and 
had  carried  out  their  concentration  in  front  of  the  Schlestadt- 
Sarreburg-Saint-Avold-Luxemburg-Bastogne  line. 

Even  in  such  a  contingency,  according  to  the  General,  if  Ger- 
many concentrated  on  the  Rhine  and  controlled  the  bridges,  the 
transportation  capacity  of  these  bridges  would  enable  her,  in  three 
days  to  transport  half  of  her  forces — more  than  twenty  Army 
Corps — to  the  line  Juliers-Duren-Kochem-Birkenfeld-Kaiserlau- 
tern-Haguenau,  without  her  adversaries  having  time  to  prevent  it. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  hypothetical  conditions  stated  by  Gen- 
eral von  Falkenhausen  correspond  exactly  to  the  situation  which 
would  arise  if  peace  were  to  leave  Germany  in  possession  of  the 
Rhine  bridges.  This  possession  of  these  bridges,  according  to  the 
General's  own  demonstration,  would  suffice,  no  matter  what  hap- 
pened, to  assure  to  Germany  the  advantages  of  an  offensive  war. 

This  hypothesis  proves,  in  other  words,  that  the  danger  arises 
from  the  possession  by  Germany  not  only  of  the  left  bank  but  also 
and,  above  all,  of  the  Rhine  bridges. 

Thus,  geography,  history  and  the  doctrine  of  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff  all  go  to  prove  that  the  aggressive  power  of  Germany 
depends  upon  the  strategic  railway  system  she  has  built  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  taken  in  combination  with  the  river  fortresses, 
that  is  to  say,  in  the  last  analysis,  that  her  power  of  aggression  is 
measured  by  the  transportation  capacity  of  the  Rhine  bridges. 

If  that  power  of  aggression  is  to  be  abolished,  it  is  essential  to 
take  from  Germany  not  only  the  left  bank,  but  the  Rhine  bridges, 
which  amounts  to  the  fixation  of  her  Western  frontier  at  the  Rhine. 

That  is  an  absolutely  essential  condition.  Is  it  a  sufficient 
safeguard  ? 

(3)     The  safety  of  the  Western  and  Overseas  Democracies 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  153 

makes  it  imperative,  in  present  circumstances,  for  them  to  guard 
the  bridges  of  the  Rhine. 

Would  the  non-occupation  by  Germany  of  the  left  bank  and  the 
bridges  suffice  to  prevent  the  renewal  of  her  sudden  attacks  of  1870 
and  1914?  Certainly  not. 

(a)  If  indeed  the  bridges  are  not  guarded  against  Germany, 
she  can  easily  seize  them  by  reason  of  her  railway  system  on  the 
right  bank.    The  railway  map  shows  this. 

Can  it  be  said  that  in  this  case  it  be  enough  to  destroy  the  sys- 
tem of  strategic  railways  on  the  left  bank?  It  would  either  be 
impossible  or  useless. 

Impossible,  because  a  total  destruction  cannot  be  conceived ;  for 
the  railways  respond  to  economic  as  well  as  to  strategic  demands. 

Useless,  because  a  partial  destruction,  involving  only  the  mili- 
tary equipment,  would  be  ineffective,  for  the  military  and  the 
commercial  stations  are  often  the  same. 

It  would  always,  therefore,  be  possible  for  Germany  either  to 
build  new  stations  on  commercial  pretexts  or  to  supplement  those 
already  existing  with  debarcation  sidings  along  the  tracks. 

(b)  On  the  other  hand,  even  dismantled,  the  Rhine  towns, 
with  their  bridges,  railway  stations,  commercial  equipment  could 
always  constitute  splendid  points  for  the  detraining  and  concen- 
tration of  troops. 

In  other  words,  the  only  positive  guarantee  against  a  German 
aggression  is  inter-allied  occupation  of  the  bridges,  for,  if  once 
this  occupation  is  effected  and  Germany  were  again  to  plan  an 
aggression,  it  would  first  be  necessary  for  her  to  modify  her  rail- 
way system  on  the  right  bank.  This  would  quickly  become  known. 

Therefore,  the  occupation  of  the  bridges  is  the  minimum  protec- 
tion essential  to  the  Western  and  Overseas  Democracies. 

(c)  It  is  also  an  indispensable  protection  for  the  new  States 
which  the  Allies  have  called  into  being  to  the  east  and  south  of 
Germany. 

Let  us  suppose  that  Germany,  controlling  the  Rhine,  should 
decide  to  attack  the  Republic  of  Poland,  or  the  Republic  of 
Bohemia. 

Established  defensively  on  the  Rhine,  she  would  hold  in  check 
for  how  long  nobody  knows  the  Western  nations  coming  to  the 
rescue  of  the  young  Republics,  and  the  latter  would  be  crushed 
before  they  could  receive  aid. 


154    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

(4)     Conclusion. 
To  sum  up : 

(a)  The  common  safety  of  the  Western  and  Overseas  Democ- 
racies makes  it  essential  that  Germany  should  be  unable  to  renew 
her  sudden  attack  of  1870  and  1914. 

(b)  To  prevent  Germany  from  renewing  that  attack,  it  is 
essential  to  forbid  her  access  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  to 
fix  her  western  border  at  the  river. 

(c)  To  forbid  her  this  access,  it  is  essential  that  the  bridges  be 
occupied. 

This  is  the  one  and  only  way : 

(a)  To  deprive  Germany  of  her  offensive  base. 

(b)  To  provide  the  Western  Democracies  with  a  proper  and 
reliable  defense;  first,  by  the  width  of  the  Rhine  (preventing  any 

sudden  attack  by  means  of  gases,  tanks,  etc ) ;  second,  by  its 

straight  course  (preventing  any  flanking  movement). 

The  history  of  a  whole  century  shows  the  necessity  of  this 
defense !  The  common  safety  of  the  Allies  demands  that  the  Rhine 
should  become,  in  President  Wilson's  words  "the  frontier  of 
freedom. ' ' 

III 

INADEQUACY  OF  PRESENT  GUARANTEES 
FURNISHED  BY  THE  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  MILITARY 
FORCES  OF  GERMANY  OR  BY  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Everybody,  we  believe,  will  be  agreed  on  the  object  to  be 
attained.  But  it  may  be  asked  whether  there  is  only  one  way  to 
attain  it. 

In  other  words,  is  the  guarantee — Germany  and  her  military 
forces  thrust  back  across  the  Rhine  and  the  Rhine  bridges  occupied 
by  the  Allies — which  the  French  Government  deems  absolutely1 
indispensable,  the  only  one  which  can  possibly  attain  the  object 
sought  ? 

Would  not  sufficient  protection  be  afforded,  on  the  contrary, 
either  by  limitation  of  Germany's  military  forces  or  by  the  terms 
of  the  first  draft  of  the  League  of  Nations? 

To  this  question,  the  French  Government  for  the  following  rea- 
sons makes  a  negative  reply. 

(1)  The  limitation  of  the  military  forces  of  Germany  is  not  at 
present  an  adequate  guarantee. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  155 

(a)  Germany's    military    strength    rests    upon    three    basic 
factors. 

Man  Power  (seventy  million  inhabitants,  furnishing  650,000 
men  a  year)  ;  war  supplies  (existing  stocks  and  potential  produc- 
tion) ;  General  Staff  (which  constitutes  a  veritable  State  within  the 
State). 

Measures  for  limiting  Germany 's  military  forces  are  under  con- 
sideration. They  must  rest  upon  the  three  foregoing  factors,  and 
more  especially  restrict : 

— the  number  and  composition  of  divisions,  the  annual 
contingent,  etc. 

— the  equipment  and  supplies. 

— the  old  military  organization  (war  college,  manoeuvres,  etc.). 

Suppose  Germany  accepts  these  restrictions.  Will  this  be  a 
complete  safeguard?  No. 

(b)  First  history — though  not  wishing  to  lay  undue  stress 
upon  its  lessons — teaches  the  value  of  skepticism. 

Just  one  instance ;  in  September,  1808,  Napoleon  imposed  upon 
Prussia  the  undertaking  that  for  ten  years  she  would  not  keep  an 
Army  of  more  than  42,000  men  or  resort  to  any  extraordinary  levy 
of  militia  or  national  guards  or  to  any  other  device  which  might 
give  her  a  military  force  exceeding1  this  total  of  42,000  men.  But 
what  actually  happened  ? 

In  spite  of  Napoleon 's  unceasing  diplomatic  and  military  super- 
vision, Prussia  managed  to  elude  or  nullify  all  the  clauses.  Know- 
ing that  with  a  population  of  five  millions,  she  could  maintain  an 
Army  of  150,000  men,  she  passed  all  her  male  population  fit  for 
service  through  the  Army  in  the  shortest  time  possible,  by  reducing 
the  term  of  active  service,  and  she  also  organized  preliminary  mili- 
tary instruction  in  her  schools. 

Despite  her  conqueror's  threats  and  his  power  to  bring  pressure 
to  bear  upon  Prussia,  this  military  reorganization  proceeded  unin- 
terruptedly and  resulted  in  the  creation  of  the  great  National  Army 
of  several  hundred  thousand  men  which  was  mobilized  in  1813. 

(c)  So  much  for  the  past.    Will  it  be  said  that  we  shall  have 
in  the  future  more  effective  means  of  supervision  than  Napoleon 
had  ?    Perhaps.    But  we  answer  that  the  difficulties  attending  this 
supervision  will  increase  far  more  than  the  efficacy  of  our  means  of 
supervision. 

Instead  of  a  small  country  of  five  million  inhabitants,  we  shall 
have  to  deal  with  a  country  of  seventy  millions. 


156    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Instead  of  a  country  without  industries,  we  shall  have  to  deal 
with  a  country  possessing  huge  industrial  resources. 

For  our  supervision  to  be  real,  it  should  extend  over : 

— the  war  budget 

— the  industrial  budget 

— the  organization  of  the  General  Staff  and  of  the  Army 

— the  size  of  the  Army  and  the  recruiting  laws 

— the  supplies  of  war  material 

— the  manufacturing  capacity  of  the  whole  German  territory 

— the  moral  influences  including  schools  and  education. 

Does  anyone  believe  that  this  supervision  can  be  established  in 
a  day  ?  Does  anyone  believe  that  we  shall  know,  for  many  years  to 
come,  whether  or  not  it  is  effective  ?  Assuredly  not. 

Can  it  fail  to  be  recognized,  on  the  other  hand,  that  during  the 
next  few  years  Germany  will  retain  through  force  of  circumstances 
a  military  force,  certain  elements  of  which  cannot  be  reduced — viz. : 

— highly  trained  staffs 

— an  enormous  corps  of  trained  officers  (110,500  in  August, 
1918,  excluding  the  Bavarian  Army) 

— millions  of  soldiers  broken  to  war 

— a  man  power  of  military  age  which  will  grow  for  many1  years 
in  direct  ratio  to  the  steady  increase  in  the  German  birth  rate. 

— war  supplies  and  manufacturing  potentialities,  part  of  which 
Germany  can  conceal,  since  we,  ourselves, — the  Allies — have  not 
yet  been  able  to  make  an  accurate  estimate  of  our  own  existing  war 
material. 

And  can  one  on  the  other  hand  rely  upon  Germany  for  an 
honest  fulfillment  of  her  undertaking,  when  the  so-called  German 
Democracy  shows  in  every  direction  a  total  lack  of  morality  and 
has  placed  at  its  head  men  who  were  the  most  active  agents  of  mili- 
tarism and  imperialism:  Ebert,  Scheidemann,  David,  Erzberger 
and  Brockdorf  f-Rantzau,  not  to  mention  Hindenburg  ? 

Besides  as  regards  their  intentions,  we  have  their  own  state- 
ments. The  Ebert  Government  has  declared  its  intention  of  adopt- 
ing the  Swiss  military  system.  Translated  into  figures,  what  does 
this  mean  ? 

It  means  that  Germany  could  on  the  basis  of  Swiss  military  law 
mobilize  193  divisions  with  the  corresponding  army  troops — the 
exact  force  which  she  hurled  against  the  Western  front  in  her 
spring  offensive  of  1918. 

Again  in  the  Miinchner  Neueste  NachricWen  of  January  25, 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  157 

1919,  was  published  a  statement  by  the  Bavarian  war  minister, 
estimating  at  7,700,000  men  the  war  strength  of  the  future  German 
Army,  3,200,000  of  them  being  fighting  troops. 

(d)  From  all  this  we  may  draw  a  conclusion,  which  all  will 
admit  to  be  just  and  conservative,  that,  at  least  for  the  present  and 
for  years  to  come,  no  limitation  of  Germany's  forces  is  possible,  no 
supervision  of  this  limitation  can  assure  complete  safety,  either  to 
the  victims  of  the  German  aggression  in  1914,  or  to  the  new  states 
now  in  process  of  formation. 

On  the  seas  the  total  surrender  of  the  German  Navy  has,  to  a 
large  extent,  afforded  such  a  safeguard.  On  land  nothing  of  the 
kind  is  possible. 

The  result  is  that  whatever  improvement  the  future  may  bring 
to  the  general  world  situation,  the  limitation  of  Germany's  mili- 
tary power  can  at  present  only  hold  out  troops  to  the  Western 
Democracies,  but  in  no  wise  constitute  a  certain  safeguard ! 

But  hopes — without  certainty — cannot  suffice  to  those  who  suf- 
fered the  aggression  of  1914. 

Hopes — without  certainty — cannot  suffice  Belgium,  victim  of 
her  loyalty  to  her  pledged  word,  punished  for  her  loyalty  by  inva- 
sion, fire,  pillage,  rape  and  ruin. 

Hopes — without  certainty — cannot  suffice  France,  invaded 
before  any  declaration  of  war,  deprived  in  a  few  hours  (because 
she  had  drawn  her  troops  back  from  the  border  to  avoid  incidents) 
of  90  per  cent,  of  her  iron  ore  and  86  per  cent,  of  her  pig  iron. 
Hopes — without  certainty — cannot  suffice  France  whose  losses 
were  1,364,000  killed,  790,000  crippled  and  3,000,000  wounded,  not 
to  mention  438,000  prisoners  who  suffered  physical  martyrdom  in 
German  prison  camps.  Hopes — without  certainty — cannot  suffice 
France  who  lost  16  per  cent,  of  her  mobilized  man  power  and  57  per 
cent,  of  her  soldiers  under  31  years  of  age — the  most  productive 
part  of  the  nation.  Hopes — without  certainty — cannot  suffice 
France  who  saw  a  fourth  of  her  productive  capital  blotted  out  by 
the  systematic  destruction  of  her  industrial  districts  in  the  North 
and  in  the  East,  who  saw  taken  into  captivity — and  what  captivity 
— her  children,  her  women  and  her  girls. 

To  these  two  countries — Belgium  and  France — certain  safe- 
guards are  essential — not  only  the  certainty  of  never  again  being 
exposed  to  what  they  suffered  five  years  ago,  but  also  the  certainty 
that,  failing  physical  guarantees,  they  will  not  have  to  bear  over- 
whelming military  burdens.  But  these  certain  safeguards  cannot 


158     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

be  furnished  France  and  Belgium  by  the  limitation  of  German 
military  power. 

(2)  Nor  can  the  League  of  Nations,  at  present,  provide  an 
adequate  guarantee. 

Can  this  complete  security,  which  is  indispensable  and  which 
cannot  now  be  given  either  by  limiting  German  military  power, 
or  by  supervising  this  limitation,  be  found  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  as  now  submitted  to  the  Conference  ? 

(a)  Eight   articles   of   the   draft    Covenant    (Articles  X  to 
XVIII)  define  the  guarantees  against  aggression  assured  to  the 
members  of  the  League.    These  guarantees  may  be  said  to  consist  in 
a  double  interval  of  time,  viz. : 

(1)  The  longest  possible  time  between  the  threat  of  war  and 
the  act  of  war  (to  increase  the  chances  of  reaching  agreement). 

(2)  The  shortest  possible  time  between  the  act  of  war  and  the 
concerted  action  of  the  League  members  in  aid  of  the  country 
attacked. 

Under  such  conditions,  we  believe  that  this  guarantee  is  inad- 
equate to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  what  took  place  in  1914,  i.  e.  a 
sudden  attack  by  Germany  against  France  and  Belgium  and  the 
immediate  invasion  of  their  territory. 

The  reasons  for  our  belief  are  numerous,  principally  the 
following : 

(b)  First:  the  measures  which  determine  the  interval  of  time 
between  the  threat  of  aggression  and  the  act  of  aggression  (ordi- 
nary diplomatic  methods,  arbitration,  inquiry  by  the  Executive 
Committee,  undertakings  of  the  parties  not  to  resort  to  force  before 
arbitration  and  inquiry,  and  only  three  months  after  a  judicial 
decision  has  been  rendered)    are  applicable  only  if  the  dispute 
arises  between  nations  having  subscribed  to  the  Covenant  of  the 
League. 

Now  Germany  is  not  and  cannot  be  a  member  of  the  League. 

The  Covenant  provides,  it  is  true,  a  complete  procedure  appli- 
cable to  States  not  members.  But  there  is  no  guarantee  whatever 
that  this  procedure  would  be  accepted  by  Germany,  should  she 
again  plan  a  sudden  attack. 

On  the  contrary,  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  she  would 
act  with  the  utmost  speed. 

In  such  an  hypothesis,  it  is  clear  that  the  Germany  of  to-day — 
the  Germany  that  is  evading  the  question  of  responsibilities, — the 
Germany  of  Scheidemann,  Erzberger,  Brockdorff-Rantzau — will  be 
halted  in  her  plans  for  aggression,  neither  by  an  invitation  to  join 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  159 

the  League,  nor  by  the  threat  of  a  financial  and  commercial  block- 
ade. It  is  clear  that  Germany — knowing  the  penalty  she  would 
have  to  pay  if  she  gave  international  forces  time  to  come  into  play 
— will  fall  upon  France  and  Belgium  with  the  idea,  even  more 
firmly  implanted  than  in  1870  or  1914,  that  time  is  for  her  the 
essential  factor  of  success. 

We  believe  therefore  that  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  which 
enjoin  legal  steps  between  the  threat  of  war  and  the  act  of  war  will 
not  suffice  to  stop  Germany,  should  she  decide  to  attack.  That  is 
our  first  reason. 

(c)  Second.  Germany's  method  is  sudden  attack.  What 
immediate  guarantee  does  the  Covenant  furnish?  Remember  that 
proposals  made  by  the  French  delegation  with  a  view  to  the  cre- 
ation of  a  permanent  international  force  have  been  rejected. 

If  one  of  the  members  is  attacked,  what  happens?    The  Exec- 
utive Committee  of  the  League   takes  action  and  specifies  the- 
strength  of  the  military  or  naval  contingents  to  be  furnished  by 
every  member  of  the  League. 

Suppose  that  the  Committee  takes  this  action  with  the  utmost 
speed.  Only  one  thing  is  lacking,  the  decisions  of  the  Committee 
are  not  of  themselves  executory. 

Take,  in  order  to  make  this  clear,  the  case  of  America,  for 
instance.  What  happens? 

The  naval  and  military  forces  of  the  United  States  cannot  be 
used  without  the  assent  of  the  Congress.  Suppose  Congress  is  not 
in  session.  Between  a  German  aggression  and  the  moment  when 
American  aid  could  become  effective,  the  following  steps  would 
have  to  be  taken : 

— a  decision  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  League. 

— a  meeting  of  Congress,  with  the  necessary  quorum,  which 
might  take  four  or  five  days. 

— a  message  from  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

— a  discussion  of  the  matter  before  Congress. 

— the  mobilization  of  an  American  Expeditionary  Force  and  its 
transportation  to  Europe. 

We  have  cited  the  case  of  America  but  it  is  not  the  only  one. 

Consider  anew  the  necessary  steps  outlined  above  and  apply 
them  to  the  German  attack  of  1914. 

Suppose  that  invaded  France  and  invaded  Belgium  had  had  to 
set  this  complicated  machinery  in  motion  before  obtaining  British 
aid  and  that  Great  Britain,  instead  of  beginning  to  ship  troops 
within  a  week,  had  been  obliged  (after  si  meeting  of  and  action  by 


160 

the  Executive  Committee  of  the  League  of  Nations,  communication 
of  its  decision,  discussion  of  the  case  by  the  British  Government, 
meeting  of  Parliament,  debate,  etc.)  to  delay  her  actual  interven- 
tion till  all  these  various  things  had  been  done,  the  left  of  the 
French  Army  would  have  been  turned  at  Charleroi,  and  the  war 
lost  on  August  24,  1914. 

In  other  words,  suppose  that  instead  of  the  defensive  military 
understanding — very  limited  indeed — which  was  given  effect  to 
between  Great  Britain  and  France  in  1914  there  had  been  no  other 
bond  between  the  two  countries  than  the  general  agreements  con- 
tained in  the  Covenant  of  the  League,  the  British  intervention 
would  have  been  less  prompt  and  Germany's  victory  thereby 
assured. 

So  we  believe  that,  under  present  conditions,  the  aid  provided 
for  by  the  Covenant  of  the  League  would  arrive  too  late.  That  is 
our  second  reason. 

(d)  Our  third  reason,  and  it  is  final,  is  that  because  of  the 
geographical    position    of    France    we    have    two    aims    equally 
imperative : 

— the  one  is  Victory 

— the  other  the  protection  of  our  soil. 

It  may  be  accepted  as  certain  that,  thanks  to  the  principle  of 
solidarity  embodied  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League,  final  victory 
would  rest  with  us  in  the  case  of  a  new  German  aggression. 

But  this  is  not  enough.  "We  are  determined  that  invasion,  the 
systematic  destruction  of  our  soil  and  the  suffering  of  our  fellow 
citizens  in  the  North  and  East,  shall  not  again  be  endured  from  the 
time  of  the  aggression  to  that  of  final  victory. 

It  is  against  this  second  danger,  quite  as  much  as  against  the 
danger  of  defeat,  that  a  certain  safeguard  is  necessary.  This 
guarantee  the  League  does  not  provide,  but  it  is  provided  by  the 
proposals  put  forward  by  the  French  Government. 

(e)  Summing  up  here  our  argument  touching  the  guarantee 
provided  by  the  League,  our  contention  is  that : 

On  the  one  hand,  Germany  will  remain  outside  of  the  League  of 
Nations  for  an  indefinite  length  of  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  decisions  of  the  Executive  Committee, 
instead  of  automatically  setting  in  motion  an  international  force 
ready  for  action,  will  have  to  be  submitted  to  the  approval  of  the 
various  Parliaments,  which  will  decide  whether  or  not  their 
national  forces  may  join  the  military  forces  of  the  nation  attacked. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  161 

So  we  obtain  neither  of  the  two  guarantees  on  which  the  peace- 
enforcing  action  of  the  League  is  supposedly  based,  namely : 

— a  very  long  interval  between  the  idea  of  war  and  the  act  of 
war. 

— a  very  brief  interval  between  the  act  of  war  and  the  joining 
together  of  all  the  military  forces  of  the  League  members. 

In  default  of  these  two  guarantees,  we  ask  against  a  Germany 
whose  population  is  twice  that  of  France,  and  whose  word  cannot 
be  trusted  for  a  long  time  to  come,  another  kind  of  guarantee:  a 
physical  guarantee. 

This  physical  guarantee  in  our  mind  is  not  intended  to  take  the 
place  of  the  other,  provided  by  the  League,  but  to  give  the  latter 
time  to  operate  before  it  is  too  late. 

This  physical  guarantee — We  have  shown  that  there  is  such 
guarantee,  and  only  one  such:  the  guard  of  the  Rhine  bridges  by 
an  inter-allied  force. 

Let  us  add  that,  for  the  time  being,  it  is  to  the  interest  of  the 
League  of  Nations  itself  that  this  supplementary  guarantee  should 
insure  the  normal  and  effective  working  of  the  dual  machinery  con- 
ceived by  the  League  for  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

IV 

SUPPRESSION  BY  INTER-ALLIED  OCCUPATION  OF  THE 
RHINE  BRIDGES  OF  SEVERAL  CAUSES  OF  WAR 

We  have  established : 

(1)  That  a  common  guarantee  against  the  recurrence  of  any 
sudden  attack  from  Germany  is  necessary. 

(2)  That  this  guarantee  cannot  be  completely  assured  either 
by  the  limitation  or  the  suppression  of  Germany's  military  power, 
or  by  the  proposed  clauses  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

(3)  That  this  guarantee  can  be  found  only  in  the  fixation  at 
the  Khine  of  the  Western  frontier  of  Germany,  and  in  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  bridges  by  an  inter-allied  force. 

It  is  easy  to  show,  moreover,  that  the  common  guarantee  assured 
by,  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  bridges  accords  with  the  common 
interests  of  the  League  and  with  its  pacific  ideals;  it  does  away 
with  a  certain  number  of  permanent  causes  of  war  which  it  is  at 
once  the  interest  and  the  duty  of  the  League  to  eliminate. 

(1)     Elimination  of  a  dangerous  disproportion  in  strength. 


162    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

Germany  (even  without  Poznan,  Schleswig,  Alsace-Lorraine 
and  the  Rhine  provinces  on  the  left  bank)  still  has  more  than  fifty- 
nine  million  inhabitants,  to  which  would  probably  be  added  in  case 
of  war  seven  million  German- Austrians,  making  a  total  of  sixty-six 
million  men.  France,  Belgium  and  Luxemburg,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  not  more  than  forty-nine  million. 

Russia  no  longer  exists  as  a  counter-weight  and  the  States 
recently  created  do  not  yet  count.  This  was  strongly  emphasized 
by  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme  Council  of 
the  Allies  on  February  15,  1919:  "There  are  twice  as  many  Ger- 
mans as  French  and  by  reason  of  the  high  German  birth  rate, 
Germany  has  annually  three  times  as  many  young  men  of  military 
age  as  France.  That  is  a  tremendous  fact."  This  "tremendous 
fact"  is  a  war  factor.  If  it  cannot  be  eliminated,  it  is  at  least  use- 
ful to  try  to  reduce  it. 

(2)  Elimination  of  one  of  the  economic  causes  of  German 
aggressions. 

It  is  generally  admitted  that  it  is  essential  that  industrial  zones 
vital  to  each  nation  should  be  protected. 

For  rapid  occupation  of  these  vital  zones  gives  a  decisive  advan- 
tage to  the  aggressor,  who  thus  adds  to  his  own  means  of  production 
those  which  he  wrests  from  his  adversary.  It  is  thus  certain  that 
the  possibility  of  securing  such  an  advantage  is  a  cause  of  war. 

History  demonstrates  this.  In  1815,  Germany  aimed  at  the  coal 
of  the  Sarre ;  in  1870  at  the  ores  of  Lorraine ;  in  1914  at  the  ores  of 
Briey. 

Germany  herself  has  explicitly  admitted  that,  if  she  was  able  to 
carry  on  the  last  war  it  was  because  she  was  able  by  sudden  attack 
to  seize  the  French  ores  "without  which  she  could  never  by  any 
possibility  have  waged  this  war  successfully."  (Memorandum  of 
the  German  iron  and  steel  manufacturers,  December,  1917). 

If  the  Rhine  had  separated  the  two  Powers,  no  such  action 
would  have  been  possible.  And  it  is  strengthening  the  peace  to 
remove  from  Germany — in  separating  her  from  her  historical 
objective — one  of  the  main  motives  of  her  past  aggressions. 

(3)  Protection  for  the  smaller  states  whose  safety  the  League 
of  Nations  seeks  to  secure. 

First  to  Belgium  by  removing  from  her  a  dangerous  neighbor. 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  quoted  above,  made  this  statement  to  the 
German  Fatherland  League  (Milnchner  Neueste  Nachrichten, 
November  11,  1917)  ; 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  163 

' '  Realize  clearly  what  would  happen  if  our  existing  front — now 
resting  on  the  sea, — should  be  on  the  eastern  border  of  the  Rhine 
country,  we  could  never  again  succeed  in  throwing  our  armieg 
through  a  neutral  Belgium. ' ' 

Then  to  Poland,  to  Czecho-Slovakia,  to  Jugo  Slavia  which, 
should  Germany  take  advantage  of  their  initial  difficulties  and 
seek  to  throttle  them,  must  not  see  the  Rhine,  held  by  Germany,  cut 
off  the  aid  awaited  by  them  from  the  Western  Democracies. 

(4)  Closing  the  great  historic  road  of  invasion. 

The  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  has  been  for  centuries  the  road  of 
invasions.  Its  natural  situation  on  the  one  hand,  the  direction  of 
its  railway  lines  on  the  other,  have  made  of  it  one  of  the  battle 
grounds  of  history,  where  the  peoples  of  the  right  bank  (whenever 
they  also  controlled  the  left  bank)  found  potentialities  of  aggres- 
sion which  the  interests  of  peace  demand  should  be  done  away  with. 

(5)  Creation  of  a  natural  frontier  equal  for  all. 

The  Rhine,  both  on  account  of  its  width  and  of  the  straightness 
of  its  course,  offers  to  the  peoples  of  both  banks  the  same  natural 
guarantee  against  aggression. 

(6)  Conclusion. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  permissible  to  conclude  that  the  com- 
mon guarantee  created  by  the  fixation  at  the  Rhine  of  the  "Western 
frontier  of  Germany  and  by  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  bridges 
by  an  inter-allied  force,  is  not  only  necessary  but  in  complete 
accord  with  the  principles  advocated  by  the  League  of  Nations  for 
the  prevention  of  future  wars. 


FRENCH  INTERESTS  IDENTICAL  WITH  GENERAL 

INTERESTS 

It  is  now  possible  to  obtain  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  problem 
which  can  be  summed  up  as  follows  : 

(a)  In  this  matter,  France  claims  nothing  for  herself,  neither 
an  inch  of  territory,  nor  any  right  of  sovereignty.  She  does  not 
want  to  annex  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

What  she  proposes  is  the  creation  in  the  interest  of  all  of  a  com- 
mon protection  for  all  the  peaceful  democracies,  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  of  the  cause  of  Liberty  and  of  Peace. 

But  it  is  France's  duty  to  add  that  her  bequest,  which  accords 
with  the  general  welfare  and  is  free  from  any  selfish  design,  is  of 


164    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

vital  necessity  to  herself  and  that  on  its  principle  she  cannot  com- 
promise. France  sees  in  it  in  fact  the  only  immediate  and  complete 
guarantee  that  what  she  suffered  in  1870  and  1914  will  not  occur 
again  and  she  owes  it  to  her  people,  to  the  dead  who  must  not  have 
died  in  vain,  to  the  living  who  wish  to  rebuild  their  country  in  peace 
and  not  to  stagger  beneath  overpowering  military  burdens  to  obtain 
this  guarantee. 

As  to  the  manner  of  applying  this  guarantee,  the  French  Gov- 
ernment is  ready  to  consult  with  its  Allies  with  a  view  to  establish- 
ing under  the  most  favourable  conditions  the  national,  political  and 
economical  system  of  the  regions,  access  to  which  it  demands  shall 
be  forbidden  to  Germany.  To  this  end,  the  French  Government 
will  accept  any  suggestions  which  are  not  inconsistent  with  the 
principle  stated. 

This  principle  may  be  summed  up  in  three  paragraphs. 

1.  No  German  military  force  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and 
fixation  at  the  Rhine  of  the  Western  frontier  of  Germany. 

2.  Occupation  of  the  Rhine  bridges  by  an  inter-allied  force. 

3.  No  annexation. 

This  is  what  under  present  circumstances  France  asks  as  a 
necessary  guarantee  of  international  peace,  as  the  indispensable 
safeguard  of  her  national  existence. 

She  hopes  that  all  her  Allies  and  Associates  will  appreciate  the 
General  Interests  of  this  proposal. 

She  counts,  on  the  other  hand,  that  they  will  acknowledge  her 
right  and  her  duty  to  present  and  to  support  this  demand  for  her 
own  sake. 

(b)  Also  this  is  not  the  only  time  that  the  vital  interests  of  a 
nation  have  accorded  with  the  general  interests  of  mankind. 

At  all  times  the  great  naval  Powers  have  asserted — whether  the 
issue  were  Philip  II  or  Napoleon  or  "William  II — that  their 
strength  was  the  only  force  capable  of  offsetting  imperialistic 
attempts  to  control  the  continent. 

It  is  on  this  ground  that  they  have  justified  the  maintenance, 
for  their  own  advantages,  of  powerful  fleets. 

Yet,  at  the  same  time,  they  have  never  concealed  the  fact  that 
these  fleets  were  a  vital  necessity  to  themselves  as  well. 

Of  vital  necessity  to  the  British  Isles  and  the  British  Empire — 
which  have  made  known  their  refusal  to  give  up  any  part  of  that 
naval  power  which  enabled  them  to  hold  the  seas  against  Germany. 

Of  a  vital  necessity  to  the  United  States,  washed  by  two  oceans, 
requiring  safeguards  for  the  export  of  its  natural  and  industrial 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  165 

resources,  and  which  despite  its  peaceful  policy  has  for  the  above 
reason  created  a  Navy  that  is  even  now  being  further  expanded. 

For  Great  Britain,  in  fact,  as  well  as  for  the  United  States,  the 
Navy  is  a  means  of  pushing  away  from  beyond  their  coasts  the 
frontier  which  they  would  have  to  defend  in  case  of  aggression,  and 
of  creating  a  safety-zone  in  front  of  this  frontier,  in  front  of  their 
national  soil. 

For  France,  the  question  is  the  same  with  this  triple  difference : 
that,  first,  she  is  not  protected  from  Germany  by  the  seas;  that, 
second,  she  cannot  possibly  secure  on  land  the  complete  guarantee 
which  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  secured  on  the  sea  by 
the  surrender  of  the  German  fleet  to  the  Allies,  and  that  finally, 
the  "one  to  two"  ratio  between  her  population  and  Germany's 
precludes  the  hope  that  in  case  of  war  she  may  ever  enjoy  the  ad- 
vantage which  the  naval  Powers  have  always  derived  from  the 
"two  power  standards." 

For  France,  as  for  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  it  is 
necessary  to  create  a  zone  of  safety. 

This  zone  the  naval  Powers  create  by  their  fleets,  and  by  the 
elimination  of  the  German  fleet.  This  zone  France,  unprotected  by 
the  ocean,  unable  to  eliminate  the  millions  of  German  trained  to 
war,  must  create  by  the  Rhine,  by  an  inter-allied  occupation  of 
that  river. 

If  she  did  not  do  so,  she  would  once  more  be  exposed,  if  not  to 
final  defeat,  at  least  to  a  partial  destruction  of  her  soil  by  an  enemy 
invasion. 

It  is  a  danger  which  she  never  intends  to  run  again. 

Moreover,  as  explained  above,  the  guarantee  of  peace  created 
by  the  existence  of  the  naval  Powers,  could  not  be  of  full  effect 
unless  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  provided  a  similar  guarantee 
for  the  Western  Democracies. 

At  a  recent  meeting  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies,  Feb- 
ruary 11,  1919,  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  and  Mr.  House  showed  one 
after  the  other  what  the  future  has  to  fear  from  a  Russo-German 
rapprochement. 

In  such  an  event  it  is  not  with  their  fleets  that  the  naval  Pow- 
ers, capable  only  of  establishing  a  blockade,  could  defend  the 
continent  against  an  imperialistic  aggression. 

The  naval  Powers  would  still  need  the  possibility  of  landing  on 
the  continent  and  of  fighting  there.  For  that  the  inter-allied  guard 
of  the  Rhine  is  indispensable. 


166    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

But  there  is  more  and  one  may  ask  whether,  in  such  case,  even 
the  blockade  established  by  the  fleets  would  be  effective.  Of  what 
use  would  it  be  against  Germany,  mistress  of  Russia,  colonizing  and 
exploiting  Russia,  if  Germany  were  to  strike  a  successful  and  de- 
cisive blow  against  France  and  Belgium,  occupying  their  ports  and 
dominating  all  the  neutral  powers  of  Europe  ? 

This  fear  was  expressed  by  Mr.  House  at  the  meeting  of  Feb- 
ruary 15,  when  he  pointed  out  the  danger  of  an  union  "of  the 
whole  world  east  of  the  Rhine."  To  prevent  such  an  union,  or  at 
least  to  avert  its  consequences,  there  is  only  one  way:  that  the 
Ehine,  henceforth,  instead  of  serving  as  in  the  past  Germany 
against  the  Allies,  should  protect  the  Allies  against  the  undertak- 
ings of  Germany. 

In  commending  this  viewpoint  to  the  attention  of  our  Allies 
and  Associates,  and  more  especially  of  the  two  great  naval  Powers, 
the  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  the  French  Government 
is  deeply  conscious  that  it  is  working  for  peace,  just  as  the  naval 
Powers  are  conscious  that  they  serve  the  cause  of  peace  by  main- 
taining or  increasing  their  naval  forces. 

And  just  as  the  naval  Powers,  in  maintaining  or  increasing 
their  fleets,  have  no  design  whatsoever  to  conquer  the  seas,  so  the 
demand  of  France  as  to  the  guard  of  the  Rhine  involves  neither 
gain  nor  sovereignty  nor  annexation  of  territory. 

France  does  not  demand  for  herself  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine : 
she  would  not  know  what  to  do  with  it,  and  her  interest  equally 
with  her  ideals  forbids  any  such  claim. 

France  demands  one  thing  only.  It  is  that  the  necessary  and 
only  possible  and  certain  measures  to  prevent  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  from  again  becoming  a  base  for  German  aggression,  shall  be 
taken  by  the  Powers  now  gathered  at  the  Peace  Conference. 

In  other  words,  with  no  territorial  ambitions,  but  deeply  imbued 
with  the  necessity  of  creating  a  protection  both  national  and  inter- 
national, France  looks  to  an  inter-allied  occupation  of  the  Rhine  for 
the  same  results  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  expect 
from  the  maintenance  of  their  naval  forces ;  either  more,  or  less. 

In  both  cases,  a  national  necessity  coincides  with  an  interna- 
tional safeguard. 

In  both  cases,  even  if  the  second  be  interpreted  in  different 
ways,  the  first  will  remain  for  the  country  concerned  an  obligation 
subject  neither  to  restriction  nor  reserve. 

Such  is  the  principle  that  the  French  Government  begs  the 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  167 

Allied  and  Associated  Governments  to  confirm  and  sanction  by 
adopting  the  following  decision  to  be  inserted  in  the  provisions  of 
the  preliminaries  of  Peace  : 

1.  The  Western  frontier  of  Germany  must  "be  fixed  at  the 
Rhine. 

2.  The  bridges  of  the  Rhine  must  be  occupied  by  an  inter- 
allied force. 

3.  The  above  measures  to  imply  no  annexation  of  territory  to 
the  benefit  of  any  Power. 

To  this  document  setting  forth  the  principle  of  our 
demand  I  had  attached  two  appendices.  One  was  the  out- 
line of  a  political  system  applicable  to  an  independent 
Rhineland,  the  other  a  study  of  the  economic  results  of  its 
independence,  both,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  in 
Germany  itself. 

The  first  of  these  Notes  recalled  that  during  the  greater 
part  of  their  history  the  Rhine  provinces  of  the  left  bank, 
with  their  five  and  a  half  million  inhabitants,  had  been 
independent  of  both  Prussia  and  Germany.  Since  1815 
they  had  lived,  under  Prussian  as  well  as  under  Bavarian 
rule,  as  " crown  property" — a  legal  title  abolished  by  the 
fall  of  the  Hohenzollerns  and  the  Wittelsbachs.  Originally 
peopled  by  Celts  and  Latinized  by  Rome,  they  had  in  the 
course  of  centuries  been  affected  quite  as  strongly  by 
French  as  by  German  influences.  In  1793,  they  had  greeted 
the  French  as  liberators  and  gratefully  accepted  the  wise 
administration  of  Napoleon.  Since  that  time,  again  at- 
tached to  Germany,  they  had  persisted  in  their  hatred  of 
Prussia  and  their  inhabitants  called  themselves  "must  be 
Prussians"  (Muspreussen).  At  present,  all  the  concord- 
ant reports  submitted  by  us  to  our  Allies  tended  to  show 
this  rich  region  in  terror  of  the  separatist  danger,  wanting 
the  maintenance  of  order  above  all  else,  distrustful  of  the 
Prussian  officials  and,  though  German  in  tongue  and  tradi- 
tion, probably  capable  of  developing  politically  along  liberal 
lines,  if  it  could  thereby  serve  its  own  interest.  The  peace 
of  Europe  demanded,  in  our  view,  that  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  should  become  independent.  There  was  no  reason 


168    THE  TKUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

we  thought  why  the  left  bank  itself  should  not  appreciate 
the  advantages  of  this  independence.  Our  Note  enumerated 
in  support  of  this  contention  various  measures:  suppres- 
sion of  military  service ;  relief  from  war  taxes ;  facilities  of 
food  supplies  and  export ;  customs  union ;  banking  reforms ; 
independent  government  under  the  protection  of  the 
League  of  Nations — all  of  which  seemed  likely  to  help  the 
conditions  imperative  for  common  safety. 

Our  last  Note,  exhaustive  and  very  detailed,  analyzed, 
one  by  one,  the  conditions  which  would  prevail  both  in 
Germany  and  in  a  free  Rhine  State,  after  the  latter  had 
been  set  up.  This  study  dealt  in  turn  with  the  territories, 
the  inhabitants,  the  large  cities,  the  railroads,  river  naviga- 
tion, wine,  wheat,  rye,  barley,  oats,  hay,  potatoes,  sugar, 
coal  mines,  lignite,  iron  ore,  cast  iron,  steel,  zinc,  lead,  cop- 
per and  textiles.  It  was  summarized  in  a  table  (see  oppo- 
site page)  and  concluded  as  follows: 

1.  The  loss  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  added  to  that  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  deprives  Germany  of  eight  per  cent,  of  her  terri- 
tory and  represents  a  loss  of  : 

of  her  population 

approximately  of  her  railroad  and  river  traffic 
of  her  wine  industry 
of  her  coal  mines 
80%  of  her  iron  ore 
33%  at  least  of  her  metallurgy 
30%  of  her  textiles 

Of  the  important  articles,  only  cereals,  sugar  and  potatoes 
would  be  slightly  diminished  by  from  four  per  cent,  to  nine  per 
cent. 

2.  The  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,   separated  from   Germany, 
would  easily  find  the  products  she  needs  (cereals,  iron  ore,  mineral 
and  chemical  products). 

Her  fuel  exports  would  provide  an  adequate  outlet  in  France. 

Her  mental  and  textile  products  would,  as  before,  be  obliged  to 
find  a  market  outside  of  Germany. 

Her  chemical  products  (dyestuffs,  etc.)  would,  like  those  of  the 
right  bank,  have  to  face  the  budding  competition  of  the  countries 


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170    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

of  the  Entente.  Her  wines,  however,  heretofore  consumed  in  Ger- 
many, would  probably  have  difficulty  in  finding  buyers  elsewhere, 
and  it  might  be  necessary  to  force  Germany  to  levy  only  specified 
duties. 

A  customs  union  between  France,  Belgium  and  the  Rhine  coun- 
try would  offer  advantages  in  regard  to  a  large  number  of  products 
and  at  least  would  offer  no  disadvantages. 

It  would,  however,  present  four  problems:  one,  easily  solved, 
regarding  metal  products ;  and  three  others,  more  delicate,  regard- 
ing wines,  textiles  and  coloring  matters. 

The  independence  of  the  Rhineland,  only  effective  guar- 
antee that  this  region  would  act  as  barrier  and  buffer 
between  Germany  and  the  Western  Democracies — for  its 
autonomy  as  part  of  the  German  Reich  would  merely  place 
it  in  the  same  position  as  Bavaria,  whose  theoretical  ''lib- 
erty" did  not  prevent  it,  in  1870  or  1914,  from  joining  the 
attack  against  France — the  independence  of  the  Rhineland 
and  its  occupation  by  Allied  forces — essential  as  a  military 
safeguard — appeared  to  us  to  be  a  political  and  economic 
possibility.  It  was  a  solution  of  Liberty,  not  of  Imperial- 
ism. A  certain  safeguard  against  a  Germany  ever  more 
populous  than  France ;  a  guarantee  of  the  peaceful  enforce- 
ment of  the  Treaty  which  was  to  found  a  new  order  of 
things  in  Europe — thus  it  was  that  France  presented  the 
problem  from  the  beginning.  And  if  only  a  part  of  France 's 
proposals  prevailed,  still  it  was  as  a  safeguard  and  as  a 
guarantee  that  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  imposed  upon 
Germany  the  occupation  by  the  Allies  of  the  Rhineland  left 
under  her  sovereignty,  but  forbidden  to  her  Army. 

II 

By  the  end  of  December,  M.  Clemenceau  and  I  had  pre- 
sented our  arguments  to  Mr.  House  who  appreciated  their 
importance.  During  the  crossing  from  America,  our  Am- 
bassador at  Washington,  M.  Jusserand,  had  talked  them 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  171 

over  with  President  Wilson,  who  had  seemed  to  acknowl- 
edge their  weight  and  who,  two  months  later,  at  the 
beginning  of  March,  had  not  yet,  according  to  his  most 
intimate  collaborators,  any  definite  objection  to  them.  On 
the  English  side,  on  the  contrary,  a  strong  resistance  was 
encountered  and  the  friendly  tone  in  which  it  was  couched 
in  no  way  lessened  its  firmness. 

The  Rhine  policy  advocated  by  France  had  from  the 
beginning  been  misunderstood  by  the  British  ministers. 
There  where  France  saw  an  essential  guarantee — a  guar- 
antee of  execution  and  of  security — Mr.  Lloyd  George  and 
his  colleagues,  obsessed  by  memories  of  Napoleon  and  by 
the  intemperance  of  part  of  our  Press,  feared  as  early  as 
1917  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  It  was  in  1917  that 
Mr.  Balfour  in  two  speeches  energetically  repudiated  the 
idea  of  a  self-governing  Rhine  State  which  M.  Aristide 
Briand  had  suggested  the  preceding  January  in  a  confi- 
dential letter  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
London.  The  British  Minister  of  Foreign  affairs  had 
denied  that  an  agreement  between  the  Allies  had  ever  con- 
templated the  creation  of  independent  States  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine.  "Such  a  solution,"  he  added,  "has 
never  entered  into  the  policy  of  the  British  Government." 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  for  his  part,  had  often  repeated:  "We 
must  not  create  another  Alsace-Lorraine."  He  also  said: 
' '  The  strongest  impression  made  upon  me  by  my  first  visit 
to  Paris  was  the  statue  of  Strassburg  veiled  in  mourning. 
Do  not  let  us  make  it  possible  for  Germany  to  erect  a  sim- 
ilar statue. ' '  Speeches  and  remarks  revealed,  under  vary- 
ing forms,  a  fear  from  which  the  British  Government  had 
never  freed  itself. 

The  first  conversations  brought  us  echoes  of  this  fear. 
It  was  unreservedly  admitted  that  we  needed  guarantees. 
But  the  means  proposed  by  us  caused  alarm.  All  talk  of 
separation  between  Germany  and  the  left  bank,  of  military 
occupation  of  the  latter,  of  participation  in  this  occupation, 
was  extremely  repugnant  to  our  Allies.  And,  from  the 


172    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

outset,  they  emphasized  the  fact  that  other  securities  were 
possible,  such  as  disarmament  of  Germany;  the  League  of 
Nations;  if  need  be,  the  complete  demilitarization  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Our  Memorandum,  published 
above,  had  answered  these  objections.  But  despite  the 
answer,  the  objections  kept  reappearing. 

It  was  towards  the  beginning  of  March  that  the  serious 
discussion  began.  President  Wilson  is,  at  the  moment,  on 
the  ocean  en  route  for  France.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  just 
returned  to  Paris.  It  is  decided  to  prepare  the  work  of 
the  heads  of  Governments  by  a  conference  of  three.  I  rep- 
resent France,  Mr.  Philipp  Kerr,  Great  Britain,  and  Doctor 
Mezes,  the  United  States.  "We  meet  twice,  on  March  11  and 
12,  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  apartment  at  23  rue  Nitot.  I 
explain  verbally,  in  all  its  details  the  proposals  of  my 
Memorandum  of  February  25.  As  my  explanation  pro- 
ceeds, I  become  conscious  of  the  psychological  barrier  just 
mentioned.  I  am  offered  a  strengthening  of  the  disarma- 
ment clauses.  I  am  offered  a  reinforcement  of  those  deal- 
ing with  demilitarization.  As  soon  as  I  return  to  the 
question  of  occupation,  opposition  becomes  more  marked. 

Mr.  Mezes  says  little.  These  eight  hours  of  discussion 
are  a  dialogue  between  Mr.  Kerr  and  myself,  and  it  is 
evident  that  through  the  voice  of  his  Chief  Secretary  it  is 
the  British  Prime  Minister  himself  who — invisible  but 
present — speaks  with  some  reserve  at  the  first  meeting, 
more  emphatically  at  the  second.  Is  it  possible,  objects 
my  opponent,  to  occupy  a  German  territory,  bridgeheads 
included,  inhabitated  by  seven  million  Germans  I  Is  it  pos- 
sible, on  the  other  hand,  to  separate  these  Germans  from 
Germany  without  consulting  them  and  thus  to  betray  the 
very  principles  for  which  the  Allies  have  fought  ?  French 
tradition  ?  But  years  have  passed,  and  the  historical  argu- 
ment has  been  too  much  used  and  abused  by  Germany 
against  France,  for  France  to  be  willing  to  make  use  of  it 
against  Germany.  Besides,  in  her  official  declarations, 
both  by  her  Government  and  her  Parliament  (December  30, 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  173 

1916,  January  10  and  June  5  and  6,  1917,  and  November  4, 
1918)  France  made  no  such  demands.  So  it  is  impossible 
to  participate  in  such  an  occupation.  So,  also,  it  would 
cause  deep  regret  if  France  sought  to  undertake  it  alone; 
and  Mr.  Kerr  sums  up  his  objection  as  follows : 

"In  a  word  we  quite  agree  with  France  as  to  the  object 
to  be  attained.  We  are  not  sure  we  agree  with  her  as  to 
the  method  to  be  employed. 

"We  do  not  agree  to  military  occupation.  England  is 
equally  opposed  both  to  a  permanent  Army,  and  to  the  use 
of  British  troops  outside  of  English  territory.  Further- 
more occupation  tends  to  create  a  nationalist  irritation  not 
only  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine  but  throughout  all  Ger- 
many. It  may  at  the  same  time  foster  in  Anglo-Saxon 
countries  a  propaganda  unfavourable  to  the  Allies,  and 
especially  to  France.  Besides,  Germany  being  disarmed,  is 
occupation  necessary? 

"Nor  do  we  agree  as  to  the  creation  of  an  independent 
State  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  We  see  in  it  a  source 
of  complication  and  of  weakness.  If,  after  a  longer  or 
shorter  period,  this  independent  State  asserts  its  will  to 
reunite  with  Germany,  what  shall  we  do?  If  Press  propa- 
ganda or  public  meetings  with  this  end  in  view  go  on  within 
its  territory,  are  the  troops  of  occupation  to  be  used  to 
prevent  it  ?  If  local  conflicts  occur,  whither  will  they  lead  ? 
If  war  results  from  these  conflicts,  neither  England  nor 
her  Dominions  will  have  that  deep  feeling  of  solidarity  with 
France  which  animated  them  in  the  last  war. 

"It  is,  therefore,  impossible  for  us  to  accept  the  solution 
you  propose." 

I  reply.  I  recall  that  the  Rhinelanders  are  not  Prus- 
sians. I  show  that  the  French  proposal  excluding  annexa- 
tion is  the  reverse  of  imperialistic;  that  the  control  of  the 
League  of  Nations  gives  every  facility  for  evolution;  that 
France,  after  such  unparalleled  sufferings,  has  a  right  to 
insist  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  methods  of  her  choice. 
Public  opinion  is  hostile  ?  Public  opinion  must  be  enlight- 


174    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

ened.  It  has  already  learned  much  during  the  war,  and 
first  of  all  this,  that  France  is  the  sentinel  of  the  Overseas 
Democracies.  Besides  in  default  of  occupation,  what 
guarantee  is  there  that  the  treaty  will  be  fulfilled?  And  I 
added : 

"You  say  that  England  9oes  not  like  English  troops  to 
be  used  away  from  home.  It  is  a  question  of  fact.  England 
has  always  had  troops  in  India  and  Egypt.  Why?  Be- 
cause she  knows  that  her  frontier  is  not  at  Dover.  But, 
the  last  war  has  taught  her  that  her  European  frontier  is 
on  the  Rhine  and  that  the  Rhine  is  more  important  to  her 
than  even  the  Suez  Canal  or  the  Himalayas. 

"You  say  that  the  British  public  does  not  understand 
this  question.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  British  Government  to 
make  it  understand.  Neither  did  the  English  public  under- 
stand in  1914  the  necessity  of  conscription.  War  has 
taught  it  many  things. 

"You  say  that  there  is  a  danger  of  provoking  nationalist 
irritation  in  Germany.  The  German  defeat  has  already 
created  this  feeling.  Wherefore,  then,  the  need  of  protec- 
tion against  a  risk  which  will  exist  in  any  case? 

"You  say  that  the  Rhineland  will  revolt.  Our  answer 
is  that  fear  of  Bolshevism  and  dread  of  war-taxes  dominate 
the  Rhinelander,  and  that,  moreover,  we  are  not  threaten- 
ing them  with  annexation.  We  are  offering  them  independ- 
ence. Other  peoples — the  Germans  of  Bohemia,  for 
instance — will,  under  the  Treaty,  have  to  accept  a  foreign 
sovereignty. 

"If  you  object  to  a  possible  resistance  of  British 
opinion,  we  rely  on  the  certain  revolt  of  French  opinion 
against  a  peace  which  would  not  include  the  occupation  of 
the  Rhine.  England  did  not  feel  that  the  complete  sur- 
render of  the  entire  German  fleet  permitted  her  to  do  away 
with  her  own.  And  France  will  not  admit  that  the  partial 
disarmament  of  Germany  on  land — partial,  because,  for 
twenty  years,  she  will  have  at  her  disposal  three  million 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  175 

trained  men — absolves  France  from  the  necessity  of  taking 
guarantees. 

"To  ask  us  to  give  up  occupation,  is  like  ashing  England 
and  the  United  States  to  sink  their  fleet  of  battleships. 
We  refuse. 

"We  want  no  annexation.  But  we  want  our  security. 
We  consider  the  question  a  vital  one,  and  I  do  not  even 
need  to  consult  M.  Clemenceau  to  declare,  in  his  name,  that 
we  insist  upon  our  demand." 

Accordingly,  I  hand  my  friends  a  draft  of  seven  articles 
and  agree  with  them  that,  as  no  agreement  has  resulted 
from  our  conference,  the  question  will  have  to  be  decided 
by  the  heads  of  Governments.  The  proposal  I  submitted 
was  as  follows : 

March  12,  1919. 

WESTERN  FRONTIER  OF  GERMANY 

1.  In  the  general  interest  of  peace  and  to  assure  the  effective 
working  of  the  constituent  clause  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the 
Western  frontier  of  Germany  is  fixed  at  the  Rhine.    Consequently 
Germany  renounces  all  sovereignty  over,  as  well  as  any  customs 
union  with  the  territories  of  the  former  German  Empire  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

2.  The  line  of  the  Rhine  to  be  occupied  under  a  mandate  of  the 
League  of  Nations  by  an  inter-allied  military  force. 

The  extent  and  conditions  of  occupation  in  German  territory  of 
the  bridgeheads  of  Kehl,  Mannheim,  Mayence,  Coblenz,  Cologne 
and  Dusseldorf,  necessary  to  the  security  of  inter-allied  forces  to  be 
fixed  by  the  final  Treaty  of  Peace.  Until  the  signature  of  the  said 
Treaty  the  conditions  of  occupation  established  by  the  Armistice  of 
November  11,  1918,  to  remain  in  force. 

In  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometers  east  of  her  Western  frontier  Ger- 
many shall  not  maintain  nor  erect  fortifications. 

3.  The  territories  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  (except  Alsace- 
Lorraine)  to  constitute  one  or  several  independent  States  under  the 
protection  of  the  League  of  Nations.    Their  Eastern  and  Southern 
frontiers  to  be  fixed  by  the  Peace  Treaty.    Germany  undertakes  to 
do  nothing  which  could  binder  the  aforesaid  State  or  States  in  the 


176    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

fulfillment  of  the  duties  or  the  exercise  of  the  rights  devolving 
upon  them  from  the  causes  or  the  conditions  of  their  creation. 

4.  Within  one  month  after  the  signature  of  the  present  pre- 
liminaries of  peace,  the  general  conditions  of  evacuation  of  the 
higher  German  and  Prussian  civil  officials  at  present  on  duty  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  to  be  settled  by  a  special  agreement 
between  the  signatory  Powers  and  the  German  Government. 

5.  Within  two  months  from  the  signature  of  the  present  pre- 
liminaries of  peace,  a  special  agreement  between  the  signatory 
Powers  and  the  German  Government  to  determine,  under  the  guar- 
antee of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  general  conditions  of  liquida- 
tion of  the  German  economic  interests  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine. 

6.  The  German  Government  undertakes  to  furnish  every  year 
to  the  independent  State  or  States,  which  may  be  created  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  the  amount  of  coal  necessary  for  their  indus- 
tries.   This  amount  shall  be  credited  to  Germany  in  the  general 
reparations  account. 

This  was  on  March  12.  On  the  morning  of  the  fourteenth 
President  Wilson  arrives  in  Paris.  After  an  interview 
with  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  he  meets  the  same  afternoon  M. 
Clemenceau  and  the  British  Prime  Minister  at  a  private 
talk  of  two  hours,  without  secretary  or  interpreter  at  the 
Hotel  de  Crillon.  M.  Clemenceau  explains  once  more  the 
French  proposals.  He  tells  our  needs,  our  dangers  of  yes- 
terday and  of  to-morrow.  Alone  against  Germany,  invaded 
and  bleeding,  we  ask  not  for  territory,  but  for  guarantees. 
Those  offered  to  us — disarmament,  demilitarization, 
League  of  Nations — are  inadequate  in  their  present  form. 
Occupation  is  indispensable.  It  is  essential  that  this  occu- 
pation be  inter-allied.  It  is  essential  that  the  left  bank 
be  closed  to  the  political  and  military  schemes  of  Germany. 
Its  independence  is  at  once  the  condition  and  the  conse- 
quence of  the  foregoing. 

At  first  the  same  objections  are  made  to  the  same 
arguments.  But  to  the  great  Frenchman  who  holds  his 
ground  and  sticks  to  his  original  demands,  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent and  most  capital  proposal  is  soon  made.  Great 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  177 

Britain,  with  her  century-old  pride  in  her  splendid  isola- 
tion, the  United  States,  "too  proud  to  fight,"  separated 
from  the  rest  of  the  world  by  Washington's  Farewell  Ad- 
dress and  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  offer  France  a  formal 
pledge  of  alliance: — their  immediate  military  guarantee 
against  any  unprovoked  aggression  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many; an  unprecedented  and  immensely  significant  pro- 
posal which  will  assure  us  in  peace  the  same  unity  of 
power  which  enabled  us  to  win  the  war. 

M.  Clemenceau,  "who  asked  nothing" — he  will  recall 
it  with  pride  before  the  Senate  later — immediately  states 
the  very  great  value  he  attaches  to  this  offer.  But  he 
expresses  at  the  same  time  his  formal  desire  not  to  give  an 
immediate  answer.  He  intends  before  so  doing  to  reflect 
and  to  take  counsel.  The  next  two  days,  March  15  and  16, 
three  meetings  are  held  at  the  Ministry  of  War  between 
MM.  Clemenceau,  Pichon,  Loucheur  and  myself,  when  ver- 
bally and  in  three  successive  Notes  the  various  aspects  of 
the  problem  are  analyzed  and  discussed.  From  this  study 
two  conclusions  appear,  both  equally  illuminating,  and  for 
the  moment  at  least  mutually  contradictory. 

The  first  is  that  a  French  Government  which,  receiving 
such  an  offer  under  such  conditions,  would  allow  it  to 
escape  would  be  guilty  of  a  crime.  The  second,  that  a 
French  Government  satisfied  with  only  this  and  nothing 
more  would  be  equally  guilty.  A  grave  contradiction 
indeed.  For,  in  the  conversation  of  March  14,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  Mr.  Wilson  have  clearly  indicated  that  they 
offered  the  military  guarantee  in  lieu  of  occupation  and 
the  independence  of  the  left  bank.  It  is  to  avoid  the  latter 
which  they  do  not  wish,  that  they  propose  the  former  which 
to  these  two  countries  so  justly  proud  of  their  strength 
seems  of  equal,  if  not  of  greater,  value.  They  recognize  as 
indisputable  France's  right  to  the  guarantee,  demanded 
by  her  in  the  Notes  of  January  8  and  February  19 
and  25  and  in  the  conversations  of  February  6,  19  and  23, 
and  March  11,  12  and  14.  But  rejecting  the  method  pro- 


178    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

posed  by  us — and  because  they  reject  it — they  propose 
another.  The  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  to  remain  German. 
The  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  to  be  occupied  neither  by  an 
inter-allied  nor  by  a  French  force.  In  return,  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  to  give  France  their  solemn  pledge 
of  immediate  military  aid  in  case  of  danger. 

M.  Clemenceau's  mind  is  made  up  on  the  evening  of  the 
sixteenth  and  his  decision  expressed  in  a  Note  handed  to  the 
heads  of  the  Allied  Governments  on  the  morning  of 
the  seventeenth.  A  proposal  is  made  to  us,  which  substitutes 
one  guarantee  for  another.  We  refuse  this  substitution. 
We  gratefully  note,  with  the  fullest  appreciation  of  its 
value,  the  pledge  offered  and  desire  to  accept  it  but  only 
on  the  express  condition  that  it  be  supplemented  by  most 
of  the  other  guarantees  demanded  by  us,  first  of  all, 
by  occupation.  This  is  the  text  of  the  Note  of  March  17, 
1919. 


NOTE  ON  THE  SUGGESTION  MADE  MARCH  14 


RESUMES  OF  THE  FRENCH  PROPOSAL  OF  FEBRUARY  25,  1919. 

(1)  The  military  occupation  of  the  Rhine  by  an  inter-allied 
force  (with  this  immediate  and  lasting  result,  separation  of  the  left 
bank  from  the  German  Reich  and  Zollverein)  is,  in  the  present  state 
of  international  relations,  a  vital  necessity  for  France  and  of  com- 
mon interest  to  the  Allies.  A  detailed  memorandum  has  proved 
this  assertion. 

The  object  is  to  prevent  the  renewal  of  that  which  we  have 
undergone  twice  in  fifty  years  and  for  that  to  deprive  Germany  of 
her  essential  means  of  attack  (the  left  bank,  the  railroads  and  the 
bridges  of  the  Rhine). 

As  a  guarantee  of  this  the  military  occupation  of  the  Rhine 
border  is  indispensable  to  France,  with  a  far  smaller  population 
than  Germany,  deprived  of  Russia's  alliance,  and  without  good 
natural  frontiers. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  179 

On  the  other  hand  the  Overseas  Democracies  cannot  fight  in 
Europe  if  the  French  ports  and  railroads  are  not  substantially 
protected.  The  last  war  demonstrated  how  serious  for  them  is  this 
danger  which  might  completely  deprive  them  of  a  European 
battlefield. 

(2)  The  limitation  of  the  military  forces  of  Germany  is  not  a 
sufficient   guarantee    against   this   danger   until    experience   has 
proved  the  method  efficacious,  and  especially  so  long  as  Germany 
has  at  her  disposal  more  than  three  million  men  who  are  trained  to 
war,  because  they  fought  in  war.     The  total  suppression  of  the 
German  fleet  was  not  sufficient  reason  for  the  naval  countries  to 
disarm  their  own  fleets.    On  land,  France,  too,  has  need  of  physical 
guarantee. 

The  League  of  Nations  is  also  not  a  sufficient  guarantee.  The 
present  draft  of  its  clauses  makes  final  victory  almost  certain. 
But  the  League  is  too  slow  moving  a  mechanism  to  prevent  terri- 
torial invasion  at  the  beginning  of  a  war.  Here  also,  therefore,  a 
physical  guarantee  is  necessary. 

This  physical  guarantee  is  the  military  occupation  of  the  Rhine 
and  the  control  of  its  bridge  traffic. 

(3)  The  objections  presented  do  not  modify  this  conclusion. 
It  is  feared  on  the  left  bank  that  there  may  be  a  movement  for 

union  with  Germany.  But  the  left  bank  is  different  from  the  rest 
of  Germany.  It  fears  Bolshevism  and  war-taxes.  It  is  conscious  of 
its  economic  independence.  It  has  no  liking  for  Prussian  officials 
forced  upon  it  by  the  Empire.  Separatist  tendencies  are  already 
making  themselves  felt  despite  the  strict  reserve  we  have 
maintained. 

A  nationalist  irritation  in  Germany  is  foreseen.  Defeat  has 
aroused  this  sentiment.  The  question  resolves  itself  into  protecting 
ourselves  against  its  possible  consequences. 

It  is  thought  that  the  proposed  solution  may  be  suspected  of 
imperialism.  But  it  is  not  a  question  of  annexation,  it  is  a  question 
of  creating  under  the  safeguard  of  the  League  of  Nations,  an  inde- 
pendent State  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  the  inhabitants 
and  with  the  aspirations  of  a  very  large  number  of  them.  This  is 
not  a  Bismarckian  solution. 

Anxiety  is  expressed  concerning  the  effect  upon  British  and 
American  opinion.  But  the  whole  lesson  of  the  war  is  that  the 
Rhine  is  the  military  frontier  not  only  of  France  and  Belgium,  but 
of  the  Overseas  Democracies  as  well,  "The  Frontier  of  Freedom," 


180 

as  President  Wilson  expressed  it.  These  Democracies  will  under- 
stand this  as  they  understood  the  necessity  of  conscription  during 
the  war,  as  British  democracy  understands  to-day  the  channel 
tunnel. 

The  danger  is  pointed  out  of  the  indefinite  duration  of  the  occu- 
pation. But  as  the  entire  organization  of  the  left  bank  is  to  be  in 
the  hands  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  latter  will  always  have  the 
right  to  alter  it. 

Therefore,  the  physical  guarantee  which  will  make  impossible  a 
renewal  of  the  1914  situation,  remains  of  vital  necessity  to  France 
in  the  present  state  of  international  relations. 

II 

EXAMINATION  OF  THE  SUGGESTION  PRESENTED  BY  OUR  ALLIES 

(1)  The  suggestion  presented  on  March  14,  that  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  should  pledge  themselves  in  case  of  aggres- 
sion, by..  Germany  to  bring  their  military  forces  to  the  aid  of  France 
without  delay,  is  a  recognition  that  France  needs  a  special  guar- 
antee ;  but  in  place  of  the  physical  guarantee  demanded  by  France 
it  substitutes  a  political  guarantee  designed  to  curtail  by  a  definite 
pledge  the  time  which  would  elapse  between  the  menace  of  war  and 
the  joint  action  of  the  Allied  forces. 

The  French  Government  fully  appreciates  the  great  value  of 
such  a  guarantee,  which  would  profoundly  change  the  international 
situation,  but  this  guarantee  to  be  effective  must  be  supplemented 
and  defined. 

(2)  In  the  first  place  there  will  always  be,  on  account  of  dis- 
tance, a  period  in  wTiich  France  attacked  will  have  to  defend  her- 
self single-handed  without  her  overseas  Allies ;  she  must  be  able  to 
do  this  under  fairer  conditions  than  in  the  past. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  important  there  should  be  no  doubt 
about  the  substance  and  scope  of  the  pledge — that  is  as  to  the  obli- 
gations imposed  upon  Germany,  the  methods  of  their  enforcements, 
the  nature  of  the  act  which  shall  constitute  a  menace  of  war,  the 
right  of  France  to  defend  herself  against  it,  and  the  importance  of 
the  military  aid  to  be  furnished  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States. 

(3)  In  other  words,  before  we  can  consider  giving  up  the 
first  guarantee  (a  material  guarantee  founded  on  space)  it  is  essen- 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  181 

tial  that  the  second  guarantee  (founded  on  time,  that  is  on  the 
speedy  aid  of  our  Allies)  lend  itself  to  no  uncertainty  and  that  it 
be  supplemented  by  some  of  the  other  safeguards  contained  in  the 
first  guarantee. 

It  is  really  not  possible  for  France  to  give  up  a  certain;  safe- 
guard for  the  sake  of  expectations. 

Ill 

POSSIBLE  BASES  OP  AGREEMENT 

Wishing  to  respond  to  the  suggestion  which  has  been  made  to  it, 
the  French  Government  thinks  it  its  duty  to  set  out  in  detail  the 
general  bases  upon  which  agreement  might  be  reached,  these  bases 
being  the  minimum  guarantees  indispensable  to  France. 

It  should  be  agreed,  in  the  first  place,  that : 

In  case  Germany,  in  violation  of  the  peace  conditions  imposed 
upon  her  by  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  should  com- 
mit an  act  of  aggression  against  France,  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  would  bring  to  France  the  aid  of  their  military 
forces. 

Therefore  : 

(1)  The  date  and  the  conditions  of  evacuation  of  the  bridge- 
heads on  the  right  bank,  and  of  the  territories  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  to  be  fixed  by  the  Peace  Treaty  (as  one  of  the  guarantees 
to  be  taken  for  the  execution  of  the  financial  clauses).* 

(2)  Germany  to  maintain  neither  military  force  nor  military 
organization  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Khine  nor  within  fifty  kilo- 
meters east  of  the  river.  The  German  Army  to  be  forbidden  to  ma- 
noeuvre there.  Recruiting  to  be  forbidden  there — even  appeals  for 
volunteers.  Fortifications  to  be  demolished  there.  No  new  fortifica- 
tions to  be  erected  there.     No  war  material  to  be  mnaufactured 
there.     ( Certain  of  these  clauses  already  figure  in  the  preliminary 
peace  proposals:  but  in  the  present  hypothesis  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  strengthen  them.) 

(3)  Great  Britain,  the  United  States  and  France  to  have  the 
right  to  satisfy  themselves  by  means  of  a  permanent  Commission  of 
Inspection  that  the  conditions  imposed  upon  Germany  are  com- 
plied with.     (For  without  this  right  the  preceding  clause  would  be 
worthless. ) 

(4)  Great  Britain,  the  United  States  and  France  to  agree  to 


*In  other  words  an  occupation  for  thirty  years. 


182    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

consider  as  an  act  of  aggression  any  entry  or  attempted  entry  of  all 
or  any  part  of  the  German  Army  into  the  zone  fixed  in  para- 
graph 2. 

(5)  Furthermore,  Great  Britain  and  France  to  recognize  the 
right  of  France  to  occupy  the  line  of  the  Rhine  with  five  bridge- 
heads of  a  radius  of  twenty  kilometers  in  case  Germany,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Commission  of  Inspection,  should  violate  the  terms 
of  paragraph  2  or  any  one  of  the  military,  aerial,  and  naval  clauses 
of  the  peace  preliminaries.  (In  fact,  if  France  gives  up  after  thirty 
years'  permanent  occupation  she  must  at  least  in  case  of  danger  of 
war  resulting  from  Germany's  violation  of  her  pledges,  be  able  to 
advance  her  troops  to  the  only  good  defensive  position,  that  is  to 
the  Rhine.} 

'(6)  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  to  recognize  to 
France  her  frontier  of  1814  and  by  way  of  reparation  the  right  of 
occupation  without  annexation  of  that  part  of  the  coal  basin  of 
the  Sarre  not  included  within  this  frontier. 

P.  S.    It  goes  without  saying  that  ly  act  of  aggression  against 
France,  the  French  Government  also  means  any  aggression  against 
Belgium. 
i 

The  French  Note  of  March  17  marks  the  beginning  of 
negotiations  in  which  twice  a  day  up  to  April  22,  we  kept 
up  our  efforts.  Our  object?  To  obtain  the  proffered 
guarantee  but  with  the  addition  of  occupation — and  a  few 
other  safeguards  which  to  the  minds  of  our  Allies  were  to 
be  replaced  purely  and  simply  by  their  military  guarantee. 

Ill 

The  difficulty  which  had  revealed  itself  to  us  on  March 
14,  gained  substance  in  every  conference  held  and  in  every 
Note  exchanged — English  Notes  of  March  26  and  April  2; 
American  Notes  of  March  28  and  April  12,  and  daily  and 
uninterrupted  conferences.  On  many  points  we  make 
progress  from  day  to  day.  For  the  first  plan  of  disarma- 
ment, another  and  distinctly  better  one  is  substituted  which 
does  away  with  conscription  and  reduces  the  German  Army 
to  100,000  men  serving  twelve  years.  The  demilitarization 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  183 

of  the  left  bank  is  extended  to  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometers  on 
the  right  bank.  The  violation  of  this  zone  by  Germany  is 
to  be  considered  a  hostile  act.  Better  still  the  right  of 
verifying  the  execution  of  the  military  clauses  of  the  Treaty 
by  investigations  in  Germany  is  entrusted  to  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Nations  acting  by  a  majority.  Finally 
the  Treaties  of  Guarantee  are  drafted.  But  of  occupation, 
no  word  agreeing  to  our  initial  demand,  repeated  and  main- 
tained in  our  Note  of  March  17. 

It  appears  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Wilson  are 
now  in  complete  agreement  against  any  occupation.  On 
the  twenty-sixth,  the  British  Prime  Minister  hands  his  col- 
leagues a  General  Note  on  the  peace,  in  which  after  insist- 
ing on  the  danger  of  too  drastic  a  peace  he  sums  up  his 
point  of  view  regarding  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine  as 
follows : 

No  attempt  to  be  made  to  separate  the  Rhenish  provinces  from 
the  rest  of  Germany. 

These  provinces  to  be  demilitarized,  that  is,  the  inhabitants  of 
this  territory  will  not  be  permitted  to  bear  arms  or  receive  any 
military  training  or  to  be  incorporated  in  a  military  organization 
either  on  a  voluntary  or  a  compulsory  basis ;  and  no  fortifications, 
depots,  establishments,  railway  construction,  or  works  of  any  kind 
adapted  to  military  purposes  will  be  permitted  to  exist  within  this 
area.  No  troops  to  be  sent  into  this  area  for  any  purpose  whatso- 
ever, without  previous  notification  to  the  League  of  Nations. 

As  France  is  naturally  anxious  about  a  neighbor  who  has,  twice 
within  living  memory,  invaded  and  devastated  her  land  with  sur- 
prising rapidity,  the  British  Empire  and  the  United  States  under- 
take to  come  to  the  assistance  of  France  with  their  whole  strength 
in  the  event  of  Germany  moving  her  troops  across  the  Rhine  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations.  This 
guarantee  to  last  until  the  League  of  Nations  has  proved  itself  to 
be  an  adequate  security. 

Mr.  Wilson  also  in  a  Note  of  April  12  forcefully  recalls 
the  scope  and  importance  of  his  proposals  of  March  14  and 
27,  which  were  identical  with  those  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
and  he  adds  with  great  gravity: 


184    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

It  will  be  recalled  that  these  proposals  were  made  jointly  with 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  who  made  practically  identical  proposals  with 
regard  to  the  action  of  Great  Britain. 

Both  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  proposals  and  my  own,  were  made 
after  repeated  consideration  of  all  other  plans  suggested,  and  they 
represent  the  maximum  of  what  I  myself  deem  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  France,  or  possible  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

Every  day,  often  twice  a  day,  M.  Clemenceau  renewed 
his  efforts: 

"I  beg  to  point  out,"  he  said,  "that  on  the  seas  this 
guarantee  has  already  been  provided.  Germany  no  longer 
has  a  Navy.  We  must  have  an  equivalent  guarantee  on 
land.  America  is  far  away,  protected  by  the  ocean.  Even 
Napoleon  could  not  reach  England.  You  are  both  under 
cover.  "We  are  not.  No  man  has  less  of  the  militaristic 
spirit  than  I.  But  we  want  safety." 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  kept  to  his  invariable  formula. 

"You  must  fully  understand  the  state  of  mind  of  the 
British  public.  It  is  afraid  to  do  anything  whatsoever 
which  might  repeat  the  mistake  Germany  committed  in 
annexing  Alsace-Lorraine. ' ' 

We  repeat  our  arguments,  ever  more  urgent  and  direct. 
We  recall  the  fact  that  the  English  put  Prussia  in;  or 
allowed  Prussia  to  put  herself,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  in  1815.  They  know  what  it  has  cost  them.  We 
show  how  they  have  continued  to  assure  their  own  safety 
by  a  Navy  superior  to  that  of  all  other  powers  combined. 
Can  they  be  astonished  then  that  France  desires  a  physical 
guarantee  on  the  Rhine  1  England  has  asked  France  not  to 
question  her  naval  policy  which  enabled  the  war  to  be  won, 
but  which  restricted  the  liberty  of  neutrals.  France  whose 
Army  saved  the  world  on  land,  as  the  English  Fleet  saved 
it  on  the  seas,  thinks  it  just  that  for  her  safety  on  which 
the  safety  of  all  is  dependent,  a  similar  guarantee  and 
restriction  should  be  acceded  to.  On  March  31,  M.  Cle- 
menceau summoned  Marshal  Foch  and  the  Commanders-in- 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  EHINE  185 

Chief  of  the  Allied  Armies  before  the  Council  of  the  Four. 
The  Marshal  of  France  once  more  presents  the  argument 
of  his  Notes  of  November  27,  and  January  10.  He  then 
reads  a  new  report  summarizing  the  others.  This  is  its 
conclusion : 

To  sum  up,  unless  we  hold  the  Rhine  permanently,  no  neu- 
trality, no  disarmament,  no  written  clause  of  any  kind,  can  prevent 
Germany  from  seizing  the  Rhine  and  debauching  from  it  at  an 
advantage. 

The  Rhine  remains  to-day  the  barrier  essential  to  the  safety  of 
the  peoples  of  Western  Europe,  and  therefore,  of  civilization. 

In  the  circumstances,  it  seems  difficult  to  refuse  to  the  nations 
in  the  forefront  of  battle — France  and  Belgium —  the  protection 
they  deem  indispensable  to  enable  them  to  live  and  fight  until 
their  Allies  arrive 

Whether  the  inhabitants  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  remain 
German  or  not,  the  political  frontier  between  the  Western  Euro- 
pean nations  and  Germany  is  the  Rhine. 

I  urge  with  all  my  strength  upon  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments,  which  in  the  most  critical  hours  of  the  war  entrusted 
to  me  the  conduct  of  their  armies  and  the  future  of  our  common 
cause,  to  consider  that  the  future  can  only  be  permanently  assured 
— to-morrow  as  it  was  yesterday — by  the  military  frontier  of  the 
Rhine  and  its  occupation  by  the  Allies.  This  essential  position 
must  therefore  be  held. 

Everyone  listens  attentively.  But  not  one  of  the  Allied 
Generals  supports  the  Commander-in-Chief.  On  April  4, 
the  King  of  the  Belgians  joins  the  Conference  of  the  heads 
of  the  Governments  but  he  too  does  not  express  himself  in 
favour  of  an  extended  occupation.  We  are  alone.  The 
atmosphere  is  tense.  Overseas  newspapers  grow  aggres- 
sive. Some  French  papers  are  no  less  so.  In  two  days, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  gives  out  two  soothing  interviews,  the 
effect  of  which  does  not  last.  Subordinates  are  nervous, 
and  make  blunders.  In  spite  of  Mr.  House,  the  mendacious 
news  is  published  that  the  George  Washington  has  been  hur- 
riedly summoned  to  Brest. 


186    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

M.  Clemenceau  holds  his  ground  unmoved.  We  send 
Note  upon  Note  (March  19,  20,  22,  28  and  31,  and  April  4, 
5,  15,  16  and  19).  We  show  that  no  matter  how  important 
the  results  attained  it  remains  indispensable  to  give  the 
Treaty  a  guarantee  of  execution,  to  give  to  France  a 
material  safeguard  against  a  Germany  which  because  of 
the  war  will  have  millions  of  trained  soldiers  for  years  to 
come.  We  show  that  occupation  alone  meets  this  double 
need.  Days  pass. 

At  last  M.  Clemenceau 's  indomitable  will  wins  its  end. 
Light  begins  to  break.  Slowly,  prudently  and  patiently,  he 
widens  the  opening  and  on  April  20  at  six  o'clock  in  the 
evening  he  secures — first  of  all — from  President  Wilson 
his  approval  of  the  provisions  of  Chapter  14.  On  the 
morning  of  April  22,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  gives  his  approval 
also,  but  not  without  again  renewing  his  objections.  M. 
Clemenceau,  who  for  two  days  has  been  in  agreement  with 
President  Wilson,  maintains  all  his  points — duration  of  the 
occupation,  its  possible  extension;  participation  by  the 
Allies.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  ends  the  discussion: 

"Very  well,  I  accept." 

The  long  debate  is  over.  Despite  divergencies  of 
opinion,  the  personal  relations  between  the  three  men  dur- 
ing those  forty  days  have  never  ceased  to  be  sincere,  calm 
and  affectionate.  May  their  fellow  countrymen  never 
forget  it! 

The  inter-allied  occupation  of  the  left  bank  and  the 
bridgeheads  of  the  Rhine  are  fixed  at  fifteen  years.  Evac- 
uation is  to  be  by  zones,  every  five  years,  but  only  on  condi- 
tion that  Germany  faithfully  complies  with  the  Peace 
Treaty.  If  faithful  compliance  is  lacking,  there  is  to  be  no 
evacuations  at  five-year  intervals.  Even  at  the  end  of 
fifteen  years,  we  retain  in  any  event,  a  safeguard;  if  the 
guarantees  against  an  unprovoked  German  aggression  are 
deemed  insufficient,  there  is  to  be  no  evacuation.*  Finally, 
if,  after  evacuation,  Germany  fails  in  her  obligations  to 

*Sce  Chapter  VI,  page  209,  and  following. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  187 

pay,  there  is  to  be  re-occupation  by  all  the  Allies, — not  by 
France  alone.  Eemember  that,  from  the  beginning  of  Jan- 
uary to  the  end  of  April,  the  participation  of  the  Allies 
in  the  occupation  and  even  occupation  itself  had  been 
refused  us;  that  as  a  substitute  we  had  been  offered  the 
two  Treaties  of  Guarantee  and  that  at  the  end  of  the  dis- 
cussion we  had  both  the  treaties  and  the  occupation.  We 
had  gone  a  long  way. 

But  such  was,  notwithstanding  the  advantages  won  by 
M.  Clemenceau,  the  attachment  of  some  great  men  to  our 
original  proposal  that,  even  before  the  agreement  was  made 
public,  strong  opposition  broke  out.  Hardly  was  the  dis- 
cussion between  the  Allies  closed  than  it  began  between 
the  French.  Marshal  Foch,  whose  views  the  French  Govern- 
ment had  so  strongly  defended,  feels  that  the  time  limits 
accepted  by  M.  Clemenceau  destroy  the  value  of  the  guar- 
antee. He  does  not  hide  his  way  of  thinking,  even  from 
the  Press.  On  April  17,  he  refuses  to  transmit  to  General 
Nudant,  President  of  the  Armistice  Commission  and  rep- 
resentative of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  in 
their  dealings  with  the  German  Government,  the  convoca- 
tion which  the  Council  of  Four  has  decided  to  address  to 
the  enemy  plenipotentiaries  for  April  25.  On  the  eighteenth 
Le  Matin  publishes  an  article  (inspired  by  him  and  the 
proofs  of  which  had  been  corrected  by  one  of  his  officers) 
against  the  conditions  of  peace.  Then  it  is  an  interview  in 
the  Daily  Mail,  the  reproduction  of  which  is  forbidden  in 
the  French  Press  by  the  Censorship,  but  which  none  the 
less  has  its  echo  in  the  lobbies  of  Parliament  where  a  resolu- 
tion is  prepared  to  be  presented  in  the  Senate. 

These  incidents,  and  others  as  well,  create  a  certain 
amount  of  friction  in  Allied  circles.  They  oblige  M.  Cle- 
menceau to  defend  the  Commander-in-Chief  with  some 
warmth  against  the  criticisms  of  some  heads  of  Govern- 
ments who  blame  his  recent  interventions.  M.  Clemenceau 
regrets  them  as  much  as  they  do.  But  he  makes  it  plain — 
with  generous  foresight — that  the  men  of  victory  must  stick 


188    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

together  and  "that  the  image  they  hold  in  the  nation's 
mind  be  not  broken."  The  discussion  is  somewhat  sharp. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Wilson  take  the  view  that  the 
Commander-in-Chief  has  no  right  to  adopt  the  attitude  he 
has  assumed  in  the  past  two  days.  They  say: 

"We  very  willingly  placed  our  Armies  under  the 
supreme  command  of  a  French  General  for  whom  we  have 
the  highest  admiration  and  the  deepest  gratitude.  But 
this  General,  no  matter  how  great  his  glory,  is  an  obstacle 
to  the  decisions  of  the  Governments.  We  cannot  accept 
this  situation  and  permit  the  authority  we  have  conferred 
to  be  turned  against  us.  It  is  a  fundamental  question  of 
constitutional  responsibility." 

They  add: 

"We  are  to-day  as  yesterday,  ready  to  accept  a  French 
General  as  Commander-in-Chief.  But  we  must  have  a 
General  who  obeys  the  Governments." 

M.  Clemenceau,  to  gain  time,  himself  sends  to  General 
Nudant  the  message  which  Marshal  Foch  had  declined  to 
transmit  and  on  the  eighteenth  in  the  evening  asks  M.  Pom- 
care  to  summon  Marshal  Foch.  On  the  nineteenth  the  heads 
of  the  Allied  Governments  asked  M.  Clemenceau  what  he 
had  done  in  the  matter.  M.  Clemenceau  replies  that  he  is 
going  to  see  the  Marshal  immediately  after  the  Council,  and 
that  the  next  day  he  will  be  able  to  inform  them.  As  we  were 
leaving  the  Hotel  Bischof f sheim  M.  Clemenceau  says  to  me : 

"Foch  is  coming  presently.  Although  he  has  unques- 
tionably put  himself  in  the  wrong,  I  want  to  get  him  out 
of  it.  I  don 't  want  the  Chief  of  Victory  to  be  touched. ' ' 

I  ask  him  if  he  expects  to  succeed.    He  answers : 

"I  think  so." 

Marshal  Foch  arrives  at  a  quarter  past  six  at  the  Min- 
istry of  War.  M.  Clemenceau  explains  the  situation  to  him. 
The  Marshal,  somewhat  embarrassed,  says  that  he  has 
been  misunderstood;  that  he  made  objections  but  that  he 
does  not  refuse  to  send  the  convocation  to  the  Germans; 
that  he  knows  nothing  of  the  newspaper  articles.  M.  Cle- 
menceau reminds  him  that  he  wrote  a  letter  of  refusal  on 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  189 

receipt  of  the  order  to  transmit  the  convocation.  He  cites 
the  name  of  the  officer  of  his  staff  who  went  to  correct 
the  proofs.  The  Marshal  remains  silent.  M.  Clemenceau 
says  to  the  Marshal: 

"Come,  you  are  sorry  for  all  that,  aren't  you!" 

The  Marshal  answers: 

1  'I  regret  it  with  all  my  heart." 

M.  Clemenceau,  full  of  cordiality,  begs  him  not  to  allow 
himself  to  be  used  by  papers  and  politicians  and  as  he 
shows  him  out,  he  pats  him  on  the  shoulder  with  friendly 
bruskness : 

"Look  here,"  he  says,  "they  are  pulling  your  leg. 
Don't  let  'em." 

And  the  Marshal  smiling  answers: 

"All  right.    I  will  call  off  my  dogs  of  war." 

A  frank  avowal  by  the  great  soldier  of  the  pressure  that 
his  over-wrought  entourage  has  brought  to  bear  upon  him. 
M.  Clemenceau  is  now  sure  of  adjusting  the  matter  which, 
from  the  very  first,  he  had  been  anxious  to  do.  He  tele- 
phones the  result  of  his  interview  to  M.  Poincare  and  the 
next  morning,  April  20,  at  ten  o  'clock,  he  informs  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  Mr.  Wilson  that  the  matter  is  settled,  that 
there  has  been  a  misunderstanding,  that  Marshal  Foch  is 
sorry  and  that  all  is  well.  The  two  heads  of  Governments 
let  the  matter  drop.  Thus,  thanks  to  M.  Clemenceau,  thanks 
to  his  firm  and  prudent  stand,  thanks  to  the  great  moral 
influence  with  his  colleagues,  the  incident  was  closed. 

But  the  conflict  reappears  on  April  25,  at  the  Cabinet 
meeting,  in  the  final  sitting  when  the  whole  French  Gov- 
ernment is  to  pass  upon  the  Treaty.  Marshal  Foch, 
specially  invited  to  be  present  by  M.  Clemenceau,  renews 
his  criticisms.  He  is  listened  to  with  attention.  He  with- 
draws. The  Cabinet  deliberates  and  after  two  hours  of  dis- 
cussion unanimously  approves  the  Treaty.  But  even  that 
is  not  all,  and  on  May  6,  at  the  plenary  session  of  the  Con- 
ference twenty-four  hours  before  the  Treaty  is  handed  to 
the  Germans,  the  illustrious  leader  of  the  victorious  Armies 
once  more  makes  heard  his  protest: 


190    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

"  Chapter  XIV,"  he  says,  "  provides  as  guarantee  for 
reparations,  the  occupation  of  the  country  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine  for  a  period  of  five,  ten,  or  fifteen  years.  Could 
we  discuss  the  question  at  length,  it  would  be  easy  to  prove 
that,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  this  guarantee 
amounts  to  nothing  and  that  it  will  become  an  increasing 
burden  upon  the  Allied  Armies.  Before  going  any  further, 
therefore,  I  wish  to  state  that  the  guarantee  represented 
by  Chapter  XIV  or  Section  XIV — I  do  not  remember  which 
— is  in  my  judgment  equal  to  zero,  all  the  while  involves 
us  in  increasing  military  expenses.  This  is  the  first  reser- 
vation that  I  make ! 

"Moreover,  according  to  my  understanding,  we  shall 
hold  the  Rhine  for  five  years  as  a  military  guarantee  and 
as  a  means  of  assuring  our  indemnities.  After  five  years, 
and  by  the  tenth  year,  we  would  abandon  the  Rhine,  from 
the  Dutch  frontier  to  below  Cologne — that  is  a  space  of 
more  than  two  hundred  kilometers  out  of  the  five  hundred 
held  by  us. 

"Right  now  I  would  call  attention  that  from  the  point  of 
indemnities,  this  means  giving  up  the  greatest  industrial 
area  in  the  occupied  territory  and  the  bridgeheads  which 
furnish  access  to  the  basin  of  the  Ruhr,  the  principal  source 
of  Germany's  wealth,  which  we  no  longer  menace  and 
whose  seizure  we  renounce. 

"After  ten  years,  we  give  up  eighty  additional  kilome- 
ters of  the  Rhine  line,  from  Cologne  to  beyond  Coblenz. 
Eventually,  after  fifteen  years,  the  Rhine  barrier  will  be 
abandoned  along  the  whole  length  of  the  occupied  territory, 
and  France  will  find  herself  with  her  frontier  of  1870 — 
that  is  with  no  military  guarantee,  whatsoever.  After  fif- 
teen years,  as  you  see,  we  shall  have  no  further  guarantee 
for  the  indemnities.  Therefore,  I  state  that,  in  this  respect, 
Section  XIV  is  completely  ineffectual.  As  payments  and 
indemnities  are  to  continue  for  thirty  years,  we  shall  find 
ourselves  for  fifteen  years  with  guarantees  more  or  less 
restricted  and,  after  those  fifteen  years,  with  none  at  all. 

"I  call  your  attention  to  this  lack  of  military  guarantees. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  191 

On  the  other  hand,  reoccupation  of  the  occupied  territory, 
during  or  after  this  fifteen-year  period,  is  contemplated, 
in  case  Germany  should  fail  to  execute  part  or  all  of  the 
Treaty  which  she  signed.  Who  is  to  decide  upon  the  advis- 
ability of  this  reoccupation?  The  Reparation  Commission. 
For  all  violations  of  the  Treaty  clauses — even  those  which 
have  no  connection  with  indemnities,  whether  they  be  of  a 
military  or  of  an  administrative  nature — the  Commission 
on  Indemnities  will  be  the  one  to  intervene  and  say  '  Clause 
so-and-so  has  been  violated.  Therefore,  reoccupation  of 
the  occupied  territory  is  in  order.'  Is  the  Commission 
alone  qualified  to  do  this  ?  Furthermore,  in  the  question  of 
indemnities,  it  will  be  the  part  of  the  Commission  to  estab- 
lish any  violation  of  clauses  that  do  not  figure  in  the 
Treaty,  since  they  are  not  to  be  established  until  a  period 
following  the  signing  of  the  Treaty.  This  jurisdiction  is 
not  sufficient. 

"To  sum  up,  the  Treaty  assures  complete  guarantees 
for  a  period  of  five  years,  during  which  Germany  will 
doubtless  be  in  a  position  to  do  no  harm.  But,  from  that  time 
on,  as  German  power  returns  and  our  danger  increases, 
our  guarantees  decrease,  until,  at  the  end  of  fifteen  years, 
they  disappear  altogether.  After  this  period,  there  will  be 
no  further  means  of  enforcing  payment  from  an  enemy 
which  has  thirty  years  in  which  to  pay,  while  all  the  time 
the  Allied  expenses  will  be  mounting  up. 

"In  short,  it  is  an  indisputable  fact  that,  in  order  to 
occupy  a  line  other  than  the  Rhine  line  and  establish  a 
strong  barrier  on  this  side  of  the  river,  more  troops  will  be 
necessary.  Our  expense,  therefore,  will  increase  as  our 
guarantees  decrease,  until  they  reach  zero.  At  the  same 
time,  during  the  fifteen  years,  we  shall  have  other  losses 
to  make  good. 

"There  is  only  one  way  to  hold  the  enemy  to  his  engage- 
ments, and  that  is  to  maintain  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine. 
"With  only  a  few  forces  on  the  Rhine,  we  can  in  fact  prevent 
all  action  on  the  part  of  Germany,  and  reserve  all  action 
for  ourselves. 


192    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

"These  are  the  observations  I  have  to  present  on  Sec- 
tion XIV.  I  ask  that  all  these  provisions  be  re-examined, 
especially  by  the  military  experts  of  the  Allied  Nations. 

"If  I  were  asked  what  solution  I  have  to  suggest,  I 
should  answer  as  follows:  'The  question  of  the  Rhine  bank 
is  absolutely  conditional  upon  the  Rhine.  Everything  is 
regulated  by  this  river.  Master  of  the  Rhine,  means  mas- 
ter of  the  whole  country.'  Not  to  be  on  the  Rhine  means 
losing  everything.  "We  have  a  comparison  close  at  hand. 
If  we  wished  to  defend  ourselves  in  this  room,  we  should 
need  only  to  hold  the  doors  to  keep  the  enemy  from  enter- 
ing. Inversely  if  we  lose  the  doors,  the  enemy  can  enter. 
And  so,  as  long  as  we  hold  the  barriers  of  the  Rhine,  we 
shall  be  complete  masters  on  the  left  bank,  at  little  expense. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  we  give  up  the  Rhine,  we  shall  need  a 
large  force  to  hold  a  land  where,  in  any  case,  our  position 
will  be  weak,  since  the  enemy  will  be  free  to  come  and 
attack  us  when  he  willt 

"From  a  military  point  of  view,  therefore,  the  Rhine 
alone  is  important.  Nothing  else  counts.  Occupation  of  the 
Rhine  bank  is  valueless  unless  we  seize  the  Rhine.  If  we 
fall  back,  we  will,  as  I  have  said,  give  up  our  pledges,  we 
will  open  the  doors,  and  place  ourselves  in  a  position  of 
inferiority,  because  we  shall  be  obliged  to  occupy  a  country 
that  has  no  obstacles,  to  keep  in  it  a  much  larger  Army — in 
a  word  to  occupy  it  in  a  much  more  expensive  manner. 

"The  most  economical  and  the  surest  way  is  to  maintain 
the  occupation  of  the  Rhine.  It  may  be  that  I  am  mistaken. 
That  is  why  I  ask  the  other  military  experts  to  join  me  in 
going  over  this  chapter  again.  How  long  should  the  Rhine 
be  held?  Just  as  long  as  we  wish  to  keep  our  guarantee, 
since  there  are  no  others.  When  we  find  we  have  been 
paid,  and  that  we  have  sufficient  guarantees,  we  shall  only 
have  to  retire  our  troops  and  leave. 

"Take  note  that  I  ask  for  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine, 
and  not  for  that  of  the  Rhine  land.  It  is  on  this  point  that 
our  opinions  disagree.  I  have  been  criticized  for  wishing  to 
occupy  a  country.  That  is  quite  inexact.  I  wish  to  occupy 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  EHINE  193 

the  passage  of  the  Rhine, — an  occupation  which  will  re- 
quire a  very  small  military  force. 

"When  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  shall  have  been  car- 
ried forward,  when  the  German  countries  have  given  evi- 
dence of  unmistakable  good  faith,  and  disarmament  has 
gone  into  effect,  the  expenses  of  everybody — Allies  and 
Germans — can  be  lightened  by  reducing  the  Army  of  Occu- 
pation. This  will  be  accomplished,  as  you  see,  not  by  giv- 
ing up  ground,  but  by  reducing  the  actual  numbers  of  the 
occupying  Army. 

"To  sum  up,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  I  state 
absolutely  that  we  must  stay  on  the  Ehine,  and  that  we 
must  not  abandon  this  line,  or  even  part  of  it,  unless  we 
wish  to  assume  a  burden  of  expense,  weaken  our  position, 
and  stand  without  guarantees  at  the  end  of  a  certain  time. 
These  observations  apply  to  the  whole  line  of  the  Rhine, 
from  Cologne  to  Coblenz  and  Mayence. 

"These  are  the  chief  observations  I  wished  to  make.  I 
ask  that  they  be  given  consideration,  and  that  some  action 
be  taken  with  regard  to  my  statement,  for  I  cannot  allow 
these  provisions  to  pass  unchallenged.  I  have  not  seen  the 
text  of  the  Treaty.  I  may  be  mistaken,  but  I  ask,  again, 
that,  if  the  text  be  thus,  it  be  given  for  examination  to  mili- 
tary experts,  who  will  see  to  what  extent  it  may  be 
modified. ' ' 

The  Government  heads  held  a  meeting  immediately. 
This  statement  created  more  surprise  than  emotion.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  Marshal  placed  himself  on  financial 
grounds  which  escaped  his  competence  and  propounded  a 
theory  of  guarantees  which  figures  reduced  to  absurdity.* 
On  the  other  hand,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  he 
arbitrarily  ignored  a  certain  number  of  facts  which  had  to 
be  taken  into  account  in  any  case:  first  the  unswerving 
opposition  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  to  indefinite  occu- 
pation; then  the  offer  made  by  them  to  France  to  bring 
her  their  armed  assistance  in  case  of  German  aggression; 

*See  Chapter  X,  page  334. 


194     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

finally  the  right  obtained  by  M.  Clemenceau  not  to  evacu- 
ate in  five-year  periods  if  Germany  violated  her  financial 
undertakings,  and  not  to  evacuate  at  the  end  of  fifteen 
years  if  at  that  time  the  guarantees,  that  is  to  say,  the 
British  and  American  Treaties,  seemed  insufficient*  and 
to  reoccupy  after  evacuation  if  any  violation  by  Germany 
was  proved.  All  these  provisions  together  gave  satisfac- 
tion to  the  demands  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Besides, 
his  demands  had  varied.  In  his  Note  of  November  27, 1918, 
the  Marshal  had  asked  that  the  German  inhabitants  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  be  "included  in  the  French  military 
establishment."  This  was  an  extreme  proposal  amounting 
to  annexation  in  disguise  which  had  never  been  endorsed 
by  the  French  Government.  But  the  Marshal  himself  had 
quickly  abandoned  it.  In  his  Note  of  January  10,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief confined  himself  to  demanding  the  occu- 
pation of  the  Rhine  and  of  its  strategic  points  while  seeking 
a  suitable  political  status  for  its  inhabitants.  On  March 
31  he  had  read  a  Note  of  similar  tenor  and  in  the  course  of 
the  discussion  which  had  followed  he  had  said : 

"  Peace  can  only  be  guaranteed  by  the  possession  of 
the  Rhine  till  further  orders,  that  is  to  say  till  Germany 
has  a  change  of  heart." 

On  May  6,  he  had  insisted  in  his  premises  upon  the 
execution  of  the  financial  clauses  of  the  peace,  in  his  con- 
clusion upon  the  limited  object  of  his  demand — occupation 
not  of  the  left  bank  but  of  the  Rhine;  occupation  limited 
in  time  and  scope,  "when  we  find  we  have  been  paid  and 
have  sufficient  safeguards,  we  shall  only  have  to  retire  our 
troops  and  leave."  If  this  is  compared  with  the  clauses  of 
the  Treaty  itself,  what  difference  is  there?  Very  little,— 
for,  as  on  one  hand,  the  faculty  of  prolonging  the  occupa- 
tion after  fifteen  years  is  assured  to  France;  and  on  the 
other,  because  the  suggestion  of  the  Marshal  to  occupy  the 
river  without  the  left  bank  would  plainly  have  been  in  case 
of  conflict  a  grave  imprudence  to  the  troops  thus  thrust 
forward. 


"See  Chapter  VI,  page  211. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  RHINE  195 

Such  was,  on  the  evening  of  May  6,  the  unanimous  feel- 
ing of  the  heads  of  Governments  who  at  once  meet  in  M. 
Pichon's  room.  After  a  brief  exchange  of  news  it  is  clear 
that  Marshal  Foch  had  advanced  no  argument  that  had  not 
already  been  discussed.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  main- 
tain the  clauses  of  the  Treaty.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the 
matter  adjusted  with  such  difficulty  by  M.  Clemenceau 
twenty  days  before,  was  revived.  One  of  the  British  dele- 
gates, Mr.  Bonar  Law,  known  for  his  habitual  restraint, 
declares : 

"If  a  British  General  adopted  such  an  attitude  towards 
his  Government,  he  would  not  retain  his  post  for  five 
minutes. ' ' 

M.  Clemenceau  answered: 

"You  know  my  opinion.  No  matter  how  much  I  regret 
the  attitude  of  the  Marshal,  we  cannot  forget  that  he  led 
our  soldiers  to  Victory." 

The  matter  rested  there.  The  next  day  the  Treaty  was 
handed  to  the  Germans. 

IV 

We  had  gone  a  long  way,  as  I  said  above,  but  we  still 
had  a  long  way  to  go.  On  May  29,  the  German  delegation 
presented  over  the  signature  of  Count  Brockdorff  its  "re- 
marks on  the  conditions  of  peace."  Chapter  XIV  was 
more  especially  denounced  as  an  odious  abuse  of  power. 
There  was  great  uneasiness  everywhere:  in  the  Confer- 
ence, in  the  Parliaments,  even  among  the  public.  "Will 
they  sign?"  was  the  question  on  everyone's  lips,  and  on 
how  to  make  them  sign  there  was  wide  divergence  of 
opinion.  M.  Clemenceau,  a  few  days  later,  summed  up  the 
disagreement  as  follows: 

"There  are  two  ways.  Some  wish  to  make  concessions. 
We  favour  decisive  action." 

No  question  showed  this  divergence  of  views  more  clear- 
ly than  that  of  occupation.  At  the  end  of  May,  Mr.  Lloyd 


196    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

George  expressed  his  regret  at  having  allowed  himself  to 
be  convinced  too  quickly  by  the  arguments  of  his  French 
colleague.  In  the  stormy  atmosphere  of  the  beginning  of 
June,  the  concession  made  to  our  urgent  demand  seemed 
to  him  to  be  the  greatest  mistake  that  had  been  made,  one 
which  might  perhaps  lead  to-morrow  to  a  renewal  of  the 
war.  A  new  discussion  was  beginning.  On  four,  six,  ten 
occasions  the  question  of  occupation  was  opened  up  in 
earnest.  The  Treaty  leaves  the  Germans  only  100,000  men 
— is  it  against  that  that  an  Army  is  to  be  kept  on  the  Rhine  ? 
Germany  has  damages  and  pensions  to  pay.  Is  a  great  part 
of  her  resources  to  be  used  to  pay  for  Armies  of  Occupa- 
tion? The  Germans  are  at  the  highest  pitch  of  national 
excitement.  There  is  no  telling  what  incidents  may  arise 
from  this  system  employed  in  1815  and  1871.  The  Treaties 
of  Guarantee  henceforth  bind  the  overseas  nations  to  come 
to  the  aid  of  France.  If  danger  arises  from  such  an  inci- 
dent, those  nations  will  be  reluctant  to  recognize  their 
obligations  and  their  moral  strength  will  not  be  back  of 
their  material  strength,  as  in  the  late  war.  Protests  are 
already  pouring  in  from  other  sources.  Labor  and  demo- 
cratic circles  condemned  the  occupation  as  unjust,  moder- 
ates as  absurd  and  useless.  It  is  a  matter  of  sentiment,  not 
of  logic,  they  say.  It  should  never  have  been  accepted. 
At  least  it  must  be  greatly  restricted. 

"I  fear,"  said  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  "that  we  rallied  too 
quickly  to  the  idea  of  a  prolonged  occupation.  In  my 
opinion,  the  whole  scheme  should  be  reconsidered. 

"I  accepted  the  occupation,  it  is  true.  But  since  then 
I  have  held  four  meetings  of  Imperial  "War  Cabinet  and  our 
delegates  to  the  Peace  Conference.  They  are  unanimous 
in  their  belief  that  I  did  wrong,  and  that  I  should  have 
given  you  the  choice  between  the  occupation  and  the  Treaty 
of  Guarantee. 

"Occupation  is  useless  since  Germany  will  have  only 
100,000  men  and  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  also 
will  be  on  the  side  of  France  in  case  of  aggression.  It  is 
illogical  because  it  is  only  much  later  in  fifty  or  sixty  years 


197 

that  Germany  will  become  dangerous.  It  is  unjust  because 
it  amounts  to  making  Germany  pay  for  the  cost  and  upkeep 
of  the  French  Army.  It  is  ruinous  because  it  will  absorb 
to  the  detriment  of  the  indemnity  fund  the  best  part  of  the 
German  resources.  It  is  dangerous  because  unpopular, 
inspired  by  the  methods  of  1815  and  1871,  and  of  a  nature 
to  give  rise  to  local  incidents  which  will  arouse  Anglo-Saxon 
sympathy  for  Germany. 

"That  is  the  conclusion  I  draw  from  my  recent  inter- 
views. I  reproach  you  with  nothing.  I  accuse  myself  only 
of  having  yielded  too  quickly  last  April  to  your  arguments. 
If  you  persist,  I  shall  be  forced  to  leave  Paris  and  go  to 
London  to  submit  the  question  to  Parliament." 

For  three  long  weeks,  from  May  23  to  June  13,  M.  Cle- 
menceau,  unmoved  and  unflinching,  continued  to  answer: 

"I  cannot  accept  a  reversal  of  the  decision  already  made. 

"You  know  my  policy.  It  is  wholly  based  upon  the 
close  union  of  France  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  On  that  account  I  am  attacked  on  every  side  as 
weak  and  inadequate.  I  am  sure  that  in  persisting  I  am 
serving  my  country  well  and  so  I  persist.  But  in  this  ques- 
tion of  occupation  you  do  not  understand  the  French  point 
of  view.  You  are  in  your  island,  behind  the  rampart  of  the 
sea.  We  are  on  the  continent,  with  a  worthless  frontier. 
My  country  suffered  more  than  any  other  from  the  Ger- 
mans. We  know  them  better  than  you  do. 

"What  we  fear  in  the  years  to  come  is  not  a  German 
attack,  but  systematic  failure  to  execute  the  Treaty.  No 
treaty  ever  contained  so  many  clauses;  and  no  treaty, 
therefore  ever  involved  so  many  risks  of  non-execution. 
Against  these  risks,  we  want  the  material  guarantee  of  an 
occupation  and  we  intend  to  retain  it  as  long  as  may  be 
necessary  to  form  our  opinion  as  to  Germany's  good  faith. 
In  exchange  for  the  two  treaties  of  immediate  assistance, 
I  shortened  the  duration  of  occupation  I  had  originally  de- 
manded. But  as  I  wished  to  provide  for  everything,  I  also 
asked — and  you  agreed — that  occupation  might  in  certain 
events  be  prolonged  beyond  the  fifteen  years.  All  that  has 


198    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

been  accepted.  I  cannot  consent  to  having  the  question 
reopened  again. 

"So  much  for  the  guarantee.  But  we  also  need  in  the 
coming  years  a  barrier  behind  which  our  people  can  work 
in  security  and  rebuild  their  ruins.  That  barrier  is  the 
Rhine.  I  must  reckon  with  national  feeling.  I  do  not  mean 
that  I  am  afraid  of  being  overthrown,  that  does  not  matter. 
But  I  cannot  by  giving  up  occupation  do  something  that 
would  take  the  very  backbone  out  of  our  people 's  life. 

"Besides  it  is  your  interest  as  well  as  ours.  For  in 
the  union  of  our  three  countries,  France  also  is 
indispensable. 

"There  are  now  two  methods  under  consideration.  We 
are  all  anxious  to  settle  the  matter.  But  in  England  it  is 
believed  that  the  way  to  succeed  is  by  making  concessions. 
In  France  we  believe  that  it  is  by  taking  decisive  action.  I 
will  have  none  of  a  policy  begging  Germany's  pardon  for 
our  victory.  I  know  them  too  well.  I  have  known  them 
too  long.  The  whole  world  was  told  of  our  principles,  in 
war  and  in  peace.  We  have  remained  faithful  to  them.  It 
is  our  duty  to  make  them  triumph.  If  the  Germans  feel 
that  peace  is  imposed  by  the  strong,  who  have  justice  on 
their  side,  upon  the  weak,  who  were  the  aggressors,  they 
will  resign  themselves  to  it. 

"I  know  that  you  and  your  colleagues  are  perfectly  sin- 
cere, and  this  is  what  makes  the  situation  so  serious. 
Weighing  my  words,  I  say  to  you:  If  you  go  before  your 
Parliament,  I  will  go  before  mine  and,  if  need  be,  resign. 
But  I  will  not  accept  what  you  propose,  it  is  impossible. 

"And  now  I  say  that  I  will  not  even  think  of  such  an 
hypothesis,  nor  admit  that  after  five  years  of  war,  we  can! 
be  incapable  of  giving  the  German  a  united  answer. ' ' 

Never  I  believe  has  the  voice  of  a  citizen  speaking  for 
his  country  had  greater  force  or  a  more  persuasive  power. 
On  June  13,  with  the  discreet  support  of  Mr.  Wilson,  M. 
Clemenceau  obtained  satisfaction  and  secured  the  unre- 
served agreement  of  all  his  colleagues.  Chapter  XIV  was 
kept  in  its  entirety,  without  the  change  of  a  single  word. 


199 

To  inform  Germany  of  this — three  days  later — the  Allies 
forward  a  phrase  from  the  President  of  the  United  States : 
"The  peace  must  be  guaranteed  because,  among  the  con- 
tracting parties,  are  those  whose  promises  have  proved 
unworthy  of  our  faith." 

It  is  the  interest  of  France,  the  common  interest  of  the 
Allies  that  I  hope  to  serve  in  showing — by  the  detail  of  an 
important  discussion — how  difficult  it  is  for  men — even 
the  most  earnest  and  the  most  sincere — to  reach  agree- 
ment when  these  men  represent  different  nations  and  cen- 
turies of  opposite  traditions.  May  those  who  make  light 
of  this  difficulty  never  be  called  upon  to  face  it.  In  this 
great  discussion  the  responsible  heads  of  Governments  put 
forward  their  arguments  without  the  slightest  reserve. 
They  passed  through  difficult  hours  of  total  disagreement. 
They  defended  their  views  to  the  very  limit.  But  they  did 
it  in  mutual  esteem  and — it  is  M.  Clemenceau  who  speaks 
— "in  a  conversational  and  friendly  tone,  even  when  hav- 
ing cruel  things  to  say  to  one  another."  They  felt  to  the 
full  the  iron  hand  of  the  conflicting  past  which  weighed 
upon  them.  They  found  themselves — again  I  quote  M.  Cle- 
menceau— "more  French,  more  English,  more  American 
than  they  could  have  believed."  But  the  will  to  agree  was 
strongest.  Agreement  was  reached,  and  upon  this  agree- 
ment— now  signed  and  sealed — depends  the  safety  of  the 
world.  Without  it  there  would  have  been  neither  Victory 
in  War,  nor  Treaty  in  Peace,  nor  Security  in  the  Future. 

The  French  Government  has  been  violently  attacked 
over  these  very  clauses.  Its  difference  of  opinion  with 
Marshal  Foch — from  which  M.  Clemenceau  in  his  personal 
feelings  suffered  very  keenly — was  unrelentingly  employed 
against  it.  I  have  shown  that  if  one  looks  closely  at  the 
Treaty  and  at  the  facts,  the  variation  between  the  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  and  the  proposals  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  is  not  very  considerable.  Occupation  for  fifteen 
years  it  is  true.  For  fifteen  years?  Yes, — but  with  pos- 
sibility of  prolonging  it  and  of  reoccupying  either  should 
Germany  prove  unfaithful  to  her  undertakings,  or  should 


200    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  guarantees  contained  in  the  British  and  American 
Treaties  be  inadequate  or,  a  fortiori,  absent.  There  is  one 
difference  and  only  one,  it  is  a  political  not  a  military  dif- 
ference. The  left  bank  remains  German  instead  of  becom- 
ing independent.  One  may  regret  it.  But  if  we  had  stuck 
to  the  original  proposal  it  would  have  meant  a  break  with 
the  Allies ;  the  hostile  outbreaks  of  a  mixed  population,  the 
necessity  for  intervention  with  all  its  risks,  the  imposition 
of  independence  with  all  its  drawbacks.  "It  is  not,"  as  M. 
Clemenceau  told  the  Senate,  "the  fault  of  the  Armies  of 
the  First  Republic  if  we  did  not  stay  on  the  Rhine.  But  it 
is  not  our  fault  if  to-day  when  I  want  to  go  to  the  Rhine  I 
find  German  lands  between  the  Rhine  and  me, — and  if  I 
am  obliged  to  take  that  into  account."  Could  M.  Cle- 
menceau, having  obtained  satisfaction  on  all  essentials, 
break  with  Great  Britain  on  this  special  point?  He  did 
not  think  so.  Who  would  have  proposed  it  T 

Parliament,  when,  in  turn,  the  question  was  placed  be- 
fore it,  confirmed  the  decision  of  the  Chief  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  of  the  Cabinet, — the  Chamber  by  372  votes  to 
53,  and  the  Senate  unanimously.  Mr.  Barthou,  one  of  M. 
Clemenceau 's  opponents,  who  made  the  General  Report  on 
the  Treaty,  passed  upon  this  matter  with  great  fairness 
when  he  wrote : 

No  matter  how  great  the  authority  of  the  illustrious  General  in 
question,  a  problem  such  as  this  can  only  be  treated  by  military 
men  from  a  special,  isolated,  and  very  exclusive  point  of  view.  To 
a  Government  this  same  problem  presents  itself  as  a  whole  with  all 
its  components,  which  agree  or  disagree,  but  none  of  which  is  unim- 
portant or  negligible. 

Between  so  many  reasons  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  choice  and 
making  this  choice  means  adopting  a  definite  policy. 

Mr.  Barthou  added: 

The  French  Government,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  in  its  place 
another  government  would  have  acted  differently,  has  secured  for 
France  strong  guarantees.  Can  anyone  deny  their  imposing 
strength?  They  complete  and  strengthen  each  other. 


THE  LEFT  BANK  OF  THE  EHINE  201 

On  the  vital  point — the  closing  to  Germany's  Army  of 
the  Rhine  regions  and  joint  occupation  by  all  the  Allies — 
the  French  proposals  prevailed.  It  was  just  that  they 
should  prevail.  The  Germans  and  their  friends — for  they 
know  how  to  have  friends  in  every  country — have  made 
this  an  excuse  for  attacking  France.  They  forget  that 
France  never  demanded  annexation.  All  that  France 
sought  was  to  avert  the  risk  of  invasion,  which  she  has 
known  twice  in  fifty  years.  We  were  determined  that  that 
should  not  be  renewed.  Nothing  more,  nothing  less.  Our 
proposals  were  as  frankly  made  as  they  were  steadfastly 
upheld.  We  modified  them  on  certain  secondary  points  to 
secure  full  agreement  with  our  Allies,  and  to  obtain  the 
Treaties  of  Guarantee.  But  we  did  not  consent  to  give  up 
occupation  any  more  than  the  right  to  prolong  it.  We 
followed  this  policy  in  the  face  of  weighty  and  conflicting 
opposition — sometimes  French,  sometimes  Allied — because 
we  thought  that  it  was  our  duty  to  France.  I  am  still  wait- 
ing to  hear  what  others  would  have  done  in  our  place. 


CHAPTER  VI 

TREATIES  OF   GUARANTEE 

IT  WAS  on  March  14,  1919,  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and 
President  "Wilson  proposed  to  M.  Clemenceau,  in  place  of 
the  inter-allied  occupation  of  an  independent  Rhineland,  the 
undertaking  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  to 
come  immediately  to  the  assistance  of  France  in  case  the 
latter  should  be  the  object  of  an  unprovoked  aggression  by 
Germany.  I  have  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter  how, 
after  five  weeks  of  negotiation,  M.  Clemenceau  obtained 
at  one  and  the  same  time  the  occupation  of  the  Rhineland 
as  well  as  the  two  Treaties.  The  genesis,  text  and  ultimate 
fate  of  these  solemn  and  unprecedented  undertakings  hold 
an  important  place  in  the  peace  considered  as  a  whole. 

I  have  said  " unprecedented;"  on  that  I  would  lay 
stress.  England  in  the  course  of  her  history  has  entered 
into  specific  and  temporary  agreements  with  various  con- 
tinental countries  but  has  never  subscribed  to  any  general 
and  permanent  obligation.  She  has  at  times  lent  her  aid; 
she  has  never  bound  herself  in  advance  to  give  it.  Even 
in  the  years  before  the  war — in  spite  of  the  ever  growing 
German  menace — Great  Britain  did  not  bind  herself.  On 
August  2,  1914,  she  was  free  and  could  in  all  independence 
shape  her  course.  The  conversations  carried  on  in  1911,  at 
the  time  of  the  Agadir  crisis,  by  the  French  and  English 
military  staffs  had  been  a  study  of  the  eventual  possibili- 
ties of  combined  action.  But  nothing  had  been  decided  as 
to  the  aims  and  conditions  of  such  action.  The  letters 
exchanged,  in  November,  1912,  between  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the 
French  Ambassador,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  left  both  parties 
absolutely  free.  Sir  Edward  Grey  wrote: 

202 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  203 

On  various  occasions  during  the  past  few  years,  the  French  and 
British  Military  and  Naval  Staffs  have  exchanged  their  views.  It 
has  always  been  understood  that  these  exchanges  of  views  in  no  way 
affect  the  liberty  of  either  of  the  Governments  to  decide  at  any 
moment  in  the  future  whether  it  shall  or  not  assist  the  other  with 
armed  forces. 

We  have  admitted  that  exchanges  of  views  between  technical 
experts  do  not  constitute  and  must  not  be  regarded  as  constituting 
an  engagement  binding  either  of  the  Governments  to  interfere  in 
an  eventuality  which  has  not  yet  presented  itself  and  which  may 
never  arise.  For  example,  the  present  distribution  of  the  French 
and  English  Navies  is  not  based  upon  an  undertaking  to  cooperate 
in  case  of  war. 

When,  in  presence  of  the  mobilization  of  the  German 
Army,  M.  Poincare  addressed  an  appeal  to  His  Majesty 
George  V  asking  that  Great  Britain  take  her  place  at 
France 's  side  in  the  conflict  which  was  then  certain,  George 
V  confined  his  reply,  couched  in  terms  of  the  utmost  sym- 
pathy, to  stating  that  exchanges  of  views  would  continue 
on  all  points  between  his  Government  and  the  French 
Government  but  that  "as  far  as  the  attitude  of  his  country 
was  concerned  events  were  changing  too  rapidly  for  it  to 
be  possible  to  foresee  what  would  happen."  The  whole 
letter  is  worth  quoting: 

Buckingham  Palace 

August  1,  1914 
My  Dear  and  Great  Friend, 

I  appreciate  most  highly  the  sentiments  which  inspired  you  to 
write  me  in  so  cordial  and  friendly  a  spirit  and  I  am  grateful  to 
you  for  having  set  forth  your  views  so  fully  and  frankly. 

You  may  be  assured  that  the  actual  situation  in  Europe  causes 
me  much  anxiety  and  I  am  happy  to  think  that  our  two  Govern- 
ments have  worked  together  in  so  friendly  a  manner  to  try  to  find 
a  peaceful  solution  for  the  questions  which  have  arisen. 

It  would  be  for  me  a  source  of  real  satisfaction  if  our  combined 
efforts  met  with  success;  and  I  am  not  without  hope  that  the  ter- 
rible events  which  seem  so  near,  may  still  be  averted. 

I  admire  the  calm  that  you  and  your  Government  have  shown 
in  avoiding  exaggerated  military  measures  on  the  frontier  and  in 


204    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

adopting  an  attitude  that  cannot  in  any  manner  be  construed  as  a 
provocation. 

I  personally  am  making  every  effort  to  find  a  solution  that  will 
permit,  in  any  case,  of  the  adjournment  of  active  military  opera- 
tions and  leave  to  the  Powers  time  for  calm  discussion  among  them- 
selves. I  intend  to  pursue  these  efforts  unceasingly,  as  long  as 
there  remains  a  hope  of  a  friendly  settlement.  As  to  the  attitude 
of  my  country,  events  are  changing  so  rapidly  that  it  is  difficult  to 
foresee  what  will  happen,  but  you  may  be  assured  that  my  Govern- 
ment will  continue  to  discuss  frankly  and  fully  with  M.  Cambon  all 
points  of  interest  to  the  two  nations. 

GEOKGE  R.  I. 

On  the  evening  of  August  2,  the  British  Government 
promised  us  to  block  the  Channel  with  its  fleet  in  case  the 
German  fleet  should  come  out.  Nothing  more,  nothing  less. 
And  it  was  only  after  the  invasion  of  Belgium  that  England 
decided  to  enter  the  war.  The  formal  undertaking  offered 
to  us  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  on  March  14,  1919,  was  a 
startling  innovation  in  the  development  of  his  country's 
traditional  policy.  Had  his  desire  to  induce  M.  Cle- 
menceau  to  forego  the  occupation  of  the  Rhineland  any- 
thing to  do  with  it?  Doubtless!  But  this  offer  was  to 
an  even  greater  extent,  not  only  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  but  on  the  part  of  his  country  as  well,  an  accept- 
ance of  the  great  lessons  of  the  war;  a  homage  rendered 
the  tremendous  effort  and  unexampled  sufferings  of 
France ;  a  token  of  esteem  and  affection  which  honours  the 
British  nation  as  much  as  it  does  the  French. 

On  the  American  side,  the  break  with  the  past  was  no 
less  worthy  of  note.  Since  TVashington's  Farewell  Address, 
the  United  States  had  remained  unswervingly  faithful  to 
the  policy  of  aloofness  from  European  affairs  which  the 
Father  of  His  Country  laid  down  when  leaving  office.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  a  few  years  later  gave  form  and  sub- 
stance to  this  policy.  Mr.  Roosevelt  often  expressed  his 
regret  that  his  fellow  countrymen  were  unable  to  grasp 
the  significance  of  world  politics.  That  they  were  indeed 
unable  is  abundantly  proved  by  the  first  years  of  the  war. 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  205 

It  needed  Germany's  accumulated  provocations  and  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  firm  decision  to  enlighten  their  minds.  The 
war  once  over,  many  citizens  of  the  United  States,  with  but 
summary  notions  as  to  the  future  of  the  world,  desired 
nothing  better  than  to  return  to  their  isolation.  Political 
parties  even  urged  this  as  a  national  duty.  What  reasons 
prompted  President  Wilson  to  ignore  these  objections  and 
to  associate  himself  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  the  proposal 
which  the  latter  laid  before  M.  Clemenceau? 

I  have  answered  this  question  by  publishing  the  Memo- 
randum in  which  the  French  Government,  on  February  25, 
gave  the  reasons  for  its  Rhineland  policy.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  it  was  our  arguments  on  the  inadequacy  of  the  guar- 
antee given  to  France  by  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  that  finally  convinced  Mr.  Wilson.  When  M.  Cle- 
menceau, with  all  the  intensity  of  his  patriotic  faith,  said  to 
him:  "The  Covenant  may  guarantee  our  victory;  for  the 
time  being  it  is  inadequate  to  guarantee  us  from  invasion," 
Mr.  Wilson  honestly  believed  this  to  be  true,  and  sought  a 
solution.  On  March  28,  he  put  this  solution  into  concrete 
form,  and  handed  the  head  of  the  French  Government  the 
following : 

In  a  separate  Treaty  with  the  United  States,  a  pledge  by  the 
United  States,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Executive  Council  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  to  come  immediately  to  the  assistance  of 
France  as  soon  as  any  unprovoked  movement  of  aggression  against 
her  is  made  by  Germany. 

This  formula,  approved  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  became 
the  basis  of  the  negotiation.  A  difficult  negotiation  indeed, 
because,  as  I  have  said  and  repeat,  M.  Clemenceau  had  to 
derive  the  maximum  of  efficiency  from  the  undertakings 
thus  offered  and  at  the  same  time  to  obtain  the  occupation 
— that  is  to  say  the  very  thing  in  exchange  for  which  the 
Treaties  of  Guarantee  had  been  offered  him.  The  debate 
on  the  occupation,  longer  and  more  difficult  than  the  other, 
lasted  until  April  22.*  The  actual  text  of  the  two  pledges 
was  decided  upon  in  the  course  of  the  following  days. 

*See  Chapter  V. 


206     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

It  was  proper  first  of  all  in  urging  reasons  for  them  to 
give  them  their  true  meaning.  Some  political  parties — 
notably  the  French  Socialists — have  discovered  a  contra- 
diction between  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  and 
the  Treaties  of  Guarantee.  Need  I,  after  what  I  have  just 
written,  assert  that  this  contradiction  does  not  exist ;  or  add 
that  these  Treaties  form  an  integral  part  of  the  funda- 
mental charter  of  the  League  and  are  destined,  within  its 
scope  and  in  its  service,  to  establish  a  security  which  the 
League  itself  might  at  first  have  proved  incapable  of  assur- 
ing effectively?  The  two  instruments,  almost  identical  in 
form,  make  this  clear  in  their  preamble : 

Whereas  there  is  a  danger  that  the  stipulations  relating  to  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  contained  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  signed  this 
day  at  Versailles,  may  not,  at  first,  provide  adequate  security  and 
protection  to  the  French  Republic. 

The  Treaty  with  the  United  States,  even  more  explicit 
in  its  statement  of  reason  than  that  with  Great  Britain, 
emphasizes  the  general  importance  rather  than  the  particu- 
lar bearing  of  a  German  aggression  against  France  and 
the  union  for  protection  that  such  an  aggression  would  call 
forth. 

Whereas  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  French  Republic 
are  equally  animated  by  the  desire  to  maintain  the  peace  of  the 
world,  so  happily  restored  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace  signed  at  Ver- 
sailles the  twenty-eighth  day  of  June,  1919,  putting  an  end  to  the 
war  begun  by  the  aggression  of  the  German  Empire  and  ended  by 
the  defeat  of  that  Power  and, 

Whereas  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  French  Repub- 
lic are  fully  persuaded  that  an  unprovoked  movement  of  aggres- 
sion ~by  Germany  against  France  would  not  only  violate  both  the 
letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  to  which  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  French  Republic  are  parties,  thus  expos- 
ing France  anew  to  the  intolerable  burdens  of  an  unprovoked  war, 
but  that  such  an  aggression  on  the  part  of  Germany  would  be,  and 
is  so  regarded  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  an  hostile  act  against  all 
the  Powers  signatory  to  that  Treaty  and  as  calculated  to  disturb 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  207 

the  peace  of  the  world  by  involving  inevitably  and  directly  the 
States  of  Europe  and  indirectly,  as  experience  has  unfortunately 
and  amply  demonstrated,  the  world  at  large 

The  reasons  for  general  solidarity  being  thus  asserted, 
the  manner  of  giving  it  effect  follows  directly  and  is 
defined  by  Articles  2  and  3.  Article  2  makes  clear  that 
what  is  involved  is  not  an  agreement  between  two  Powers 
for  particular  ends,  but  a  common  measure  of  precaution 
which  will  come  into  force  simultaneously  with  ratification 
by  the  signatory  Powers. 

The  present  Treaty,  in  similar  terms  with  the  Treaty  of  even 
date  for  the  same  purpose  concluded  between  the  United  States  and 
the  French  Republic,  a  copy  of  which  Treaty  is  annexed  hereto,  will 
only  come  into  force  when  the  latter  is  ratified. 

M.  Clemenceau's  opponents,  in  the  course  of  the  parlia- 
mentary debates  on  the  ratification  of  the  Peace  Treaty, 
lyingly  asserted  that  the  aid  to  be  furnished  by  one  of  the 
two  Powers  to  the  third  would  always  be  dependent  upon 
prior  negotiations  between  the  first  two.  The  very  word- 
ing of  these  two  Treaties  gives  the  lie  to  this  fabrication. 
It  is  only  the  coming  into  force  of  each  Treaty  that  is  put 
off  until  the  other  shall  have  been  ratified.  Once  this  con- 
dition is  fulfilled,  the  provisions  of  both  become  binding 
without  restriction  or  reserve,  on  all  the  contracting 
parties.  These  provisions,  to  fulfill  the  obligations 
assigned  them,  are  to  receive  the  approval  of  the  League 
of  Nations.  To  this  effect: 

The  present  Treaty  must  be  submitted  to  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations  and  must  be  recognized  by  the  Council — acting, 
if  need  be,  by  a  majority — as  an  engagement  which  is  consistent 
with  the  Covenant  of  the  League. 

Here  another  question  arises.  How  long  are  the  two 
Treaties  to  remain  in  force?  Our  Allies  to  make  clearer 
their  immediate  purpose  had  at  first  proposed  a  period  of 
three  years.  M.  Clemenceau  refused  this  absolutely.  In 
support  of  his  refusal,  we  drafted  a  Note  which  read : 


208    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

The  solution  of  undertaking  for  three  years  cannot  be  accepted 
by  the  French  Government.  First,  it  is  not  in  the  next  months  that 
Germany  will  again  become  dangerous,  it  is  later.  The  guarantee 
would  in  that  case  cease  to  operate  at  the  very  moment  when  most 
necessary. 

But  this  it  not  all.  The  French  Government  has  shown  in  its 
Memorandum  of  February  25  how  permanent  is  the  need  for  the 
guarantee  it  demands.  This  permanent  need  finds  expression  in 
the  numerical  strength  of  the  French  population  as  compared  with 
that  of  the  German  population  and  in  all  the  history  of  the  last 
century. 

In  a  general  way,  the  French  Government  believes  that  the  pro- 
posed political  guarantee  will  have  its  full  material  and  moral 
value  in  international  public  opinion  only  if  it  expresses  on  the 
clearest  lesson  of  the  war  unanimity  of  the  three  democracies  of 
France,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  For  this  reason  also, 
a  temporary  pledge  should  not  be  considered.  Therefore  we  ask 
that  the  Treaties  of  Guarantee  remain  in  force  until  such  time  as 
their  three  signatories,  France,  the  United  States  and  Great  Brit- 
ain, shall  deem  them  to  have  become  no  longer  necessary. 

To  this  end,  we  proposed  the  following  text  which  was 
accepted  by  President  Wilson  (Note  of  April  12) : 

The  pledge  to  continue  until  it  is  considered  by  all  the  signatory 
Powers  that  the  League  itself  affords  sufficient  protection. 

The  British  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown  felt  that  this 
wording  while  leaving  France  sole  mistress  of  the  decision, 
implied  an  inadmissible  restriction  of  the  rights  of  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  which  would  have  to 
approve  the  two  Treaties.  The  discussion  lasted  three 
days.  At  last  a  compromise  draft  was  accepted  by  France 
who  realized  that  the  worth  of  Treaties,  no  matter  how 
formal,  is  no  greater  than  the  good-will  of  their  signa- 
tories. This  was  worded  as  follows: 

The  present  Treaty  will  continue  in  force  until,  on  the  applica- 
tion of  one  of  the  parties  to  it,  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions— acting,  if  need  be,  by  a  majority — agrees  that  the  League 
itself  affords  sufficient  protection. 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  209 

In  these  conditions,  and  by  virtue  of  these  principles, 
the  United  States  declared  itself  "bound  to  come  immedi- 
ately to  the  assistance  of  France  in  the  event  of  any 
unprovoked  movement  of  aggression  against  her  made  by 
Germany/'  Great  Britain  accepted  the  same  undertaking. 
In  consideration  of  this  dual  pledge,  M.  Clemenceau  agreed 
that,  if  Germany  fully  complied  with  the  Treaty,  the  occu- 
pation of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  should  last  only  fifteen 
years  and  withdrew  the  demand  that  by  the  creation  of  an 
independent  Rhineland,  the  Rhine  should  form  the  Western 
frontier  of  Germany — the  left  bank  and  fifty  kilometers  on 
the  right  bank  being,  moreover,  demilitarized  and  forbidden 
to  German  troops. 

Thus  everything  appeared  to  be  settled.  But  every- 
thing being  settled,  the  main  problem  resulting  from  this 
arrangement  still  confronted  the  French  negotiators  and 
demanded  a  solution.  The  guarantee  of  assistance  offered 
to  France  by  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  was 
embodied  in  the  two  Treaties  which  I  have  just  analyzed. 
On  the  contrary  M.  Clemenceau 's  concession — limitation  to 
fifteen  years  of  the  occupation  of  the  left  bank  if  Germany 
observed  faithfully  the  conditions  of  the  Treaty — found 
place  in  the  Treaty  with  Germany.  In  other  words  there 
was  a  risk  that  the  two  elements  of  the  agreements  regis- 
tered in  different  instruments,  might  not  come  into  play 
together.  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  who,  in 
signing  these  two  Treaties,  had  departed — how  far  I  have 
already  shown — from  their  common  traditions,  were  par- 
liamentary countries.  Their  negotiators  could  therefore 
bind  them  only  subject  to  the  approval  of  their  respective 
Parliament.  If,  the  Treaty  with  Germany  having  come 
into  force,  the  House  of  Commons  or  the  American  Senate 
refused  to  ratify  the  Treaties  of  Guarantee  the  coming  into 
force  of  which  was  mutually  dependent  upon  each  other, 
what  would  happen  ?  France,  bound  by  the  German  Treaty 
to  the  concession  in  exchange  for  which  the  defensive 
pledges  were  given,  would  have  agreed  to  this  sacrifice 
without  compensation  and  accepted  the  evacuation  at  the 


210 

end  of  fifteen  years,  without  obtaining  American  and  Brit- 
ish military  assistance.  This  was  a  risk  that  our  country 
could  not  accept :  it  could  be  thus  stated,  * '  If,  by  failure  of 
either  to  ratify,  the  British  and  American  Treaties  are  lost 
to  us,  would  we  nevertheless  at  the  end  of  fifteen  years  be 
deprived  of  the  material  guarantee  resulting  from  the 
occupation!"  The  question  was  disconcerting  and  a 
proper  answer  hard  to  formulate. 

It  was,  on  April  25,  that  face  to  face  as  was  his  wont 
M.  Clemenceau  boldly  confronted  the  difficulty  in  an  inter- 
view with  President  Wilson  by  saying: 

"The  Treaty,  as  it  stands,  satisfies  me  on  the  score  of 
guarantees;  but  the  future  belongs  neither  to  you  nor  to 
me.  You  have  a  Senate  and  I  have  a  Parliament.  We 
cannot  be  sure  of  what  they  will  do  ten  years  hence,  or 
even  of  what  they  will  do  to-morrow.  If,  for  example,  the 
Treaties  with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  were  not 
ratified,  what  would  be  France 's  situation  I  What  alterna- 
tive guarantee  would  she  have  at  her  disposal?" 

President  Wilson  answered: 

"Your  observation  is  perfectly  just.  But  it  raises  a 
delicate  question.  Let  us  seek  a  solution." 

Prior  to  this  conversation,  Chapter  XIV  of  the  Treaty 
(Article  429)  relating  to  guarantees,  read  as  follows: 

If  the  conditions  of  the  present  Treaty  are  faithfully  observed 
by  Germany,  the  occupation  (of  fifteen  years)  provided  by  Article 
428  will  be  successively  reduced  as  stated  below : 

(1)  At  the  end  of  five  years. .. 

(2)  At  the  end  of  ten  years. .. 

(3)  At  the  end  of  fifteen  years  the  remainder  of  the  occupied 
territories  will  be  evacuated. 

The  right  not  to  evacuate  or  to  reoccupy  after  evacua- 
tion in  the  event  of  "Germany's  refusing  to  observe  all  or 
part  of  her  obligations  concerning  reparations,"  was 
embodied  in  Article  429.  But  anent  the  situation  that  would 
result  from  the  non-ratification  of  either  the  English  or 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  211 

the  American  Treaties,  not  a  word!    It  was  this  omission 
that  had  to  be  remedied. 

The  debate  lasted  for  more  than  a  week.  On  five  dif- 
ferent occasions  the  two  Presidents  exchanged  suggestions 
and  drafts.  The  sequence  of  these  drafts  which  are  in 
existence  throws  full  light  upon  their  common  efforts. 
They  arrived  on  April  29  at  the  following  solution  which 
became  the  final  paragraph  of  Article  429: 

If,  at  that  date  (the  end  of  fifteen  years),  the  guarantees 
against  an  unprovoked  aggression  by  Germany  are  not  considered 
sufficient  by  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  occupying  troops  may  be  delayed  to  the  extent  regarded 
as  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  required  guarantees. ' ' 

What  is  the  situation  created  by  this  additional  clause  I 
It  is  that  at  the  end  of  fifteen  years,  on  January  10,  1935, 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  will,  according  to 
the  term  of  the  last  paragraph,  have  to  decide  whether  the 
guarantees  against  an  unprovoked  aggression  by  Germany 
are  or  are  not  sufficient.  What  are  the  guarantees 
referred  to?  Those  provided  for  at  Versailles  on  June  28, 
1919,  by  the  Treaty  with  Germany  and  by  the  two  English 
and  American  Treaties;  that  is,  in  the  distant  and  indefi- 
nite future,  the  League  of  Nations;  in  the  nearer  future, 
occupation  supplemented  by  the  two  Treaties.  In  what 
case  would  these  guarantees,  in  1935,  be  deemed  insuf- 
ficient? In  case  of  course  of  the  failure  of  the  two  Treaties; 
that  is  precisely  the  case  actually  presented  by  the  negative 
vote  of  the  American  Senate.  In  this  case  what  may  hap- 
pen ?  The  evacuation  may  be  delayed  so  long  as  is  deemed 
necessary  to  secure  the  above  guarantees. 

In  other  words  if,  failing  the  ratification  of  the  British 
and  American  Treaties,  France  in  fifteen  years  has  no 
other  guarantee  of  security  than  the  occupation  of  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  and  the  bridgeheads,  this  occupation  may 
be  prolonged  until  other  guarantees  come  into  existence — 
that  is  to  say  until  the  coming  into  force  of  the  two  Treaties 
signed  on  June  28,  or  of  equivalent  agreements.  Thus  to 


212    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  hypothetical  question  put,  on  April  23,  1919,  by  the 
head  of  the  French  Government  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  the  practical  question  raised  on 
March  19,  1920,  by  the  negative  vote  of  the  United  States 
Senate,  the  final  paragraph  of  Article  429  which  crowned 
our  efforts,  brings  a  clear  and  formal  answer.  This  answer 
whatever  may  happen  safeguards  the  interests  of  France. 
For,  in  the  by  no  means  certain  event  that  the  con- 
tractual guarantee  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
fails  her,  France  will  retain  the  physical  and  territorial 
guarantee  afforded,  and  instead  of  retaining  it  at  the  risk 
of  a  break  with  her  Allies  she  will  hold  it  by  virtue  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  itself.  In  a  word,  no  Treaties  of  Guar- 
antee, no  evacuation  in  1935. 

Thus  balanced,  the  agreement  was  equitable  and  satis- 
factory. The  union  publicly  asserted  against  unjust  aggres- 
sion of  the  three  greatest  democracies  of  the  world  was  an 
appreciable  guarantee  of  stability.  Remember  the  past — 
remember  the  last  visit  of  the  British  Ambassador  to 
Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  on  August  2,  1914, — 
the  stupefaction  and  the  consternation  of  the  German  on 
hearing  that  England  is  to  defend  violated  Belgium.  Con- 
sider again  that  situation ;  suppose  that  in  the  weeks  pre- 
ceding the  war,  Germany,  instead  of  being  condemned  by 
the  absence  of  public  pledges  between  the  Western  Nations 
to  draw  chance  inferences  concerning  England's  attitude, 
had  known  by  the  existence  of  a  public  Treaty  that  England 
would  be  on  the  side  of  Belgium  and  of  France,  that  the 
United  States  would  come  in  also.  I  think  that  without 
undue  optimism  it  may  be  believed  the  idea  of  war  would 
have  less  easily  taken  hold  of  German  minds,  that  their 
plans  of  aggression  would  have  vanished.  This  is  the 
situation  created  by  the  Treaties  of  Guarantee.  For  the 
three  contracting  parties  who  had  learned  the  lessons  of 
the  war,  it  was  the  part  of  logic  and  of  prudent  foresight. 

For  France  it  was  the  crowning  achievement  of  the 
policy  followed  by  M.  Clemenceau.  On  December  29,  1918, 
the  head  of  the  French  Government,  applauded  by  the 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  213 

immense  majority  of  the  Chamber,  had  declared  his  deter- 
mination to  do  everything  to  maintain  in  peace  time  com- 
plete harmony  among  the  Allies  so  as  to  avoid  after  a 
victory  won  by  unity  a  peace  of  disunion.  Not  only  was 
this  result  achieved,  but  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  with 
Germany  was  accompanied  by  the  signing  of  agreements 
perpetuating  the  coalition  against  which  German  force  had 
shattered  itself.  France  there  found  the  just  satisfaction 
of  a  vital  interest.  In  point  of  fact  the  triumphant  end  of 
the  war  had  left  her  alone  and  unallied.  Russia  had  ceased 
to  be,  as  regards  Germany,  the  counterweight  she  had  been 
in  the  past.  The  agreements  entered  into  for  the  war  with 
Great  Britain,  Belgium,  Italy  and  the  United  States  were 
valid  only  for  the  duration  of  the  war  and  ended  with  peace. 
Where  in  this  peace  was  France  to  turn  for  necessary 
assistance?  Some  people  rather  vaguely  and  as  a  timid 
echo  of  M.  Caillaux's  policies,  had  spoken  of  a  "continental 
policy."  But  however  dear  and  precious  to  France  her 
relations  of  friendship  with  her  European  neighbors,  the 
war  itself  has  proved  that  no  continental  Power  on  our 
side  could  take  the  place  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  or  bring  us  anything  but  an  aid  which  no  matter 
how  desirable,  could  not  be  decisive.  The  policy  of  union 
with  the  Anglo-Saxon  world  remained  after  victory  as 
before  the  part  of  wisdom  and  of  truth. 

Not  only  did  this  policy  bind  us  to  countries  whose 
integrity,  vigour  and  physical  and  moral  soundness  we  had 
tested  for  long  months;  to  countries  which  in  both  hemi- 
spheres were  in  touch  with  us  and  by  their  financial,  indus- 
trial and  commercial  resources  appeared  more  capable 
than  any  others  of  aiding  us  in  our  reconstruction ;  not  only 
did  it  afford  us  the  best  of  means  for  exercising  a  just 
influence  within  the  League  of  Nations,  at  the  same  time 
as  it  joined  us  to  two  great  and  liberal  nations  whose 
democratic  views  we  are  certain  of  sharing;  but  in  addi- 
tion by  making  us  one  with  Powers  which  by  their  magni- 
tude and  the  nature  of  their  interests  are  obliged  both  to 
interest  themselves  in  European  affairs  and  to  avoid 


214    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

becoming  absorbed  therein,  this  policy  placed  us  on  our  own 
continent  in  the  honourable  and  lucrative  position  of  being 
the  representative  and  guarantor  of  the  policy  of  peace 
which  had  triumphed  in  the  war.  These  truths  were  so 
well  understood  by  all  France  that  M.  Clemenceau's  most 
impassioned  opponents  did  not  dare  vote  against  the  two 
Treaties,  and  that  in  the  Chamber  as  in  the  Senate  they 
were  unanimously  ratified. 

But  a  misfortune  has  happened — through  no  fault  of 
France's.  The  Franco-British  Treaty  was  approved  by 
the  House  of  Commons.  Not  so  the  American  Treaty  which 
went  down  in  the  defeat  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  by  the 
Senate  in  Washington.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  lacked  six 
votes  for  ratification.  The  Treaty  of  Guarantee  though 
favourably  reported  by  the  Commissions,  was  not  even  dis- 
cussed ;  so  that  under  Article  2,  which  provides  that  these 
two  Treaties  shall  come  into  force  simultaneously,  the 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  is  also  pending.  Need  I  say  that 
this  development  has  been  exploited  to  the  full  against  the 
French  negotiators,  who  are  accused  in  France — sometimes 
even  in  the  United  States — with  having  abandoned  the 
substance  for  the  shadow  and  renounced  part  of  the  sub- 
stantial guarantees  demanded  in  their  Memorandum  of 
February  25,  1919,  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  two  Treaties 
which  up  to  now  do  not  exist?  It  has  also  been  said  that 
this  mistake  was  the  more  inexcusable  in  that  no  one  had 
the  right  to  ignore  the  fact  that  Mr.  Wilson  was  in  a  minor- 
ity in  Congress  following  the  elections  of  November  5, 
1918.  The  conclusion  drawn  is  that  the  non-ratification  of 
the  agreements  negotiated  by  him  should  have  been  fore- 
seen. This  double  accusation  has  held  a  prominent  place 
in  discussions  on  the  peace.  Entrusted  as  I  was  with 
Franco-American  relations  in  the  Clemenceau  Ministry, 
my  desire  to  leave  nothing  unrevealed  and  to  give  the  full 
facts,  will  easily  be  understood. 

Moreover,  the  facts  are  quite  simple ;  for  the  two  accusa- 
tions that  I  have  mentioned  can  harm  no  one  but  their 
authors.  We  have,  it  is  said,  abandoned  the  substance  for 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  215 

the  shadow.  Look  at  the  last  paragraph  of  Article  429, 
analyzed  a  few  pages  above,  and  you  will  see  that  failing 
the  guarantees  against  German  aggression,  embodied  in 
the  Franco-British  and  Franco-American  Treaties,  the 
occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  can  be  extended 
beyond  fifteen  years.  So  we  did  foresee  the  risk  of  non- 
ratification  and  did  adopt  appropriate  precautions.  As  to 
the  childish  accusation  that  we  ignored  the  results  of  the 
American  elections  of  November  5,  1918,  or  that  we  did  not 
allow  for  their  possible  consequences — it  is  to  laugh.  These 
elections  attracted  some  attention  in  the  Press.  Their  pos- 
sible effect  on  the  ratification  of  the  various  Treaties 
escaped  us  so  little  that  precisely  because  of  the  result,  we 
demanded  and  obtained  by  strenuous  efforts  the  final 
paragraph  of  Article  429.  What  more  could  we  have  done 
and  what  would  others  have  done  in  our  place?  Not  nego- 
tiated with  President  Wilson,  our  critics  answer.  With 
whom  then  should  we  have  negotiated?  The  French  Gov- 
ernment knew  as  well  as  any  one  that  on  November  5, 
1918,  Mr.  Wilson  had  lost  his  majority  in  Congress — a  mis- 
hap that  has  befallen  a  number  of  his  predecessors  not 
excepting  the  greatest  among  them,  George  Washington. 
But  it  knew  also  that  in  spite  of  this  adverse  election,  Mr. 
Wilson  remained  none  the  less  until  the  end  of  his  term  the 
only  constitutional  power  with  whom  we  could  treat;  for 
the  President  of  the  United  States  is  responsible  not  to 
Congress  but  to  the  whole  electorate.  It  is  objected  that 
Mr.  Wilson  in  appointing  the  American  delegation  has 
neglected  to  include  Republican  Senators.  Was  this  an 
error  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  President?  It  is  quite 
possible.  But  that  was  none  of  our  business,  any  more  than 
it  would  have  been  Mr.  Wilson's  or  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
business  to  decide  whether  M.  Clemenceau  was  right  or 
wrong  in  not  calling  upon  M.  Briand  or  M.  Barthou.  The 
reproach  of  "having  negotiated  with  Mr.  Wilson"  is 
simply  absurd — just  as  absurd  in  fact  as  it  would  be  to 
reproach  Mr.  Lloyd  George  with  having  made  important 
concessions  to  M.  Clemenceau  without  foreseeing  that  Ms 


216    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Clemenceau,  six  months  later,  would  be  placed  in  a  minority 
by  M.  Deschanel. 

These  are — whether  we  look  upon  it  as  good  or  bad — 
the  risks  of  the  parliamentary  system.  The  heads  of  Gov- 
ernments who  negotiated  the  peace  legally  represented 
their  respective  Governments  and  it  was  possible,  whether 
one  liked  it  or  not,  to  negotiate  or  bargain  with  them  alone. 
None  of  them  on  the  other  hand  could  enter  into  an  under- 
taking except  subject  to  parliamentary  ratification,  which 
no  one  of  them  could  command.  These  were  the  very  condi- 
tions of  the  undertaking.  It  was  in  nobody's  power  to  avoid 
the  contradictions  implied  in  these  conditions.  After  the 
exchange  of  signatures,  it  was  the  delegates'  business  to 
return  to  their  respective  Parliaments  and  obtain  their 
approval.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  fortunate  enough  having 
his  elections  behind  him  to  meet  with  no  opposition.  M. 
Clemenceau,  whom  his  enemies  sought  to  overthrow  by 
means  of  the  Treaty  before  the  general  elections  of  Novem- 
ber, 1919,  had  to  fight  for  more  than  two  months  in  the 
Chamber  finally  to  obtain  the  imposing  majority  of  372 
votes  against  53 ;  on  the  other  hand  it  took  him  but  two  days 
to  secure  the  unanimous  approval  of  the  Senate.  Mr.  Wil- 
son met  with  a  harder  fate,  singularly  aggravated  by  his 
illness  which  for  more  than  six  months  isolated  him  phys- 
ically and  intellectually  from  his  country  and  the  rest  of  the 
world.  A  campaign  lacking  strong  opposition  succeeded 
in  wrecking  the  work  of  unity  he  had  accomplished  in  Paris. 

France  from  the  point  of  view  of  her  own  interests, 
which  no  one  can  reproach  her  for  holding  dear,  deplored 
this  and  deplores  it  still,  but  it  was  not  in  her  power  to  pre- 
vent it.  All  she  could  do  was  to  take  precautions  and 
guarantees  against  this  risk  which  had  been  present  from 
the  very  first  in  the  minds  of  her  negotiators.  This  she 
did  by  obtaining  the  addition  of  the  final  paragraph  to 
Article  429  on  the  importance  of  which  I  have  laid  such 
stress.  The  future  rests  with  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  and  with  it  alone,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
national  sovereignty.  "We  know  what  we  wish  may  be  the 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  217 

outcome  for  the  sake  of  the  peace  of  the  world  in  which 
France  more  than  anyone  else  is  interested.  But  in  case 
the  hoped-for  assistance  fails  us,  we  shall  have  to  remain 
on  the  Rhine  and,  in  the  absence  of  undertakings  now 
pending  as  by  virtue  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  for  the 
common  good  of  all,  mount  guard  for  Liberty. 

II 

If  the  policy  of  union  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  was 
for  France — as  indeed  it  was  for  them — a  labour  of  love,  of 
experience  and  of  foresight,  there  was  for  my  country  yet 
another  labour,  which  experience  commanded  us  to  pre- 
pare equally  with  love  and  foresight :  a  union  with  Belgium ! 
Like  brothers  both  in  danger  and  in  misfortune,  our  two 
countries  might  have  found  in  a  more  active  pre-war  policy 
some  measure  of  protection.  Had  they  been  better  informed 
of  Germany,  less  trustful,  more  confiding  in  each  other, 
they  might  perhaps  have  held  the  German  onslaught  at  the 
start;  won  on  the  Meuse  the  Victory  of  the  Marne;  and  if 
not  by  their  own  unaided  efforts  have  decided  the  outcome 
of  the  war,  at  least  saved  from  invasion  and  from  ruin 
millions  of  acres  of  their  soil. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  Conference,  M.  Clemenceau 
attached  peculiar  importance  to  the  realization  of  this 
union.  I  shall  advance  but  one  proof.  In  our  reply  of 
March  17,*  to  the  offer  of  the  English  and  American 
Treaties,  we  ended  our  statement  of  the  clauses  which  we 
considered  essential  with  the  following1  sentence  which 
expressed  the  indissoluble  unity  of  French  and  Belgian 
interests : 

It  goes  without  saying  that  by  act  of  aggression  against  France 
the  French  Government  understands  also  any  aggression  against 
Belgium. 

Briefly  in  the  mind  of  the  French  Government  the 
destiny  of  France  and  that  of  Belgium  were  inseparable. 

(1)     See  Chapter  V,  page  182. 


218    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Our  aim  was  to  associate  them  practically.  But  to  realize 
this  association  two  preliminary  conditions  had  to  be  met ; 
first  that  a  general  plan  of  security  in  which  Belgium  should 
form  an  integral  part  be  drawn  up ;  second,  that  satisfac- 
tion in  accord  with  France,  be  given  to  the  Belgian  demands 
by  the  Conference.  M.  Clemenceau's  Government  worked 
hard,  until  its  retirement,  to  obtain  these  two  results. 
When  he  relinquished  power,  both  had  been  achieved  and 
the  way  was  open  for  the  defensive  agreement  signed  in 
August,  1920,  between  the  Governments  of  France  and 
Belgium. 

It  was  necessary,  in  order  to  build  up  the  future,  to 
first  clear  away  all  vestiges  of  a  dead  past  and  for  that 
purpose  to  obliterate  the  Treaties  of  1839 — the  burdensome 
and  unavailing  charter  of  a  violated  neutrality.  By  the 
revision  of  these  Treaties,  moreover,  Belgium  summarized 
her  various  demands.  The  unswerving  support  of  France 
was  given  her  for  the  breaking  of  this  obsolete  encum- 
brance. On  February  12,  1919,  the  Supreme  Council 
appointed  the  Commission  for  Belgian  Affairs  of  which  I 
was  chairman  and  in  accord  with  my  colleagues  I  imme- 
diately asked  for  explicit  authority  to  present  general  pro- 
posals concerning  the  revision  and  its  consequences.  Why? 
Because  knowing  the  hesitation  of  some  in  regard  to  stipu- 
lations which  necessarily  affected  a  neutral  country- 
Holland — I  wished,  before  entering  into  any  discussion  of 
details,  to  assert  and  justify  the  essential  principle  of  the 
free  existence  of  a  victorious  Belgium.  On  February  25, 
I  said  to  the  Supreme  Council : 

"There  is  only  one  question.  It  is  this,  Belgium  lived 
wholly  and  entirely  under  the  Treaties  of  1839.  The  war 
has  destroyed  these  Treaties,  and  Belgium  demands  that 
they  be  revised. 

"The  signatory  Powers  which  fought  together  in  the 
war  are  in  agreement.  President  Wilson,  in  one  of  his 
fourteen  points,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  ought  to  disappear. 

"The  Treaties  of  1839  are  signed  not  only  by  Belgium 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  219 

and  Holland,  but  by  the  Guaranteeing  Powers  two  of  which 
are  here  represented.  It  results  therefore  that,  so  long  as 
the  Great  Powers  have  not  officially  declared  that  new 
negotiations  should  be  begun  with  a  view  to  establishing 
a  new  regime  in  place  of  the  Treaties  of  1839,  we  shall  con- 
tinually encounter  the  difficulties  already  noted." 

The  delegates  of  the  Powers  were  of  this  opinion  and 
the  next  day  the  Commission  set  to  work  on  the  basis  of  my 
proposals.  Five  days  later  the  report  was  unanimously 
adopted  and  transmitted  to  the  Supreme  Council.  On  the 
points  of  law  we  recalled  first  that  the  three  Treaties  of 
1839 — between  Belgium  and  Holland  and  the  Five  Great 
Powers — by  virtue  of  their  stipulations  formed  an  indi- 
visible whole.  Three  of  the  guarantors  had  violated  their 
undertakings — Prussia  and  Austria  in  1914,  Russia  by  the 
Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk — while  two  of  them — France  and 
Great  Britain — have  honoured  their  signature.  The  sixth 
Power  among  the  signatories — Holland — had  declared  its 
neutrality.  Without  discussing  either  the  question  of  the 
manner  in  which  this  neutrality  had  been  observed,  or  that 
of  the  nullity  in  law  of  these  Treaties  by  reason  of.  the  non- 
execution  of  their  fundamental  clause,  the  Commission 
reported  in  favour  of  revision  on  the  grounds  that  Belgium, 
France,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  had  declared 
it  necessary  and  that  furthermore  it  was  the  logical  out- 
come of  the  events  of  the  past  seventy  years. 

Following  the  same  line  the  Commission  showed  the 
Treaty  of  1839  originally  negotiated  not  on  behalf  of  Bel- 
gium but  against  her  by  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  of  1815 ; 
all  the  Belgian  claims  of  1839  concerning  the  freedom  of 
the  Scheldt,  Limburg  and  Luxemburg  ruthlessly  rejected 
by  the  future  guarantors;  Belgium,  eight  years  later 
declaring  on  the  eve  of  the  signature  that  "she  was  yield- 
ing to  the  imperious  law  of  necessity.*'  Our  report  estab- 
lished that  these  Treaties  born  of  a  so-called  "higher 
interest" — foreign  in  any  case  to  Belgium  and  to  Holland 
— had,  in  no  degree  and  at  no  time,  expressed  the  self- 
determination  of  the  two  principal  countries  involved ;  and 


220    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

that  moreover  if  they  had  imposed  on  Belgium  undisputed 
and  onerous  servitudes,  they  had  not  in  the  hour  of  danger 
given  her  the  promised  security.  Much  to  the  contrary,  the 
regime  of  the  Scheldt  had  prevented  sending  supplies  to 
Antwerp.  Luxemburg  had  served  as  an  offensive  base 
for  Germany.  It  had  not  been  possible  to  hold  the  Meuse 
properly.  Dutch  Limburg  had  at  the  time  of  the  Armistice 
given  passage  to  German  troops. 

The  Commission  reported  therefore,  de  jure  et  de 
facto,  in  favour  of  revision : 

(1)  The  Treaties  of  1839  should  be  revised  in  the  totality  of 
their  clauses  on  the  joint  demands  of  the  Powers  which  consider 
this  revision  necessary. 

(2)  Holland  should  take  part  in  this  revision. 

(3)  Those  among  the  great  guaranteeing  Powers  which  have 
held  their  engagement,  should  also  take  part  in  it. 

(4)  The  Great  Powers  which  have  general  interests  repre- 
sented at  the  Peace  Conference  should  also  take  part  in  it. 

(5)  The  general  aim  of  this  revision  is  (in  accordance  with  the 
purpose  of  the  League  of  Nations)  to  liberate  Belgium  from  the 
limitations  of  sovereignty  imposed  upon  her  by  the  Treaty  of  1839, 
and  to  suppress  as  much  for  her  sake  as  for  that  of  peace  in  general 
the   various   risks   and   inconveniences   resulting   from   the    said 
Treaties. 

On  March  8,  I  presented  the  report  to  the  Supreme 
Council  which  on  the  same  day  unanimously  adopted  its 
conclusions.  The  Treaty  handed  to  Germany,  on  May  8, 
consequently  stipulated  that  the  latter,  recognizing  that 
the  Treaties  of  1839  no  longer  met  the  circumstances, 
accepted  their  abrogation  and  undertook  to  conform  to  all 
the  conventions  destined  to  replace  them,  between  Belgium 
and  the  Powers. 

There  remained  Holland.  Some  of  our  great  Allies 
would  have  preferred — and  they  made  no  secret  of  it — 
that  the  negotiation  be  carried  on  directly  between  that 
country  and  Belgium.  On  the  strength  of  the  decision  of 
March  8, 1  obtained  on  June  4,  consent  from  the  Council  of 
Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs,  after  long  discussion,  that 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  221 

the  Great  Powers  should  take  part  in  the  negotiations  along 
with  Belgium  and  Holland.  The  first  meeting  was  held  on 
July  29,  1919,  the  last  on  March  23,  1920.  This  agreement 
reached  so  laboriously  was  halted  again,  at  the  last  moment 
by  the  unjustified  claims  of  Holland  to  the  Wielingen 
Channels  which  she  herself  during  the  war  had  recognized 
as  not  belonging  to  her  territorial  waters.  In  any  case  the 
revision  of  the  Treaties  of  1839  and  its  main  consequence, 
the  abrogation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  are  no  longer  opposed 
by  anyone.  Thus  liberated  Belgium  acquires  the  right  of 
providing  for  her  own  safety.  It  is  the  birthright  of  the 
Belgian  Army  of  600,000  which  to-morrow  will  be  joined  in 
brotherly  union  with  our  own  for  the  defense  of  peace. 
France,  by  the  part  she  played  in  the  negotiations,  may 
justly  claim  an  honourable  sponsorship. 

On  principle  the  case  was  won.  But  practically  as 
regards  the  consequences,  or  at  least  some  of  them,  Bel- 
gium was  less  fortunate.  Here  two  distinct  but  contradic- 
tory currents  manifested  themselves  in  the  Belgian 
Government,  in  which  all  parties  were  represented.  The 
Socialists  said:  "No  annexation.'*  The  bourgeois  parties 
inclined  to  believe  that  to  guarantee  to  Belgium  full  mili- 
tary and  economic  security  (use  of  the  Scheldt,  canal  from 
Ghent  to  Tervueren,  canal  from  Antwerp  to  the  Meuse)  the 
simplest  solution  would  be  to  place  the  left  bank  of  the 
Scheldt  and  Dutch  Limburg  under  Belgian  sovereignty.  It 
is  superfluous  to  add  that  this  transfer  was  justified  not 
only  on  historical  ground  but  by  excellent  arguments  of 
national  security  confirmed  by  more  than  four  years  of 
war.  In  spite  of  this,  the  Belgian  case  was  put  forward 
with  hesitation.  Premises  were  presented  and  no  conclu- 
sions drawn.  Belgium  did  suggest,  however,  that  in  the 
event  of  satisfaction  being  given  her  Holland  might  receive 
compensation  either  on  the  banks  of  the  Ems,  or  in  Guel- 
ders — a  Prussian  district  inhabited  by  a  people  of  Dutch 
origin  and  tradition. 

The  Commission  for  Belgian  Affairs,  after  a  minute 
discussion,  admitted  the  principle  of  this  solution  which 


222     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

seemed  to  be  a  just  and  necessary  guarantee  of  Belgian 
security;  but  it  very  soon  appeared  that  such  a  solution — 
obviously  delicate,  as  it  implied  cession  of  territory  by 
Germany  to  a  neutral  power — would  meet  with  objections. 
As  early  as  February  11,  Mr.  Wilson  had  said: 

"I  do  not  see  how  Holland  can  be  brought  to  discuss 
this  question  of  sovereignty." 

On  March  31,  he  added: 

1  'You  ask  Germany  to  yield  German  territory  to  a  neu- 
tral country.  That  may  be  just,  but  it  is  difficult  to 
justify." 

April  4,  the  King  of  the  Belgians  insisted  in  his  usual 
clear  and  straightforward  fashion  and  expressed  astonish- 
ment at  the  objections  presented  by  the  British  Admiralty 
with  regard  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Scheldt.  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  replied  to  him: 

"If  you  wish  to  modify  the  regime  of  the  Scheldt,  we 
are  ready.  If  however  territorial  questions  are  concerned, 
it  is  another  matter." 

On  April  16, 1  was  summoned,  as  President  of  the  Com- 
mission for  Belgian  Affairs,  to  defend  the  report  of  this 
Commission  before  the  Council  of  Four.  Mr.  Hymans  was 
present.  We  both  insisted  upon  the  character  of  the  pro- 
posal, it  was — neither  more  nor  less — to  render  possible  a 
future  Dutch  and  Belgian  agreement,  which  could  hardly 
be  arranged  without  some  medium  of  exchange.  We  asked 
to  have  a  door  left  open  and  we  expressly  reserved  the 
rights  of  the  population  ~by  a  plebiscite.  We  had  the  con- 
viction that  our  suggestion  was  just  and  we  defended  it 
with  force.  In  vain.  All  cession  of  Dutch  territory  to  Bel- 
gium, and  of  German  territory  to  Holland  was  rejected  by 
the  Council. 

Henceforth,  Belgium's  territorial  claims  were  limited 
to  the  two  Walloon  districts  of  Eupen  and  Malmedy  and 
to  the  territory  of  Moresnet.  Ten  meetings  of  the  Commis- 
sion finally  led  to  a  favourable  solution  which  events  have 
since  justified ;  for  out  of  a  population  of  55,000  inhabitants 
only  266  protests  were  made  within  the  time  fixed  by  the 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  223 

Treaty.  This  was  for  Belgium,  a  very  meagre  extension  of 
territory.  The  increases  that  were  refused  would  have  been 
of  real  importance  to  her.  Belgium  despite  the  weight  of 
historical  argument  was  defeated — as  France  had  been  in 
her  demands  for  the  1814*  frontier  and  an  independent 
Rhineland.f  But  she  had  been  able  once  again  to  test  our 
country's  active  support  and  to  understand  the  need  of  a 
close  union  between  the  two  countries. 

This  union  was  riveted  still  more  firmly  by  the  result 
of  another  discussion  equally  vital  for  Belgium  and  for 
France — that  of  the  reparations.  Nothing  more  certain 
than  Belgium's  right  in  this  matter.  In  the  month  of 
April,  1914,  Herr  Bethmann-Hollweg — "Necessity  knows 
no  law" — had  himself  recognized  it.  Attacked  not  on 
political  grounds  involving  her,  but  as  a  result  of  her 
geographical  situation ;  thrust  into  the  struggle  in  violation 
of  the  Treaties  of  1839  and  of  the  Hague  Convention  of  1907 
— Belgium  had  on  February  14,  1916,  received  from  her 
Allies  by  the  declaration  of  Ste.  Adresse  the  solemn  assur- 
ance that  she  would  be  restored  and  effectively  aided  in 
her  recovery.  January  8,  1918,  President  Wilson,  in  the 
seventh  of  his  fourteen  points,  had  declared  for  "the  full 
restoration  of  Belgium."  The  bases  of  peace  announced 
on  November  5  following  had  sanctioned  this  declaration. 
Agreement  as  to  principle  was  complete.  But  its  applica- 
tion was  to  give  rise  to  difficulties. 

As  soon  as  the  Commission  and  Sub-Commission 
entrusted  by  the  Supreme  Council  with  the  study  of  the 
problem  of  reparations  began  their  work  in  February, 
1919,  the  Belgian  delegate,  M.  Van  den  Heuvel,  made  no 
secret  of  the  fact  that  he  claimed  exceptional  treatment 
for  his  country.  Other  delegates  immediately  opposed  this 
claim  on  the  ground  of  absolute  equality  for  all,  and  the 
desirability — which  was  unquestioned — of  general  solu- 
tions. I  had  met  the  same  objections  when  as  President  of 
the  Commission  formed  to  draft  the  clauses  relative  to 


*See  Chapter  VIII. 
tSee  Chapter  V. 


224    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Alsace  and  Lorraine*  I  was  obliged  to  fight  through  long 
sessions  to  obtain  departures  from  the  general  principles 
of  the  Treaty  no  matter  how  justified  in  equity.  Such  was 
the  Belgian  situation  in  February.  Neither  Belgium  nor 
France  obtained  all  she  asked.  But  we  did  get  the 
essential. 

M.  Van  den  HeuvePs  plea  was  a  strong  one.  In  order 
to  avoid  a  total  of  more  than  a  thousand  billions  which 
clearly  could  never  be  recovered,  the  Allies  did  not  demand 
from  Germany  the  reimbursement  of  their  war  expendi- 
tures. Belgium,  contractually  neutral  and  victim  of  a 
double  violation  of  international  law,  asked  that  an  excep- 
tion be  made  to  this  rule  and  Germany  be  forced  to  pay  all 
her  war  and  Government  expenditures  which  the  loans  of 
the  Allies  had  enabled  her  to  meet.  Germany  was  compelled 
to  pay  the  Allies  pensions  and  separation  allowances  in 
addition  to  reparations  for  damage  to  property.  Belgium 
asked  that  it  be  remembered  that  invaded  at  the  very  start 
of  the  war  she  had  not  been  able  to  raise  a  large  Army  and 
that  therefore  her  share  of  payments  on  account  of  pen- 
sions would  be  very  small.  Finally  under  the  two  heads 
settled  upon  by  the  Allies,  Reparations  and  Pensions,  Ger- 
many would  have  to  pay  hundreds  of  billions;  Belgium 
urged  that  as  her  share  would  be  only  a  small  one,  she 
would  in  the  ordinary  course  of  pro-rata  distribution  be 
obliged  to  wait  too  long  for  monies  of  which  she  stood  in 
urgent  need.  For  all  these  reasons,  Belgium  demanded 
privileged  treatment  and  priority,  the  exact  terms  and 
amounts  to  be  settled  later.  This  demand  was  formulated 
in  a  Note  of  March  29  which  ended  as  follows: 

Belgium  does  not  overlook  the  demands  for  reparations  that 
may  be  presented  by  other  Powers ;  but  she  thinks  she  may  legiti- 
mately claim  that  her  special  position  should  be  taken  into  account 
and  her  recovery  facilitated. 

Owing  to  the  de  jure  et  de  facto  position  in  which  it  is  placed, 
the  Royal  Government  demands  priority  for  Belgian  claims,  and 
solicits  the  aid  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  to  obtain 


"See  Chapter  VIL 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  225 

such  privilege  for  Belgium  in  the  division  of  the  indemnities  paid 
by  Germany,  so  that  the  reparation  to  which  she  is  entitled  may  be 
completely  and  rapidly  realized. 

The  opposition  of  Great  Britain's  representatives  on 
the  Commission,  which  had  been  apparent  from  the  very 
beginning  of  the  discussions,  continued  during  the  months 
of  March  and  April.  King  Albert,  at  the  meeting  on  April 
4,  was  unable  to  overcome  it.  The  British  delegates 
answered  that  Belgium's  losses  were  less  than  those  of 
other  countries,  and  that  thousands  of  soldiers  come  from 
afar  had  died  to  give  her  back  her  land.  Broad  promises 
had  been  made  at  the  time  of  the  Armistice  with  regard  to 
German  payments ;  and  it  would  not  do  for  any  Parliament 
to  be  able  to  say  that  Belgium  alone  had  benefited  from 
them.  The  resistance  was  unyielding,  and  M.  Loucheur,  in 
the  Committee  of  five  members  appointed  to  deal  with  the 
financial  questions,  could  not  break  it.  Equality  for  all; 
such  was  the  principle  adhered  to. 

Belgium  then  made  a  supreme  effort.  On  April  24  in 
two  Notes  handed  to  the  plenipotentaries,  M.  Hymans  sum- 
marized his  country's  demand.  He  no  longer  claimed  full 
priority,  but  only  a  privileged  payment  of  2,500  millions. 
He  asked  in  addition  for  the  reimbursement  of  food  relief 
expenses,  war  expenses,  and  expenses  of  administration 
while  the  Belgian  Government  was  at  Havre  and  also  the 
reimbursement  of  communal  relief  loans,  the  interprovincial 
loan  raised  to  pay  off  penalties  inflicted  by  the  Germans; 
and  of  loss  sustained  by  the  Government  on  marks  repur- 
chased at  1  fr.  25  from  Belgian  citizens.  April  29,  M. 
Hymans,  accompanied  by  M.  Van  den  Heuvel  and  M.  Van- 
dervelde,  appeared  before  the  Council  of  Four.  It  was  a 
thrilling  and  tragic  meeting,  in  which  the  three  Belgian 
Ministers  pleaded  with  their  hearts  and  their  heads,  a 
confused  meeting  in  which  the  Great  Powers  tried  in  every 
way  to  persuade  Belgium  to  keep  calm  and  be  moderate — a 
tumultuous  meeting  also  for  at  certain  moments  one  won- 
dered whether  Belgium  would  not  break  away. 


226     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

"Think  of  our  people,"  said  M.  Vandervelde,  "a  little 
people  but  one  that  trusts  you.  Do  not  refuse  what  it 
expects  and  what  it  has  a  perfect  right  to. ' ' 

"You  have  fewer  dead  than  we,"  answered  Mr.  Lloyd 
George. 

"Look  at  France,"  said  M.  Clemenceau,  "I  have  not 
always  been  satisfied  with  the  solutions  that  I  have  been 
obliged  to  accept.  Our  Parliaments  all  believe  that  we  do 
not  obtain  enough.  I  do  my  duty  and  that  is  enough  for  me. 
I  give  way  sometimes  to  solutions  which  I  feel  to  be  imper- 
fect and  even  unjust.  I  do  so  in  the  interest  of  higher 
unity.  You  think  that  you  have  not  been  given  enough.  I 
do  not  say  no.  You  ask  our  aid?  I  do  not  say  no.  But 
there  are  general  rules  against  you,  rules  the  strength  of 
which  lie  in  the  very  fact  that  they  are  general,  equal  for 
all.  Do  not  be  uncompromising  and  rest  assured  that  you 
will  never  find  us  indifferent  to  your  difficulties." 

And  France,  by  the  side  of  Belgium — France  unjustly 
attacked  and  who  in  order  to  facilitate  the  practical  accord 
of  the  Allies  did  not  claim  the  recovery  of  her  own  war 
expenses — France,  through  a  new  effort  of  her  financial 
experts,  principally  due  to  M.  Loucheur,  succeeded,  by  dint 
of  patience  and  firmness,  in  finding  a  solution  which, 
although  incomplete,  gave  Belgium  essential  advantages. 
She  was  not  reimbursed,  any  more  than  France  was,  for  her 
losses  in  marks ;  because  such  a  course  would  have  plunged 
us  into  an  abyss  of  unlimited  claims,  on  the  part  of  Bohemia, 
Poland  and  Roumania.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reimburse- 
ment of  all  the  loans  contracted  by  Belgium  up  to  the 
Armistice  was  charged  against  Germany,  and  Belgium  was 
liberated  by  the  Treaty  itself  from  her  debt  to  the  Allies. 
In  addition,  a  priority  of  2,500  millions  was  granted  to  her 
on  the  first  German  payments  to  rank  immediately  after 
the  expenses  of  occupation. 

Four  months  later,  M.  Clemenceau  declared  in  the 
Senate : 

As  far  as  priority  is  concerned,  I  have  done  something  which 
may  be  said  to  be  imprudent.  We  have  not  obtained  priority  for 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  227 

our  own  reparations . . .  and  yet,  at  a  critical  moment,  Belgium  hav- 
ing great  need  of  us,  I  pleaded  for  her  and  obtained  for  her  a 
priority  payment  of  two  and  one-half  billions.  I  was  unable  to  get 
this  priority  for  France,  but  I  got  it  for  another  country.  I  repeat 
it  was  perhaps  imprudent,  but  I  could  not  permit  that  Belgium 
should  be  left  in  the  situation  you  know  of  with  the  consent  of 
France.  (Applause.) 

Several  Senators.    You  were  right. 

From  beginning  to  end  of  the  financial  discussion,  with- 
out restriction  or  reserve  but  with  practical  foresight, 
France  had  lent  Belgium  her  active,  her  full  support. 
Honour  commanded  it.  The  result  has  justified  it. 

There  remained  a  last  question,  more  delicate  than  the 
others — that  of  Luxemburg.  More  delicate  for  it  might 
easily,  if  caution  were  not  exercised,  lead  to  at  least  an 
apparent  conflict  between  French  and  Belgian  interests. 
On  February  11, 1919,  M.  Hymans,  with  the  unanimous  sup- 
port of  Belgian  opinion,  had  declared  that  his  country, 
repudiating  all  policy  of  annexation,  counted  nevertheless 
upon  the  Powers  to  aid  in  establishing  closer  relations 
between  Belgium  and  the  Grand  Duchy — relations  justified 
by  historic  memories  and  considerations  of  security.  In 
Luxemburg,  on  the  other  hand,  many  who  desired  to  change 
the  pre-war  system  were  attracted  politically  and  econom- 
ically towards  France  rather  than  towards  Belgium.  Their 
appeal  was  heard  in  Paris  and  many  of  our  countrymen, 
especially  in  Parliament,  urged  the  blood  shed  in  our  cause 
by  so  many  Luxemburgers  as  an  argument  to  oppose  Bel- 
gian claims.  They  demanded  that  Luxemburg  should  be 
permitted  to  choose  freely,  and  that  France  should  hearken 
to  a  call  the  tenour  of  which  none  of  them  doubted. 

The  French  Government,  even  before  the  signing  of  the 
Armistice,  had  felt  these  two  contradictory  currents.  M. 
Aristide  Briand  in  his  confidential  Memorandum  to  the 
French  Ambassadors  of  February,  1917,  on  the  war  aims, 
had  avoided  any  definite  reference  to  the  solution  of  the 
Luxemburg  problem.  Five  months  later  however  on  June 
9,  1917,  M.  Ribot,  then  Premier,  had  declared  to  Baron  de 


228 

Gaiffier,  the  Belgian  Minister,  that  the  annexation  of 
Luxemburg  was  not  one  of  France 's  war  aims  and  had  for- 
mally authorized  King  Albert's  representative  to  make 
official  use  of  this  declaration.  At  the  opening  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  French  policy  had  no  other  legal  basis  than 
this  negative  affirmation.  Is  it  necessary  to  add  that  how- 
ever lively  our  sympathies  for  the  people  of  Luxemburg 
surrendered  by  its  dynasty  to  Germany  in  1914  but  now 
steadfast  in  its  desire  for  liberations,  the  will  to  give  Bel- 
gium a  proof  of  our  friendship  was  uppermost  in  all  minds  ? 

During  the  negotiations  of  1919,  M.  Clemenceau,  in 
spite  of  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  him  in  varying 
directions,  treated  these  difficult  problems  in  the  only  right 
way,  with  complete  loyalty  and  entire  frankness.  From  the 
first  day,  he  told  Belgium  what  he  would  and  what  he  could 
do.  From  the  first  day  also  he  made  clear  the  one  thing 
he  could  not  do.  Confirming  without  restriction  M.  Eibot's 
promise  he  declared: 

"France  has  in  Luxemburg  no  design  of  annexation 
either  open  or  disguised." 

Going  even  further,  he  added: 

"France  will  welcome  any  agreement  between  Belgium 
and  Luxemburg.  Not  only  will  she  rejoice  at  it,  but  she 
will  aid  it  by  every  means  in  her  power." 

The  only  restriction — and  who  could  fail  to  understand 
it — was  the  following: 

"Settle  your  own  affair  with  Luxemburg.  But  do  not 
ask  me  to  repel — by  an  official  act — affections  that  turn 
towards  France,  or  to  impose  the  Belgian  solution — a  solu- 
tion which,  in  my  opinion,  should  come  from  a  free  under- 
standing and  form  another  link  between  our  three 
countries." 

Ever  unchanging  M.  Clemenceau,  to  the  day  of  his 
retirement,  proved  to  Belgium  by  his  acts  the  sincerity  of 
his  declaration.  In  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the 
Luxemburg  Government  he  constantly  refused  to  take  any 
initiative  and  declared  his  intention  of  leaving  to  Belgium 
the  privilege  of  priority.  On  March  5  in  response  to  the 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  229 

wish  of  the  Belgians  he  intervened  to  adjourn  the  hearing 
of  the  Luxemburg  delegation  by  the  Supreme  Council.  At 
the  same  period  incidents  having  arisen  in  Luxemburg  the 
responsibility  for  which  Belgium  laid  to  a  French  general, 
this  general  was  relieved  of  his  command.  It  was  M.  Cle- 
menceau  who  in  order  to  leave  Belgium  full  liberty  of  action 
and  negotiation,  supported  on  two  occasions  the  adjourn- 
ment of  the  political  plebiscite  and  the  economic  referen- 
dum. Finally  when  on  May  28,  M.  Reuter,  Minister  of  the 
State  of  Luxemburg,  was  heard  by  the  Council  of  Four, 
these  were  the  terms  in  which  the  head  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment summed  up  the  situation: 

"We  are,  and  we  wish  to  be,  your  friends.  We  also 
want  to  be  on  the  best  terms  with  the  Belgian  people,  who 
threw  themselves  into  the  battle  with  a  heroism  that  we  can 
never  forget,  and  which  lays  us  under  great  obligations  to 
them.  As  the  political  situation  in  Luxemburg  did  not 
appear  to  us  to  be  very  clear  we  have  preferred  to  ask  you 
to  adjourn  your  plebiscite  and  your  referendum.  I  am 
glad  we  waited.  The  potential  difficulties  and  misunder- 
standings are  now  in  fair  way  to  be  settled. 

"Your  object  is  to  bring  France,  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
burg closer  together.  Belgium  has  already  begun  these 
conversations.  We  are  ready  to  join  you  in  them,  if  you 
both  desire  it.  I  do  not  want  to  force  myself  upon  you. 
If  you  desire  our  participation  in  your  conversation,  we 
shall  be  glad  to  add  thereto  our  friendship. ' ' 

It  was  in  these  conditions,  and  in  this  atmosphere  that 
a  Committee  over  which  I  presided  and  on  which  Baron  de 
Gaiffier  represented  Belgium  prepared  Articles  40  and  41 
relative  to  Luxemburg.  Germany,  under  these  articles, 
renounced  the  advantages  accruing  to  her  from  all  provi- 
sions in  the  Treaties  and  conventions  that  had  been  con- 
cluded between  herself  and  the  Grand  Duchy  from  1842  to 
1902.  Luxemburg  was  to  withdraw  from  the  German  Zoll- 
verein.  Germany  was  to  renounce  all  her  rights  in  the 
operation  of  the  railways,  and  to  adhere  in  advance,  to  all 
arrangements  relative  to  the  Grand  Duchy  that  might  be 


230    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

arrived  at  by  the  Powers.  Moreover,  according  to  Annex 
5,  Chapter  8,  she  undertook  to  deliver  to  Luxemburg  an 
annual  quantity  of  coal  equal  to  that  which  the  latter  bought 
in  Germany  before  the  war.  Thus  was  finally  achieved 
emancipation  from  the  tutelage  imposed  by  Prussia.  Full 
liberty  was  in  addition  guaranteed  to  the  Allies  for  the 
negotiation  of  further  agreements. 

At  the  end  of  1919,  the  situation  was  favourable  to  the 
definite  conclusion  of  such  agreements.  At  the  meeting  of 
the  Supreme  Council,  November  13,  M.  Clemenceau  said: 

"At  present  there  is  no  difficulty  between  France  and 
Belgium  with  regard  to  the  question  of  Luxemburg  as  a 
whole.  The  only  point  at  issue  relates  to  a  railroad  which 
Bismarck  took  from  us  in  1871.  This  technical  difficulty  is, 
moreover,  in  a  fair  way  to  be  settled."* 

Thus  by  his  unwavering  fairness  the  head  of  the  French 
Government  had  succeeded  in  negotiating  without  a  hitch 
a  question  which  through  no  fault  of  Belgium's  or  of  our 
own,  might  at  times,  by  the  very  force  of  circumstances, 
have  provoked  friction.  The  road  was  clear  for  a  complete 
and  general  agreement  between  our  neighbors  and  our- 
selves. Before  long  this  was  to  be  officially  consummated. 

On  January  6,  1920,  as  a  result  of  technical  negotiations 
between  two  members  of  the  French  and  Belgian  Govern- 
ments, M.  Loucheur  and  M.  Jaspar,  it  was  recognized 
that  a  general  conversation  was  necessary  and  possible, 
notably  with  regard  to  the  military  agreement  of  which  the 
French  representatives  in  1919,  had  occasion  to  speak 
either  with  the  King  of  the  Belgians  or  his  Ministers.  On 
January  8,  M.  Clemenceau  called  upon  Marshal  Foch  to 
take  up  the  question  and  prepare  a  plan.  On  January  18 
the  Clemenceau  Cabinet  resigned. 

The  negotiation  thus  begun — the  consequence  and  the 


•Article  67  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  substituting  the  French  Gov- 
ernment in  all  the  rights  of  the  German  Empire  over  all  the  railway  lines 
managed  by  the  Empire  Railroad  Administration,  had  placed  in  the  hands  of 
France,  the  Luxemburg  system  which  had,  moreover  been  operated  before 
1870  by  the  Compagnie  des  Chemins  de  Fer  de  1'Est.  It  was  on  this  point 
that  Belgium  has  asked  for  an  amendment. 


TREATIES  OF  GUARANTEE  231 

consecration  of  a  year  of  brotherhood  in  peace  after  four 
years  of  brotherhood  of  arms — was  carried  to  a  successful 
conclusion  by  the  Millerand  Cabinet.  Such  an  agreement 
answers  so  clearly  to  the  interests  and  feelings  of  the  two 
nations  that  it  needs  no  comment.  It  is  the  contractual 
expression  of  the  nature  of  things  and  the  instincts  of 
nations.  France  and  Belgium,  to  whom  the  war  has  taught 
so  much,  had  on  the  way  to  peace  met  the  same  obstacles. 
Great  and  loyal  Allies  without  whose  aid  their  very  exist- 
ence would  have  been  compromised  did  not  always  under- 
stand certain  of  their  claims.  Who  was  wrong  ?  Who  was 
right  1  The  future  will  tell.  In  any  case  the  policy  followed 
since  November  11,  1918,  has  tightened  bonds  forged  in 
anguish — that  is  the  main  thing!  Two  nations,  brave  and 
honest,  standing  shoulder  to  shoulder  to  uphold  their  rights 
and  make  Europe  safe,  can  look  to  the  future  with  confi- 
dence. In  the  future  as  in  the  past,  in  the  future  even  more 
than  in  the  past,  in  peace  or  in  war — if  ever  Germany  should 
resort  to  war  again — Frenchmen  and  Belgians  will  hold  for 
the  welfare  of  mankind  as  much  as  for  that  of  their  respec- 
tive lands. 

Need  I  insist — after  the  foregoing — upon  the  character 
of  these  three  Treaties — the  first  two  still  pending,  the 
third  in  force?  Whoever  may  have  doubts  as  to  their 
scope  or  origin  will  find  an  answer  in  the  ruined  cities  and 
the  devastated  regions  of  Belgium  and  of  France.  They 
are  like  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  itself,  the  work  of  men 
who  are  determined  that  it  shall  never  recur.  Menace? 
No.  Protection?  Yes.  Neither  Belgium  nor  France  can, 
to  save  the  liberty  of  the  world,  inflict  upon  themselves 
every  few  decades  the  sufferings  they  underwent  for  five 
years.  They  are  determined  that  in  the  future  the  door 
shall  be  closed  and  the  bolt  made  strong.  Moreover  these 
three  defensive  Treaties  are  within  the  scope  and  beneath 
the  control  of  the  League  of  Nations.  They  are  secret 
neither  in  their  origin  nor  in  their  clauses.  They  appear 
as — what  they  indeed  are — the  living  lesson  of  history — 
the  seed  of  a  prosperous  future.  They  are  also — and  I 


232    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

hope  that  Great  Britain  and  America  will  see  it — an  essen- 
tial factor  of  that  Peace  of  Justice  and  of  Right  which 
France,  in  complete  accord  with  her  Allies,  wanted  and 
has  achieved. 


CHAPTER  VH 

ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

WHAT  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were  to  France,  the  whole 
world  knew  on  that  day  when  the  two  provinces  acclaimed 
the  triumphant  entry  of  our  troops.  Their  loyalty  was  of 
long  standing.  As  far  back  as  the  eighteenth  century  Prus- 
sians acknowledged  it.  Read  what  at  the  time  of  the  Con- 
gress of  Utrecht,  their  Government  wrote  to  its 
plenipotentiaries : 

It  is  notorious  that  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace  are  more  French 
than  the  Parisians  and  that  the  King  of  France  is  so  sure  of  their 
attachment  to  his  service  and  his  glory  that  he  commands  them  to 
provide  themselves  with  swords,  guns,  halberds,  pistols,  powder  and 
shot,  whenever  there  is  rumour  that  the  Germans  purpose  crossing 
the  Rhine,  and  that  they  rush  in  a  body  to  the  banks  of  that  river  to 
prevent  or  at  any  rate  to  oppose  the  passage  of  the  Germanic 
nations  at  the  evident  risk  of  their  own  lives,  as  though  they  were 
marching  to  victory .... 

Were  the  Alsatians  to  be  separated  from  the  King  of  France 
whom  they  adore,  he  could  not  be  deprived  of  their  hearts  except 
by  two  hundred  years  of  bondage. 

Bismarck  knew  this  and  what  the  result  would  be.  After 
brief  hesitation,  he  nevertheless  yielded  to  Moltke's 
demands  and  to  the  theory  of  the  military  frontier.  He 
attempted  neither  to  deny  nor  to  excuse  the  outrage  per- 
petrated against  the  rights  and  the  will  of  a  people.  Just 
as  Bethmann-Hollweg  was  to  appear  in  the  Reichstag  forty- 
three  years  later,  so  Bismarck  was  in  the  same  place  on 
May  2,  1871.  Proclaiming  "the  repugnance  of  the  inhabi- 
tants for  their  separation  from  France,"  he  asserted  his 

233 


234    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

intention  of  taking  no  account  of  this.  The  representatives 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  had  just  launched  from  Bordeaux 
their  heartrending  appeal  for  justice.*  No  one  answered. 
The  "Land  of  Empire"  was  necessary  to  the  new-born 
Empire  not  only  as  a  bulwark,  but  as  cement.  It  became, 
under  the  absolute  authority  of  the  Emperor,  King  of  Prus- 
sia, the  common  property  of  the  German  States.  It  was 
the  first  Imperial  conquest,  the  first  sign  of  Empire.  But 
historically  in  a  century  of  national  aspirations,  the  annex- 
ation was  a  monstrous  solecism.  By  it  German  victory 
assumed  against  France  a  meaning  and  an  importance  it 
had  not  had  against  Austria.  For  an  indefinite  future  the 
relations  between  France  and  Germany  were  encumbered 
by  a  lien  which  precluded  harmony  or  healthy  exchanges. 
The  peace  of  the  whole  world,  to  use  President  Wilson's 
words,  "was  greatly  disturbed  thereby." 

From  1871  to  1914,  the  drama  of  two  million  men  defend- 
ing their  national  soul  against  a  powerful  Empire  went  on. 
In  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  France  and  abroad,  536,000  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers  declared  for  France.  Those  who 
remained  at  home  did  not  give  way.  With  ruthless  severity 
Germanization  fell  upon  both  provinces.  In  Government 
as  in  education,  everything  that  recalled  the  past  was 


*"The  representatives  of  Alsaee  and  Lorraine,  prior  to  any  negotia- 
tions for  peace,  have  laid  on  the  table  of  the  National  Assembly  a  declaration 
most  solemnly  stating,  in  the  name  of  both  Provinces,  their  wish  and  right  to 
remain  French. 

"Having  been  handed  over,  contrary  to  all  justice,  and  through  an  odious 
abuse  of  power,  to  the  domination  of  the  foreigner,  we  have  one  last  duty  to 
perform. 

"We  once  again  declare  to  be  null  and  void  a  treaty  which  disposes  of  us 
without  our  consent. 

"The  revindication  of  our  rights  remains  forever  open  to  each  and  all, 
according  to  the  dictates  of  our  conscience. 

' '  On  leaving  these  precincts,  where  our  dignity  will  not  allow  us  to  remain 
any  longer,  and  despite  the  bitterness  of  our  sorrow,  the  supreme  thought, 
which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  our  hearts,  is  one  of  gratitude  to  those  who,  for 
the  last  six  months,  have  unceasingly  defended  us,  as  also  of  unalterable 
attachment  to  the  Mother  country  from  which  we  have  been  so  violently  torn. 

"We  shall  still  be  with  you  in  our  prayers,  and  shall  wait,  with  full  con- 
fidence in  the  future,  for  regenerated  France  to  resume  the  course  of  her  great 
destiny. 

"Your  brothers  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  albeit  separated  for  the  time 
being  from  the  common  family,  will  retain  for  France,  absent  though  she  be 
from  their  homes,  a  filial  affection  until  the  day  when  she  returns  to  take 
again  her  place  therein. ' ' 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  235 

abolished  and  forbidden.  Men  came  and  went.  Manteuff el, 
the  two  Hohenlohe,  Wedel.  The  principle  remained  and 
never  varied  even  when  domination  made  pretense  of 
indulgence.  But  the  spirit  of  protest  never  abated  even 
when  the  exigencies  of  life  suggested  accommodation.  I 
will  refrain  from  writing  here  the  history  of  this  long 
martyrdom:  independent  newspapers  suppressed;  the 
French  language  forbidden ;  the  right  of  association  denied ; 
police  pressure  unloosed;  political  trials  multiplied;  indi- 
vidual relations  hampered  by  passport  regulations;  the 
"peace  of  the  grave"  organized  by  the  victors  under  the 
notorious  "paragraph  concerning  dictatorship."  Sepa- 
rated from  France,  refractory  to  Germany,  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  sought  refuge  in  their  own  genius ;  here  too  after 
a  few  months,  everything  this  effort  had  created — 
museums,  theatres,  magazines,  sporting  clubs  or  literary 
societies — fell  under  the  iron  hand  of  unbending  authority. 
In  1902,  the  law  -establishing  the  dictatorship  was 
repealed;  in  1911,  a  new  Constitution  was  promulgated  but 
neither  real  liberty  nor  legal  autonomy  resulted  for 
Alsace-Lorraine.  "We  have  been  swindled,"  wrote  the 
Abbe  Wetterle.  A  few  isolated  Germans  understood  the 
cleavage  which  Prussian  officialism  was  every  day  widen- 
ing between  conquerors  and  conquered.  Never  did  the 
Imperial  Government  abandon  oppression  of  those  it  felt 
unable  to  convince.  Its  active  and  often  beneficial  adminis- 
tration was  unable  to  offset  the  initial  error  and  its  conse- 
quences. Years  pass  and  antagonism  grows  more  bitter. 
In  1909  authoritarianism  turned  to  persecution.  Every 
day  brought  a  lawsuit.  Every  verdict  a  renewal  of  protest 
which  expressed  itself  in  a  thousand  ingenius  ways  that 
irritated  and  exasperated  the  dull-witted  Germans.  Expul- 
sions increase  daily  as  do  imprisonments.  Suspects  are 
hunted  down  and  then  came  the  Saverne  incident  when  a 
colonel,  setting  law  at  naught,  charges  people  in  the  streets 
and  arrests  magistrates  in  their  homes,  for  the  glory  of  an 
Army  which  he  alleges  has  been  insulted :  a  striking  epitome 
— not  only  for  the  people  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  but  also 


236    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

for  Germany  and  the  whole  world — of  the  relentless  strug- 
gle between  a  tortured  race  and  a  government  of  oppression. 
Thereafter,  the  "Land  of  Empire"  is  openly  treated  as 
enemy  country.  Spies  lurked  in  every  home.  Germans  no 
longer  even  try  to  dissimulate,  they  think  only  of  crushing 
and  of  uprooting. 

The  war  breaks  out  and  the  Imperial  Government  which 
up  till  1918  is  to  repeat  that  "there  was  no  Alsace-Lor- 
raine question,"  the  Imperial  Government  which  by  the 
mouth  of  Count  Hertling  is  to  aver  that  "Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  bound  to  Germanism  by  bonds  that  grow  daily 
stronger" — the  Imperial  Government,  I  repeat,  inflicts 
upon  the  downtrodden  provinces  an  iron-clad  regime  the 
like  of  which  history  has  never  known.  For  the  civilian 
population,  Alsatians  are  forbidden,  under  pain  of  impris- 
onment, to  post  their  letters  in  boxes  other  than  those  of 
their  own  districts.  On  January  5,  1917,  4,000  inhabitants 
of  Mulhouse,  between  seventeen  and  sixty,  are  assembled 
in  the  barracks  and  deported  to  the  interior  of  Germany. 
An  old  man  in  Strassburg,  who  took  off  his  hat  to  French 
prisoners  in  the  street,  is  sentenced  to  six  weeks '  imprison- 
ment. To  facilitate  arbitrary  repression,  newspapers  were 
forbidden  to  publish  reports  of  courts-martial.  An  Alsatian 
nun  for  protesting  against  the  destruction  of  the  Cathedral 
at  Reims  is  sent  to  prison  for  six  months.  Another,  at 
Riedisheim,  for  treating  the  French  wounded  too  kindly, 
is  sentenced  to  five  years'  hard  labour.  A  Swiss  has  com- 
puted the  sentences  passed  in  three  years  by  German 
courts-martial  upon  natives  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine;  the 
total  exceeds  5,000  years '  imprisonment.  A  label  in  French 
on  any  package  brought  fine  or  even  imprisonment  to  the 
sender.  Two  women  speak  French  in  a  tramcar:  fourteen 
days'  imprisonment.  The  mayor  of  a  commune  speaks  in 
French  to  one  of  his  fellow  townsmen:  three  months  in 
prison.  Of  course  as  soon  as  war  began  all  newspapers 
printed  in  French  were  suppressed.  The  governor  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  summed  up  the  situation  in  1915  in  a 
proclamation  which  brands  the  inhabitants  as  traitors, 


ALSACE  AND  LOREAINE  237 

14,000  of  them  having,  at  the  risk  of  their  lives  joined  the 
French  Army  in  August,  1914. 

Meanwhile,  Alsatian  recruits  already  conscripted  when 
the  war  began,  serve  in  the  Germany  Army.  They  are  sub- 
jected to  savage  persecution.  A  general  order  prescribed 
special  treatment  for  all  soldiers,  natives  of  Alsace  or 
Lorraine:  more  stringent  postal  censorship:  no  leave: 
police  supervision  and  corporal  punishment.  An  Alsatian 
soldier  complains  of  having  had  nothing  to  eat :  his  lieuten- 
ant and  adjutant  horsewhip  him  till  he  faints  beneath 
their  blows.  Another  officer  instructs  his  sergeants  to 
4 'break  in  well  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  who  are  all 
bandits  and  traitors. "  It  is  ordered  that  they  be  stationed 
in  the  most  dangerous  places  and  everywhere  regarded  as 
suspects.  In  the  course  of  the  battles  of  1918,  we  captured 
on  prisoners  several  hundred  such  orders.  Among  them 
I  will  quote  two :  one  in  which  it  is  laid  down  that  German 
troops,  quartered  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  are  to  conduct  them- 
selves "as  in  enemy  country'*;  the  other,  issued  by  General 
Loewenfeld,  commanding  the  Prussian  Guard,  where  one 
may  read:  "The  Lorrainers  do  not  belong  to  our  race." 
Herr  von  Kuhlmann  said  in  December,  1917 :  '  *  There  is  no 
Alsace-Lorraine  question."  To  this  piece  of  ministerial 
impudence  fit  answer  was  given  throughout  the  war  by 
the  acts  of  German  civil  and  military  authorities.  Besides, 
was  it  not  a  deputy  for  Saxony,  the  Socialist  Wendel,  who 
declared  to  the  Reichstag  on  June  7, 1918 :  ' '  If  a  vote  of  the 
people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  were  taken  to-day,  four-fifths 
— that  is  to  say,  the  whole,  minus  the  German  immigrants — 
would  vote  in  favour  of  France." 

n 

In  France  all  parties  without  distinction,  in  peace  as  in 
war,  have  lived  the  martyrdom  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  * '  Think 
of  them  always, ' '  said  Gambetta.  And,  twenty  years  later, 
Jaures  answered  this  appeal:  "Alsace  and  Lorraine  are 
like  two  trees  which  may  be  separated  from  the  forest  by 


238    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

a  wall  but  whose  far-reaching  roots  extend  beneath  the 
enclosure  and  rejoin  the  roots  of  the  main  forest."  The 
French  did  not  declare  a  war  of  revenge.  But  when  the 
conqueror  of  1870  renewed  his  criminal  aggression,  the 
recovery  of  the  two  provinces  became,  with  the  defense  of 
French  soil,  the  instinctive  war  object  of  the  nation.  On 
that  point  neither  hesitation  nor  doubt.  Full  recovery,  pure 
and  simple,  was  a  natural  right. 

By  no  means  all  the  Allied  Governments  and  people  had 
during  the  war  an  equally  clear  understanding  of  the  mani- 
fest justice  of  our  claim.  Take  Great  Britain,  for  example. 
Up  to  the  last  moment,  the  more  advanced  Liberals 
accepted  the  idea  of  the  return  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to 
France  only  under  express  reservations.  The  least  unrea- 
sonable demand  a  plebiscite  which  the  conscience  of  France 
rejects  as  an  outrage  against  truth  and  a  challenge  to  jus- 
tice. Others  (read  the  articles  published  in  the  Nation, 
Manchester  Guardian  and  Labour  Leader) — go  further 
still  and  demand  that,  when  peace  is  declared,  "both  the 
annexed  provinces,  by  universal  and  solemn  Treaty,  be 
placed  under  the  guardianship  of  all  the  belligerent  Powers, 
America  included."  An  influential  pacifist,  M.  Snowden, 
writes  at  the  same  time  (end  of  1917)  that  "if,  in  the  ques- 
tion of  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  Allies  persist  in  their  present 
.attitude,  the  war  will  not  be  finished  either  in  1917  or  in 
1918."  On  January  18,  1918,  a  delegate  of  the  Trades 
Unions,  received  by  the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
asks  him  this  question  which  reveals  both  suspicion  and 
lack  of  understanding: 

"Is  it  the  people  of  France  or  the  people  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  who  complain  of  the  latter 's  present  situation?" 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  himself  hesitated  long  before  he 
asserted  the  conviction  which  will  for  ever  honour  his 
speech  of  January  5,  1918:  "The  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  a  sore,  which,  for  the  last  half  century,  has 
infected  the  peace  of  Europe.  Normal  conditions  cannot 
be  re-established  before  it  is  cured. . .  .We  mean  to  support 
the  French  Democracy  to  the  death,  when  it  calls  for  a 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  239 

revision  of  the  great  iniquity  perpetrated  in  1871."  Six 
months  earlier,  on  July  14,  1917,  he  had  not  thought  the 
question  sufficiently  clear  in  the  minds  of  his  fellow 
countrymen  to  warrant  his  being  present  at  the  banquet  to 
which  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  in  England  had  invited 
him.  Up  to  the  very  end  of  the  war,  the  special  case — 
unique  and  clear — presented  by  the  Alsace-Lorraine  ques- 
tion, was  persistently  misunderstood  by  a  portion  of 
British  public  opinion. 

In  America  the  same  misunderstanding  prevailed  to  an 
even  greater  extent.  On  my  arrival  in  Washington  on 
May  15,  1917,  as  High  Commissioner  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic, I  at  once  noticed  that,  however  sincere  the  affection  of 
America  for  France,  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was 
misunderstood  by  the  majority.  For  most  Americans, 
Alsace  was  a  German-speaking  country.  That  settled 
everything.  They  were  ignorant  both  of  the  facts  and  the 
feelings,  as  well  as  of  the  incomparable  example  of  moral 
loyalty  displayed  for  nearly  fifty  years  by  these  people, 
hard  and  staunch  as  granite.  They  hesitated  to  take  the 
word  of  Alsatians  in  America  who,  when  speaking  of  the 
sufferings  and  the  hopes  of  their  native  land,  did  so  with 
an  accent  which  though  foreign,  was  not  French.  More- 
over, every  country  in  Europe — not  without  abuses  of 
analogy — professed  to  have  its  own  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Italians,  Serbians,  Greeks,  Roumanians,  Poles,  to  justify 
certain  pretentious  warranted  in  principle  but  very  differ- 
ent in  historical  evolution  from  the  case  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
never  tired  of  evoking  Metz  and  Strassburg;  and  this  gen- 
eralization alarmed  timid  minds  which  regarded  all  terri- 
torial claims  as  germs  of  war.  How  often  Americans  have 
expressed  to  me  the  hope  that  France  would  be  content 
with  an  independent  and  neutral  Alsace-Lorraine!  How 
many  expressed  surprise  when,  to  the  statement  of  our 
rights,  I  added  that  their  obvious  justice  made  a  plebiscite 
useless  and  unacceptable.  I  remember  a  long  discussion  I 
had  in  August,  1917,  with  Mr.  Walter  Lippmann,  a  member 
of  the  Inquiry  Office,  the  official  bureau  established  for 


210    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  advance  study  of  peace  questions:  the  idea  of  a  plebi- 
scite was  so  deeply  rooted  in  his  mind — the  idea  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  forming  an  integral  part  of  France  was  so 
perfectly  foreign  to  him — that  he  had  concocted  a  system 
of  voting  by  fragments  under  which  the  two  provinces 
would  be  divided  into  a  dozen  sections.  Two  hours  of 
explanation  were  needed  to  dissuade  him  from  a  scheme  at 
which  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  would  have  been  the 
first  dismayed  could  they  have  known  of  it. 

A  few  months  later  this  state  of  opinion  was  entirely 
changed.  I  venture  to  believe  that  the  activities  of  my 
co-workers  and  of  myself,  the  15,000  lectures  in  English 
where  young  officers,  with  all  the  authority  of  their  war 
record  and  of  their  wounds,  presented  the  pitiful  situation 
of  the  captive  provinces,  had  something  to  do  with  this 
transformation.  On  May  10,  1918,  in  introducing  in  New 
York  at  an  impressive  ceremony,  a  company  of  chasseurs 
a  pied,  which  I  had  asked  M.  Clemenceau  to  place  at  my 
disposal  for  the  third  Liberty  Loan  campaign,  I  described 
the  convict  system  enforced  in  Alsace-Lorraine  and  added : 
"If,  as  alleged  by  Kuhlmann  and  Scheidemann,  there  is  no 
Alsace-Lorraine  question ;  if,  as  Hertling  avers,  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  are  bound  to  Germanism  by  ever  tightening 
bonds,  then  I  ask  why  Germany  has  for  the  last  four  years, 
been  treating  Alsace-Lorraine  as  a  conquered  country;  I 
ask  why  the  regulations  which  she  applied  to  those  prov- 
inces are  even  more  savage  than  those  to  which  Belgium 
and  Northern  France  have  been  subjected.'7  I  was 
answered  by  tremendous  cheers.  At  my  side,  stood  M. 
Daniel  Blumenthal,  former  mayor  of  Colmar,  who,  by  the 
reorganization  under  his  presidency  of  the  Associations  of 
Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  in  America,  had  afforded  me  the 
most  valuable  assistance.  Thousands  of  huge  posters, 
reproducing  Henner's  "Alsacieime,"  with  the  text  of  the 
Bordeaux  protest  referred  to  above,  had  carried  the  mean- 
ing and  scope  of  our  claim  to  every  state  of  the  Union. 
Support  came  from  all  sides.  The  battle  was  won. 

In   this   success  which   does  honour  to   the   heart   of 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  241 

America,  Americans  themselves,  particularly  university 
men,  worked  with  us.  French  gratitude  must  assign  a 
place  apart  to  the  eminent  university  man  who  presided 
over  the  destinies  of  the  United  States.  On  January  8, 
1918,  at  11  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a  gentleman  connected 
with  the  White  House  telephoned  me:  "The  President  is  to 
read  a  message  to  Congress  at  noon.  Come.  You  will  be 
pleased."  An  hour  later,  I  heard  President  Wilson, 
before  the  Senate  and  House,  which  stood  to  cheer  him, 
utter  the  famous  words:  "The  wrong  done  to  France  by 
Prussia  in  1871,  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine  which  has 
unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years, — 
should  be  righted  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be 
made  secure  in  the  interest  of  all." 

Of  all  the  public  declarations  of  our  Allies  upon  this 
essential  matter  this  was  the  clearest  and  most  comprehen- 
sive. The  President  formulated  the  axiom  of  pure  and 
simple  reparation  of  an  international  outrage.  It  excluded 
at  the  same  time  the  insultingly  illegitimate  solutions  of 
neutrality  and  of  a  plebiscite.  Lastly,  it  gave  to  the  prob- 
lem of  Alsace-Lorraine  its  full  significance  not  only  from 
a  French  but  from  a  human  standpoint;  its  true  symbolic 
value  of  a  triumph  of  justice  and  liberty.  A  few  days  later, 
replying  to  the  President  of  the  Association  of  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers,  Mr.  Wilson  telegraphed  his  hope  that 
"the  year  1918  would  see  the  realization  of  the  deferred 
hopes  of  Alsace-Lorraine."  And  as,  owing  to  controversies 
in  the  Press,  M.  Pichon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
wished  to  have  from  the  President  himself  a  definite  inter- 
pretation of  his  words,  Mr.  Wilson  answered,  smiling: 

*  *  I  think  I  have  spoken  clearly.  To  right  a  wrong  means 
only  one  thing — to  put  things  back  in  the  state  where  they 
were  before  the  wrong  was  done.  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
must  be  placed  purely  and  simply  in  the  situation  they 
were  in  before  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort." 

A  Frenchman  would  not  have  spoken  otherwise.  More- 
over, the  President's  conviction  was  of  long  standing. 

"When  I  was  a  boy,"  he  told  me  one  day,  "I  could  never 


242    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

think  of  Alsace-Lorraine  without  sorrow.  For  half  a  cen- 
tury, they  had  the  unique  privilege  of  representing  violated 
justice  in  the  eyes  of  the  entire  universe.  In  the  world's 
history,  there  is  no  parallel  of  their  case." 

From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  Peace  Conference, 
President  Wilson  was  for  all  our  Alsace-Lorraine  pro- 
posals, a  staunch  and  active  friend.  Just  as  by  his  supreme 
authority,  he  had  welded  the  public  opinion  in  his  country 
on  the  principle  of  the  case,  so,  in  its  application,  he  loyally 
helped  us  in  securing  the  necessary  guarantees.  I  wish 
here  to  express  to  him  my  deep  gratitude. 

On  July  14,  1918,  at  Mount  Vernon,  on  the  annual  pil- 
grimage to  Washington's  tomb,  each  of  the  races  repre- 
sented in  the  American  people  sent  delegates  to  speak  in 
their  name.  When  the  turn  came  for  Americans  of  French 
origin,  it  was  an  Alsatian  who  stepped  forward  and,  on  the 
verdant  slopes  which  rise  from  the  banks  of  the  Potomac 
to  the  wooded  heights  above,  a  tremendous  cheer  greeted 
Alsace,  as  the  spokesman  of  France.  All  America  had 
understood. 

in 

Once  the  Conference  began,  our  rights  were  never  again 
challenged  from  any  quarter.  But  when  it  came  to  its 
application,  many  difficulties  arose,  some  of  which  were  of 
a  moral,  others  of  a  material  order,  but  had  the  same 
origin. 

Our  Allies  were  willing  in  principle  to  entertain  our 
demands.  But  it  was  their  understanding  that  this  should 
be  subject  to  the  same  procedure  and  rules  as  applied  to 
the  other  chapters  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  France  on  the 
contrary  considered  that  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine — 
not  being  like  any  other — should  be  settled  in  strict  equity, 
even  at  the  expense  of  precedent.  We  wished  that  by  its 
preamble  and  its  clauses,  that  portion  of  the  Treaty  relat- 
ing to  Alsace-Lorraine  should  bring  out  the  unique  charac- 
ter of  a  restitution  consecrated  by  universal  conscience  as 
much  as  by  the  wave  of  joy  which  overwhelmed  our  troops 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  243 

after  the  Armistice  and  which  caused  one  of  our  Socialists 
to  say : ' '  The  plebiscite  is  over.  ' '  We  wished  that  by  reason 
of  its  unique  character  this  restitution  should  be  accom- 
panied both  as  regards  persons  and  property  by  special 
conditions.  And  when  we  were  told  that  what  we  wanted 
was  contrary  to  the  general  principles  of  the  Treaty,  we 
replied:  "All  the  more  reason."  Any  Frenchman,  in  our 
place,  would  have  felt  and  spoken  as  we  did.  Let  us  not 
blame  foreigners — even  Allies — for  having  felt  otherwise. 
The  soul  of  each  nation  has  its  secret  garden. 

I  was  personally  responsible  for  this  negotiation  as 
President  of  a  Committee  of  three  members,  on  which  Mr. 
Charles  H.  Haskins  represented  the  United  States,  and 
Mr.  Headlam  Morley,  Great  Britain.  I  had  cause  to  con- 
gratulate myself  upon  the  friendly  understanding  of  both 
of  my  eminent  colleagues.  But  the  dozen  experts,  by 
whom  each  was  accompanied,  at  times  gave  me  great 
trouble.  Like  all  my  compatriots,  I  was  inclined  to  think 
that  our  claims  in  connection  with  Alsace-Lorraine  called 
for  no  discussion  whatever  and  were  a  foregone  conclusion. 
Ten  meetings  lasting  four  hours  each,  in  which  Mr.  Keynes 
poured  out  his  pro-German  views,  taught  me  that  with 
specialists  feeling  forfeits  its  rights.  Without  returning  to 
the  history  of  this  long  and  minute  controversy,  I  will  by 
a  few  examples  show  the  difficulties  encountered  and  the 
results  obtained. 

I  asked  first  of  all  that  the  Allied  Powers,  and  Germany 
with  them,  should  recognize  the  moral  grounds  for  the 
arrangements  to  be  made.  Some  opposition  shows  itself: 
Do  we  propose  to  write  a  preliminary  explanation  for  each 
article!  I  replied  that  no  article  could  be  compared  with 
this,  that  its  meaning  and  importance  to  mankind  had  been 
recognized  by  all  the  Allies.  I  added  that  it  was  not  enough 
for  Germany  to  give  up  what  she  had  stolen ;  that  she  must 
also  confess  her  guilt  and  admit  the  justice  of  the  penalty. 
Satisfaction  was  given  us  by  the  following  paragraph: 

The  High  Contract  ing-Parties  (thus  including  Germany)  recog- 


244    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

nizing  the  moral  obligation  to  redress  the  wrong  done  by  Germany 
in  1871,  both  to  the  rights  of  France  and  to  the  wishes  of  the  pop- 
ulation of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  which  were  separated  from  their 
country  in  spite  of  the  solemn  protest  of  their  representative  at  the 
Assembly  of  Bordeaux,  agree  upon  the  following  articles : 

In  compliance  with  this  principle,  the  Treaty  defined 
the  nature  of  the  restitution,  the  principle  of  which  has 
just  been  laid  down.  According  to  a  wording  nowhere  elso 
used  in  the  Treaty,  the  two  provinces  were  "restored  to 
French  sovereignty."  They  were  so  restored  contrary  to 
what  was  done  for  other  territorial  transfers,  not  as  from 
the  date  on  which  the  Treaty  of  Peace  was  signed,  but  as 
from  the  date  of  the  Armistice  concluded  on  November  11, 
1918.  Their  emancipation  de  facto,  in  this  particular  case, 
sufficed  to  establish  the  right.  The  consequences  were 
at  once  apparent  in  the  section  concerning  nationality. 

Here  again  the  clauses  demanded  by  the  French  negotia- 
tors, pursuant  to  the  programme  prepared  by  the  authori- 
ties of  Alsace-Lorraine,  were  prompted  by  the  idea  of 
reintegration  and  restoration.  They  differed  on  some 
important  points  from  those  which  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
applied  to  cessions  of  territory  in  general.  In  all  other 
cases,  the  right  of  option  in  favour  of  the  ceding  Nation 
was  admitted.  We  rejected  and  caused  to  be  set  aside  this 
procedure.  In  Alsace-Lorraine,  there  is  no  right  of  option 
in  favour  of  the  Germans.  On  the  contrary,  the  French 
Government  alone  has  the  right,  under  the  Treaty  and  in 
the  exercise  of  its  restored  sovereignty,  to  confer  the  title 
of  " Frenchmen"  to  true  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  which 
it  recognizes  as  such.  For  this  it  alone  has  power  to  deter- 
mine the  limits  of  reintegration  pleno  jure  as  well  as  the 
conditions  with  which  Germans,  who  may  seek  naturaliza- 
tion, must  comply.  In  short  we  have  here  in  this  matter  of 
paramount  importance  an  integral  resurrection  of  our  right 
which  makes  manifest  by  penal  dispositions  unlike  any- 
thing else  in  the  Treaty,  the  criminal  character  of  the 
annexation.  Other  clauses,  relating  also  to  persons,  are 
based  upon  the  same  principle:  fines  inflicted  by  Germany 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  245 

to  be  refunded  by  her ;  judgments  rendered  by  the  civil  or 
commercial  courts,  since  August  3,  1914,  between  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers  and  Germans  not  to  be  executory  until 
confirmed, — sentences  for  political  offenses  or  misde- 
meanours after  the  same  date  to  be  quashed.  All  this  was 
only  just  in  view  of  the  special  situation  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, but  to  obtain  this  justice  in  derogation  of  the 
ordinary  rules  entailed  several  days '  effort. 

After  questions  affecting  persons  came  questions  relat- 
ing to  interests.  Here  the  difficulty  took  shape;  for  we 
were  claiming  exemptions  refused  to  others  in  clauses,  the 
effects  of  which  would  amount  to  millions  for  each  of  the 
Allies.  I  am  referring  to  the  taking  over  of  national  debts, 
the  repurchase  of  public  property,  of  sequestrations  and 
industrial  organization.  For  all  territories  transferred, 
the  Treaty  stipulated  the  assumption  by  the  Nation  in 
whose  favour  the  cession  was  made  of  a  portion  of  the  pub- 
lic debt  of  the  ceding  Nation.  By  derogation  from  Article 
254  I  asked  and  obtained — Bismarck  having  boasted  in 
1871  of  having  assumed  no  portion  of  the  French  debt  on 
Germany's  behalf — that  Article  254  should  not  apply  to 
Alsace-Lorraine.  Article  256  stipulated  that  Powers,  to 
whom  German  territories  were  transferred,  would  acquire 
all  property  or  real  estate  belonging  to  the  Empire  or  to 
the  States  located  within  such  territories  and  that  the  value 
thereof  should  be  placed  to  Germany's  credit  by  the  Repara- 
tions Commission;  I  asked  and  obtained,  despite  this 
formal  provision,  despite  the  enormous  increment  of  cer- 
tain State  properties — railways,  for  instance — since  1871 
that  France  should  have  nothing  to  pay.  Belgium  alone 
obtained  a  like  privilege  in  respect  to  the  territories  of 
Malmedy  and  Eupen.  By  certain  no  less  legitimate,  but 
no  less  exceptional  enactments,  we  obtained  recognition  of 
our  right  to  sequestrate  and  dispose  of  all  property  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  belonging  to  Germans,  as  well  as  of  the 
right  to  prohibit  hereafter  all  German  participation  in 
private  enterprises  of  public  interest,  such  as  mines,  elec- 
tric power  stations,  etc and  lastly,  of  the  right  to  annul 


246     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

all  German  interests  in  the  exploitation  of  potash  deposits. 
By  this  clear-cut  and  total  suppression,  the  rights  of  France 
were  wholly  restored — a  matter  of  no  less  importance  to 
us  than  the  material  advantages  assured  by  the  foregoing 
clauses.  What  a  conflict  of  arguments  before  reaching 
this  point!  When  at  last  Mr.  Keynes,  who  had  led  the 
attack,  saw  that  he  had  lost,  he  left  our  conference  room 
with  an  angry  gesture.  He  has  vented  his  spite  in  his 
notorious  book.  Mr.  Keynes  has  his  book.  France  has  the 
Treaty.  So  all  is  well! 

Some  articles  remained  in  abeyance  in  which  the  posi- 
tion of  France  was  even  more  delicate.  To  leave  to  victory 
its  full  moral  significance,  we  had  asked  and  obtained  the 
solemn  and  absolute  severing  of  all  bonds  forged  by  might 
between  Germany  and  Alsace-Lorraine.  But,  in  some 
things,  perfectly  respectable  interests  made  it  necessary 
to  maintain  temporarily  economic  relations,  which  this  rup- 
ture would  have  jeopardized.  And  again  it  was  necessary 
in  view  of  the  ruins  caused  by  the  war,  that  the  maintenance 
of  such  relations,  indispensable  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  should 
not  entail  to  the  benefit  of  Germany  the  reciprocity  gener- 
ally prescribed  in  like  matters  by  the  Treaty ;  indeed,  this 
reciprocity  would  only  too  obviously  have  tempted  the 
Germans  to  try  by  commercial  and  industrial  infiltration, 
to  regain  possession  of  everything  that  a  just  victory  had 
so  recently  taken  from  them  and  restored  to  us.  After  what 
I  have  said  of  the  state  of  mind  of  the  Allies '  experts,  it  can 
be  guessed  how  easy  this  was.  Despite  the  difficulty, 
France  succeeded  in  obtaining  both  for  herself  and  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  all  essential  guarantees :  the  right  for  a  period  of 
five  years  to  a  special  customs  treatment  without  reciproc- 
ity for  Germany;  the  guaranteed  supply — for  ten  years 
and  at  the  same  rates  as  to  Germans — of  the  electric  current 
from  the  power  stations  on  the  left  bank ;  the  water  power 
of  the  Rhine  in  its  course  through  Alsace ;  the  maintenance 
of  private  contracts  with  exclusive  power  to  the  French 
Government  to  cancel  them — the  maintenance  in  Germany 
and  under  German  law  of  the  industrial,  literary  and  artis- 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  247 

tic  rights  of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers.  Each  of  these 
derogations  entailed  hours  of  discussion.  The  final  discus- 
sion lasted  five  days,  it  was  over  the  port  of  Kehl.  This 
port  created  by  Germany  just  opposite  Strassburg  and 
splendidly  equipped  had  been  purposely  used  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  Alsatian  port.  If,  after  the  signature  of  Peace, 
Kehl  were  to  be  free  to  compete  in  any  way  it  chose,  Strass- 
burg would  be  finally  throttled.  So  we  asked  that  for  a 
certain  number  of  years  Strassburg  should  be  afforded  the 
possibility  of  organizing  itself  and  that  with  this  in  view 
the  two  ports  should  during  this  period  be  placed  under  a 
single  management.  Objections  rained  upon  us :  Kehl  is  a 
German  port:  a  German  port  cannot  be  placed  under  a 

French   comptroller Our  only   reply   was   to   ask   the 

experts  to  make  an  investigation  on  the  spot;  as  soon  as 
they  got  back;  our  demand,  contrary  to  precedent  but  in 
accordance  with  equity,  was  acceded  to.  Its  success  is 
recorded  in  the  Treaty. 

France  saw  herself  on  the  other  hand  obliged  to  comply 
with  the  ordinary  rule  on  two  other  questions,  which  the 
Council  of  Four  finally  decided:  that  of  redeeming  the 
marks  and  that  of  reparations.  In  Alsace-Lorraine  as  in 
our  liberated  regions  and  in  Belgium,  the  national  Govern- 
ment had  redeemed  from  the  inhabitants,  at  the  rate  of 
francs  1.25,  the  marks  put  in  compulsory  circulation  by  the 
German  authorities  during  their  occupation.  It  had  con- 
sequently suffered  the  loss  caused  by  the  depreciation  of 
that  currency.  France  and  Belgium  demanded,  not  with- 
out reason,  that  this  loss  be  borne  by  Germany.  The  Peace 
Conference  decided  otherwise,  to  avoid  the  contingent  effect 
of  such  a  principle  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  where 
Germany  had  abused  the  compulsory  circulation  of  her 
currency  to  an  even  greater  extent.  Had  this  debt  been 
admitted  a  bottomless  pit  would  have  been  opened  in  the 
reparations  fund.  This  decision,  albeit  well  grounded, 
clearly  did  not  permit  the  reimbursement  of  the  loss  sus- 
tained on  marks  in  Alsace-Lorraine  more  especially  as,  up 
to  the  time  of  the  Armistice,  the  mark  had  been  the  legal 


248     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

currency  in  that  country.  So  the  French  Government  itself 
bore  the  whole  loss  from  which  by  redeeming  the  marks  at 
francs  1.25,  it  had  saved  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers.  A 
like  solution  prevailed  as  regards  the  damages  sustained  by 
Alsatians  and  Lorrainers,  which  were  not  placed  to  the 
debit  of  Germany.  An  injustice,  at  first  sight ;  why  make 
a  distinction  between  the  damage  sustained  at  Bacearat  in 
France,  for  which  Germany  has  to  pay,  and  the  damage 
sustained  at  Thann,  in  Alsace,  for  which  she  does  not  have 
to  pay?  Here  again  the  decision  was  dictated  by  prudence 
for  although  the  destructions  in  Alsace-Lorraine  were  rela- 
tively of  slight  importance,  other  transferred  territories, 
such  as  those  which  passed  to  Poland  and  Roumania,  would 
have  been  very  difficult  to  verify.  The  reparations  to  the 
countries  most  severely  damaged  by  five  years  of  fighting 
would  have  been  correspondingly  reduced.  The  Confer- 
ence thought  it  better  not  to  run  the  risk. 

Such  as  it  is,  the  chapter  of  the  Treaty  dealing  with 
Alsace-Lorraine  presents  a  character  of  pure  justice  and 
draws  from  the  war  one  of  its  grandest  conclusions.  Vio- 
lated right  restored  to  the  full  at  the  very  point  where 
violation  had  attained  in  modern  times  the  maximum  of  its 
cynical  brutality.  To  the  full  also  is  wiped  out  the  wrong 
done  both  to  these  two  provinces  and  to  France  and  all 
proper  steps  are  taken  to  prevent  any  of  its  consequences 
continuing  in  time  of  peace.  It  is  to  the  honour  of  the 
Allies  that  they  thus  recognized  that  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
had  all  through  Europe,  infused  life  into  the  national  ideal 
for  which  they  had  fought  and  by  which  they  had  con- 
quered. At  the  sight  of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers,  suffer- 
ing patient  and  undaunted  for  more  than  fifty  years, 
Bohemia,  downtrodden  for  centuries,  began  again  to  dream 
of  liberty;  Poland,  divided  into  three  enslaved  parts,  con- 
ceived possible  an  improbable  restoration.  It  was  in  Strass- 
burg  and  in  Metz  that  the  Tyrol,  the  Trient,  Istria,  Croatia, 
Slovania,  Transylvania,  the  Greeks  of  Macedonia  and  Asia, 
the  Belgians  of  the  Walloon  cantons  and  the  Danes  of 
Schleswig  found  abundant  reason  not  to  despair  of  the 


ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE  249 

future.  It  was  at  Alsatian  firesides  that  all  oppressed 
nationalities  kindled  their  hopes  of  redemption  or  of 
rebirth.  All  these  hopes  and  all  these  aspirations  were  fed 
by  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Quickeners  of  French  energies, 
our  oppressed  brothers  have  quickened  all  the  national 
energies  of  the  present  age.  And  as  a  crowning  act  of 
justice,  the  Treaty  which  liberated  them,  has  carried  to 
darkest  Europe  the  same  resplendent  message  of  freedom. 
In  December,  1917,  Herr  von  Kuhlmann,  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  German  Empire,  cried:  "Alsace- 
Lorraine?  Never!"  Less  than  two  years  later  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  gave  to  the  arrogance  of  this  German  Minister 
the  reply  of  the  universal  conscience  of  mankind.  Might — 
this  time — served  Right! 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  SAERE   BASIN 

THE  problem  of  the  Sarre  Basin  was  one  of  those  which 
the  American  delegates  to  the  Peace  Conference,  and  the 
United  States  as  a  whole,  least  understood.  It  is  the  only 
one  that  led  to  disagreement  between  the  French  and 
American  representatives.  It  lasted  ten  days  and  at  times 
assumed  an  aspect  of  conflict.  It  was  the  basis  of  the  most 
outrageous  attacks  upon  my  country.  All  the  more  reason, 
therefore,  for  leaving  nothing  in  the  dark.  I  shall  follow 
the  negotiations  day  by  day,  and  publish  the  documents, 
hitherto  secret,  but  which  France  has  no  need  to  hide,  to 
regret  or  to  withdraw. 

A  difficult  problem,  indeed,  for  it  had  two  aspects:  an 
economic  aspect  because  of  the  coal  mines,  the  ownership 
of  which  was  essential — in  equity  and  in  fact — to  a  nation 
systematically  ruined  by  Germany;  and  a  moral  and  his- 
toric aspect  because  a  large  part  of  this  territory  was 
inhabited  by  people  French  by  race,  by  tradition  and  by 
aspiration,  which  the  Treaties  of  1814  had  left  to  France 
and  which  violence  alone  had  torn  from  her  in  1815.  A 
difficult  problem  also  because  its  two  elements  were  geo- 
graphically contradictory.  When,  strong  in  our  national 
right,  we  demanded  the  return  of  these  French  people 
wrested  from  us  by  the  Treaty  of  1815,  and  strong  in  our 
right  to  reparations,  we  demanded  the  coal  mines  of  the 
basin,  we  were  confronted  on  the  map  with  an  undeniable 
conflict  between  these  two  claims.  The  frontier  of  1814 
would  have  given  us  but  a  part,  and  the  less  important  part, 
of  this  coal  basin.  On  the  other  hand,  the  basin  itself,  while 
exceeding  by  700  square  kilometers  on  the  north,  the  terri- 

250 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  251 

tory  included  between  the  frontiers  of  1814  and  1815, 
enclosed  only  a  part  of  these  territories.  In  other  words, 
our  claim  to  the  soil  did  not  coincide  with  our  claim  to  the 
sub- soil,  and  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  could  be 
abandoned. 

The  conclusion  was  evident.  Justified  in  claiming  the 
mines  as  a  whole,  incapable  of  insuring  their  operation  on 
Germany  territory  without  serious  industrial,  administra- 
tive and  political  guarantee ;  morally  obliged  and  naturally 
anxious  on  historical  and  sentimental  grounds  to  recover 
the  frontier  of  1814;  bound  by  our  war  aims  to  forego  any 
forcible  annexation,  we  had,  of  necessity,  to  find  a  mixed 
solution,  economic  and  political ;  applicable  in  its  first  part 
south  of  the  1814  frontier,  in  its  second  part  north  of  that 
line.  And  nothing  but  the  combination  of  these  two  solu- 
tions could  satisfy  the  double  claim  which  it  was  our  duty 
to  press. 

This  statement  explains  the  difficulties  encountered. 
These  difficulties  were  not  underestimated  by  the  French 
delegations  and  they  were  met  with  frankness  in  a  Memor- 
andum which  I  myself  drew  up.  Its  more  salient  portion 
I  reproduce  here,  as  it  has  never  before  been  published. 

MEMORANDUM  PRESENTED  BY  THE  FRENCH 
DELEGATION 


Restitution 

The  region  under  consideration  was  for  many  centuries  united 
to  France  and  was  only  separated  from  her  by  force. 

(1)     Union  with  France. 

(a)  Landau  was  ceded  to  France  in  1648.  Sarrelouis  was  built 
by  Louis  XIV.  These  two  towns  were  represented,  at  the  time  of 
French  Revolution,  at  the  Federation  Fete,  and  they  proclaimed 
their  union  with  the  Republic  ' '  one  and  indivisible. ' ' 

In  1793,  Landau  sustained  a  heroic  siege,  at  the  end  of  which 
the  National  Convention  declared  that  "the  town  had  earned  the 
gratitude  of  the  nation." 


252    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

All  the  rest  of  the  Sarre  Basin  became  French  between  1792  and 
1795,  amid  the  enthusiasm  of  the  population  so  well  described  by 
Goethe,  and  their  vote,  expressed  in  eloquent  petitions,  still  pre- 
served in  our  National  Archives,  recorded  their  union  with  France, 
"in  one  and  the  same  family." 

(b)  All  these  petitions  deserve  to  be  reproduced,  but  we  will 
quote  a  few  only. 

Those  of  the  Cantons  of  Queich,  Blies  and  the  Sarre  express 
unanimously  "the  most  earnest  wish  to  be  reunited  to  the  French 
Republic." 

Certain  others,  like  Impflingen,  make  a  special  point  of  the  fact 
that  "this  wish  is  not  one  for  unlimited  liberty,  but  prompted 
solely  by  love  of  their  native  land." 

Others,  like  Deux-Ponts,  offer  the  prayer  to  which  subsequent 
events  have  given  its  true  significance:  "to  be  sheltered  from  the 
wars  that  German  despots  stir  up  in  their  country  every  twenty 
years,  usually  for  reasons  entirely  foreign  to  them." 

The  inhabitants  of  Neuenkirchen  hope  that  France  will  have 
the  ' '  magnanimity  to  bestow  upon  them  the  greatest  possible  happi- 
ness, by  pronouncing  their  reunion  with  the  first  of  Republics," 
and  they  added :  ' '  We  will  do  our  utmost  to  prove  worthy  of  this 
signal  favour." 

In  the  Sarre  the  tone  is  very  marked.  The  population  hope 
that  "France  may  deign  to  admit  them  to  the  rank  of  beloved 
children,  and  crown  her  work  by  bestowing  upon  them  the 
glorious  title  of  Frenchmen,  which  they  have  so  long  carried  in 
their  hearts,  and  of  which  they  will  never  cease  to  show  themselves 
worthy. ' ' 

The  population  of  Sarrebruck  phrases  its  feeling  as  follows: 
"May  our  reunion,  as  pure  as  it  is  inviolable,  associate  us  with 
France,  our  Mother  country.  "We  shall  have  henceforth  but  one 
heart,  one  mind,  one  common  welfare." 

(c)  This  passionate   desire  to  be  united  to   France   found, 
moreover,  justification  in  the  wise  administration  we  gave  to  the 
country.    Great  public  works  drew  the  bonds  of  sentiment  closer. 
France  was  the  first  to  operate  the  mines.     A  mining  school  was 
founded  by  Napoleon  at  Geslautern  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sarre, 
south  of  Voelklingen,  and  the  results  achieved  excited  the  covetous- 
ness  of  the  Prussian  metallurgists,  whose  agent,  Boecking,  in  1814 
and  1815,  conducted  a  campaign  on  behalf  of  his  employers,  in 
favour  of  Prussian  annexation. 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  253 

The  system  of  State  operation  instituted  by  France  still  exists 
there.  All  the  mining  has  moreover  been  conducted  on  the  basis 
of  studies  made  by  our  engineers,  and  our  National  Archives  con- 
tain the  receipt,  signed  by  Prussia,  of  the  "plans  and  registers 
relative  to  concessions  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  Departments  of  the 
Sarre  and  the  Ruhr." 

(2)     Since  the  Separation. 

(a)  It  was  force  alone  that  separated  these   regions  from 
France.     The  Treaty  of  Paris,  May  13,  1914,  had  not  attempted 
this  separation,  which  was  effected  only  at  the  request  of  Prussia 
in  1815,  without  reference  to  the  wishes  of  the  population,  in  order 
to  hold  France  under  a  perpetual  menace  of  invasion. 

At  the  very  outset  several  Powers,  Great  Britain  among  them, 
protested  against  the  "cession  of  territories  belonging  to  France, 
the  loss  of  which  would  stir  the  indignation  of  all  French  hearts. ' ' 
Finally  Prussian  insistence  prevailed. 

Metternich  condemned  this  operation  when  he  wrote:  "Prus- 
sia had  no  respect  for  any  principle  of  justice  or  even  of  decency." 

(b)  Many  of  the  inhabitants  expatriated  themselves.    Others, 
oppressed    by    the    Prussian    administration    and    colonization, 
declared  themselves  to  be  "Prussians  perforce"  (Musspreussen) . 

In  1850,  during  the  Italian  war,  the  feeling  was  the  same.  Vio- 
lent pro-French  manifestations  were  organized  at  Landau.  Again, 
in  1865,  William  I  traveling  in  this  region  was  very  coldly  received. 

In  1866,  Prince  Clovis  von  Hohenlohe  wrote  in  his  memoirs : — 
"The  Bavarians  of  the  Palatinate  (*.  e.  the  region  about  Landau 
and  north  of  it)  would  very  willingly  accept  being  transferred 
back  to  France."  Prussian  officials  in  1870  called  Sarrelouis  the 
"French  Nest." 

(c)  German  historians  did  not  attempt  to  deny  the  feeling  of 
"mesalliance"  that  persisted  in  the  population  for  half  a  century 
after  union  with  Prussia.    They  even  found  in  the  ' '  faithfulness  of 
these  Khinelanders  to  their  memories  of  France"  a  proof  of  their 
Germanic  character. 

Treitschke's  remarks  on  this  subject  are  amusing  and  instruct- 
ive. We  gather  from  his  description  that,  until  1848,  the  Rhine- 
landers  had  given  proof  of  their  German  patriotism  by  vigorous 
defense  of  their  French  institutions  against  Berlin,  and  by  the  dis- 
play of  that  invincible  dislike  with  which  their  new  Prussian 
compatriots  inspired  them. 

(d)  There  exists,  even  to-day,  in  the  Sarre  Basin,  a  strong 
middle  class  and  peasant  element  passionately  attached  to  French 


254    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

tradition.  In  the  region  of  Sarrelouis,  it  forms  a  large  majority. 
This  town  welcomed  the  French  troops  after  the  Armistice  and 
addressed  a  cordial  telegram  to  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The 
sentiment  had  survived. 

"The  sympathies  of  Sarrelouis  for  France  are  stronger  than 
might  have  been  hoped, ' '  writes  a  witness.  ' '  The  population  would 
declare  itself  without  hesitation,  were  it  not  restrained  by  fear  of 

Prussian  retaliation,  in  case  the  frontier  were  not  modified 

Many  people  at  Sarrelouis  were  disposed  not  to  take  part  in  the 
last  elections  for  the  German  National  Assembly. 

"The  Municipal  Council  of  Sarrelouis  proposed  a  secret  delib- 
eration for  the  purpose  of  demanding  its  reunion  with  France. 
It  would  gladly  send  a  deputation  to  Paris  if  this  were  desired. 
Even  now,  we  may  be  sure  that  Sarrelouis  would  send  to  the  Cham- 
ber a  deputy  of  French  sympathies." 

To  sum  up,  the  whole  of  this  country  which  was  French  for  a 
long  time  and  never  had  any  reason  to  complain  of  French  sov- 
ereignty, was  wrested  from  France  by  force,  without  the  inhab- 
itants having  been  consulted.  In  spite  of  the  Prussian  immigration 
it  has  kept  its  remembrance  of  the  past  and  in  spite  of  continual 
divisions,  recalling  those  of  Poland,  it  remains  at  least  partly 
French  in  sentiment. 

(3)     Possible  Objections. 

(a)  Two  objections  have  been  offered. 

The  separation,  though  violent  and  unjust,  dates  back  a  century. 
Is  it  possible  to  blot  out  one  hundred  years  of  history  ? 

Besides,  must  we  not  take  into  consideration  the  great  German 
immigration,  systematically  carried  on  through  half  a  century, 
which  has  profoundly  modified  the  population  ? 

(b)  To  the  first  objection  it  may  be  answered  that  in  the 
opinion   of  the    Conference   time   does  not   suffice  to   eliminate 
righteous  claims.    Poland  is  revived  after  more  than  a  century,  and 
Bohemia  after  more  than  four  centuries. 

To  the  second  objection,  the  French  Government  can  also  oppose 
some  of  the  most  justifiable  decisions  of  the  Conference. 

The  systematical  colonization  of  a  country  conquered  by  force  is 
not  an  excuse  for  the  outrage  to  which  it  has  been  subjected.  It  is 
rather  an  aggravation. 

Prussian  colonization  in  Poland,  German  colonization  in  Bohe- 
mia, Magyar  colonization  in  Transylvania,  did  not  prevent  the 
Powers  from  heeding  the  wishes  of  peoples  conquered  in  the  past,  or 
from  restoring  their  rights. 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  255 

France  claims  the  same  treatment. 

(4)     Conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  Principle  of  Restitution. 

The  minimum  France  claims,  under  this  head,  is  the  frontier  of 
1814.  The  line  of  this  frontier  is  as  follows : 

Starting  from  the  Rhine,  south  of  Germersheim,  it  takes  in 
Landau  and,  at  Weissenburg,  joins  the  1815  frontier  which  it  fol- 
lows till  it  reaches  the  valley  of  Sarrelouis.  From  this  last  point  it 
forms  two  salients,  north  of  Sarrebruck  and  Sarrelouis,  and  joins 
the  French  frontier  of  1815  about  sixty  kilometers  south  of  Merzig. 

In  its  details,  this  line  shows  the  influence  of  principalities 
which  have  disappeared. 

Eventual  altercations  would,  therefore,  be  required  in  its  appli- 
cation; but,  as  a  whole,  it  represents  a  principle  which  cannot  be 
questioned. 

This  principle,  France  has  a  right  to  invoke. 

II 

Reparation 

The  region  which,  north  of  Alsace  Lorraine,  is  its  geographical 
continuation  and  extends  beyond  the  frontier  of  1814  is  a  mining 
and  industrial  region,  of  well  marked  character.  This  region  is 
known  as  the  Basin  of  the  Sarre. 

(1)     Brief  Description  of  the  Region. 

(a)  The  Sarre  Basin,  which  is  triangular  in  form,  its  base  run- 
ning parallel  to  the  Sarre  between  Sarrebruck  and  Sarrelouis,  and 
its  apex  being  at  Frankenholz  (nine  kilometers  northwest  of  Hom- 
burg)  has  an  economic  unity  derived  from  its  coal. 

There  are  three  principal  groups  of  mines ;  the  first  situated  in 
the  Valley  of  the  Sarre,  from  Sarrelouis  to  just  above  Sarrebruck; 
the  second,  around  Neuenkirchen ;  the  third,  in  the  region  of 
St.  Ingbert. 

Around  these  mines  has  developed  an  industrial  region  in  which 
the  three  main  industries,  in  the  order  of  their  importance,  are: 
metallurgy,  glass  making  and  pottery. 

(b)  This  whole  region,  mining  as  well  as  industrial,  is  inhab- 
ited by  miners  and  factory  workers.    Nearly  all  of  them  are  natives 
of  the  country. 

Many  have  small  houses  and  cultivate  a  little  plot  of  ground. 
In  1912,  39  per  cent,  of  those  who  worked  in  the  mines  belonging 
to  the  Government  were  owners  of  real  estate,  65  per  cent,  being 


256    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

married.    The  unmarried  were  nearly  all  sons  of  miners  in  the  dis- 
trict and  lived  with  their  parents. 

Thanks  to  a  highly  developed  system  of  communications  (in- 
cluding both  standard  and  narrow  gauge  railways,  electric  tram- 
ways and  motor-car  services),  it  is  possible  for  these  workers, 
72,000  in  number,  to  live  at  a  certain  distance  from  the  mines 
which  are  the  very  heart  of  the  district.  More  than  40  per  cent,  of 
them  avail  themselves  of  this  privilege. 

In  other  words,  the  Sarre  Basin  forms  an  entity  the  three  ele- 
ments of  which  are:  a  mining  zone  (very  incompletely  devel- 
oped) ;  an  industrial  zone,  which  is  the  outgrowth  of  the  former; 
and  finally  a  workers'  zone  which  extends  beyond  the  other  two 
and  is  connected  with  them  by  railroads,  of  which  Homburg  is  the 
most  important  center. 

(c)  In  this  basin,  the  component  parts  of  which  are  so  inter- 
dependent, any  artificial  separation  would  be  ruinous. 

A  frontier  cutting  in  two  the  basin  and  its  railroads,  would 
place  the  non-French  section  at  a  disadvantage,  since  it  would  have 
to  compete  with  the  Westphalian  factories  on  the  German  side  and, 
at  the  same  time,  would  be  isolated  on  the  French  side  from  the 
Briey  ore  which  is  the  necessary  complement  of  the  Sarre  coal. 

The  financial  situation  would  be  no  less  disadvantageous  be- 
cause, the  mark  falling  below  the  franc,  remuneration  for  the  same 
work  would  be  different  in  the  two  sections,  owing  to  the  exchange. 

Finally,  the  labour  situation  would  be  equally  deplorable. 
First  on  account  of  transportation,  for  many  of  the  workers  would 
find  a  frontier  between  their  place  of  residence  and  their  place  of 
work :  second  on  account  of  wages,  for  the  various  reasons  already 
enumerated:  and  finally  on  account  of  the  cost  of  production;  of 
working  regulations,  of  social  laws  and  the  maintenance  of  order  in 
times  of  strike. 

(d)  Recent  facts  have,  moreover,  revealed  the  unity  of  the 
region. 

On  the  one  hand  several  of  the  big  Prussian  manufacturers, 
actuated  by  economic  consideration,  have  made  significant  ap- 
proaches to  the  French  authorities  with  a  view  to  maintaining  this 
unity. 

On  the  other  hand,  since  the  Armistice,  the  French  authorities 
charged  with  the  supervision  of  the  local  administration  have  been 
unanimous  in  recognizing  the  impossibility  of  separating  the  min- 
ing, industrial  and  working  men's  districts.  They  all  declared  the 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  257 

danger  which  would  result,  even  during  the  transitional  period  of 
the  Armistice,  from  the  establishment  of  barriers  between  the  dif- 
ferent circles  (bezirks),  constituting  the  Basin.  The  military 
organization  has  thus  been  placed,  though  temporarily,  on  the  basis 
of  the  economic  unity  of  the  region.  The  results  have  been 
excellent. 

(2)     France's  Special  Title  to  Reparation  in  the  Sarre  Basin. 

(a)  It  is  notorious  that  the  industrial  destruction  committed 
by  Germany  in  France  was  especially  directed  against  the  coal  and 
industrial  zone  of  the  departments  of  the  Nord  and  the  Pas-de- 
Calais.    Two-thirds  of  the  surface,  as  well  as  of  the  production  of 
this  zone,  have  been  systematically  destroyed  by  the  invader. 

This  destruction  was  committed  in  the  following  order : — 

First,  the  flooding  of  the  Lens  Basin,  resulting  in  an  annual 
loss  of  eight  million  tons  of  coal. 

Next,  the  destruction  of  the  Courrieres  Basin  and  of  Dourges, 
resulting  in  an  annual  loss  of  four  million  tons. 

Finally,  the  general  devastation  of  the  coal  district  of  the 
departments  of  the  Nord,  resulting  in  an  annual  loss  of  eight  mil- 
lion tons. 

(b)  This  destruction  was  not  the  result  of  chance  or  of  war 
operations.     It  was  an  integral  part  of  the  economic  plan  of  the 
German  Staff.    This  plan,  which  was  printed  in  Munich,  by  order 
of  the  German  Quartermaster  General,  in  February,  1916,  and 
which  was  the  work  of  200  experts  covering  4,031  operations,  dis- 
closed in   detail  the  benefit  anticipated  by   Germany  from  the 
disappearance  of  the  French  mines  and  industries.    Premeditation 
is  thus  thoroughly  established.* 

This  premeditation  is  explained  as  regards  the  Basin  of  the 
Nord  and  the  Pas-de-Calais  by  its  keen  competition  with  the  West- 
phalian  Basin. 

(c)  The  results  of  the  methodical  operations  conducted  by 
Germany  are  as  follows : 

Two  hundred  shafts  rendered  useless  for  several  years. 
All  plants  in  existence  at  that  date  entirely  destroyed. 
A  production  of  over  twenty  million  tons,  or  50  per  cent,  of  the 
national  production,  withdrawn  from  the  country: 

A  production  of  corresponding  by-products  equally  eliminated, 
viz.: 


*See  Chapter  IX,  page  281. 


258 

Coke    2,243,000  tons 

Briquettes   1,674,925     " 

Sulphate  of  Ammonia  23,200     " 

Benzol     13,900     " 

Coal  Tar 61,000    " 

The  labour  population  of  100,000  workmen,  thrown  out  of  work 
and  their  families  reduced  to  want. 

In  all,  a  material  damage  of  at  least  two  thousand  million  francs 
gold  (price  of  1912)  to  which  should  be  added  loss  of  production 
during  the  ten  years  required  for  reconstruction. 

It  is  enough  to  state  these  facts  to  establish  France's  right  to 
complete  reparation. 

(3)     France  after  the  War. 

(a)  If  France,  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  were  not  in  pos- 
session   of   the    Sarre    Basin,   her    economic    position    would    be 
disastrous. 

France  needs  this  basin,  not  only  to  furnish  coal  to  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  which  consume  seven  million  tons  more  than  they  pro- 
duce, but  for  herself  also. 

Before  the  war,  France  imported  annually  23,000,000  tons. 
"With  the  added  needs  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  she  would  therefore 
without  the  Sarre  coal  be  obliged  to  import  even  after  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  her  mines  in  the  North,  thirty  million  tons,  and,  until 
this  re-establishment,  fifty  millions  out  of  a  total  consumption  of 
seventy-five  millions. 

(b)  This  situation  is  summarized  in  the  following  table  which 
calls  for  no  comment : 

In  millions  of  tons. 

France's  consumption  of  coal  (1913) 63 

Consumption  by  Alsace-Lorraine  (1913) 12 


Total  consumption 75 

France's  production  in  coal  (1913) 40 

Destruction  of  the  French  mines  during  the  war 20 

France 's  production  of  coal  up  to  date 20 

Production  of  Alsace-Lorraine . .  , 4 


Total  production  up  to  date 24 

Coal  to  be  imported  up  to  date 51 


THE  SABRE  BASIN  259 

(c)  In  other  words,  France  would  be  economically  tributary 
to  Germany,  who,  through  coal,  would  control  the  prices  of  all  our 
steel  and  iron  in  the  east  and  thus  dominate  our  policies. 

German  manufacturers  themselves  wrote  in  their  Memorandum 
to  the  Chancellor  on  May  20, 1915 :  "Coal  is  one  of  the  most  decisive 
of  political  factors.  The  neutral  countries  are  dependent  upon  the 
belligerent  who  can  supply  them  with  coal. ' ' 

Consequently  if  France  were  left  without  coal  Germany's  dom- 
ination over  her  would  be  assured. 

Such  a  situation  would  mean  imposing  upon  France  defeat  in 
peace  after  victory  in  war. 

(4)  The  Cession  of  the  Sarre  Basin  is  indispensable  as  a 
reparation  from  the  general  point  of  view. 

(a)  It  is  not  only  reparation  for  the  special  damage  done  to 
French  mines  that  is  here  involved.     It  is  the  whole  problem  of 
Germany's  indebtedness  to  France. 

The  amount  of  reparation  for  which  Germany  is  indebted  to 
France  on  account  of  devastations  is  a  difficult  financial  problem, 
complicated  by  the  just  claims  of  other  Allied  Powers. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  the  means  of  payment  which  Germany 
has  at  present  at  her  disposal,  or  which  she  will  have  in  the  course 
of  the  next  few  years,  will  enable  her  even  approximately  to  meet 
the  estimates  for  this  reparation,  the  total  of  which  amounts  to 
1,000,000  millions. 

(b)  Therefore  in  her  own  interest  as  well  as  in  that  of  her 
creditors  it  is  indispensable  that  Germany  should  avail  herself  of 
every  possible  means  to  discharge  her  debt. 

It  must  be  recalled  that : — 

Germany  is  one  of  the  greatest  coal-producing  countries  in  the 
world,  and  that  her  production  exceeds  her  consumption  (she 
extracted  before  the  war  191  million  tons  and  consumed  137), 
without  counting  87  million  tons  of  lignite,  which  gives  for  1914  a 
total  production  of  278  million  tons. 

The  coal  mines  constitute  a  sure  resource  and  yield  a  product 
readily  convertible  into  money. 

Coal,  like  all  other  raw  materials,  has  an  intrinsic  value  inde- 
pendent of  the  German  exchange  situation,  and  therefore  eliminates 
one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  in  the  financial  settlement. 

In  these  circumstances  we  are  led  to  consider  the  cession  of  the 
German  part  of  the  Coal  Basin  of  the  Sarre  as  a  necessary  element 
of  the  reparation  due  by  Germany  to  France. 


260     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

(c)     The  Sarre  Basin  produced  in  1912-1913 : — 

Prussian    Mines   12,730,000 

Bavarian  Mines   896,000 

Lorraine  Mines 3,846,000 


Total 17,472,000 

The  production  of  that  part  of  the  basin  situated  north  of  the 
frontier  of  Alsace-Lorraine  represents  therefore  13,626,000  tons. 

It  is  difficult  to  calculate  the  value  of  these  mines — this  value 
depending  naturally  upon  the  net  cost  of  production,  upon  the 
sale  price  and  upon  the  duration  of  the  mines,  etc. 

In  any  event  the  mineral  wealth  of  the  basin  estimated,  for 
layers  worked  at  a  depth  of  at  least  1,000  meters,  amounts  to  3,660 
million  tons. 

It  is  therefore  wise  and  just  to  take  account  of  so  important  a 
resource  in  the  general  account  of  reparations. 

(5)     This  necessary  reparation  is  an  easy  reparation. 

(a)  The  Sarre  Mines  belong  almost  in  their  entirety  to  the 
Prussian  and  Bavarian  Treasuries. 

Total  Surface     116,000  Hectares 

Prussian  Fiscal  Mines 110,000        ' ' 

Bavarian  Fiscal  Mines  4,000 

The  cession  from  State  to  State  presents  no  difficulty ;  the  few 
private  mines  that  exist  would  be  repurchased  by  the  German 
State  from  their  owners  and  ceded  to  the  French  State. 

As  has  previously  been  mentioned,  the  Sarre  Basin  through  its 
cession  will  revert  to  the  country  which  developed  its  value  and 
which  after  having  done  so  was  deprived  of  it  by  force. 

(b)  No  economic  break  will  result  from  this  cession. 
Indeed,  the  economic  outlet  of  these  mines  is  to  the  South  for 

they  competed  in  the  North  with  Westphalian  coal  to  which  Prussia 
has  always  sacrificed  them. 

It  suffices  to  recall  that  with  this  in  view  Germany  has  con- 
stantly opposed  the  canalization  of  the  Sarre  below  Sarrebruck 
and  of  the  Moselle  as  far  as  the  Rhine.  The  only  water  communi- 
cation which  she  decided  to  grant  to  the  Sarre  Basin,  was  the  canal 
of  the  coal  mines  which  at  present  has  no  outlet  except  on  French 
territory  at  Nancy  on  one  hand,  and  at  Strassburg  on  the  other.  It 
may  therefore  be  said  that  it  was  Germany  herself  who  in  order  to 
protect  the  interests  of  the  rival  "Westphalian  Basin,  imposed  and 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  261 

maintained  the  outlet  of  the  Sarre  in  the  direction  of  France  and 
Alsace-Lorraine. 

Before  becoming  French  citizens  in  1793,  several  magnates  of 
the  region  alleged  in  a  Memorandum  addressed  to  the  Representa- 
tives of  the  People,  that:  "Commerce — the  exchange  of  our  iron, 
our  timber  and  our  coal  for  goods  produced  by  French  factories — 
has  cemented  and  maintained  the  bond  between  the  inhabitants  and 
the  French." 

At  present,  Alsace-Lorraine,  France,  Italy  and  Switzerland  are 
important  buyers  in  the  Sarre  Basin.  The  return  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine to  France  and  the  orientation  that  Germany  deliberately  gave 
the  basin  can  only  serve  to  develop  this  situation  in  the  near  future. 

(c)  Finally,  the  prejudice  to  Germany  will  not  be  of  a  nature 
to  compromise  her  economic  equilibrium  so  far  as  coal  is  con- 
cerned. The  following  table  so  indicates : 

Total  production  of  Germany  in  1913  (without  count- 
ing eighty-seven  million  tons  of  lignite) 191,000,000 

Production  of  the  Sarre 13,626,000 


Balance 177,374,000 

Total  consumption  in  1913 137,000,000 


Surplus  after  cession  of  the  Sarre 40,374,000 

5°     Conclusions  drawn  from  the  Principle  of  Reparation. 

As  special  reparation  for  the  destruction  of  her  mines,  as  well 
as  a  necessary  element  in  the  total  reparation,  France  is  justified 
in  claiming  the  Sarre  Basin. 

By  the  Sarre  Basin  must  be  understood : 

(a)  The  mines  operated. 

(b)  Layers  not  yet  exploited. 

(c)  Industrial  Region  (factories,  steel  works,  foundries,  etc.,) 
which  owes  its  existence  to  the  basin  and  forms  part  of  it. 

The  profound  unity  of  this  region  has  already  been  referred  to. 

To  separate  it  into  several  sections  would  be  ruinous  and  a 
source  of  innumerable  vexations  for  the  inhabitants. 

This  separation  moreover  would  render  the  operation  of  the 
mines  impossible  or  in  any  event  exceedingly  difficult.  It  should 
therefore  not  be  considered. 

For  these  reasons  France's  minimum  claim  under  the  head  of 
Reparations,  includes  the  region  delimitated  by  the  following  line: 


262    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Starting  from  the  frontier  of  1815  to  the  point  where  it  is 
crossed  by  the  French  Nied,  this  line  includes  in  the  Basin  of  the 
Sarre  the  valley  and  the  villages  of  the  French  Nied — passes  by 
Beckingen  (excluded),  Duppenweiter-Bettingen,  Tholey,  St.  Wen- 
del,  "Werschweiter,  Kuselberg,  (two  kilometers  east  of  Momburg) 
Kirrberg,  Einod,  (all  these  preceding  localities  included),  and 
joins  the  frontier  of  1814  and  1815  in  following  the  ridge  valleys 
of  the  Blies  and  the  Bickenhall. 

This  Memorandum,  based  upon  the  admirable  essays  of 
Professor  Gallois  and  his  colleagues  of  the  Comite 
d 'Etudes,*  was  explained  and  interpreted  to  our  Allies  in 
the  course  of  numerous  conferences  during  the  months  of 
January  and  February.  It  offered  a  three-term  solution 
imposed  upon  us  by  the  circumstances:  restoration  to 
French  sovereignty  of  the  territories  south  of  the  frontier 
of  1814 ;  a  special  political  administration  for  the  territories 
of  the  mineral  and  industrial  basin  north  of  this  frontier; 
full  ownership  of  the  mines  in  these  two  zones.  Our 
Memorandum  was  distributed  in  March  to  the  heads  of  the 
delegations.  The  discussion  thus  prepared,  opened  a  few 
days  later. 

n 

On  the  morning  of  March  28,  M.  Loucheur  and  I  were 
summoned  by  the  Council  of  the  Four  to  President  Wil- 
son's residence.  We  were  jointly  entrusted  with  the  verbal 
presentation  of  the  French  case.  The  moment  we  entered 
the  meeting  our  impression  was  formed.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
did  not  attribute  first  rate  importance  to  this  matter. 
President  Wilson  on  the  contrary,  wore  a  quizzical  smile 
that  foreshadowed  objections. 

I  will  not  reproduce  the  statement  made  that  day  by  M. 
Loucheur  and  myself,  the  whole  substance  of  which  was 
borrowed  from  the  document  I  have  just  quoted.  The  first 
interruptions  showed  us  just  where  we  stood.  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  without  hesitation  expressed  himself  in  favour  of 
our  contention  so  far  as  the  ownership  of  the  mines  was 


*See  Chapter  III,  page  86. 


THE  SABRE  BASIN  263 

concerned.  He  recognized  that  this  ownership  was  due  to 
us  as  a  just  compensation.  With  regard  to  the  territories, 
he  was  less  categorical.  He  admitted  that  an  autonomous 
organization  ought  to  be  established  for  the  entire  coal 
basin ;  in  other  words  that  it  should  be  detached  from  Ger- 
many. On  the  other  hand,  however,  he  did  not  admit  our 
right  to  possess  both  the  territories  and  the  coal,  and  our 
claim  for  the  frontier  of  1814  alarmed  him;  he  repeated 
the  formula  so  often  heard  during  the  discussions:  "Let 
us  not  renew  the  mistake  committed  by  Germany  in  1871 
in  the  name  of  a  fictitious  historical  right.  Do  not  let  us 
create  a  new  Alsace-Lorraine. " 

Mr.  Wilson,  who  at  first  had  said  nothing,  then  spoke. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  accepted  the  greater  part  of  our 
claims;  the  President,  on  the  contrary,  rejected  them  all. 
He  admitted  our  right  to  take  from  the  Sarre  Basin  a 
quantity  of  coal  equal  to  the  deficit  from  our  mines,  due 
to  the  war.  But  he  refused  us  the  ownership  of  the 
mines,  the  frontier  of  1814,  and  the  autonomous  organiza- 
tion suggested  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  His  point  of  view, 
presented  in  the  most  friendly,  but  most  emphatic  manner, 
was  as  follows: 

"Never  has  France,  in  any  public  document,  claimed 
the  frontier  of  1814.  The  bases  of  peace  accepted  by  her 
speak  of  reparation  for  the  wrong  which  she  suffered  in 
1871— and  not  in  1815. 

"Now  these  bases  bind  the  Allies.  The  historical  argu- 
ment used  by  Germany  against  France  to  justify  her  theft 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  is  a  dangerous  one.  Let  us  avoid 
using  it. 

"The  frontier  of  1814  does  not  correspond  to  any 
economic  reality.  It  would  ruin  the  basin  by  cutting  it  in 
two,  without  assuring  coal  to  France.  A  cession  of  terri- 
tory, without  an  immediate  plebiscite,  would  under  these 
conditions  be  inadmissible. 

"There  is  no  Nation  more  intelligent  than  the  French. 
If  I  thus  frankly  express  my  point  of  view  I  do  not  fear 
her  judgment.  I  have  so  high  an  opinion  of  the  intelli- 


264 

gence  of  the  French  Nation  that  I  believe  she  will  always 
accept  a  principle  based  upon  justice  and  applied  fairly. 
"I  do  not  believe  that  this  problem  can  be  compared 
with  that  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  For  half  a  century  the  world 
had  its  eyes  turned  towards  Alsace-Lorraine.  For  half  a 
century  the  world  has  never  thought  of  those  provinces  as 
being  German.  The  question  of  the  frontier  of  1814  has 
not  quite  the  same  character. 

"I  am  ready  to  recognize  that  France  should  have  the 
use  of  the  mines  for  a  period  that  shall  be  determined ;  but 
as  there  can  be  no  question  of  depriving  the  local  industries 
of  coal  the  question  of  the  ownership  of  the  mines  appears 
to  me  to  be  purely  sentimental. 

"I  regret  to  make  these  objections  and  I  apologize  for 
it.  It  is  painful  to  me  to  oppose  France's  wishes.  But  I 
could  not  act  otherwise  without  failing  in  my  duty." 

The  discussion  from  this  time  on  went  to  the  very  roots 
of  the  problem.  M.  Clemenceau,  who  had  allowed  his  col- 
leagues to  answer  questions  of  fact  and  figures  put  by 
President  "Wilson,  felt  it  necessary  to  intervene,  and  did 
so  with  rare  elevation  of  thought. 

"I  have,"  he  said,  "a  serious  reservation  to  make.  You 
eliminate  sentiment  and  memory.  The  world  is  not  guided 
by  principles  alone. 

"You  say  you  are  ready  to  render  us  justice  from  the 
economic  point  of  view,  and  I  thank  you  for  it.  But 
economic  interests  are  not  everything.  The  history  of  the 
United  States  is  glorious,  but  brief.  One  hundred  and 
twenty  years  is  a  very  long  period  for  you ;  for  us  it  is  a 
short  one.  Our  conception  of  history  cannot  be  quite  the 
same  as  yours. 

"Our  ordeals  have  created  in  us  a  profound  sentiment 
of  the  reparation  due  us.  The  point  at  issue  is  not  material 
reparation  only;  the  need  for  moral  reparation  is  no  less 
great. 

"I  know  all  that  you  have  done  for  victory  but  I  believe 
that  you  will  lose  nothing  by  recognizing  in  this  question 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  265 

a  sentiment  which  is  something  different  from  your  prin- 
ciples, but  no  less  profound. 

"When  Lafayette  and  Rochambeau — two  youths — went 
to  the  aid  of  America  struggling  for  her  independence,  it 
was  not  cold  reason  or  deeds  of  valour,  common  enough 
after  all,  which  sowed  the  seed  of  affectionate  gratitude 
which  has  sprung  from  their  action;  but  an  impression,  a 
deep  fellow-feeling  that  has  linked  our  two  nations  forever. 

"I  am  old.  In  a  few  months  I  shall  have  left  politics 
forever.  My  disinterestedness  is  complete.  I  will  defend 
before  Parliament  the  conclusions  that  we  shall  reach  here 
together;  but  if  you  do  not  listen  to  me  to-day,  you  will 
lose  an  opportunity  of  riveting  yet  another  link  in  the 
chain  of  affection  binding  France  to  America. 

"There  are,  in  this  region,  150,000  Frenchmen.  These 
men  who  in  1918  sent  addresses  to  President  Poincare 
have  also  a  right  to  justice.  You  wish  to  respect  the  rights 
of  the  Germans.  So  do  I.  But  bear  in  mind  the  rights  of 
these  Frenchmen  as  you  will  have  to  bear  in  mind  later  the 
historic  rights  of  Bohemia  and  of  Poland. 

"We  shall  soon  resume  this  discussion.  For  the  moment 
I  merely  ask  you,  when  you  are  alone,  to  think  over  all  I 
have  just  said  to  you  and  ask  your  conscience  whether  it 
does  not  contain  a  great  deal  of  truth. ' ' 

Thus,  two  principles  confront  each  other.  On  one  side, 
economic  arguments  which  can  be  shown  in  figures ;  on  the 
other  side,  moral  arguments  which  can  be  weighed.  On 
both  sides  a  lively  and  honest  desire  for  agreement,  but 
the  impossibility  of  reaching  this  agreement.  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  favours  a  compromise.  But  the  historical  argument 
so  dear  to  the  French  heart  has  no  weight  with  any  of  our 
Allies.  Our  entire  contention  is  disputed.  We  are  far 
from  the  goal  and  the  road  is  long  and  hard. 

This  dramatic  meeting  ended  at  twelve-thirty.  At  two 
o'clock  M.  Clemenceau,  M.  Loucheur  and  I  met  again  at 
the  War  Office  and  went  over  the  situation  which  was  not 
promising.  Frontier  of  1814 — we  were  alone,  therefore 
without  hope  of  success.  Ownership  of  the  mines  and  crea- 


266    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

tion  of  an  autonomous  state — we  had  Great  Britain's  sup- 
port without,  however,  adequate  guarantees  either  for  the 
operation  of  the  mines  or  above  all  for  the  liberation  of 
the  French  inhabitants  of  the  Sarre.  Long  experience  had 
taught  us  that  reasoning  borrowed  from  the  past  had  but 
little  appeal  for  Mr.  "Wilson:  there  he  feared  to  find  the 
germ  of  new  wars.  The  one  point  on  which  we  felt  a  lesser 
resistance  was  the  economic  problem.  Mr.  Wilson  contested 
our  ownership  of  the  mines :  but  already  he  recognized  our 
right  to  work  them.  It  was  upon  that  point,  therefore,  that 
M.  Clemenceau,  M.  Loucheur  and  I  agreed  unanimously  to 
make  our  first  effort.  We  would  assert  simultaneously 
two  principles,  distinct  in  their  character  but  one  in  their 
consequence.  The  first  was  that  operation  of  the  mines 
required  a  special  political  organization  of  the  territory. 
The  second,  that  if  our  Allies  believe  there  are  too  many 
Germans  in  the  Sarre  Basin  to  justify  an  immediate  reunion 
with  France,  we  on  the  other  hand  deem  that  there  are  in 
this  same  basin  too  many  people  of  French  origin  and 
aspirations  for  France  to  consent  to  leave  them  under 
Prussian  domination.  The  assertion  of  these  three  prin- 
ciples— ownership,  complete  guarantee  of  operation 
through  a  special  political  administration,  safeguards  for 
the  rights  of  the  inhabitants — became  the  bulwark  of  our 
defense.  We  dealt  with  them  in  three  Notes,  dated  respec- 
tively March  29,  and  April  1  and  5.  I  publish  the  first 
below : 

March  29. 

NOTE  ON  THE  SARRE  QUESTION 

France  demands  first  that  the  preliminaries  of  peace  should 
permanently  guarantee : 

(a)  FuH  ownership  of  all  the  mines  of  the  Sarre. 

(b)  An  economic  regime  which,  on  the  soil,  would  permit  the 
development  of  the  sub-soil. 

If  the  Sarre  coal  were  found  under  the  soil  of  the  Ruhr,  France 
would  ask  nothing  more. 

We  ask  more  because  the  soil  of  the  Sarre  was  formerly  French 
soil: 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  267 

• — in  part  for  nearly  two  centuries 

— in  part  for  more  than  twenty  years 

and  during  the  Revolution,  when  the  right  of  self-determination 
for  all  nations  was  applied  for  the  first  time,  this  country  was 
entirely  incorporated  with  France  "one  and  indivisible"  by  the 
free  vote  of  its  people. 

It  was  wrested  from  France  against  the  will  of  its  inhabitants. 
This  was  the  first  manifestation  of  the  military  and  economic 
imperialism  of  Prussia  from  the  moment  she  became  our  neighbor — 
an  imperialism  whose  traces  it  is  the  first  object  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  to  obliterate. 

It  is  true  that,  on  this  soil  germanized  for  one  hundred  years, 
the  majority  of  the  population  is  German  owing  to  immigration. 

We  recognize  this  fact  by  not  claiming  annexation.  On  the 
other  hand  we  insist  on  a  solution  which  would  recognize  in  part  at 
least  France's  unquestionable  claim  on  a  country  consecrated 
French  by  the  will  of  its  inhabitants. 

This  country  has  been  French.  The  fact  creates  the  presump- 
tion that  it  will  become  so  again  gladly.  The  example  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  there  to  prove  it.  We  already  know  that  the  majority 
of  the  inhabitants  living  in  the  circle  of  Sarrelouis  are  ready  to 
demand  their  reunion  with  France. 

In  order  to  allow  time  in  all  fairness  to  undo  what  was  done  a 
century  ago  by  force,  it  is  just  that  the  question  of  the  sovereignty 
of  this  region  should  not  be  settled  immediately. 

For  the  time  being  it  will  not  be  placed  under  the  sovereignty 
either  of  Germany  or  of  France,  but  under  the  protection  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

The  Germans  in  this  region  will  retain  their  nationality. 

But,  like  Germans  living  in  a  foreign  country  they  will  take  no 
part  in  the  elections  for  the  German  Assemblies. 

They  will  vote  for  the  local  Assemblies  (District  Council  and 
Municipalities). 

The  German  officials,  appointed  by  the  Central  Administration, 
will  be  withdrawn. 

All  facilities  for  the  liquidation  of  their  possessions  will  be 
given  Germans  who  desire  to  leave  the  country. 

France  will  receive  from  the  League  of  Nations  a  double 
mandate : 

(1)  Military  occupation. 

(2)  Right  of  visa  or  veto  on  the  local  administration  (includ- 
ing the  schools),  the  nomination  of  Mayors  and  deputy  Mayors. 


268    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

French  nationality  will  be  conferred  individually  and  after 
investigation  upon  those  who  ask  for  it. 

When  in  each  of  the  principal  administrative  sections  the 
majority  of  the  electors  shall  have  adopted  French  nationality,  or 
rather  when  the  district  council  shall  ask  for  annexation  to  France, 
this  annexation  will  occur  de  jure  upon  its  acceptance  by  the 
League  of  Nations. 

At  the  end  of  fifteen  years  the  inhabitants  who  have  not  already 
manifested  their  choice  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to  do  so.  No 
demand  for  reunion  with  Germany  would  be  considered  before  that 
date  as  this  term  of  fifteen  years  is  fixed  precisely  with  a  view  to 
allowing  events  to  shape  themselves  and  the  population  to  decide 
justly  and  freely  as  to  its  sovereignty.  Prussia  had  one  hundred 
years  to  consolidate  her  work  of  violence. 

The  solution  outlined  above  enables  us  to  meet  the  two  objec- 
tions formulated  against  the  French  demands : — 

First  objection:  It  is  a  new  claim  advanced  by  France,  who 
had  hitherto  spoken  only  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Here  also  is  a  question  of  Alsace  and  of  Lorraine  for  it  is  a 
question  of  their  frontier.  French  Lorraine  mutilated  in  1871  had 
already  been  mutilated  in  1815.  Time  without  doubt  has  placed 
these  two  frontiers  on  different  planes.  But  the  proposed  solution 
respects  them. 

The  Lorraine  of  Metz  and  Thionville  will  be  immediately 
detached  from  Germany.  The  Lorraine  of  Sarrebruck  will  be  given 
time  to  decide  to  which  of  the  two  countries,  having  already  been 
governed  by  them  both,  she  wishes  to  be  attached  definitely  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  her  re-attachment  to  Prussia  one  hundred  years  ago 
was  entirely  due  to  violence. 

Second  objection :  It  is  a  breach  in  the  principle  of  the  right  of 
self-determination  of  peoples. 

No.  Nothing  definite  or  irreparable  is  decided.  On  the  con- 
trary homage  is  rendered  to  this  principle  in  giving  the  population 
the  opportunity  under  the  protection  of  the  League  of  Nations  to 
decide  upon  a  matter  concerning  which  Germany — as  opposed  to 
France — has  never  consulted  them,  i.  e.  the  sovereignty  under 
which  they  desire  to  live  in  the  future,  in  view  of  the  possible 
hesitation  created  by  the  double  historic  title  of  the  two  countries. 

To  sum  up,  if  on  the  one  hand  our  Allies  deem  France's  right 
to  the  region  of  the  Sarre  insufficient  to  justify  immediate  re- 
annexation,  on  the  other  hand,  France  deems  these  rights  too 
important  for  her  to  accept  the  definite  adjudication  of  the  Sarre 


THE  SABRE  BASIN  269 

Basin  to  Germany  by  the  Treaty.    An  intermediate  regime  should 
therefore  be  considered. 

We  now  went  at  once  to  the  heart  of  the  discussion.  The 
Note  just  read  establishes  the  fact  that  if,  in  order  to  reach 
an  agreement  we  eventually  decide  to  give  up  the  frontier 
of  1814,  we  yield  neither  on  the  question  of  the  liberation 
of  the  French  population  of  the  Sarre,  the  ownership  of  the 
mines,  nor  on  the  special  political  regime  necessary  for 
their  operation.  After  this  triple  assertion  which  defines 
the  limits  of  the  debate,  we  take  up,  to  deal  with  the  prob- 
lems one  by  one,  the  long  chapter  of  the  mining  clauses. 
The  question  of  ownership  is  settled  on  March  31,  when 
Mr.  "Wilson  agrees  to  the  transfer  of  the  mines  to  France 
with  certain  guarantees  of  an  economic  order  but  on  the 
condition  that  there  should  be  no  question  either  of  displac- 
ing the  frontier  or  of  creating  an  independent  State.  His 
proposal  which  did  not  give  us  satisfaction  but  from  which 
a  week  later  we  are  to  evolve  the  solution  is  as  follows : 

It  is  agreed  in  principle : 

1.  That  full  ownership  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  Sarre  Basin 
should  pass  to  France  to  be  credited  on  her  claims  against  Germany 
for  reparation. 

2.  That  for  the  exploitation  of  these  mines  the  fullest  economic 
facilities  shall  be  accorded  to  France,  including  particularly : 

(a)  Exemption  from  taxation  on  the  part  of  Germany,  includ- 
ing important  export  dues. 

(b)  Full  mobility  of  labour,  foreign  and  native. 

(c)  Freedom  for  the  development  of  adequate  means  of  com- 
munication by  rail  and  water. 

3.  That  the  political  and  administrative  arrangements  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  foregoing  results  be  inquired  into. 

We  are  still  far  from  the  goal.  Nevertheless  on  one 
important  item,  the  points  of  view  begin  to  harmonize. 
M.  Clemenceau  seizes  the  occasion.  He  takes  the  paper 
handed  to  him  by  the  President.  He  reads  and  re-reads 
it — saying  neither  yes  nor  no.  He  states  that  before 
answering  he  must  consult  his  advisers.  So  a  committee  of 
three  is  formed.  I  represent  France,  and  I  have  the  assist- 


270    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

ance  of  M.  Louis  Aubert,  who  for  two  years  had  most  suc- 
cessfully directed  the  Press  and  Information  Service  of 
the  French  High  Commission  in  America,  and  of  M. 
Deflinne,  Director  of  Mines.  Professor  Charles  H.  Haskins 
is  the  American  delegate ;  Mr.  Headlam  Morley  the  British. 
France  should  remember  the  names  of  these  two  men; 
their  uprightness  and  sympathetic  understanding  of  our 
rights  played  a  most  important  part  in  the  results  obtained. 
After  ten  meetings  of  several  hours  each,  the  demands  of 
our  engineers  are  accepted  and  on  certain  points  com- 
pleted. We  agree  on  the  technical  conditions  of  the  opera- 
tion of  the  mines  in  German  territory  by  the  French  State 
which  was  to  own  them.  But  that  does  not  satisfy  me. 
No  technical  clauses  can  avail  if,  on  all  sides,  political  and 
administrative  pressure  is  to  distort  and  warp  them.  I 
appeal  to  the  good  faith  of  my  British  and  American  col- 
leagues with  whom  I  was  convinced  in  these  circumstances, 
as  in  all  others,  I  should  not  plead  in  vain  and  I  obtain 
from  them  their  signatures  at  the  end  of  our  report  to  the 
following  declaration,  the  importance  of  which  I  need  not 
emphasize : 

The  undersigned  are  agreed  in  the  opinion  that  if  the  above 
articles  which  appear  to  be  necessary  from  the  social  and  economic 
point  of  view  were  to  be  applied  without  the  establishment  of  a 
special  administrative  and  political  regime,  serious  difficulties  and 
conflicts  would  inevitably  arise, 
(signed) 

Andre  Tardieu 
Charles   H.   Haskins 
Headlam  Morley. 

Thus  the  second  part  of  the  problem  rejected  on  March 
31  by  President  Wilson  and  no  less  important  for  us  than 
the  first,  is  put  forward  by  those  who,  up  to  that  time,  had 
not  been  entrusted  with  its  discussion.  From  then  on  the 
negotiation  is  solidly  established  and  if  we  finally  have  to 
give  up  our  claim  to  the  frontier  of  1814,  we  shall  at  least 
obtain  liberal  and  essential  compensations ;  but  not  without 
another  effort. 


THE  SAERE  BASIN  271 

On  the  morning  of  April  8,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  after 
reading  Mr.  Headlam  Morley's  report,  frankly  sides  with 
us.  We  offer  either  the  establishment  of  an  independent 
State  linked  to  France  by  a  Customs  Union,  or  the 
sovereignty  of  the  League  of  Nations  with  a  mandate  given 
to  France,  and  a  plebiscite  at  the  end  of  fifteen  years. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  presents  at  the  same  time  two  proposi- 
tions similar  to  ours,  and  in  a  few  words  states  his  opinion : 

"I  would  give  the  Sarre  Basin  its  independence  under 
the  authority  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

"A  Customs  Union  would  attach  it  to  France.  There 
does  not  exist,  it  is  true,  any  natural  economic  link  between 
this  region  and  Germany.  All  its  relations  are  with  Alsace 
and  Lorraine. 

"We  must  also  not  forget  that  this  country  was  French 
in  its  greater  part  until  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century;  that  it  was  taken  away  from  France  by  force  in 
spite  of  the  opposition  of  English  statesmen. 

"We  are  opposed  to  all  annexation.  But  we  do  not 
believe  that  it  is  possible  for  this  region  to  live  if  we  do 
not  make  it  a  political  unit. 

"I  am  convinced  that,  if  in  a  few  years  a  plebiscite  takes 
place,  this  population  will  not  ask  to  belong  again  to 
Germany. '  * 

Mr.  House  that  day  represented  President  Wilson  who 
was  ill.  He  admits  that  these  solutions  are  "very  interest- 
ing and  worthy  of  close  examination."  It  seems  that  a 
step  forward  has  been  made. 

But  on  the  same  day,  the  eighth  in  the  afternoon,  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  who  has  returned  to  his  place,  again  voices 
his  hesitations.  He  approves  our  plan  of  economic  clauses. 
On  the  other  hand  he  approves  neither  change  nor  suspen- 
sion of  sovereignty.  He  also  rejects  the  suggestion  of  a 
mandate  and  to  meet  the  danger  pointed  out  by  us  of  inci- 
dents and  conflicts,  hands  us  a  Note  which  merely  proposes, 
instead  of  an  independent  political  unit,  the  setting  up  of 
a  Commission  of  Arbitration  to  settle  the  differences 
between  the  French  mines  and  the  German  Government. 


272     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

M.  Clemenceau  refuses.  A  short  and  lively  debate 
ensues  with  a  brisk  volley  of  questions  and  answers.  The 
President  implores  us  not  to  make  the  peace  of  the  world 
depend  upon  the  question  of  the  Sarre.  M.  Clemenceau 
replies  that  the  peace  of  the  world  demands,  first  of  all, 
that  justice  be  established  among  the  Allies.  No  conclu- 
sion is  reached.  The  atmosphere  is  tense.  Since  March  27, 
the  minor  officials  at  the  Hotel  Crillon  are  nervous.  The 
Chief  of  the  Press  Service,  Mr.  Eay  Stannard  Baker,  is 
particularly  active  in  spreading  pessimistic  reports.  On 
April  6,  he  accuses  M.  Clemenceau  of  "claiming  annexa- 
tions." The  following  day,  the  seventh,  the  rumour  spreads 
that  the  President,  discouraged,  has  ordered  the  George 
Washington  to  Brest.  The  hour  is  critical. 

in 

Once  again,  M.  Clemenceau,  M.  Loucheur  and  I  meet  on 
April  8  at  the  War  Office  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening. 
We  weigh  the  consequence  of  an  adverse  decision.  Never- 
theless we  decide  not  to  yield.  A  Note,  which  I  write  dur- 
ing the  night,  states  the  reasons  for  our  resistance.  This 
Note  distributed  very  early  the  next  morning  to  the  heads 
of  Governments  asserts  both  our  spirit  of  conciliation  and 
the  impossibility  of  our  making  any  further  concessions. 
This  is  the  text: 

April  9. 

ANSWER  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON'S 
NOTE  OF  APRIL  8. 

I.    Preliminary  observations: 

The  Note  presented  by  President  Wilson  to  M.  Clemenceau  on 
March  31  was  worded  as  follows : 

"It  is  agreed  in  principle : 

"  (1)  That  full  ownership  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  Sarre  Basin 
should  pass  to  France  to  be  credited  on  her  claims  against  Germany 
for  reparation. 

"(2)  That  for  the  exploitation  of  these  mines  the  fullest  eco- 
nomic facilities  shall  be  accorded  to  France,  including  particularly : 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  273 

"(a)  Exemption  from  taxation  on  the  part  of  Germany 
including  import  and  export  dues. 

"  (b)     Full  mobility  of  labour,  foreign  and  native. 

"  (c)  Freedom  for  the  development  of  adequate  means  of  com- 
munication by  rail  and  water. 

"(3)  That  the  political  and  administrative  arrangements 
necessary  to  secure  the  foregoing  results  should  be  inquired  into." 

With  reference  to  this  Note  the  three  designated  experts  drew 
up  a  set  of  economic  clauses  which  they  recognized  as  just  and 
necessary,  both  in  the  interest  of  the  working  of  the  basin  as  well 
as  for  its  general  prosperity  and  the  welfare  of  the  population. 

The  experts  at  the  same  time  gave  as  their  opinion  that  certain 
of  these  clauses  would,  in  application,  cause  inevitable  friction  and 
conflict  unless  a  special  political  and  administrative  regime  were 
established. 

The  Note  presented  by  President  Wilson  on  April  8  accepts, 
save  for  certain  amendments,  the  economic  clauses,  but  carries  no 
political  or  administrative  clauses. 

In  effect,  it  creates  a  Court  of  Arbitration  for  settling  conflicts, 
but  does  nothing  to  prevent  the  said  conflicts. 

In  other  words  the  Note  of  April  8  recognizes  that  conflicts  will 
be  inevitable,  and  confines  itself  to  establishing  a  jurisdiction 
which,  in  every  case,  will  decide  between  France  and  Germany. 

Thus  the  Sarre  Basin  will  in  final  analysis  be  under  the  admin- 
istration of  a  court. 

Such  a  regime  of  perpetual  lawsuits  seems  inacceptable  not  only 
for  France  and  for  Germany  but  also  in  the  interests  of  the  pop- 
ulations of  the  Sarre  and  of  world  peace. 
77.     Proofs  that  conflicts  would  arise. 

Examination  of  the  articles  proves  that  conflicts  would  be  sure 
to  arise.  For  example ; — 

Article  9.  If  German  sovereignty  and  administration  remain 
intact,  how  will  it  be  possible  to  apply  French  law  in  the  matter  of 
labour,  recruiting,  wages,  etc.,  for  only  a  part  of  the  workmen  of 
the  basin  ? 

Article  12.  How  can  the  powers  of  police  inspectors,  appointed 
by  the  French  State,  be  conciliated  with  the  application  of  German 
justice  and  police  T 

Article  13.  How  will  France  be  able  to  exercise  her  visa  on  the 
mining,  industrial  and  social  regulations  if  she  has  no  official  or 
administrative  standing  ?  Let  us  suppose  that  Weimar  were  to  pass 


274    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

laws  reducing  working  hours  to  six  for  an  electric  station  supplying 
the  mines.  How  in  such  a  case  would  the  miners  be  able  to  work 
eight  hours  under  the  French  regime  * 

Article  16.  How  can  the  territory  of  the  Sarre  be  submitted  to 
a  French  Customs  Administration  if  France  has  no  administrative 
personnel  there  or  any  other  title  than  ownership  of  the  mines? 
A  Customs  House  cannot  exist  without  Customs  officers. 

All  these  articles  are  necessary  and  economically  just,  but  re- 
quire an  administrative  and  political  complement  which  the  experts 
have  demanded  and  which  the  Note  of  April  8  does  not  provide. 
Many  similar  examples  could  be  quoted. 
777.     General  consequences  of  the  proposed  system. 

According  to  the  terms  suggested  by  President  Wilson  the  solu- 
tion would  be  as  follows : — 

(1)  The  inhabitants  would  be  represented  in  the  Reichstag 
where  incidents  could  be  artificially  provoked. 

(2)  The  whole  German  and  Prussian  administrative  system 
that  has  oppressed  the  region  for  one  hundred  years  would  be 
continued. 

(3)  "Every  economic  measure  however  indispensable  taken  by 
<flie  French  Government  would  be  indefinitely  held  up  by  the  Ger- 
man authorities  who,  to  this  end,  would  have  only  to  bring  an  action 
before  the  Court  of  Arbitration. 

(4)  If  the  72,000  workmen  placed  under  French  labour  laws 
started  a  strike,  what  legislation  could  be  applied  in  the  basin? 

Franco-German  friction  would  thus  be  multiplied  in  this  region 
and  would  be  reflected  in  all  the  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. No  special  and  local  Tribunal  would  be  able  to  repair  the 
damage  done  in  this  way. 

The  Sarre  Basin,  under  such  a  regime,  would  become  a  Euro- 
pean Morocco  with  all  and  more  than  all  the  defects  of  the  Algeci- 
ras  Act.    It  would  be  a  hot-bed  and  forcing  ground  for  continual 
Franco-German  conflicts. 
IV.    France's  two  essential  interests  are  defeated. 

Moreover,  the  arrangement  suggested  satisfies  neither  of  the 
two  essential  interests  which  the  French  Government  must  safe- 
guard. 

(1)     As  regards  the  sub-soil. 

The  ownership  of  the  mines  as  a  perpetual  right  was  agreed  to 
by  President  Wilson's  Note  to  M.  Clemenceaii  on  March  31. 
France  claimed  that  this  coal  to  which  she  had  a  right  of  reparation 


THE  SABRE  BASIN  275 

was  indispensable  to  her  and  to  Alsace-Lorraine.  Now  the  Note  of 
April  8  considers  the  simple  cession  of  this  right  of  ownership  after 
fifteen  years.  France  cannot  agree  to  such  an  arrangement. 

(2)     As  regards  the  soil. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  objected  to  France's  first 
claim  that  there  are  on  this  territory — formerly  French  in  its 
greater  part — too  many  German  elements  due  to  German  immi- 
gration for  an  immediate  union  with  France  to  be  acceptable.  The 
French  Government  agreed  on  March  28  to  examine  another  solu- 
tion but  it  constantly  declared  that  there  are  on  this  same  territory 
too  many  French  elements  henceforth  turned  towards  her  for 
France  to  renounce  safeguarding  for  the  future  their  right  to  be 
reunited  to  her. 

Moreover,  in  order  to  ensure  this  reunion  in  fifteen  years  by 
the  free  vote  of  the  population,  the  minimum  condition  is  that  the 
territory  until  then  be  withdrawn  from  the  pressure  of  Prussian 
administration  to  which  it  has  been  subjected  for  one  hundred 
years. 

This  administration  (elections,  functionaries,  etc.)  which  the 
Note  of  April  8  leaves  in  force  would  give  the  Germans  the  weapon 
for  that  terrorism  whereby  they  have  always  ruled,  and  would  de- 
prive the  inhabitants  of  that  "fair  chance"  of  liberation  which 
France  wishes  to  procure  for  them. 

France  agrees  that  all  guarantees,  even  that  of  nationality,  be 
given  to  the  inhabitants  as  individuals.  But  she  cannot  admit  that 
the  economic  and  social  mandate  which  will  be  entrusted  to  her  be 
mortgaged  at  every  turn  by  the  exercise  of  Prussian  sovereignty 
and  administration. 
V.  Conclusion. 

To  sum  up,  the  French  Government,  after  having  carefully 
studied  President  AVilsoii  's  Note  of  April  8,  believes  that  this  Note : 

(1)  Does  not  contain  the  administrative  and  political  clauses 
which  the  experts'  report  of  April  5  deems  indispensable  in  order 
to  avoid  conflicts. 

(2)  Involves,  by  reason  of  this  fact,  great  risk  of  stirring  up 
local  and  general  complications. 

(3)  Supplies  Germany  with  a  permanent  means  of  obstruct- 
ing French  operation  of  the  mines  of  the  basin. 

(4)  Entirely  re-opens  the  question  at  the  expiration  of  fifteen 
years  of  France's  right  of  ownership  over  the  mines  which  was 
sanctioned  by  President  Wilson's  Note  of  March  31. 


276    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

(5)  Does  not  insure  to  the  population  in  view  of  the  proposed 
plebiscite  the  indispensable  guarantees  necessary  after  one  hundred 
years  of  Prussian  oppression. 

The  French  Government  wishes  therefore  to  adhere  to  one  of 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  proposals  in  harmony  with  those  which  it  has 
itself  formulated. 

It  is  ready  to  complete  them  in  conformity  with  President  Wil- 
son 's  suggestions : 

(a)  By  a  plebiscite  after  fifteen  years; 

(b)  By  a  Court  of  Arbitration  appointed  to  settle  possible 
conflicts  in  the  application  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  three 
solutions. 

(signed)  G.  Clemenceau. 

Henceforth  the  positions  could  hardly  be  modified  or 
the  solution  much  delayed.  April  9  would  in  fact  be  deci- 
sive. At  the  morning  meeting  Mr.  Lloyd  George  gave  his 
full  approval  to  our  Note  of  the  previous  day  and  drew 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  plebiscite  at  the  end  of  fifteen 
years  answered  President  Wilson's  objections.  The  latter 
still  holds  out.  But  he  and  his  counsellors  waver  under  the 
force  of  our  arguments. 

The  afternoon  of  the  ninth  he  presents  a  new  text  which, 
without  conferring  the  mandate  upon  France  transformed 
into  an  administrative  commission  the  Commission  of 
Arbitration  which  he  had  suggested  the  previous  day.  I 
ask  the  President  three  essential  questions : 

1° — Will  German  sovereignty  be  suspended! 

2° — Will  the  Commission  have  full  rights,  including 
that  of  dismissing  officials? 

3° — Will  the  elections  to  the  Reichstag  be  suppressed! 

President  Wilson  answers:  "Yes." 

On  hearing  this  affirmative  answer  M.  Clemenceau 
agrees  to  leave  to  the  Committee,  composed  of  Mr.  Has- 
kins,  Mr.  Morley  and  myself,  the  task  of  drafting  a  clause. 

Working  from  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  until  three 
o  'clock  in  the  morning,  our  Committee,  assisted  by  technical 
and  legal  experts,  completes  this  task  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  tenth  the  draft  is  submitted  to  the  Council  of  Four 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  277 

who  accept  it:  it  will  become  Section  4  of  Part  III  of  the 
Treaty.  It  sets  forth  in  forty-six  articles  the  principles 
which  since  March  28  France  had  defended  before  the  Con- 
ference. The  mines  are  yielded  to  us  in  full  ownership 
with  the  most  minute  guarantees  for  their  operation.  In 
order  to  assure  the  rights  and  welfare  of  the  population 
the  Government  is  transferred  for  fifteen  years  to  the 
League  of  Nations  which  delegates  it  to  a  Commission  of 
five  members.  This  Commission  will  have  all  the  powers 
hitherto  belonging  to  the  German  Empire,  Prussia  and 
Bavaria.  A  Customs  Union  will  be  established  between 
France  and  the  territory  of  the  Sarre.  At  the  end  of  fif- 
teen years  the  population  will  vote  by  districts  on  the 
following  questions:  reunion  with  Germany:  union  with 
France:  continuance  of  autonomy.  If  a  mining  district 
voted  for  Germany  the  latter  would  have  the  right  to  repur- 
chase the  mines  of  that  district  but  with  the  obligation  to 
supply  France  with  the  corresponding  quantity  of  coal 
called  for  by  her  industrial  and  domestic  needs.  In  all 
other  cases  the  total  ownership  of  the  mines  goes  to  France. 

These  provisions,  like  the  rest  of  the  Treaty,  have  been 
subjected  to  contradictory  criticisms,  some  people  finding 
them  insufficient,  others  excessive.  The  latter  criticisms 
have  been  keener  than  the  former  and  have  furnished  anti- 
French  propaganda  with  valuable  material. 

What  can  be  said  in  reply  to  the  first  of  these  two 
criticisms  which  is  not  already  clear  from  what  precedes? 
We  have  not  obtained  the  frontier  of  1814.  The  complete 
silence  on  this  point  in  the  Allies'  declarations  on  Decem- 
ber 21,  1916,  and  January  10,  1917,  as  well  as  in  the  par- 
liamentary resolutions  in  the  month  of  June  following  did 
not,  it  must  be  confessed,  render  the  task  of  the  French 
delegation  any  easier.  Besides  who  could  deny  that  this 
frontier  would  have  given  us  but  a  small  part  of  the  coal ; 
that  it  would  have  ruined  the  economic  unity  of  the  basin ; 
and  that  it  would  have  involved  the  risk  of  having  protest- 
ing German  deputies  in  our  parliamentary  bodies?  It  was 
to  these  arguments  continually  put  forward  by  our  Allies, 


278 

which  were  by  no  means  devoid  of  force,  that  we  had 
finally  to  sacrifice  our  initial  contention.  At  last  we  won 
both  our  right  to  full  ownership  of  the  mines  and  self- 
determination  for  the  population.  Henceforth  the  French 
of  the  Sarre  are  liberated  from  Prussian  oppression  and 
the  future  is  theirs. 

This  solution  is  bad,  was  the  criticism  of  some,  not 
because  insufficient,  but  because  abusive,  vexatious, 
hypocritical,  injurious  to  the  liberty  of  peoples.  It  has 
hurt  France  deeply  to  see  an  English  writer  parrot  the 
arguments  put  forward  on  this  subject  by  Count  Brock- 
dorff-Kantzau  in  his  Note  of  May  29,  1919.  But  to  such 
evil  reasoning  facts  give  answer.  An  imperialist  solution 
of  the  problem  of  the  Sarre?  This  would  have  perhaps 
meant  re-annexation  pure  and  simple  to  France.  Instead 
bf  this  re-annexation  the  Treaty  provides  for  the  plebiscite 
which  will  respect  the  rights  of  the  inhabitants.  "Without 
it  two  things  were  possible:  either  annexation  to  France, 
thus  depriving  the  German  population  of  the  right  to 
choose  its  sovereignty ;  or  the  maintenance  of  the  statu  quo 
whereby  nearly  150,000  people  of  the  Sarre,  as  French  in 
their  hearts  and  their  aspirations  as  the  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers,  would  remain  forever  under  the  German  heel. 
The  Peace  Conference  would  have  neither  the  first  nor  the 
second  of  these  solutions;  determined  to  have  neither  the 
one  nor  the  other  it  was  led  by  its  very  scruples  to  the  solu- 
tion embodied  in  the  Treaty.  And  let  it  not  be  said  that 
in  order  to  avoid  this  difficulty  it  was  sufficient  to  organ- 
ize the  plebiscite  immediately :  for  beneath  the  weight  of  a 
century  of  Prussian  oppression  an  immediate  plebiscite 
would  have  been  a  vitiated  plebiscite  and  the  French  of 
the  Sarre  would  have  been  sacrificed.  In  their  answer  of 
June  16,  1919,  to  Count  Brockdorff-Eantzau,  the  heads  of 
the  Allied  Governments  moreover  rejected  his  pretensions 
in  memorable  terms: 

"For  the  first  time,"  they  said,  "since  the  annexation  of  this 
district  to  Prussia  and  to  Bavaria,  the  people  will  live  under  a  local 
Government  which  will  have  no  other  interest  or  concern  than  the 


THE  SARRE  BASIN  279 

protection  of  their  welfare.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
have  full  confidence  that  the  inhabitants  will  have  no  reason  to 
regard  the  new  administration  as  more  remote  than  that  of  Berlin 
or  Munich.  Moreover,  the  system  is  temporary  and  at  the  end  of 
fifteen  years  the  inhabitants  will  have  full  and  free  right  to  choose 
the  sovereignty  under  which  they  wish  to  live. ' ' 

Such  the  solution  furnished  by  the  Treaty.  Complex 
assuredly  because  the  problem  was  complex — because 
France  had  to  deal  with  Allies  restrained  by  well-meaning 
hesitations  and  often  incapable  of  grasping  things  from  the 
same  point  of  view  as  France,  but  just  also  because  taking 
into  account  in  this  very  complexity  all  the  interests 
involved.  At  the  beginning  of  July,  1919,  the  mayor  of 
Sarrelouis  accompanied  by  a  delegation  came  to  express  to 
M.  Clemenceau  the  gratitude  of  his  fellow  citizens.  Janu- 
ary 10,  1920,  our  mining  engineers  took  possession  of  the 
coal  basin.  Some  days  later,  the  Government  Commission 
presided  over  by  a  Frenchman,  was  installed  at  Sarre- 
bruck  and  in  several  months  did  good  and  useful  work  for 
the  inhabitants.  It  is  this  that  should  be  retained  by  the 
opinion  of  our  Allies  who,  to  inform  themselves,  will  attach 
more  weight  to  the  documents  of  which  this  chapter  sub- 
mits the  testimony  tban  to  the  captious  protests  of  men 
who,  so  long  as  they  believed  themselves  conquerors, 
intended  to  annex  Belgium  and  five  French  Departments. 


CHAPTER  IX 

WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY 

To  make  certain  her  safety  was  the  first  duty  of  France. 
To  secure  reparation  was  her  second.  Duties  common  to 
all,  it  is  true,  but  made  peculiarly  imperative  to  my  country 
by  the  losses  and  suffering  she  had  sustained. 

Here,  again,  the  interests  of  France  were  in  accord  with 
the  general  interest  and  with  justice.  Germany  was  doubly 
responsible  for  the  destruction  caused  by  the  war ;  due  first 
to  her  premeditated  aggression  and  then  made  worse  by 
her'  systematic  savagery.  War  is  an  atrocious  thing.  Ger- 
many knew  what  she  was  doing  when  she  unloosed  it.  But 
by  her  methods  she  made  it  more  atrocious  still.  Cruel  war 
on  civilians  to  win  quick  victory  was  the  doctrine  of  the 
German  General  Staff,  often  expounded  ex  cathedra,  before 
Louvain  and  so  many  other  cities  had  seen  its  hideous 
application.  But  cruel  war  for  greater  profits  in  peace 
time ;  cruel  war  that  gold  might  be  won  by  the  sword  was 
also  the  doctrine  of  German  captains  of  industry  in  whose 
eyes  the  adversary  of  to-day  was  the  competitor  of  to-mor- 
row. Much  of  the  destruction  was  systematically  wrought, 
far  from  the  front,  in  order  to  ruin  permanently  the  occu- 
pied districts  to  the  future  advantage  of  German  industry. 
This  conception  of  war,  enhancing  the  responsibility  of  the 
beaten  aggressor,  doubly  justified  full  and  complete 
reparation. 

In  the  month  of  February,  1916,  when  Germany  was 
expecting  victory  to  result  from  her  onslaught  against  Ver- 
dun, the  Quartermaster  General  of  the  Imperial  Armies 
sent  to  all  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  to  all  the  financial, 
industrial  and  commercial  associations  of  the  Empire,  a 

280 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  281 

book  of  482  pages,  with  maps  and  charts,  entitled :  Industry 
in  Occupied  France.  This  work,  prepared  by  two  hundred 
reserve  officers,  chosen  for  their  technical  qualifications, 
described  the  state  of  destruction  of  each  of  our  industries, 
at  the  time  of  publication.  This  destruction  was  of  two 
kinds.  The  first  and  less  important  resulting  from  battle 
and  bombardment;  the  second  more  frequent  and  more 
serious  resulting  from  the  organized  pillage  of  factories 
and  from  the  removal  into  Germany  not  only  of  their  stocks 
of  manufactured  goods  and  raw  material  contained,  but 
also  of  their  machinery,  their  equipment  and  often  even 
essential  parts  of  their  plants.  The  purpose  of  the  book? 
"To  give  an  idea  of  the  resultant  effects  for  Germany  of 
the  destruction  of  certain  branches  of  French  industry." 
For  what  object?  To  give  German  industry  advance  infor- 
mation of  the  markets  in  which  it  could  replace  us  after 
the  war  and  also,  by  a  refined  cynicism,  to  supply  profit- 
able customers  in  the  persons  of  the  factory  owners  robbed 
and  despoiled  by  the  German  Army.  Are  examples 
wanted?  Here  are  a  few  taken  at  random  from  this 
monstrous  plan  of  brigandage. 

Foundries.  Production  (and  therefore  receipts)  will  fall  off 
heavily  in  these  foundries,  owing  to  the  removal  of  the  machinery. 

This  loss,  which  will  be  considerably  increased  by  the  cost  of 
reconstruction,  will  so  prejudice  numerous  enterprises,  from  the 
financial  point  of  view,  that  it  will  be  difficult  for  them  to  resume 
operation,  or  to  restore  this  to  its  former  level. 

As  regards  steel  mills,  an  indirect  effect  upon  Germany  is  pos- 
sible in  this  sense,  that,  owing  to  the  considerable  deterioration 
suffered  by  French  locomotive  works  and  car  shops,  French  Rail- 
ways will  probably  be  obliged  to  buy  their  rolling  stock  in  Ger- 
many, and  the  resulting  orders  will  go  to  German  plants. 

Textile  Mills.  As  all  metals  lacking  in  Germany,  such  as 
copper,  brass,  bronze,  etc.,  have  been  seized  and  taken  away  from 
French  factories ....  resumption  of  work  will  encounter  great  diffi- 
culties. An  enormous  market,  especially  for  German  manufac- 
turers of  textile  machinery,  will  be  found  in  the  north  of  France. 

Bleaching  and  Dyeing.     All  copper  parts  and  leather  belts  have 


282    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

been  taken  out  and  sent  to  Germany.  An  important  outlet  is  thus 
made  for  German  machine  manufacturers. 

Woolen  Mills.  In  the  factories  almost  all  the  copper  boiler 
parts  have  been  removed,  as  well  as  all  leather  belting.  Electric 
wiring  has  been  taken  out  in  many  factories.  The  small  electric 
motors  will  be  removed  between  now  and  the  end  of  the  war.  In 
the  region  of  Avesnes  and  of  Sedan,  several  factories  have  been  so 
gutted  that  a  certain  number  of  their  looms,  abandoned  to  the 
weather,  may  be  looked  upon  as  scrap  iron. 

To  what  extent  will  the  continuation  of  economic  war  after 
peace  is  declared  prevent  France's  recovering  the  advantage  now 
possessed  by  Germany  who  has  suffered  practically  no  destruction 
from  the  war  ?  This  is  a  question  that  German  industry  will  have 
to  study. 

Germany  should  be  in  a  position  to  resume  her  full  productive 
capacity  in  the  manufacture  of  yarn  at  least  one  or  two  years 
sooner  than  France.  This  result  will  be  all  the  more  satisfactory 
in  that  the  sister  industries  of  weaving  and  dyeing,  as  well  as  the 
export  trade,  will  benefit  equally  thereby,  and  that  this  last, 
especially,  will  be  in  a  position,  not  only  to  recapture  the  markets 
it  has  lost,  but  even  to  acquire  new  ones  where  France  so  far  has 
been  the  only  furnisher. 

Ceramic  Industry.  Attention  is  drawn  to  considerable  war 
damages  in  the  destruction  and  requisition  on  a  large  scale  of  elec- 
tric installations  and  wiring. 

The  German  machine  makers  should  find  in  this  field  a  good 
opportunity  after  the  war  of  selling  their  wares. 

By  properly  directed  effort,  Germany  should  succeed  in  cap- 
turing the  few  French  foreign  markets,  notably  in  Turkey  and  the 
Balkan  States.  The  long  stoppage  of  work  in  the  French  factories, 
and  their  inability  to  manufacture  and  export  immediately  after 
the  war  should  contribute  to  this. 

Sugar  Industry.  The  French  refineries,  with  a  few  rare  excep- 
tions, have  suffered  greatly  from  the  war.  None  of  them  has 
escaped  requisitions.  Everywhere  their  stocks  of  sugar,  of  treacle, 
their  provisions  of  coal,  coke  and  petroleum,  rubber  and  leather 
belting,  live  stock,  consisting  of  horses,  oxen,  etc.,  carts,  harness^ 
implements,  narrow  gauge  railways,  patent  trucks  and  electric 
wiring  have  been  removed,  and  in  only  a  few  shops,  four  or  six, 
now  working  for  the  Germans — has  indispensable  equipment  been 
left. 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  283 

But  the  damage  done  to  the  refineries  themselves  and  their 
equipment  is  even  more  serious. 

Lack  of  superintendence,  occupation  by  troops,  removal  of  the 
above  mentioned  objects,  have  already  caused  great  damage;  but 
the  refineries  have  suffered  still  more  from  the  taking  out  of  all 
copper,  brass  and  bronze  appliances. 

War  wastage  has  caused  such  damage  to  whole  series  of  refi- 
neries that  their  reconstruction  would  be  impossible.  Even  those 
that  survive,  in  a  more  or  less  damaged  condition,  will  long  feel  the 
disastrous  effects  of  the  war.  The  French  sugar  industry  should 
disappear  as  a  competitor  on  the  world  market  during  the  next 
two  or  three  years.  It  will,  at  the  start,  scarcely  suffice  to  supply 
the  country's  own  needs  and  to  replenish  exhausted  stocks.  To  a 
certain  extent,  it  will  be  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  special  German 
factories  for  purposes  of  reconstruction;  for  the  French  machine 
shops  situated  for  the  most  part  in  the  North  and  reduced  in  their 
productive  capacity  by  the  war,  will  be  inadequate  for  this  task. 

Leather  Industry.  French  competition  will  be  unable  to  make 
itself  felt  for  eighteen  months.  German  industry  can  find  a  consid- 
erable market  for  several  years  in  the  North  of  France  and  assure 
itself,  for  the  future,  important  outlet,  formerly  monopolized  by 
French  products  in  Asia  Minor  and  European  Turkey. 

Coal  Mines.  The  districts  will  be  unproductive  for  years  to 
come,  owing  to  the  removal  of  the  machinery  and  the  flooding  of 
the  shafts. 

France  will  have  to  buy  her  machinery  in  Germany  and,  even 
if  the  rich  beds  in  the  French  territory  occupied  by  the  German 
troops  were  to  continue  in  the  possession  of  France,  it  might  be 
foreseen  that  Germany  would  have  to  deliver  a  higher  percentage 
than  in  the  past,  owing  to  the  deficit  in  French  production. 

Breweries.  Breweries  have  suffered  heavy  damages  owing  to 
the  removal  of  all  articles  of  brass  and  copper.  Those  only  have 
been  preserved  which  have  made  beer  for  the  troops,  and  they  have 
been  operated  by  the  Army  as  military  breweries.  Their  number  is 
not  large. 

The  brewing  industry  in  the  occupied  territory  may  be  re- 
garded, for  the  greater  part,  as  annihilated.  Certain  brewers,  who 
were  among  the  most  prosperous,  will  need  at  least  two  years  to 
restore  their  plants,  even  if  they  replace  in  part  the  copper  by  iron. 

A  large  part  of  the  orders  will  come  to  the  German  machine 
makers,  if  they  can  promise  quicker  delivery  than  their  English 
and  American  competitors. 


284     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Paper  Industry.  The  damage  caused  by  the  war  to  the  plants 
and  the  buildings  in  the  paper  industry  is  considerable,  as  impor- 
tant copper  piping  has  been  removed,  as  well  as  brass  forms  and 
cylinders  which  it  will  be  difficult  to  replace  after  the  war. 

For  example :  In  the  paper  mills  of  Bousbecque  alone,  nearly 
ninety  tons  of  wrought  copper  have  been  taken  out. 

German  machine  makers  who,  before  the  war,  found  in  the 
paper  industry  a  very  important  outlet  for  their  product,  must 
strive  to  secure  the  work  of  reconstructing  these  mills,  in  order  to 
eliminate  the  inevitable  competition,  especially  from  America. 
American  machines  would  otherwise  easily  install  themselves  in  this 
industry,  from  which,  afterwards,  it  would  be  difficult  to  drive 
them  out. 

The  Cotton  Industry.  In  the  occupied  territory  the  greater 
number  of  the  spindles  and  bobbins  will  be  able  to  operate  only  six 
or  eight  months  after  the  corresponding  German  industry  has 
started  working  again. 

These  quotations  are  tragically  enlightening.  The 
damage  sustained  by  French  industry,  object  of  this 
inquiry,  interests  German  leaders  only  in  the  measure  of 
its  beneficial  effects  upon  corresponding  branches  of  Ger- 
man activity.  To  the  Army — which  does  its  work  conscien- 
tiously— the  task  of  destroying  capital  and  throwing 
labour  out  of  work ;  to  the  business  men  the  task  of  getting 
the  most  out  of  it  either  by  the  conquest  of  markets  for- 
merly held  by  France,  or  by  the  sale  to  French  pre-war 
competitors  of  machinery  and  implements  which  the  Ger- 
man troops  had  stolen  from  them!  This  confidential  docu- 
ment, which  M.  Klotz  laid  before  the  Supreme  Council  in 
February,  1919,  is  not  only  indicative  of  an  amazing 
psychology,  it  is  the  necessary  preface  to  any  study  of 
reparations.  In  the  case  of  Germany,  we  are  confronted 
not  only  by  the  inevitable  desolation  and  ruin  of  war,  not 
only  by  the  responsibilities  of  a  war  of  aggression,  but  by 
intentional  and  methodical  destruction.  Germany  killed 
not  only  to  conquer,  but  for  profit.  Beaten,  she  has  to 
pay.  Such  the  verdict  of  Versailles. 

The  verdict  was  known  in  advance  and  astonished  no 
one.  All  the  declarations  of  the  Allies,  all  the  votes  of  their 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  285 

Parliaments,  all  the  messages  of  President  Wilson,  all  the 
speeches  of  M.  Clemenceau  and  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
finally  all  the  accepted  bases  of  the  peace,  had  laid  down 
the  Allied  programme  in  perfect  accord  with  the  dictates  of 
their  conscience.  On  the  principle,  there  was  no  disagree- 
ment ;  but  in  its  application  this  stupendous  problem  calling 
from  destroyed  towns  and  devastated  fields  for  billions 
involved  difficulties  such  as  no  political  assembly  had  ever 
before  met  or  solved. 

n 

At  the  end  of  January,  1919,  a  special  Commission  is 
created  by  the  Supreme  Council  to  study  the  problem.  It 
comprises  the  highest  financial  authorities  of  the  victorious 
countries.  At  its  very  first  meeting,  it  frankly  propounds 
the  fundamental  question:  "What  is  Germany  to  pay?" 

I  recall  the  legal  bases  of  the  question.  These  bases 
were  embodied  not  only  in  the  general  rules  of  international 
law,  but  also  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  which  had 
preceded  the  Armistice  of  November  11,  1918.  This  cor- 
respondence had  both  defined  the  necessary  conditions  of 
an  Armistice,  the  study  and  framing  of  which  had  been 
intrusted  to  Marshal  Foch  and  the  general  bases  of  peace 
laid  down  in  President  Wilson's  message  on  January  8, 
1918,  which  in  turn  accorded  with  the  declarations  of  the 
European  Governments,  dated  December  31,  1916,  and  Jan- 
uary 10,  1917.  Concerning  reparations  the  important  pas- 
sage is  found  in  Mr.  Lansing's  telegram  of  November  5, 
1918.  It  is  worded  as  follows: 

When  the  President  formulated  his  peace  conditions  in  his 
address  to  Congress  on  January  8,  last,  he  declared  that  the  invaded 
territories  must  be  not  only  evacuated  and  liberated,  but  restored. 
The  Allies  think  that  no  doubt  should  be  left  as  to  what  this  stip- 
ulation means.  They  understand  by  it  that  compensation  will  be 
made  by  Germany  for  all  damage  done  to  the  civilian  population 
of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany  by 
land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  air.  The  President  is  in  agreement  with 
this  interpretation. 


286 

Furthermore  during  the  meetings  held  on  October  31 
and  November  1,  2,  and  4,  1918,  by  the  Supreme  Council 
of  the  Allies  for  the  final  drafting  of  the  Armistice  clauses, 
M.  Klotz,  Minister  of  Finance,  had  said : 

"It  would  be  prudent  to  preface  the  financial  questions, 
in  the  Armistice  itself,  -with  an  explicit  reservation  of  all 
future  claims  of  the  Allies,  and  I  propose  the  following 
text:  'With  the  reservation  that  any  subsequent  claims  by 
the  Allies  and  the  United  States  of  America  remain  unaf- 
fected, reparation  for  damage  done.' 

M.  Klotz 's  proposal  was  read  a  first  time  on  November  2 
and  on  the  fourth  it  was  finally  adopted.  These  were  the 
two  texts  which  might  guide  the  Commission  in  its  work. 

The  meeting  of  February  10  showed  that  these  texts 
had  given  rise  to  two  contradictory  interpretations.  One 
was  put  forward  by  all  the  Powers  represented,  with  a 
single  exception;  the  other,  by  the  delegate  of  the  United 
States.  The  views  of  the  majority  found  an  admirable 
interpreter  in  Great  Britain's  principal  delegate  to  the 
Commission,  Mr.  Hughes,  Prime  Minister  of  Australia,  a 
little  man,  deaf,  impetuous,  clear-minded,  a  blunt  and 
aggressive  orator.  This  view  was  that  Germany,  without 
exception  or  reserve,  should  reimburse  all  the  costs  of  the 
war,  including  damage  to  persons  and  property,  and  war 
expenditures. 

"The  right  to  reparation,"  he  declared,  "rests  upon  the 
principle  of  justice,  pure  and  simple,  in  this  sense  that, 
where  damage  or  harm  has  been  done,  the  doer  should 
make  it  good  to  the  extreme  limit  of  his  resources.  This 
principle  is  universally  recognized  by  all  laws. 

"This  principle  demands  that  the  sum  total  of  the  cost 

of  the  war  should  be  borne  by  the  enemy  nations From 

the  points  of  view  of  both  logic  and  justice,  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  to  distinguish  between  the  claim  to  the  right  for 
restoration  in  the  devastated  regions,  and  the  claim  for 
damages  in  general. . .  .Those  who  have  mortgaged  all  they 
possess  in  order  to  free  Belgium,  have  suffered  from  Ger- 
many as  much  as  Belgium  herself. 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  287 

"Let  us  take  the  case  of  Australia.  She  has  lost  nearly 
60,000  killed,  and  about  190,000  mutilated  or  infirm  for 
life.  Her  war  debt  is  300,000,000  pounds,  or  7,500  million 
francs  gold,  a  crushing  burden  for  a  nation  of  five  million 
inhabitants.  It  may  be  that  so  far  as  civilian  life  and  prop- 
erty are  concerned,  my  countrymen  have  not  endured  actual 
sufferings ;  but  the  sacrifices  they  have  made  and  the  dam- 
age they  have  suffered,  are  no  less  great.  Full  and  com- 
plete compensation  is  due  to  them  as  to  all  other  Allies. 

"The  house  or  the  factory  of  the  Belgian  is  in  ruins. 
The  Englishman's  is  mortgaged  for  war  expenditure.  The 
damage  to  him  is  quite  as  real,  quite  as  great,  quite  as 
direct.  Germany  owes  Great  Britain  reparation  for  war 
costs  as  unquestionably  as  she  owes  reparation  to  Belgium 
for  the  ravages  she  has  committed." 

To  these  general  arguments  of  equity,  Lord  Sunnier,  the 
second  British  delegate,  added  legal  reasons  borrowed  from 
international  custom  and  from  the  text  of  the  Armistice. 
He  recalled  that  war  costs  had  been  demanded  by  the 
Allied  Powers  from  France  in  1815  (700  millions) ;  by 
Austria  from  Sardinia  in  1849  (25  millions) ;  by  Prussia 
from  Austria  in  1866  (40  millions) ;  by  Prussia  from  France 
in  1871  (5,000  millions).  He  added: 

"The  reimbursement  of  war  costs  is  the  constant  prac- 
tice of  international  law No  particular  clause,  either 

in  the  Fourteen  Points  or  in  the  Armistice,  excludes  this 
reimbursement. ' ' 

The  American  Counsel,  Mr.  J.  F.  Dulles,  a  clear  and 
forceful  logician,  did  not  of  course  deny  any  of  Germany 's' 
responsibilities,  but,  as  a  lawyer,  he  declared  that  he  was 
dealing  with  a  contract  which,  in  his  opinion,  limited  the 
right  of  the  Allies  to  claim  anything  beyond  reparation  for 
all  acts  committed  in  violation  of  international  laws  and  for 
direct  damages  suffered  by  the  civilian  population.  He 
said: 

"The  American  delegation  associates  itself  absolutely 
and  without  reserve  with  all  that  has  been  said  concerning 
the  enormity  of  the  crime  committed  by  Germany.  Besides, 
the  United  States  have  their  war  debt  also,  constituting  a 


288    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

terrible  burden.  So  as  it  is  in  accord  with  our  inmost  feel- 
ings that  the  principles  of  reparation  should  be  severe,  and 
with  our  national  interest  that  these  principles  should  be 
given  the  widest  scope,  why  is  it  that  we  propose  only  a 
limited  reparation? 

"It  is  because  we  are  not  facing  a  blank  page,  but  a 
page  covered  with  a  document  at  the  foot  of  which  are  the 
signatures  of  Mr.  Wilson,  M.  Clemenceau,  M.  Orlando  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

"The  proposal  of  the  United  States  is  therefore  that 
we  demand  from  Germany  full  reparations,  but  only  those 
stipulated  in  the  contract  with  Germany  concerning  the 
conditions  on  which  peace  could  be  signed. 

"Accordingly,  first  comes  reparation  for  acts  which 
constitute  an  obvious  violation  of  international  law.  This, 
therefore,  implies  complete  reparation  for  Belgium. 

"Then,  restoration  of  the  invaded  regions,  and  repara- 
tion for  damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  and  its 
property." 

To  this  argument,  M.  Klotz  who,  as  President  of  the 
Commission,  was  the  last  to  speak,  forcefully  opposed  an 
argument  of  fact  and  of  law  which,  without  convincing  Mr. 
Dulles,  made  a  great  impression  upon  all  his  colleagues. 

"You  speak  of  a  contract,"  he  said.  "For  my  part,  I 
know  only  of  one — signed  by  the  Allies  and  by  Germany — 
that  is  the  Armistice.  "Well,  I  read  in  that:  'With  the 
reservation  that  any  subsequent  claims  of  the  Allies  and 
the  United  States  of  America  remain  unaffected,  repara- 
tion for  damage  done.'  It  was  I  who  asked  for  the  inser- 
tion of  that  clause.  All  the  delegates  accepted  it.  Its 
meaning  is  clear. 

"I  conclude  therefore,  first,  that  there  exists  no  con- 
tract under  the  terms  of  which  reimbursement  of  war  costs 
was  renounced,  and  second,  that  there  is  in  the  Armistice 
a  contract  according  to  the  terms  of  which  the  right  to 
reimbursement  has  been  expressly  reserved." 

A  long  discussion  brought  additional  arguments  to 
strengthen  M.  Klotz 's  contention.  I  will  quote  only  the 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  289 

principal  ones.  M.  Chiesa,  the  Italian  delegate,  drew  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that,  inasmuch  as  Mr.  Lansing's  note 
referred  to  "all"  the  damage  caused  the  civilian  popula- 
tion, this  definition  covered  the  war  costs  and  indirect 
damage,  as  well  as  direct  damages.  M.  Mori,  the  Japanese 
delegate,  added:  "The  question  before  us  is  the  same  as 
that  of  the  costs  in  a  lawsuit.  The  sum  total  of  the  costs 
of  the  war  must  be  paid  by  the  aggressor."  M.  Proutich, 
the  Serbian  delegate,  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
Fourteen  Points  applied  only  to  Germany,  not  to  the  other 
belligerents.  M.  Loucheur  ended  his  summing  up  of  the 
discussion  with  the  words:  "No  indemnity"  did  not  mean 
"no  reimbursement  for  war  expenses."  Mr.  Hughes 
asserted  that,  since  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
created,  as  the  Americans  themselves  admitted,  Belgium's 
right  to  total  reparation,  the  same  right  existed  for  the 
guarantor  Powers,  obliged,  under  the  Treaty  of  1839,  to 
defend  Belgian  neutrality.  Mr.  Dulles  replied  to  each  of 
these  different  arguments  in  turn.  He  insisted  especially 
upon  that  of  M.  Klotz,  asserting  that  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence of  October,  1918,  referred  not  to  the  bases  of 
the  Armistice  but  to  those  of  the  peace;  that,  accordingly, 
it  bound  the  Conference,  charged  with  the  elaboration  not 
of  the  Armistice,  but  of  peace ;  furthermore  the  Armistice, 
whatever  its  wording,  could  change  nothing  in  the  accepted 

bases  of  the  peace As  no  agreement  was  reached,  it  was 

decided  to  ask  the  heads  of  the  Governments  for  their  inter- 
pretation, and  the  meeting  was  adjourned. 

After  the  legal  aspect,  so  full  of  fine  points,  let  us  con- 
sider the  facts  which  had  also  to  be  weighed.  The  demand 
for  full  and  complete  reparation  presented  by  M.  Klotz 
and  Mr.  Hughes  had  justice  on  its  side.  Moreover,  it  had 
held  so  large  a  place  in  the  English  elections  of  December, 
1918,  that  it  was  politically  impossible  for  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  to  abandon  it;  and  so  long  as  Great  Britain  sup- 
ported this  claim  all  the  other  Governments — especially 
those  of  countries  which  had  suffered  most  from  the  war- — 
were  bound  to  stand  by  her  to  avoid  being  overwhelmed  by 


290     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

abuse.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  looking  at  the  problem 
as  a  whole,  this  total  demand  led  to  actual  figures,  the  very 
magnitude  of  which  was  absurd  and  in  the  special  cases  of 
some  countries  it  also  led  to  results  contrary  to  what  had 
been  expected. 

The  amounts  to  be  demanded  from  Germany  for  dam- 
age done  to  persons  and  property,  reached  the  sum  of  about 
350,000  million.  For  the  Allies  as  a  whole  the  war  costs  on 
the  other  hand  amounted  to  700,000  million  francs.  The 
following  table  gives  an  approximate  estimate: 

In  thousand  of  million  francs 

Great  Britain    190  27.1% 

United  States    160  22.8% 

France     143  20.1% 

Russia    92  12.9% 

Italy    65  9.2% 

Belgium    


_  r  ~~  7.8% 

Roumania 

Greece 


Total 703        99.9% 

The  figures  revealed  that,  if  we  were  to  insist  upon  the 
three  claims — damage  to  property,  damage  to  persons,  war 
expenses — we  would  reach  a  total  capital  of  1,000  thousand 
millions,  the  payment  of  which  over  a  period  of  fifty  years 
would  represent  taking  into  account  interest  and  sinking 
fund  more  than  3,000  thousand  millions,  a  sum  so  great 
that  it  is  unreal.  If,  faithful  to  this  reasoning  as  logic 
demanded,  we  had  demanded  also  on  the  ground  of  full  and 
complete  reparation  and  in  accordance  with  full  justice 
payment  of  indirect  damages,  loss  in  operation,  loss  of 

profits,  etc we  should  perhaps  have  reached  some  such 

fabulous  total  as  7,000,  8,000  or  10,000  billions.  It  was 
clear  that,  if  the  Conference  was  to  get  practical  results,  it 
would  have  to  move  only  with  extreme  prudence. 

At  this  time  also  certain  delegates  began  to  be  worried 
by  the  thought  of  surprises  awaiting  the  countries  they  rep- 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  291 

resented.  Belgium's  first  delegate  to  the  Commission,  M. 
Van  den  Heuvel,  had  not  hesitated  to  show  his  uneasiness. 
He  said: 

"Everybody  recognizes  Belgium's  right  to  total  repara- 
tion, because  her  neutrality  was  violated.  But,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  what  will  this  right  amount  to,  if  we  accept  the 
English  view  of  full  and  complete  reparation  for  everyone  ? 
What  will  really  happen?  The  total  will  inevitably  be 
enormous.  Consequently  it  will  be  necessary  to  reduce  all 
the  debts  proportionately,  as  is  done  in  a  case  of  bank- 
ruptcy. Then  the  claims  of  the  small  Powers  will  never 
be  paid  in  full." 

Mr.  Dulles,  taking  advantage  of  this  remark,  imme- 
diately added : 

"The  American  proposals  are  those  which,  if  not  in 
principle,  at  least  in  practice,  will  ensure  the  maximum  of 
reparations  and  their  most  equitable  distribution.  To 
demand  the  whole  gigantic  total  of  the  war  costs — I  agree 
with  M.  Van  den  Heuvel — will  endanger  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  precise  reparation  to  be  fulfilled  by  Germany, 
and  to  which  she  is  compelled  to  recognize  that  she  must 
submit  and  which  will  absorb  her  resources  to  the  utmost 
limit." 

The  French  representatives  could  but  listen  to  these 
words  with  the  most  serious  attention.  For  examination 
of  the  figures  established  the  fact  that,  as  far  as  France 
was  concerned,  they  expressed  an  unquestionable  truth. 
Among  the  claimants,  France  headed  the  list  with  respect 
to  damages  to  persons  and  property.  Out  of  every  hundred 
francs  paid  by  Germany  under  these  two  heads  France 
considered  that  she  had  a  right — proved  by  the  actual 
figures — to  sixty-five,  the  other  Powers  getting  thirty-five. 
But  under  the  head  of  war  costs,  out  of  every  one  hundred 
francs  received,  we  had  a  right  to  only  twenty  and  the 
others  to  eighty.  Combine  these  two  propositions,  you  will 
see  that,  if  the  war  costs  were  not  exacted,  France  could 
claim  sixty-five  per  cent,  of  the  sum  paid  by  Germany, 
while  if  they  were,  she  could  get  only  forty-two  and  five- 


292     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

tenths  per  cent.  Our  interest — owing  on  the  one  hand  to 
the  danger  of  an  excessive  total,  on  the  other  to  the  play 
of  percentages — was  thus  to  demand,  in  opposition  to  the 
American  point  of  view,  damages  for  pensions  in  addition 
to  property  damages  but,  in  accordance  with  that  point 
of  view,  to  leave  aside  war  costs  which  ranked  us  lower 
among  the  Allies  than  the  two  other  classifications. 

This  was  the  solution  urged  by  the  French  delegation 
during  March  upon  the  heads  of  the  Governments,  and  this 
also  was  the  solution  decided  upon  at  the  end  of  the  month. 
From  then  on  the  discussion  was  rather  one  of  form  than 
of  substance,  rather  political  than  financial.  The  Ameri- 
cans had  made  a  thoroughly  just  concession  to  Franco- 
British  demands  by  adding  pensions  to  damages  to  persons 
and  property  and  agreeing  that  deaths  and  wounds  should 
be  considered  as  injuries  suffered  by  families,  whose 
resources  were  lessened  by  the  loss  or  incapacity  of  their 
members.  This  done,  they  were  ready  to  write  purely  and 
simply  in  the  Treaty:  "Germany  shall  reimburse  damages 
and  pensions."  The  British  and  the  French  in  fundamen- 
tal agreement  with  this  asked,  however,  that  for  political 
and  moral  reasons  something  further  be  added.  They 
wanted  the  Treaty  to  make  clear  in  law  Germany's  total 
responsibility  for  all  the  expenses  of  the  war.  They  wanted 
it  to  make  clear  by  specific  declaration  that,  if  full  and 
complete  reparation  were  not  demanded,  it  was  only 
because  of  material  impossibility.  They  wanted  this  impos- 
sibility to  be  set  forth  in  such  manner  as  not  to  shock  public 
opinion,  ill-informed,  as  one  may  imagine,  as  to  the  statisti- 
cal facts.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  insisted : 

"We  must  not  take  out  of  our  draft  some  indication  of 
the  enemy's  incapacity  to  pay  all  he  owes.  We  must  in 
some  way  justify  the  action  of  the  British  and  French  Gov- 
ernments, which  find  themselves  obliged  to  accept  less 
than  the  full  payment  of  war  costs.  We  must  make  it  thor* 
oughly  clear  that,  if  we  do  not  exact  it,  it  is  not  because  it 
would  be  unjust  to  claim  it,  but  because  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  obtain  it. 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY 

"Our  public  opinion  requires  reparation  as  complete  as 
possible.  I  have  communicated  to  M.  Clemenceau  a  report 
of  a  debate  upon  this  question  in  the  House  of  Commons 
and  it  gave  him  some  idea  of  the  violence  of  the  sentiments 
expressed  there.  Mr.  Bonar  Law  wrote  me  after  this 
debate  that  Parliament  had  shown  itself  ill  satisfied  with 
his  statement." 

And  M.  Clemenceau  added: 

"It  is  a  question  of  wording.  But  I  agree  with  you 
that  it  is  important  to  say  that  our  right  to  compensation 
is  not  limited,  and  that  it  is  we  ourselves  who,  in  view  of 
what  is  possible,  have  fixed  a  limit." 

It  was  thus  that  agreement  was  reached,  in  the  course 
of  two  meetings,  on  the  text  of  Articles  231  and  232  of  the 
Treaty.*  These  articles  have  often  been  misunderstood 
and  their  apparent  contradiction  has  been  bitterly  criti- 
cized. The  above  should  dispel  all  possible  misconception. 

If  it  had  been  a  question  of  principle  only,  it  is  abun- 
dantly clear  that  in  equity  neither  France  nor  any  of  the 
Allies  should  have  borne  a  cent  of  the  war  costs.  But  it 
was  a  question  of  political  realities  and  possibilities,  not 
a  question  of  ideals.  We  were  bound  first  to  remember 
that  the  American  delegation,  whose  approval  was  neces- 
sary, refused  absolutely  to  claim  the  war  costs;  then  that 
if  war  costs  were  claimed,  we  should  arrive  at  a  total  of 
more  than  a  thousand  thousand  millions,  obviously  irrecov- 
erable ;  finally  that  pro-rata  distribution  would  have  given 
France  only  forty-two  per  cent,  instead  of  the  sixty-five 


*Artiele  231.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  affirm  and  Ger- 
many accepts  the  responsibility  of  Germany  and  her  allies  for  causing  all  the 
loss  and  damage  to  which  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  and  their 
nationals  have  been  subjected  as  a  consequence  of  the  war  imposed  upon  them 
by  the  aggression  of  Germany  and  her  allies. 

Article  232.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  recognize  that  the 
resources  of  Germany  are  not  adequate,  after  taking  into  account  permanent 
diminutions  of  such  resources  which  will  result  from  other  provisions  of  the 
present  Treaty,  to  make  complete  reparation  for  all  such  loss  and  damage. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  however,  require,  and  Germany 
undertakes,  that  she  will  make  compensation  for  all  damage  done  to  the 
civilian  population  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  to  their  property 
during  the  period  of  the  belligerency  of  each  as  an  Allied  or  Associated  Power 
against  Germany  by  such  aggression  by  land,  by  sea  and  from  the  air,  and  in 
general  all  damage  as  defined  in  Annex  I  hereto. 


294    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

per  cent,  she  had  a  right  to  demand  under  the  head  of 
damages  and  pensions.  In  the  necessary  and  inevitable 
imperfection  of  solutions,  the  one  which  the  French  dele- 
gates put  through  was  unquestionably  the  best,  and  we 
can  say,  as  did  M.  Barthou  in  his  report  on  the  Treaty,  that 
by  exacting  from  Germany  the  full  and  complete  repay- 
ment of  damages  and  pensions,  the  "Peace  Conference,  all 
things  considered,  handled  the  matter  well." 

m 

We  now  knew  under  what  heads  we  could  claim  from 
Germany.  It  remained  to  fix  the  amounts  we  could  claim. 
The  damages  subject  to  reparation  had  been  defined.  It 
was  now  necessary  to  calculate  the  amount  of  these  dam- 
ages, a  difficult  task  indeed  for  so  soon  after  the  Armistice 
an  exact  estimate  of  the  devastation  was  virtually 
impossible. 

This  impossibility,  Combined  with  the  legitimate  desire 
to  make  the  Treaty  as  definite  as  possible,  suggested  as  no 
exact  estimate  was  forthcoming  the  statement  of  a  lump 
sum.  This  solution  at  first  sight  offered  attractive  advan- 
tages. The  creditors  would  know  at  once  the  sum  total 
they  were  to  receive.  The  debtors  would  know  the  sum 
total  they  were  to  pay.  The  credit  bond,  if  all  agreed  to 
discount  it,  would  be  immediately  negotiable.  Such  a  sum 
once  established  there  would  be  no  further  difficulties, 
either  for  the  Governments  or  for  the  Reparations  Commis- 
sion save  that,  which  under  this  plan  or  under  any  other 
remained  the  essential  difficulty — Germany,  forced  to 
accept  a  system  of  annuities,  might  some  day  refuse  to  pay. 

To  these  arguments  of  convenience,  the  French  delega- 
tion without  ever  wavering,  always  opposed,  throughout 
the  six  months  the  Peace  Conference  lasted,  the  arguments 
of  law  and  justice  which  were  finally  embodied  in  the 
Treaty.  It  was  its  duty  to  take  this  stand,  first  to  give 
effect  to  one  of  the  most  frequently  declared  war  aims  of 
France  (Notes  of  December  30,  1916,  and  January  10,  1917, 


295 

resolutions  of  the  Chamber  and  Senate  of  June  5  and  6 
following,  meeting  at  Versailles  of  October  31,  1918,  and 
finally  the  Armistice  itself).  It  was  its  duty,  because  the 
lump  sum  by  its  very  principal  excluded  that  full  and  com- 
plete reparation  for  damages,  the  perfect  right  of  France 
to  which  no  one  had  ever  contested.  Again,  it  was  its  duty 
because  the  lump  sum  by  its  modalities,  and  everyone  of 
them  was  minutely  discussed,  led  to  an  inadmissible  reduc- 
tion in  our  rights,  and  because  this  reduction  once  obtained 
Germany  alone,  and  not  France,  would  have  benefited  from 
the  potentialities  of  economic  improvement  the  future 
might  hold. 

For  these  reasons,  which  are  decisive,  France,  in  1919, 
refused  the  lump  sum.  She  refused  to  fix  the  amount  of 
Germany's  debt  summarily  and  at  random.  She  refused 
to  accept  as  the  basis  of  this  debt — the  inevitable  result  of 
a  lump  sum — Germany's  present  capacity  of  payment. 
She  refused  to  give  up  her  right  to  full  and  complete  repara- 
tion for  all  the  destruction  to  life  and  property  caused  by 
Germany.  She  refused  to  choose  for  fixing  the  German 
debt  the  moment  when  Germany  is  at  her  lowest.  She 
wanted  to  reserve  to  the  victims  the  future  benefit  that 
would  accrue  from  the  possible  revival  of  the  aggressor. 
These  principles  permeate  the.  whole  Treaty  and  it  is  right 
that  they  should. 

In  January,  1919,  the  discussion  had  begun  in  the 
Technical  Commissions.  These  latter  hesitated  before  the 
heavy  responsibilities  to  be  incurred  and  reserved  decision 
on  all  the  essential  points.  In  March  and  April,  the  matter 
passed  to  a  smaller  committee,  upon  which  M.  Klotz  and 
M.  Loucheur  represented  France,  and  to  the  Council  of  the 
heads  of  Governments.  Several  hundred  meetings  were 
held,  both  day  and  night.  The  question  of  the  lump  sum, 
with  two  or  three  others,  absorbed  the  greater  part  of  this 
effort.  On  March  26,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Four, 
M.  Loucheur  presented  the  problem.  Up  to  the  very  last 
our  three  representatives  held  together  to  obtain  a  settle- 
ment that  did  justice  to  France.  M.  Loucheur  said: 


296     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

"I  must  repeat  emphatically  that  the  lump  sum  offered 
us  is  not  sufficient  to  repair  all  the  damage  done  to  persons 
and  property.  What  becomes  of  the  pledges  we  have 
given?  What  will  our  people  say? 

"France  has  a  right — solemnly  recognized  even  before 
the  signing  of  the  Armistice — to  full  reparation  for  her 
sufferings  and  her  sacrifices.  What  I  ask  is  that  the 
Treaty  shall  record  this  right.  If  I  acted  otherwise,  I 
should  be  acting  against  the  interests  and  rights  of  my 
country. 

"I  do  not  fear  a  public  discussion.  No  one  to-day  can 
make  an  absolutely  certain  estimate  of  the  total  of  the 
reparations  due.  That  is  an  easy  matter  for  ships  which 
have  been  sunk.  It  is  much  more  difficult  when  dealing 
with  a  region  entirely  ruined  and  devastated." 

And,  the  same  day,  M.  Clemenceau  declared : 

"I  cannot  forget  the  document  we  signed  on  November 
4,  1918,  and  sent  to  President  Wilson  on  the  subject  of 
reparation  for  war  damages." 

On  March  28,  the  discussion  continues  and  in  a  long 
statement,  our  Minister  of  Finance  defends  the  plan  pre- 
sented by  the  French  delegation.  He  summarizes  it  thus : 

"The  Germans  are  obliged  and  have  pledged  them- 
selves to  repair  the  damages.  We  do  not  know  to-day 
what  such  reparation  will  cost.  Improvised  estimates 
would  be  imprudent.  The  only  system  is  the  following: 
The  Reparations  Commission  will  fix  the  amount — when 
it  has  all  the  facts.  Then  according  to  the  amount  of  the 
debt  thus  ascertained,  it  will  settle  the  figure  of  the  annui- 
ties and  the  length  of  payment." 

The  French  contention  is  so  strong  that,  at  this  meet- 
ing, Mr.  Lloyd  George  recognizes  it  is  preferable  not  to  fix 
any  figure  in  the  Treaty.  But  the  American  experts  hold 
to  the  lump  sum  and  repeat  in  its  favour  all  the  arguments 
that  France  had  just  refuted.  On  April  3,  4,  6,  and  7,  the 
two  contentions  continue  to  be  opposed.  It  is  objected  that, 
under  our  system,  the  payments  would  extend  over  more 
than  a  generation.  We  reply  that  this  is  not  certain  and 


WHAT  GEEMANY  MUST  PAY  297 

that  even  if  it  were  so,  it  is  just  to  inflict  this  burden  upon 
Germany  rather  than  upon  France.  Minimum  and  maxi- 
mum amounts  are  suggested.  We  reply  that  our  damages 
were  not  matters  for  bargaining,  and  that  it  is  their  real 
and  not  their  approximate  amount  which  must  be  reim- 
bursed us.  M.  Clemenceau  brings  the  final  argument : 

"It  must  be  made  plain  that  Germany  recognizes  the 
full  amount  of  her  debt.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  we 
recognize  it. 

"I  demand,  in  the  name  of  the  French  Government,  and 
after  consultation  with  my  colleagues,  that  the  Treaty  fix 
what  Germany  owes  us,  by  specifying  the  damages  for 
which  reparation  is  due  to  us. 

"We  will  fix  a  period  of  thirty  years,  if  you  wish  it,  and 
we  will  give  the  Commission,  after  it  has  calculated  the 
amount  of  the  debt,  the  mission  of  obtaining  payment  in 
these  thirty  years  of  all  that  Germany  owes.  If  that  is 
found  to  be  impossible,  the  Commission  will  have  the  right 
to  prolong  the  payments  beyond  thirty  years. 

"In  no  case  will  I  agree  to  allow  either  the  Treaty  or 
the  Commission  to  fix  an  amount  below  what  is  due  us. 
Such  settlements  are  haphazard  and  the  burden  of  them 
would  fall  upon  France.  I  repeat  in  no  case  will  I  be  able 
to  subscribe  to  them." 

From  that  day  on,  our  success  takes  shape  and  agree- 
ment is  reached  within  a  week.  If  it  were  necessary  to  add 
the  justification  of  facts  to  the  reasons  of  principle  ad- 
vanced by  the  French  delegation,  it  would  suffice  to  recall 
the  amount  of  the  lump  sums  proposed  by  our  opponents: 
125  thousand  millions  for  the  Allies  as  a  whole.  France's 
share,  under  this  system,  would  have  been  approximately 
sixty  thousand  millions.  Now  the  minimum  estimate  of  our 
damages  was  at  least  125  thousand  millions  and  the  capital 
of  our  pensions  represented  fifty  thousand  millions.*  If 


*The  valuation,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  must  be  made  in 
accordance  with  the  cost  of  reconstruction,  which,  since  the  Armistice,  has 
constantly  increased.  The  French  Government,  in  July,  1920,  supplied  the  fol- 
lowing approximate  values:  damages  one  hundred  and  fifty-two  thousand  mil- 
lions ;  pensions  fifty-eight  thousand  millions.  See  Chapter  XII,  page  396,  for 
the  evaluation  of  December,  1920. 


298    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

then  we  had  yielded,  we  should  have  accepted  less  than  half 
of  our  minimum  rights.  That  is  what  M.  Clemenceau  would 
never  consent  to. 

On  May  7,  the  Treaty  was  handed  to  the  German  dele- 
gation. Article  232  embodied  the  French  contention 
accepted  by  the  Allies.  On  May  29,  Count  von  Brockdorff- 
Rantzau  presented  his  answer.  He,  too,  preferred  the  lump 
sum,  but  the  figure  he  suggested  was  still  inferior  to  those 
we  had  rejected ;  100  thousand  million  gold  marks,  of  which 
twenty  thousand  millions,  were  to  be  paid  before  May  1, 
1926,  the  rest  in  annual  installments  calculated  pro  rata  of 
the  German  budget,  and  payable,  without  interest,  in  fifty 
or  sixty  years,  the  actual  value  of  which  at  six  per  cent, 
represented  only  about  thirty  thousand  millions. 

I  have  told,  in  connection  with  the  occupation  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the  serious  crisis  through  which  the 
Conference  passed  at  that  time.  On  all  sides  the  question 
was  asked:  "Will  they  sign?"  Yet  as  to  how  they  were  to 
be  made  to  sign  there  was  no  agreement.  Some,  like  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  wanted  to  make  concessions;  others,  like 
M.  Clemenceau,  insisted  on  adhering  to  the  verdict  ren- 
dered. Like  all  the  great  problems  of  the  peace,  that  of  the 
reparations  came  up  again  for  re-examination.  Like  them, 
it  led  to  further  discussions,  closer,  more  intense,  more 
thrilling  than  the  first.  During  the  first  days  of  June,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  said  that  the  members  of  his  Cabinet  were  all 
of  the  opinion  that  we  were  asking  Germany  for  more  than 
she  could  pay.  He  added  that  the  sharpest  criticism  was 
directed  against  the  unlimited  and  undefined  character  of 
the  debt  imposed  upon  the  vanquished.  So  he  asked  for  a 
thoroughgoing  revision  of  the  Reparations  Clauses,  and 
inclined  under  the  influence  of  Mr.  Keynes  to  the  lump  sum 
proposed  in  March  by  the  American  experts.  M.  Cle- 
menceau answered  by  a  formal  refusal. 

"Like  you,"  he  declared,  "I  am  advised  as  to  public 
opinion  in  my  country  and  I  must  take  it  into  consideration. 
French  opinion  believes  that  the  Treaty  does  not  exact  from 
Germany  from  the  financial  point  of  view  all  that  it  ought. 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  299 

France  is  the  country  that  has  suffered  most  from  the  war 
and  she  is  convicted  to-day  that  we  are  not  asking  enough 
from  Germany.  This  conviction  finds  expression  in  the 
speeches  of  eminent  and  moderate  men,  like  M.  Ribot  and 
M.  Millies-Lacroix. 

"You  must  understand  this  state  of  mind.  British 
opinion  does  not  complain  because  Germany  has  to  give  all 
her  colonies  and  all  her  fleet.  This  is  natural,  for  each 
nation  sees  the  question  from  its  own  point  of  view.  A 
feeling  no  less  natural  in  France  will  be  that  British  critics 
occupy  themselves  too  exclusively  with  continental 
questions." 

This  first  effort  was  not  sufficient.  For  although 
President  Wilson,  on  all  questions  like  disarmament  and 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  shows  himself  in  favour  of  the 
firm  policy,  advocated  by  M.  Clemenceau,  he  was,  on  the 
contrary,  influenced  in  the  financial  problem  by  his  techni- 
cal advisers  who  were  anxious,  above  all,  to  reach  a  quick 
solution.  He  recalls  this  by  declaring: 

"You  know  that  for  practical  reasons  the  American 
experts  have  always  favoured  a  sum  to  be  fixed 
immediately." 

So  he  finds  himself  in  agreement  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
in  believing  that  "so  long  as  the  Germans  remain  in  com- 
plete uncertainty  as  to  their  obligations,  they  will  be  unable 
to  find  any  foreign  credit."  This  objection  is  not  so  sound 
as  it  seemed,  for  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  itself 
Germany's  debt  has  to  be  completely  established  before 
May  1,  1921.  So  now  M.  Clemenceau  is  all  alone,  and  not 
once,  but  several  times  he  has  to  return  to  the  attack. 

"The  proposal  of  the  American  experts,"  he  said, 
"would  destroy  the  Treaty.  We  have  in  the  very  first 
lines  of  the  chapter  on  reparations  laid  down  the  principle 
that  the  damages  enumerated  in  the  annex  must  be  repaired. 
If  we  fix  a  lump  sum  to-day  how  can  we  tell  whether  it  will 
suffice  to  pay  us  ?  France  has  suffered  too  much  to  allow 
this  question  to  go  by  the  board." 


THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

The  objection  was  so  sound  that  President  Wilson  is 
brought  around  by  it.  He  declares : 

"I  must  remind  you  that  the  United  States  has  not  the 
slightest  intention  of  proposing  concessions  to  Germany. 
We  have  simply  endeavoured  to  do  our  share  of  the  common 
work  and  to  hasten  the  signing.  If  the  proposals  made  dis- 
please you,  they  will  be  withdrawn." 

From  that  moment  the  case  is  won.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
himself  loyally  admits  the  manifest  inadequacy  of  the  lump 
sums  proposed  and  fearing  that  a  higher  figure  in  the 
Treaty  would  prevent  Germany  from  signing  returns  will- 
ingly to  the  original  wording  which  at  first  he  had  regretted 
and  shows  less  alarm  at  its  lack  of  precision.  It  is  decided 
to  retain  it.  The  only  amendment  introduced,  not  in  the 
Treaty  but  in  the  answer  to  the  Germans,  consists  in  author- 
izing them  to  make  proposals  within  two  months  after  the 
Treaty  comes  in  force,  that  without  changing  anything  in 
the  principle  or  in  the  consequences  of  Article  232,  would 
tend  to  accelerate  the  settlement  either  of  the  amount  due 
or  the  manner  of  its  payment.  On  June  9,  Mr.  Keynes 
resigns  as  financial  counsellor  of  the  British  delegation, 
which  loses  in  him  an  abundant  advocate  of  all  the  German 
contentions.  On  June  10,  agreement  is  reached.  On  June 
16,  the  Allies'  answer  is  handed  to  Count  von  Brockdorff- 
Eantzau. 

It  is  important,  now  that  risky  and  improvised  sugges- 
tions are  being  made  for  the  revision  of  the  Treaty,  to  read 
over  this  document  drawn  up  by  an  Englishman,  approved 
by  all  the  Governments  and  signed  by  M.  Clemenceau.  The 
justification  of  the  course  decided  upon  is  written  all 
over  it. 

The  Allies'  proposals  confine  the  amount  payable  by  Germany 
to  what  is  clearly  justifiable  under  the  terms  of  Armistice  in 
respect  of  damage  caused  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies 
by  German  aggression. 

It  is  not  possible  to  fix  this  sum  to-day  for  the  extent  of  damage 
and  the  cost  of  repair  has  not  yet  been  ascertained. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  consistently  with  their 


[WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  301 

policy  already  expressed,  decline  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the 
principles  underlying  the  reparation  clauses. 

The  categories  of  damages  and  the  reparation  clauses  must  be 
accepted  by  the  German  authorities  as  matters  settled  beyond 
discussion. 

So  far  as  the  substance  of  the  German  counter-proposals 
is  concerned,  the  answer  was  no  less  clear,  no  less  firm: 

A  sum  of  one  hundred  billion  gold  marks  is  indeed  mentioned, 
and  this  is  calculated  to  give  the  impression  of  an  extensive  offer, 
which  upon  examination  it  proves  not  to  be. 

No  interest  is  to  be  paid  at  all. 

The  present  value  of  this  distant  prospect  is  small,  but  it  is  all 
that  Germany  tenders  to  the  victims  of  her  aggression  in  satisfac- 
tion for  their  part  suffering  and  their  permanent  burdens. 

Germany,  unquestionably,  will  have  a  heavy  burden  to  bear. 
But  why  ?  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  wish  Germany 
to  be  able  to  enjoy  the  prosperity  like  the  rest  of  the  world,  though 
much  of  the  fruit  of  it  must  necessarily  go,  for  many  years  to  come, 
in  making  reparation  to  her  neighbors  for  the  damage  she  has  done. 

If  the  Treaty  were  different,  if  it  were  based  upon  a  general 
condonation  of  the  events  of  1914-1918,  it  would  not  be  a  peace 
of  justice. 

Repeated  assertion  of  Germany's  full  and  complete 
obligation  with  regard  to  all  categories  of  damages  enumer- 
ated in  Article  232  and  Annex  1;  fixation  of  the  total 
amount  of  the  German  debt  on  May  1,  1921,  at  the  latest; 
maintenance  of  all  the  principles  and  of  all  the  methods 
urged  by  the  French  delegation  from  the  beginning  of 
January  until  the  end  of  June, — such  was  the  final  deci- 
sion, the  strict  justice  of  which  cannot  be  disputed  if  refer- 
ence be  had  to  the  principles  which  inspired  the  peace.  It 
is  indeed  objected  that,  if  the  solution  is  just,  it  is  also 
unrealizable.  It  is  said  that  Germany  will  not  pay,  and  the 
Conference  has  been  accused  of  never  having  concerned 
itself  with  Germany's  capacity  for  payment.  This  is  the 
second  position  taken  up  by  Count  von  Brockdorff-Rantzau 
and  is  no  better  than  the  first. 


302    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

IV 

The  Peace  Conference  did  not  merely  make  generous 
allowance  for  Germany's  situation  and  her  capacity  of  pay- 
ment by  letting  her  off  repayment  of  war  costs  at  the 
suggestion  of  the  American  delegation,  thus  reducing  her 
debt  by  700  thousand  millions,  more  than  two-thirds  of  the 
total.  It  also  made  a  careful  study  of  the  resources  with 
which  Germany  could  pay. 

At  its  first  meeting,  on  February  3,  1919,  the  Commis- 
sion appointed  by  the  Supreme  Council  to  study  the  prob- 
lem of  reparations,  created  three  sub-commissions.  One 
was  to  take  up  the  amount  of  the  damages;  another,  the 
financial  guarantees  of  execution;  the  third,  capacity  and 
means  of  payment.  The  latter  sub-commission  held  thirty- 
two  meetings  and  minutely  analyzed  Germany's  actual  and 
potential  resources.  Its  president,  Lord  Cunliffe,  never 
ceased  to  express  the  opinion,  shared  by  all  who  know  and 
think  that,  for  a  payment  distributed  over  a  sufficient 
period — fifty  years  for  instance — Germany  will  have 
resources  infinitely  superior  to  those  that  any  examination 
of  her  situation  immediately  after  the  war  would  make  it 
possible  to  declare  or  to  anticipate.  The  war  itself  fur- 
nished the  proof.  Who  would  have  foreseen  that,  either  in 
the  Allied  camp  or  in  the  other,  it  would  be  possible  for 
fifty-two  long  months  to  meet  expenses  exceeding  1,000 
thousand  millions  ?  M.  Loucheur,  agreeing  with  Lord  Cun- 
liffe, confirmed  this  proof  by  recalling  Germany's  prodig- 
ious development  from  1871  to  1914 — her  population 
increasing  by  fifty-two  per  cent.,  her  production  of  coal 
increasing  from  forty  million  tons  to  280  million.  Other 
delegates  showed  that  Germany,  on  the  eve  of  war,  was  less 
\burdened  with  taxes  than  any  other  country;  Austria- 
Hungary  paying  106  francs  per  head  of  her  inhabitants; 
France,  100;  England,  79;  Italy,  62.50;  Germany,  only  54. 
Others  again  recalled  that  immediately  after  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort,  France  in  a  few  weeks  had  increased  her  taxes 
by  nearly  one  billion  and  Lord  Cunliffe,  after  a  long  dis- 
cussion, summed  up  the  general  opinion  by  saying : 


"WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY      303 

"Germany's  ability  to  pay  exceeds  anything  shown  by 
our  study.  What  Germany  does  not  pay,  the  Allies, 
attacked  by  her,  will  have  to  pay." 

These  principles  once  laid  down,  the  means  of  payment 
were  examined.  Everyone  was  agreed  that  the  medium 
should  be  gold  marks.  Every  one  agreed  also  with 
M.  Loucheur  that  the  only  way  of  finding  gold  marks  was, 
by  means  of  the  Treaty,  to  impose  upon  Germany  the  obliga- 
tion to  export.  Coal  exports  were  naturally  put  in  first 
place  and  it  was  estimated  that  they  might  attain  sixty 
million  tons  a  year.  After  a  long  discussion,  the  following 
means  of  payment  were  adopted  by  the  sub-commission: 
gold  and  silver  on  hand,  German  investments  in  foreign 
countries,  coal,  potash,  wood,  colouring  matters,  ships 
already  launched  and  those  under  construction,  machinery, 
furniture,  cattle,  chemical  products,  submarine  cables. 
Increased  taxation  and  the  creation  of  monopolies  were  also 
studied — a  Frenchman,  M.  Eaphael  Georges  Levy,  antici- 
pating from  the  former  an  increase  of  revenue  amounting 
to  five  thousand  million  marks,  while  a  Serbian  expert 
thought  the  latter  would  give  more  than  four  billion.  The 
sub-commission  was  of  opinion,  however,  that  it  ought  to 
enter  upon  this  course  with  extreme  prudence  for  two  rea- 
sons: the  first  was  that,  if  the  Allies  attempted  to  impose 
fiscal  reforms  upon  Germany,  the  latter  would  always 
answer  that  these  reforms  were  badly  conceived;  the 
second,  that  the  increased  revenues  thus  obtained  would  be 
in  paper  marks ;  of  greatly  depreciated  value  as  compared 
to  gold  marks. 

The  report  of  the  sub-commission,  handed  in  on  April 
18,  was  divided  into  two  parts.  The  first  presented  figures. 
The  second  did  not.  The  sub-commission  declared  that 
within  eighteen  months  of  the  conclusion  of  peace  Germany 
could  pay  twenty  thousand  million  gold  marks  in  money  or 
in  kind.  For  the  rest,  the  sub-commission  confined  itself 
to  formulating  the  means  of  payment  it  proposed  to  adopt 
especially  exports  to  be  imposed  upon  Germany  in  order  to 
provide  the  gold  payments  which  it  thought  "ought  to  be 


304    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

very  considerable  and  Increase  progressively."  It  recom- 
mended that,  once  the  amount  of  the  debt  was  fixed,  an 
Inter-allied  Commission  should  determine  each  year  the 
payments  for  that  year,  as  annuities  fixed  in  advance  for 
a  period  of  fifty  years  could  only  be  arbitrary.  Germany 
to  meet  these  obligations  would  have  to  increase  her  pre- 
war exports,  and  for  that  to  practise  a  policy  of  restriction, 
transforming  herself  into  "an  exporting  nation  with  a  view 
to  paying  her  debts  of  reparation."  The  sub-commission 
concluded : 

The  sub-Commission  deems  it  wiser  to  fix  a  figure  which  may 
appear  somewhat  excessive  compared  to  the  resources  of  the  enemy 
countries  rather  than  to  run  the  risk  of  indicating  a  sum  clearly 
inferior  to  what  these  countries  can  pay  without  any  extraordinary 
effort. 

It  is  important  to  recall  that  the  productive  forces  of  a  nation 
may,  thanks  to  scientific  progress,  increase  much  more  rapidly  than 
can  be  thought  possible. 

Figures  which,  to-day,  may  appear  out  of  all  proportion,  will 
perhaps  seem  quite  moderate  in  twenty  or  thirty  years.  During 
the  last  fifty  years  in  Germany,  the  production  of  steel  increased 
twelvefold ;  the  number  of  workmen  employed  in  mechanical  indus- 
tries has  increased  fivefold,  the  number  of  miles  of  railway  has 
tripled,  and  exports  have  increased  fivefold. 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  add  that  the  above  report  was 
drawn  up  by  the  late  Lord  Cunliffe,  the  British  representa- 
tive and  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England. 

The  special  committee  appointed  at  the  end  of  March  to 
draft  the  reparation  clauses  tried  first  to  do  what  the 
sub-commission  had  not  done  and  to  reduce  Germany's 
payments  to  figures.  But  it  did  not  succeed,  first  because 
the  matter  itself  precluded  mathematical  certainties,  and 
conflicting  opinions  were  backed  by  no  decisive  proofs; 
because  also  whatever  the  results,  some  feared  a  figure  so 
stupendous  that  it  would  encourage  Germany  not  to  sign; 
others  one  so  moderate  that  it  would  rouse  the  indignation 
of  the  ruined  populations.  Everyone  agreed  that  imme- 
diately after  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Treaty  Germany 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  305 

could  pay  twenty-five  thousand  million  gold  francs.     But 
unanimity  ended  there. 

As  an  instance,  I  will  recall  that  the  American  experts 
considered  the  following  as  the  maximum  payments 
possible : 

Payments   before  1921 20  thousand  million  gold  marks 

Payments  from  1922  to  1931. ...   60 

Payments  from  1932  to  1941 80          "  "         "         " 

Payments  from  1942  to  1951. ..  .100 


Total   260 

The  total  of  these  payments,  allowing  for  interest,  rep- 
resented at  current  rates,  a  present  value  of  140  thousand 
million  gold  marks.*  France  and  Great  Britain  deemed  it 
impossible  to  go  below  180  thousand  million  marks  gold 
of  the  value  mentioned,  and  this  would  require  total  install- 
ments of  367  thousand  million  marks  gold,  or,  in  fifty 
years,  eighty-seven  thousand  million  marks  gold  more 


*In  connection  with  these  figures  I  desire  to  make  once  for  all  two  very 
important  remarks. 

1°  When  discussing  the  annuities  to  be  paid  by  Germany,  it  is  most 
important  always  to  bear  in  mind  this  idea  of  ' '  present  value. ' '  The  Allies 
have  an  immediate  need  of  money.  What  interests  them  is  the  amount  to  be 
received  or  to  be  minted  in  the  near  future.  Thus  defined,  the  present  value 
of  a  series  of  annuities  is  very  inferior  to  the  arithmetical  sum  of  these  annui- 
ties, and  the  longer  the  duration,  the  greater  difference  becomes.  If,  for 
example,  we  consider  a  series  of  annuities  of  ten  thousand  millions,  their  arith- 
metical calculation  gives,  for  twenty-five  years,  250  thousand  millions.  But 
their  present  value,  on  the  basis  of  a  rate  of  interest  of  five  per  cent,  repre- 
sents only  140  thousand  millions,  because  we  must  take  into  account  the  inter- 
est. For  fifty  years,  the  arithmetical  total  would  be  500  thousand  millions,  but 
the  present  value  would  bo  only  182.  For  one  hundred  years,  the  difference  is 
greater  still.  The  arithmetical  total  is  1,000  thousand  millions;  the  present 
value  only  198. 

2°  The  fact  that  Allied  claims  are  expressed  in  national  currency  at  cur- 
rent rates  and  the  German  debt  in  marks  gold  should  not  be  allowed  to  create 
any  illusion  as  to  the  possibility  of  utilizing  exchange  fluctuations  in  order  to 
reduce  the  German  debt.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  payment  will  be  spread 
over  a  long  period  of  forty  or  fifty  years.  On  the  one  hand,  the  exchange 
difficulties  (especially  in  the  case  of  France  whose  commercial  balance  is 
improving  from  month  to  month)  is  only  temporary.  On  the  other  hand,  and 
this  is  even  more  important,  the  payment  by  Germany  of  even  a  part  of  her 
debt,  say  30,000  millions  in  marks  gold,  would  immediately  result  in  bringing 
back  exchange  to  par.  The  advantages  which  some  seem  to  have  expected, — 
especially  at  the  Boulogne  Conference  of  June,  1920 — from  the  fixation  of  the 
amount  of  the  debt  in  gold  and  of  the  amount  of  the  claims  in  national  paper 
currency,  would  thus  be  insignificant  and  do  not  need  to  be  taken  into  account. 


306    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

than  the  American  proposal  contemplated.  This  was  how 
the  problem  stood  when  it  came  before  the  Council  of  Four. 

The  state  of  mind  of  our  Allies  was  anxious  and  contra- 
dictory. Mr.  Lloyd  George  declared: 

"We  are  going  to  throw  Germany  into  the  arms  of  the 
Bolsheviks.  Besides,  for  her  to  pay  the  sum  which  we  have 
in  mind,  and  which  it  is  just  she  should  pay,  she  would 
have  to  occupy  a  still  greater  place  in  the  markets  than 
before  the  war.  Is  that  to  our  interest!" 

President  "Wilson  wanted  Germany  to  pay  all  she  owed. 
But  he  also  felt  an  apprehension  which  was  very  wide- 
spread at  that  time  and  which  retrospective  criticism  takes 
sufficiently  into  account.  This  was  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment might  fall  and  when  the  time  came  to  sign  there 
might  be  nobody  in  Germany  to  do  so.  Besides  the  Ameri- 
can experts,  having  been  unable  to  obtain  from  the 
European  Allies  who  had  not  yet  estimated  it,  the  total 
amount  of  damages,  had  reversed  their  efforts  and  sought 
to  form  an  estimate  of  Germany's  capacity  for  payment. 
Mr.  Keynes  encouraged  them  with  his  habitual  spite  and 
as,  in  March,  1919,  this  capacity  naturally  presented  itself 
under  the  most  sombre  aspect,  their  conclusions  tended  to 
diverge  from  ours. 

M.  Clemenceau  protested  vehemently.  On  no  account 
would  he  allow — under  pretext  of  estimating  without  any 
real  basis  whatsoever  Germany's  power  of  contribution  for 
the  next  fifty  years — France  again  to  be  deprived, — as  she 
would  have  been  in  the  case  of  a  lump  sum — of  that  absolute 
minimum  reparation  of  damages  to  persons  and  property. 
M.  Clemenceau  protested  and  stated  in  these  terms: 

"All  is  all  very  well,  but  we  have  made  formal  promises 
to  our  people  about  reparations.  We  must  keep  our  word 
unless  it  is  clearly  proved  that  we  cannot  do  so.  But  such 
is  not  the  case.  It  is  said  that  Germany  will  find  the  price 
high.  But  it  has  not  been  proved  and  it  cannot  be  proved 
that  she  cannot  pay  if  enough  time  is  given  her.  What  we 
must  avoid  is  going  from  one  extreme  to  the  other,  and 
through  fear  of  asking  too  much,  not  asking  enough." 


"WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY!  307 

M.  Loucheur,  again  urging  our  contention  against  an 
immediate  and  therefore  inevitably  too  low  evaluation  of 
the  German  debt,  called  Helfferich's  book  to  witness, — the 
thirteen  thousand  million  annual  excess  of  German  produc- 
tion; the  reduction  in  this  production  resulting  from  the 
war  and  the  Treaty  offset  by  a  corresponding  reduction  in 
consumption ;  the  price  of  products  to  be  exported  by  Ger- 
many rising  higher  in  proportion  than  that  of  food  sup- 
plies to  be  imported  by  her ;  her  coal  production  increasing 
before  the  war  eight  million  tons  a  year;  her  exports  in 
1914;  amounting  in  this  respect  to  forty  million  tons  and 
capable  by  a  policy  of  extraction  and  restriction  of  being 
further  raised  to  sixty,  since  also  the  Treaty  deprived  her 
taking  lignite  into  account  of  only  a  small  part  of  her  com- 
bustibles;* this  exportation  of  sixty  million  tons,  at  one 
hundred  francs  per  ton — a  price  which  would  be  maintained 
for  a  long  time — alone  representing  six  thousand  millions 
gold  a  year.  Notwithstanding  the  force  of  these  arguments, 
no  agreement  was  reached. 

It  was  in  these  circumstances  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment, wishing  above  all  to  avoid  an  arbitrary  sum  which 
might  in  thirty  years  raise  a  Germany  free  from  debt  and 
prosperous  at  the  doors  of  a  France  deeply  involved,  pro- 
posed the  solution  embodied  in  the  Treaty  which  I  have 
given  above.  From  that  time  on  agreement  despite  certain 
resistances,  was  definitely  reached.  Mr.  Keynes,  although 
acquiescing,  asked  finally  that  before  a  decision  was 
reached,  the  question  of  their  capacity  for  payment  should 
be  discussed  with  the  Germans.  The  French  representa- 
tives refused  to  be  involved  in  this  fool's  game,  and  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  agreed  with  them.  As  for  President  Wilson, 

*Germany's  total  production  of  coal  and  of  lignite  amounted  in  1913,  to 
280  million  tons,  of  which  the  Sarre  accounted  for  thirteen  millions;  Upper 
Silesia  for  forty-eight.  But,  on  the  one  hand,  the  production  of  the  Sarre  was 
consumed  nearly  entirely  in  Alsace-Lorraine;  on  the  other,  the  Silesian  produc- 
tion was  consumed  to  the  extent  of  ten  million  tons  by  the  local  factories; 
nine  million  tons  by  Poland,  and  four  millions  by  Austria,  leaving  but  twenty- 
five  millions  for  German  consumption.  Taking  into  account  the  reduction  of 
coal  consumption  resulting  for  Germany  from  the  cession  of  territories  the  net 
loss  of  combustibles  to  her  amounts  only  to  twenty-five  million  tons,  or  one- 
eleventh  of  the  total  production  of  1913. 


308    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

he  did  not  follow  his  advisers.  The  dangerous  sophism  of 
"capacity  for  payment"  was  finally  discarded.  Germany 
would  pay  what  she  had  to  pay;  twenty  thousand  million 
marks  gold  before  May  1,  1921;  the  remainder  in  thirty 
years  if  that  were  possible,  or  in  a  longer  period  if  thirty 
years  did  not  suffice. 

The  Germans  may  declare  and  repeat  as  often  as  they 
like  that  the  Peace  Conference  never  gave  a  thought  to 
their  capacity  for  payment.  What  has  just  been  read 
answers  this.  The  truth  is  that  the  Conference,  under  the 
stubborn  guidance  of  M.  Clemenceau,  M.  Klotz  and  M. 
Loucheur,  understood  the  peril  involved  in  a  method  which 
consisted  in  first  declaring  not  "Germany  will  pay  what 
she  owes,"  but  "Germany  can  pay  only  a  certain  sum." 
Capacity  for  payment?  On  what  date?  Certainly  not  on 
that  of  the  signing  of  the  Treaty,  after  fifty-two  months 
of  war  and  six  months  of  revolution,  the  immediate  effect 
of  which  was  only  too  easy  to  exploit.  Capacity  for  pay- 
ment over  a  fixed  number  of  years?  Based  upon  what? 
Limited  by  what?  Here  again  the  risk  was  too  great  of 
liberating  vanquished  Germany  before  the  victims  of  her 
aggression.  France  would  have  none  of  this  risk  and  in 
accord  with  her  Allies  she  rejected  all  solutions  which 
directly  or  indirectly  would  have  led  to  this  result.  France 's 
well  justified  determination  to  found  the  Treaty,  not  upon 
the  arbitrary  presumption  of  German  capacity,  opening  the 
door  to  only  too  likely  duplicity,  but  upon  the  definition  of 
a  positive  obligation,  never  wavered  for  a  single  instant. 
For  the  adjustment  of  the  annual  payments,  the  Repara- 
tions Commission  will  take  into  fair  account  Germany's 
resources.  But  it  will  do  so  within  the  limits  of  a  debt 
fixed  at  the  latest  by  May  1,  1921,  once  and  for  all  by  the 
extent  of  the  damages. 

That  Germany  is  not  able  to  pay  all  that  she  in  justice 
owes  is  recognized  by  Article  232,  dispensing  Germany 
from  the  reimbursement  of  war  costs.  For  the  rest — dam- 
age to  persons  and  property  and  pensions — her  obligation 
will  be  absolute  and  her  capacity  for  payment  will  be  taken 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  309 

into  consideration  only  in  order  to  fix  the  number  of  annui- 
ties, the  total  amount  having  in  any  event  to  be  fully  and 
completely  paid  whether  in  thirty  years  or  in  a  longer 
period.  Nothing  could  be  clearer ;  nothing  more  just.  For 
in  this  matter  the  question  between  the  Allies  and  Ger- 
many presents  itself  clearly.  It  is  "Germany  or  the 
Allies."  "We  do  not  demand  that  Germany  should  pay  in 
full  by  a  fixed  date.  We  demand  of  her,  once  the  damages 
for  which  she  is  liable  have  been  computed,  to  arrange  to 
pay  for  as  long  as  may  be  necessary,  the  yearly  installments 
for  the  acquittal  of  her  debt.  Under  this  system — what 
alone  is  fair — Germany's  capacity  for  payment  is  not 
gauged  by  her  wealth  at  the  time  of  the  peace,  but  by  her 
capacity  for  production  and  her  will  to  work  for  a  long 
period  during  which  her  renascent  forces  may  expand. 
Time  here  is  the  essential  factor  and  this  is  what  destroys 
at  their  very  base  Germany's  mendacious  objections. 


There  still  remained  a  grave  difficulty  for  the  Allies. 
They  had  just  seen  that  Germany  by  reason  of  the  size  of 
her  debt  could  only  pay  it  by  annual  installments.  Yet 
they  knew  only  too  well  that  Germany's  creditors  by  reason 
of  the  extent  of  their  ruins  needed  prompt  payment.  There 
was  but  one  method  of  reconciling  these  two  conflicting 
needs: — the  conversion  of  the  debt  by  means  of  credits. 
With  this  in  view,  the  lump  sum  had  been  proposed.  I 
have  shown  why  France  rejected  it.  So  it  became  necessary 
to  find  for  the  beneficiaries  another  way  of  negotiating  the 
deed  drawn  up  in  their  favour. 

I  did  not  take  part  in  the  discussion  of  the  financial 
clauses  of  the  peace.  But  the  close  unity  between  M.  Cle- 
menceau  and  his  co-workers  kept  each  of  them  informed 
as  to  the  negotiations  as  a  whole  and  enabled  him  to  for- 
mulate suggestions  concerning  matters  for  which  he  was 
not  directly  responsible.  It  was  under  such  conditions  that3 
on  April  5,  1919, 1  handed  to  the  French  Premier  and  to  M. 
Klotz  and  M.  Loucheur,  a  Note  in  which  after  dealing  with 


310    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  question  of  the  sum  total  of  the  debt,  the  manner  of  its 
payment  and  the  guarantees — I  approached  the  question 
which  I  called  the  "materialization"  of  the  debt  due  the 
Allies: 

The  better  to  figure  the  debt  due  the  Allies  and  at  the  same  time 
to  permit  the  combination  set  out  below,  the  preliminaries  might 
impose  upon  the  Germans  the  delivery  of  a  single  Treasury  bond  of 
"X"  billion  gold  marks,  payable  on  July  1,  1921,  under  agreement 
on  the  part  of  the  Allies  to  exchange  this  bond  on  above  date  for  a 
series  of  bonds  of  the  same  nature,  payable  at  various  dates  deter- 
minable  by  the  Inter-allied  Commission  entrusted  with  fixing  the 
manner  of  payment. 

These  bonds  would  serve  to  pay  for  German  merchandise. 
Each  year  an  inter-allied  organization  would  fix  the  rate  at  which 
these  bonds  would  be  convertible  into  francs,  pounds  sterling, 
dollars,  etc. 

These  bonds  would  take  precedence  over  all  the  German  interior 
indebtedness. 

The  Allies  would  have  the  right  to  sell  them,  even  to  Germans. 
They  could  be  quoted,  on  the  principal  markets  of  the  world,  as 
commercial  paper. 

It  would  be  stipulated  that  they  should  never  lapse  and  that  in 
case  of  non-payment  they  should  bear  compound  interest. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  Would  be  well  to  allow  the  Germans  to 
liberate  themselves  at  any  time  by  anticipation  at  a  favourable  rate. 

In  this  way,  the  Allies  would  have  in  their  hands  international 
money  as  a  medium  of  exchange  between  themselves,  or  with 
neutrals. 

When  they  would  no  longer  buy  German  merchandise  in  the 
same  quantities,  they  would  sell  these  bonds  to  other  purchasers. 
The  Germans  also  under  certain  circumstances  would  have  an 
interest  in  redeeming  these  bonds. 

Finally  in  case  at  the  end  of  the  thirtieth  year  the  Germans  had 
not  redeemed  the  whole  of  their  debt  the  Allies  would  still  have  in 
hand  a  medium  of  exchange  which  would  always  be  valid  and  which 
could  be  sold  to  buyers  of  German  merchandise  in  any  country  of 
the  world. 

This  brief  and  imperfect  outline  was  adopted  by  my 
colleagues.  About  the  same  time  one  of  the  English  finan- 
cial experts,  Lord  Sumner,  had  hit  upon  the  same  idea  and 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  311 

in  the  days  following  it  was  subjected  to  a  minute  examina- 
tion by  the  special  committee  which  at  the  end  of  March 
had  been  appointed  to  deal  with  the  financial  solutions. 
The  immediate  issue  of  a  single  bond  did  not  appear  feas- 
ible and  as  a  beginning  a  lower  figure  was  taken  to  stand 
on  account  of  the  total  amount  of  the  debt.  On  April  7, 
the  matter  was  taken  up  by  the  Council  of  Four.  There 
was  really  no  discussion  as  to  the  principle  which  was 
accepted  by  all.  It  was  necessary,  as  M.  Klotz  pointed  out, 
to  obtain  without  delay  from  the  enemy,  so  as  to  pave  the 
way  for  the  execution  of  the  Treaty,  some  pledge  which 
might  well  be  in  the  shape  of  bonds.  M.  Klotz  added: 

"These  bonds  to  be  at  once  exacted  from  Germany  would 
be  equivalent  to  the  written  acknowledgment  which  a  cred- 
itor demands  from  a  debtor  who  cannot  pay  cash.  If  the 
debtor  is  not  insolvent,  the  paper  is  negotiable.  It  is  by 
such  means  that  we  shall  enable  our  countries  to  live  while 
awaiting  the  final  settlement. 

"Besides  Germany  must  fully  understand  this  obliga- 
tion when  she  signs  the  Treaty.  We  shall  settle  the  amount 
of  the  bond  issue.  This  must  be  submitted  to  the  enemy 
and  embodied  in  the  Treaty." 

The  question  of  the  amount  led  to  some  discussion.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  seemed  to  fear  that  the  announcement  of  the 
amount  might  mislead  public  opinion.  The  so-called  "lump 
sum"  plan  had  been  rejected.  It  had  been  decided  to  define 
Germany's  debt  by  the  list  of  specific  damages  for  which 
she  was  responsible.  If  the  Treaty  without  stipulating 
the  amount  of  the  debt  contained  that  of  the  bonds  would 
there  not  be  confusion  in  the  public  mind  which  might 
mistake  it  for  the  sum  total  of  the  German  obligation?  M. 
Klotz  answered  immediately: 

"It  is  easy  to  avert  this  misunderstanding.  This  is 
merely  a  payment  in  bonds  on  account  of  the  total  amount 
of  an  outstanding  indebtedness  payable  to  the  full  in  annual 
installments.  Between  private  individuals  when  there  are 
no  mortgages  the  creditor  asks  his  debtor  to  give  him  in 


312    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

acknowledgment  of  his  debt  a  negotiable  paper  bearing  his 
signature. ' ' 

And  M.  Clemenceau  added: 

"I  don't  understand  what  difficulty  there  is  in  fixing 
the  amount  of  a  payment  on  account.  My  watch  is  stolen, 
my  pictures,  my  furniture.  The  thief  is  caught.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  make  a  preliminary  estimate  before  the  valua- 
tion of  my  total  loss.  This  is  done  every  day.  It  is  the 
custom  of  our  courts. ' ' 

An  agreement  was  easily  reached.  But  then  President 
Wilson,  analyzing  the  practical  application  of  the  plan, 
made  certain  very  sound  observations  which  threw  an 
interesting  light  on  the  operation. 

"The  important  thing,"  he  declared,  "in  fixing  the 
amount,  is  to  bear  clearly  in  mind  what  we  intend  to  do 
with  the  bonds  once  they  are  issued. 

"The  object  of  this  bond  issue  is  to  supply  collateral 
for  loans.  An  effort  will  doubtless  be  made  to  place  a  great 
substantial  part  of  them  in  the  United  States.  Suppose 
the  amount  of  the  bond  issue  is  excessive;  it  will  reduce 
the  value  of  the  collateral  and  produce  a  bad  impression 
upon  the  prospective  lenders.  The  amount  of  the  issue 
will  have  an  influence  on  world  credit. 

"If  the  banks  refuse  to  take  an  over-issue  as  collateral, 
the  credit  of  your  countries  will  fall.  Therefore  it  is  of 
capital  importance  that  the  issue  be  for  a  definite  amount 
and  it  must  not  be  excessive." 

The  American  expert,  Mr.  Norman  Davis,  betrayed  the 
same  concern  by  saying : 

"I  do  not  dispute  that  Germany  can  within  a  very  short 
time  pay  the  interest  of  these  bonds  in  gold.  But  if  the 
bond  issue  is  too  large,  she  will  be  unable  to  do  so  and  the 
bonds  will  be  useless." 

This  matter  was  of  capital  interest  for  France.  It  was 
obvious  that  the  American  Government  had  a  perfectly 
clear  conception  of  the  financial  aid  that  the  United  States 
would  have  to  furnish  their  associates  for  the  negotiation 
and  the  realization  of  the  amount  owing  to  them.  At  the 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  313 

same  time  as  he  showed  anxiety  that  the  call  upon  Ameri- 
can credit  should  be  neither  too  sudden  nor  too  heavy,  the 
President  acknowledged  it  to  be  both  indispensable  and 
justified.  The  British  as  well  as  the  French  immediately 
gave  assurances  which  satisfied  the  United  States 
representatives. 

"The  Reparations  Commission,"  said  M.  Klotz,  "will 
begin  by  keeping  these  bonds  in  its  treasury.  It  would 
be  very  dangerous  to  put  too  large  an  amount  of  bonds 
upon  the  market  in  a  limited  length  of  time. ' ' 

And  Mr.  Lloyd  George  made  the  following  point: 

"It  is  evident  that  if  there  are  too  many  bonds  on  the 
market  they  will  fall  in  value.  But  it  is  the  country  depend- 
ing upon  them  as  collateral  that  will  be  the  first  to  suffer. 
If  France,  Belgium,  or  Great  Britain  throw  too  great  an 
amount  of  bonds  upon  the  market  it  is  these  Powers  them- 
selves that  will  suffer.  You  can  therefore  rely  upon  their 
common  sense." 

A  draft  presented  by  Lord  Sumner  met  with  unanimous 
approval.  It  fixed  at  100  thousand  million  marks  gold  on 
account  the  amount  of  the  bond  issue  to  be  embodied  in  the 
Treaty,  and  divided  it  into  three  parts  under  the  effective 
control  of  the  Reparations  Commission,  as  follows : 

(1)  An  immediate   issue    (as    of  January,   1920)    of 
twenty  thousand  million  marks  gold  in  bearer  bonds,  pay- 
able on  May  1,  1921,  at  the  latest. 

(2)  An  issue,  also  immediate,  of  forty  thousand  mil- 
lion gold  marks  in  bearer  bonds. 

(3)  A  written  undertaking  to  issue,  whenever  called 
for  by  the  Reparations  Commission,  a  third  series  of  bearer 
bonds  of  forty  thousand  million  marks  gold. 

This  system  was  during  the  debates  on  ratification  the 
subject  of  erroneous  interpretations  which,  I  need  hardly 
say,  were  not  always  involuntary.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who 
knows  Parliaments  well,  feared  that  some  would  feign  to 
believe  that  the  total  figure  of  these  three  series  of  bonds — 
100  thousand  million  gold  marks — represented  the  whole 
amount  of  what  Germany  had  to  pay.  I  do  not  insist  upon 


314    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

this  misconception  which  does  not  even  bear  examination. 
Others  mistook  the  bonds  which  are  an  acknowledgment 
and  an  instrument  of  credit  for  a  means  of  payment  and 
confused  them  with  the  one  and  only  means  of  payment 
which  the  Treaty  provides,  namely  annual  payments  in 
money  and  in  Idnd  that  Germany  must  make  until  the  settle- 
ment of  her  debt,  to  which  interest  on  the  deficit  balance 
will  be  added  each  year.  Here  again  the  account  I  have 
just  given  re-establishes  the  truth  and  defines  the  nature 
of  the  bonds  which  represent  neither  the  total  of  the  debt 
nor  a  discharge,  but  a  negotiable  acknowledgment  to  be 
used  when  the  Reparations  Commission  deems  negotiation 
possible  and  proper. 

M.  Loucheur  and  M.  Klotz  furnished  in  the  course  of 
the  parliamentary  debates,  explanation  which  may  well  be 
repeated : 

' '  These  bonds, ' '  explained  the  former,  ' '  are  not  a  means  of  pay- 
ment. They  are  embodied  in  the  Treaty  as  an  acknowledgment 
and  a  guarantee  of  the  debt. 

"Germany's  account  will  be  made  up  every  year  like  any  ordi- 
nary debit  and  credit  account.  The  sum  total  which  Germany 
owes  will  be  registered  on  May  1,  1921.  As  an  hypothesis,  I  take 
three  hundred  thousand  million.  On  May,  1,  1922,  a  year  later, 
Germany  will  be  charged  in  addition  to  the  three  hundred  thousand 
million  with  interest  for  the  year  1921  at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent., 
that  is  with  three  hundred  thousand  millions  plus  fifteen  thousand 
millions  and  she  will  be  credited  with  the  payments  she  has  actually 
made.  The  bonds  will  play  no  part  in  the  making  up  of  this 
account. 

' '  But  we  needed  to  be  able  under  certain  conditions  to  discount 
Germany's  debt.  We  needed  a  certain  number  of  securities  which 
we  could  eventually  negotiate,  if  we  so  desired,  and  which  at  our 
option  we  could  eventually  use  to  discount  in  whole  or  in  a  part  the 
annual  installment  that  Germany  must  pay. 

' '  After  admitting  that  the  only  practical  means  of  payment  was 
by  means  of  yearly  installments,  we  could  not  do  otherwise,  if  we 
intended  eventually  to  discount  these  annuities,  than  to  take  a  cer- 
tain number  of  securities  negotiable  at  our  pleasure  but  which  we 
are  in  no  way  obliged  to  accept  in  payment." 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  315 

And  then  M.  Klotz  showed  how  these  bonds  would  be 
employed  and  the  manner  in  which  they  would  be  secured. 

"As  a  result,"  he  said,  "of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  the  action 
of  the  Reparations  Commission  will  really  give  these  bonds  a  real 
moral  guarantee. 

"First,  over  and  above  the  two  first  bond  issues  (twenty  thou- 
sand million  and  forty  thousand  million  marks  gold)  to  be  delivered 
by  Germany,  the  Commission  will  call  for  other  issues  only  when  it 
is  satisfied  that  Germany  can  pay  the  interest  and  sinking  fund  of 
the  bonds. 

' '  Second  guarantee :  the  sale  and  negotiation  of  the  bonds  deliv- 
ered by  Germany  will  be  subject  to  the  unanimous  decision  of  the 
Commission.  In  the  spirit  of  the  Treaty  this  very  clearly  means 
that  such  authorization  will  be  given  only  when  Germany's  credit 
and  the  condition  of  the  market  permit  their  easy  negotiation. 

* '  To  this  twofold  moral  guarantee,  it  may  be  necessary  on  occa- 
sion to  add  that  which  each  country  receiving  bonds  may  wish  to 
give,  and  also  the  very  important  guarantee  implied  in  the  sale  of 
bonds  in  neutral  countries  after  appropriate  negotiations." 

The  purpose  of  these  bonds  to  be  issued  by  Germany  is 
thus  clear.  The  Allies  did  not  imagine  when  they  included 
this  obligation  in  the  Treaty  that  they  could  negotiate  these 
securities  immediately.  They  nevertheless  imposed  the 
issue  and  the  delivery  of  these  bonds  because  in  dealing 
with  a  reluctant  debtor  it  is  of  no  small  importance  to  hold 
an  acknowledgment  of  his  debt,  negotiable  at  pleasure  and 
bearing  interest,  and  because  in  view  of  Germany's  all  too 
probable  duplicity  it  was  well  that  securities  covering  an 
appreciable  part  of  the  debt  should  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
creditors. 

Let  us  not  in  fact  be  deceived.  Germany's  game  as 
played  by  Mr.  Hugo  Stinnes  is  to  revive  her  economic  activ- 
ity by  freeing  it  from  the  mortgage  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles. Do  I  need  to  insist  on  the  absolute  fairness  of  these 
safeguards  without  which  an  untouched  Germany  would 
in  a  few  years  gain  an  advantage  over  her  devastated  con- 
querors which  it  would  be  impossible  to  overcome?  The 
bond  system  was  the  best  of  guarantees  against  such  a  plan. 


316     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

For  as  soon  as  German  revival,  of  which  all  the  essentials 
are  undestroyed,  makes  itself  felt  in  the  world  markets,  the 
Reparations  Commission  by  placing  these  bonds  in  circula- 
tion will  associate  Germany's  creditors  with  her  revival, 
and  Germany  to  safeguard  the  progress  made  as  well  as 
not  to  compromise  the  future  will,  whether  she  wishes  it  or 
not,  be  obliged  to  honour  her  signature.  In  fact  it  will  be 
in  the  very  markets  where  she  needs  to  develop  her  credit 
that  she  will  meet  the  paper  delivered  to  the  Allies  for  nego- 
tiation and  placed  in  circulation  by  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission. The  bonds,  in  other  words,  are  an  elastic  and 
safe-guaranteed  security  which  can  be  made  use  of  at  once 
and  to  an  ever-increasing  extent  as  German  resources  grow. 

VI 

Such,  in  its  general  lines,  is  the  system  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  imposes  on  Germany  for  the  settlement  of  her 
debt.  The  account  of  the  discussion  which  led  to  its  adop- 
tion shows  how  conscientiously  it  was  studied  and  how  its 
principle  was  arrived  at: 

(1)  Germany  is  responsible,  as  having  caused  them, 
for  the  total  amount  of  the  loss  and  damage  suffered  by  the 
victors  from  the  fact  of  her  aggression. 

(2)  Germany  in  view  of  the  permanent  diminution  of 
her  resources  resulting  from  the  Treaty  is  only  bound — 
but  bound  without  restrictions  or  reserves — to  reimburse 
the  sum  total  of  damages  and  pensions  as  defined  and 
specified  in  Annex  1,  Part  8,  of  the  Treaty. 

(3)  Germany  is  to  pay,  before  May  1, 1921,  20,000  mil- 
lion marks  gold  in  money  and  in  kind. 

(4)  On  May  1, 1921,  at  the  latest,  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission is  to  fix  the  total  amount  of  Germany's  debt. 

(5)  This  debt  will  be  liquidated  by  annual  install- 
ments, the  amount  of  which  will  be  fixed  each  year  by  the 
Reparations  Commission. 

(6)  The  payments  will  continue  for  thirty  years,  and 
longer  if  at  the  end  of  thirty  years  the  debt  is  not  paid 
in  full. 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  317 

(7)  Germany  will  issue  100,000  million  marks  gold  in 
bearer  bonds  and  later  all  bonds  that  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission calls  for  up  to  the  total  amount  of  the  debt,  this  to 
permit  its  mobilization  at  the  Allies'  pleasure. 

(8)  These  payments  will  be  effected  in  money  and  in 
kind.    The  payments  in  kind  will  be  made  in  coal,  cattle, 
chemical  product,  ships  already  launched  or  under  construc- 
tion, machines,  implements   and  furnishings.     The  pay- 
ments in  money  will  be  made  in  bullion,  in  German  credits 
both  public  and  private  in  foreign  countries,  and  by  first 
lien  on  all  the  property  and  revenues  of  the  Empire  and  of 
the  German  States. 

(9)  The  Reparations  Commission  entrusted  with  the 
execution  of  these  clauses,  will  have  a  right  of  supervision 
and  decision.     Called  upon  to  decide  "and  without  being 
bound  by  any  particular  code  or  rules  of  law  or  by  any 
particular  rule  of  evidence  or  procedure,  but  guided  by 
justice,  equity  and  good  faith"  it  obtained  from  Germany 
by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  "the  irrevocable  recognition  of 
its  power  and  authority."    Enjoying  all  diplomatic  rights 
and  immunities  it  will  have  until  full  payment  of  the  debt 
to  supervise  Germany's  situation,  her  "financial  situation 
and   operations,   her  property,  productive  capacity,   and 
stocks  and  current  production,"  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
investigate  what  she  can  pay  annually,  and  also  to  see  to 
it  that  these  payments,  added  to  her  budgets,  make  her 
tax-payers  liable  for  at  least  as  much  as  those  of  the  most 
heavily  taxed  of  the  Allied  countries.    Its  decisions  will  be 
immediately  enforceable  and  * '  will  receive  immediate  appli- 
cation without  other  formalities."    It  will  have  to  initiate 
by  its  proposals  all  changes  recognized  as  necessary  in 
German  laws  and  regulations,   as  well  as   all   financial, 
economic  or  military  penalties  for  violations  of  the  clauses 
it  has  power  to  enforce.    Germany  pledges  herself  before- 
hand not  to  consider  these  penalties,  no  matter  what  they 
may  be,  as  acts  of  hostility. 

These  clauses  are  severe.    If  they  were  not,  they  would 
not  be  just.  However,  all  the  financial  clauses  of  the  Treaty 


318    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

are  marked  by  an  unquestionable  spirit  of  moderation. 
Part  of  the  payments  made  before  May  1,  1921,  is  ear- 
marked to  pay  for  German  purchases  abroad.  The  Repara- 
tions Commission,  in  fixing  the  debtor's  annual  payments, 
is  to  take  into  consideration  Germany's  internal  needs  with 
a  view  to  maintaining  its  social  and  economic  life.  It  will 
exact  from  Germany  delivery  of  machinery,  equipment, 
tools  and  the  like  only  if  no  stock  of  these  articles  is  for  sale 
in  the  open  market,  and  in  no  case  in  excess  of  thirty  per 
cent,  of  the  stocks  of  each  article  in  any  German  establish- 
ment. The  coal  deliveries,  which  are  imposed  for  a  short 
period  only  and  the  annual  maximum  of  which  is  below 
forty  million  tons,  represent  fourteen  per  cent,  of  the  Ger- 
man coal  and  lignite  production  in  1913  and  eighteen  per 
cent,  of  this  production  minus  that  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  the 
Sarre  and  Upper  Silesia.  None  of  these  clauses  resembles 
the  Draconian*  conditions  which  Germany  imposed  in  1918 
on  Russia  by  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk ;  on  Roumania  by 
the  Peace  of  Bucharest — conditions  which  their  authors 
publicity  declared  were  nothing  compared  to  those  that 
Germany  intended  to  impose  upon  the  Western  Powers. 

Mr.  Keynes  was  able,  by  criticizing  certain  articles  of 
the  peace  separately  and  by  means  of  misleading  statistics, 
to  argue  that  the  problem  of  reparation  was  dealt  with  in 
an  abusive  manner.  I  have  replaced  the  matter  in  its  true 
light.  I  have  shown  how  the  question  presented  itself,  and 
how  it  was  solved.  It  could  not  in  justice  have  been  solved 
otherwise.  The  Allies,  to  whom  the  war  has  cost  more 
than  1,000,000  millions  demand  from  Germany  only  about 
350,000  millions.  These  two  figures  tell  the  whole  story. 
They  prove  that  the  financial  bases  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles are  fair  and  moderate.  As  for  the  assertion  that 
they  constitute  a  violation  of  the  bases  of  the  peace,  or  in 
Mr.  Keynes'  words,  "an  act  comparable  to  the  invasion  of 

*The  Treaty  of  Bucharest  obliged  Roumania  from  1919  to  1926  to  deliyer 
to  Germany  her  entire  surplus,  and  to  yield  to  a  company  controlled  by  the 
German  Government,  the  right  to  operate,  for  ninety  years,  all  her  petroleum 
wells.  The  treaties  of  Geimany  with  Ukrainia,  Poland  and  Finland  contained 
analogous  clauses. 


WHAT  GERMANY  MUST  PAY  319 

Belgium,"  it  only  shows  a  curious  inability  to  distinguish 
between  right  and  wrong  combined  with  absolute  ignorance 
of  the  facts.  As  President  Wilson  declared  on  June  6, 
1919,  "the  Treaty  is  in  entire  conformity  with  the  Four- 
teen Points."  The  Germans  are  to  make  good  the  total 
amount  of  the  damages  suffered  by  the  population.  Surely 
death  and  the  mutilation  are  the  most  obvious  of  these 
damages.  The  Germans,  after  thinking  it  over  for  seventy- 
two  hours,  signed  the  Armistice,  which  reads:  "With  the 
reservation  that  any  subsequent  claims  of  the  Allies  and 
the  United  States  remain  unaffected,  reparation  for  dam- 
age done."  Mr.  Keynes  answers,  it  is  true,  that  this  is  a 
"casual  protective  phrase."  The  weakness  of  his  argu- 
ment calls  for  no  comment. 

Germany  had  premeditated  not  only  the  complete  mili- 
tary defeat,  but  also  the  economical  and  financial  ruin  of 
her  adversaries.  The  victorious  Powers  compel  her  to 
repay  about  thirty  per  cent,  of  the  damage  done  by  her. 
Such  an  obligation  after  such  an  aggression  is  neither  abu- 
sive nor  cruel.  I  add,  passing  from  equity  to  facts,  that  it 
is  far  from  unenforceable. 


CHAPTER  X 

HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID 

EVERYTHING  that  Germany  did  during  the  peace  negotia- 
tions showed  what  her  subsequent  acts,  since  the  Treaty 
entered  into  effect,  have  overwhelmingly  proved:  her 
determination  not  to  pay.  This  determination  is  a  settled 
policy,  it  is  the  policy  of  business,  Germany  striving  to 
snatch  economic  victory  from  military  defeat. 

This  ambitious  aspiration  has  its  origin  in  the  situation 
created  by  the  war.  On  the  one  hand,  victorious  countries 
invaded,  indebted  and  systematically  ruined  by  the  German 
invasion;  on  the  other,  Germany  beaten  but  untouched, 
with  an  insignificant  foreign  debt,  all  her  factories  sound, 
her  industry  developed  by  the  war  itself.  If  victors  and 
vanquished  renew  commercial  competition  at  the  same  time 
and  on  equal  terms,  the  triumph  of  Germany  is  assured. 
This  is  what  the  peace-makers  at  Versailles  tried  to  avert : 
hence  some  of  the  reparations  clauses;  hence  the  general 
mortgages  taken  on  the  financial  resources  of  Germany; 
hence  certain  non-reciprocal  clauses  concerning  customs 
for  five  years;  hence  the  obligation  imposed  upon  the 
beaten  foe  to  deliver  up  raw  materials ;  hence  the  power  of 
supervision  given  to  the  Reparations  Commission  over 
Germany's  economic  and  financial  life.  These  are  the 
clauses  which  German  business  men,  headed  by  Herr  Hugo 
Stinnes,  have  determined  to  overthrow. 

These  captains  of  German  industry  know  better  than 
anyone  that  the  state  of  German  industry  is  not  that 
described  in  their  newspapers.  They  know  that  in  many 
branches — automobiles,  for  example — German  industry  has 
since  1915  increased  its  capital  by  hundreds  of  millions 

320 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  321 

They  know  that  in  the  month  of  March,  1920,  alone,  financial 
melons  were  cut  to  the  amount  of  163  million  marks;  that 
at  the  same  time  the  munition  factories  distributed  divi- 
dends of  from  twelve  to  sixteen  per  cent.  They  know  that 
Germany  is  not  suffering  as  much  as  France  from  lack  of 
coal,  either  for  industrial  or  domestic  consumption,  and 
that  in  Germany  the  production  of  pig  iron  in  1920 
amounted  to  one-half  the  1913  output,  while  in  France  it 
amounted  to  scarcely  one-fourth.  But  they  know  also  that 
if  Germany  does  not  supply  France  during  the  next  few 
years  with  the  amount  of  coal  she  owes  under  the  Treaty, 
French  industry  will  not  recover  and  will  be  outstripped 
by  German  industry.  They  know  that,  if  the  damage  done 
to  persons  and  property  is  not  paid  for  by  Germany  in 
accordance  with  the  Treaty,  the  French  budget,  heavily 
overburdened,  will  not  be  able  to  devote  to  the  development 
of  our  national  resources  the  means  which  circumstances 
call  for  and  which  Germany  dreads.  That  is  why  by  every 
possible  means  they  strive  to  keep  for  an  unhampered  Ger- 
many, the  means  of  economic  supremacy  which  the  Treaty 
makers  at  Versailles  have  rightly  handicapped. 

Their  aim  is  clear ;  their  method  simple.  With  tearful 
pathos  Germany  is  alleged  to  be  incapable  of  working  and 
producing.  To  make  believe  a  few  factories  are  closed  here 
and  there — sometimes  in  so  obviously  an  arbitrary  manner 
that  protests  are  elicited,  even  from  the  German  Press. 
Out-of-employment  crises  are  trumpetted  abroad.  Europe 
is  threatened  with  Bolshevism.  Active  propaganda  is  con- 
ducted in  foreign  countries ;  Germany  is  gaining  time.  She 
is  reorganizing.  She  is  getting  ready  and  to-morrow,  if  the 
Allies  allow  themselves  to  be  duped  by  this  camouflage, 
Germany,  freed  from  supervision,  mistress  of  her  raw 
materials,  rid  on  easy  terms  of  her  heavy  debt,  will  again 
go  forth  to  conquer  the  markets  of  the  world  with  all  the 
inestimable  advantage  of  untouched  means  and  hampered 
competitors.  Meanwhile  it  is  asserted  that  to  pay  in  gold, 
exports  are  essential  and  that  as  Germany  consumes  more 
than  she  produces,  exports  are  impossible.  This  plea, 


322    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

which  blossomed  in  1920,  was  that  of  the  German  technical 
experts  in  1919,  when  summoned  to  the  Chateau  de  Villette 
and  to  Versailles.  If  the  Allied  Governments  had  enter- 
tained it,  they  would  not  only  have  betrayed  the  sacred 
interest  of  their  respective  peoples ;  they  would  have  been 
victims  of  a  colossal  hoax. 

The  wealth  of  Germany  was  before  the  war  a  favourite 
theme  of  German  propaganda.  The  reader  will  remember 
Helfferich's  book  in  which  he  estimated  at  10,000  million 
marks  Germany's  annual  excess  of  production  (43,000  mil- 
lion marks)  over  her  consumption  (33,000  million  marks.) 
Other  authors  went  still  further.  Alfred  Lansburg  reck- 
oned the  consumption  at  40,000  or  45,000  millions.  Stein- 
mann-Bucher  calculated  production  as  amounting  to  45,000 
or  50,000  millions,  the  consumption  as  35,000  millions,  and 
the  surplus  at  12,000  or  15,000  millions.  Figures  of  such 
magnitude  are  necessarily  approximate  only,  but  even 
with  this  reservation  they  are  useful  as  indications  and  it 
is  as  such  and  as  such  only  that  I  quote  them.  Now  the 
war  is  over  and  peace  is  declared,  what  has  become  of  the 
elements  of  these  statistics  1  Germany  like  all  the  belliger- 
ents saw  her  productive  capacity  lessened  by  the  war. 
Having  been  beaten  she  has  seen  it  still  further  lessened 
by  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  What  does  the  reduction — to 
which  Lord  Cunliffe,  as  we  have  seen,  refused  to  attach 
undue  importance — amount  to  I 

Germany  lost  during  the  war  a  part  of  her  human 
capital:  1,800,000  killed  and  4,000,000  wounded.  The  per- 
centage of  invalidity  of  the  wounded  is  generally  reckoned 
at  between  thirty-three  per  cent,  and  forty  per  cent.,  so  the 
total  loss  of  available  labour  would  be  equal  to  the  work  of 
three  to  three  and  one-half  million  men.  But  it  is  a  matter 
of  common  knowledge  that  the  employment  of  women  and 
children  has  greatly  increased  and  the  military  clauses  of 
the  Treaty  (100,000  soldiers  instead  of  880,000)  leave  a 
large  number  of  men  available  for  agricultural  and  indus- 
trial work;  furthermore  the  increment  of  population  in 
Germany  should  also  be  taken  into  consideration.  From 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  323 

1895  to  1907,  the  yearly  increment  amounted  to  774,000,  of 
which  the  " active"  population  represented  500,000,  or 
roughly  sixty-five  per  cent,  of  the  total.  Even  after  deduct- 
ing from  future  estimates  the  territories  which  Germany 
has  lost  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  the  fact  remains  that  the 
decrease  in  her  man  power  will  not  be  felt  to  any  consider- 
able extent.  No  allowance  need,  therefore,  be  made  on  this 
score. 

On  the  other  hand  there  has  been  loss  of  territory.  The 
German  Empire,  built  up  by  might,  has  been  reduced  by 
right.  It  has  lost  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  the  greater  portion 
of  its  Eastern  Polish  provinces  and  Schleswig, — say,  in 
round  figures,  a  population  of  eight  million  inhabitants,  or, 
in  other  words,  about  one-eighth  of  the  total  population 
according  to  the  census  of  1910.  As  the  lost  territories, 
according  to  their  contributions  to  public  expenditure, 
appear  to  be  of  average  wealth,  it  may  be  deduced  that  the 
territorial  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  have  reduced  the 
productive  power  of  Germany  to  the  extent  roughly  speak- 
ing of  one-eighth,  or  43,000  millions  divided  by  eight :  5,375 
millions.  To  purely  German  losses  must  be  added  German 
colonial  losses.  We  shall  make  ample  allowance  for  the 
latter  by  taking  them  to  represent  a  yearly  output  loss 
equal  to  125  millions,  which  would  bring  the  total  reduc- 
tion of  Germany's  productive  capacity,  directly  due  to  the 
territorial  clauses  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  to  about  5,500 
millions. 

German  capital  has,  also,  suffered  in  others  ways.  In 
the  first  place  by  the  reduction  of  assets  in  foreign  coun- 
tries. Personal  property  to  the  amount  of  about  5,000 
millions  has  been  realized.  Property  sequestrated  by  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments  amounts  to  between 
11,000  and  13,000  millions ;  loans  in  foreign  countries  2,000 
millions,  or  say  a  (maximum)  total  of  20,000  millions. 
Loans  granted  by  Germany  to  her  Allies  (10,000  or  12,000 
millions)  should  not  be  deducted  from  this  loss,  inasmuch 
as  Article  261  of  the  Treaty  transfers  them  to  the  Allies. 
The  reduction  of  capital  under  the  head  of  assets  in  foreign 


324    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

countries,  thus  amounts  to  20,000  millions.  To  these  20,000 
millions  must  be  added  certain  losses  which  can  be  readily 
calculated,  viz. :  stocks  which  have  disappeared,  20,000  mil- 
lions; damage  caused  by  the  Russian  invasion  in  Eastern 
Prussia  2,000  millions;  lastly,  according  to  the  terms  of 
Article  235,  Germany  is  to  deliver  to  the  Allies  before  May 
1,  1921,  either  in  cash  or  in  kind  (gold,  ships,  liquidation  of 
German  investments  in  foreign  countries,  cattle,  machinery 
and  tool  equipment,  cables,  etc.),  20,000  millions  marks 
gold.  These  four  items,  added  together,  show  a  capital 
loss  of  62,000  millions. 

We  now  come  to  another  item  which  is  more  difficult 
to  estimate :  capital  loss  by  lack  of  maintenance.  Some  of 
this  went  to  feeding  the  people — cattle,  for  instance — or  to 
war  manufactures — as  in  the  case  of  copper.  How  can  this 
loss  be  expressed  in  figures?  German  capital  was  estimated 
by  Helfferich  (whose  figures  I  take  because,  as  they  are 
lower  than  Steinmann-Bucher's,  they  are  less  favourable 
to  my  argument)  at  330,000  million  marks.  What  does 
capital  loss  by  lack  of  maintenance  of  deterioration 
amount  to? 

If  we  deduct  urban  sites  (25  to  30,000  millions)  which 
call  for  neither  upkeep  nor  amortization ;  then  the  amounts 
of  capital  we  have  already  reckoned  as  definitively  lost, 
there  remains  a  maximum  of  200,000  millions  on  which  loss 
owing  to  depreciation,  etc.,  may  be  calculated;  let  us  take 
this  depreciation  at  five  per  cent,  per  annum  for  four  years 
and  four  months,  say  43,000  millions.  This  is  a  liberal 
estimate.  For  on  the  one  hand,  rural  lands  and  house 
property  have  certainly  not  suffered — one  need  only  make 
a  trip  to  Germany  to  ascertain  this — a  depreciation  of  five 
per  cent,  per  annum;  and,  in  the  second  place,  new  indus- 
trial constructions  compensate,  to  a  great  extent,  the 
depreciation  of  old  ones.  If  to  such  depreciation  be  added 
to  other  capital  loss  the  total  amounts  to  ( 62,000 -f- 43,000=) 
105,000  millions.  I  do  not  think  this  figure  can  be  criti- 
cized, especially  as  it  exceeds  the  figures  furnished  by  the 
Germans  themselves — by  Lansburg,  for  instance,  who,  for 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  325 

the  first  two  years  of  war  estimated  the  total  reduction  of 
national  capital  at  only  28,000  millions.  As  the  average 
net  revenue  of  German  capital  (according  to  the  balance- 
sheet  of  industrial,  agricultural  and  landed  property)  has 
generally  been  reckoned  at  six  per  cent.,  the  yearly  decrease 
of  productive  capacity,  corresponding  to  this  loss  of  105,- 
000  millions  in  capital,  amounts  to  6,300  millions.  By 
adding  together  this  decrease  of  revenue  and  that  charge- 
able to  losses  of  territory,  the  total  obtained  is  11,800  mil- 
lions, as  shown  in  the  following: 

Diminution  of  Productive  Capacity  (in  millions  of  marks) 

From  losses  of  territories 5,500 

Revenue  on  capital  loss  of  105,000  millions  as  under 6,300 

Assets  in  foreign  countries 20,000 

Exhausted   stocks 20,000 

Damage   caused  by  war 2,000 

Immediate   payments 20,000 

Depreciation  and  lack  of  up-keep 43,000 

105,000 
Total 11,800 

Based  on  German  statistics  and  on  the  statistics  most 
favourable  to  Germany,  this  table  would  indicate  Ger- 
many's productive  capacity  as  equal  to  31,200  million 
marks,  instead  of  43,000  millions  before  the  war.  It  is  this 
or  an  approaching  figure  that  the  Germans  take  as  a  basis 
for  their  assertion  that  as  their  output  will  now  forth  be 
less  than  their  consumption,  33,000  millions,  they  are  unable 
to  export  anything  and  therefore  cannot  pay  for  anything 
in  gold.  But  it  is  here  that  the  fallacy  is  clearly  shown. 
For  if  the  war  and  the  conditions  of  peace  have  reduced 
the  productive  capacity  of  Germany,  they  have  likewise 
reduced  its  consumption,  and  it  is  precisely  by  German 
statistics  that  such  a  reduction  can  be  proved. 

Taking  no  account,  as  in  the  preceding  chapter,  of  losses 
in  men,  we  shall  first  bear  in  mind  that  losses  of  territories 
represent  one-eighth  of  the  population  and,  consequently, 


326    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

of  the  consumption — that  is  to  say  in  round  figures  33,000 
millions  divided  by  eight  or  4,120  millions.  But  this  is  not 
the  only  decrease,  there  remains  another  to  be  considered 
which,  though  more  difficult  to  estimate,  is  nevertheless 
certain ;  that  caused  by  the  reduction  in  standard  of  living. 

In  this  connection,  German  economists  are  unanimous. 
Lansburg  calculates  this  reduction  at  one-third  of  the  con- 
sumption which  as  already  stated,  he  reckons  at  40,000  to 
45,000  millions;  it  would  therefore  be  something  between 
13,000  and  15,000  millions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  success 
of  the  war  loans  (151,000  millions)  and  the  increase  of 
deposits,  both  in  savings-banks  (15,000  millions)  and  in 
current  accounts  (13,500  millions)  besides  the  capital 
increases  of  companies  show  us  that  the  German  people 
contrived  to  save  180,000  millions  in  four  years,  or  say 
about  45,000  millions  yearly.  These  figures  are  doubtless 
subject  to  certain  reservations.  There  has  been  a  rise  in 
prices.  There  has  been  a  considerable  increase  of  currency 
circulation.  The  fact  nevertheless  remains  that  there  has 
been  a  decrease  in  consumption.  At  what  amount  should 
it  be  estimated?  Lansburg  calculated  it  between  13,000 
and  15,000  millions.  In  order  to  be  extremely  conservative, 
I  will  reckon  it  at  6,000  millions.  These  6,000  millions, 
added  to  the  4,120  millions  chargeable  to  loss  of  territories, 
give  a  minimum  total  of  10,120  millions,  which  reduces  the 
consumption  amounting  to  33,000  millions  before  the  war, 
t o  21,880  millions,  after  the  declaration  of  peace. 

"We  are  now  in  possession  of  two  very  important  fac- 
tors (both  bases  for  calculations.)  The  productive  capacity 
would  seem  to  have  been  reduced,  by  the  war  and  by  the 
peace,  from  43,000  millions  to  31,200  millions.  The  consump- 
tion on  the  other  hand  would  seem  to  have  been  reduced 
from  thirty-three  billions  to  twenty-one  billions,  880  mil- 
lions. The  surplus  which  amounted  to  10,000  millions 
before  the  war  appears  to  be  8,320  millions  since  peace. 
For  the  sake  of  greater  clearness,  I  give  a  synopsis  of  the 
foregoing  analysis  in  the  following  table : 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID 


327 


Yearly  Production 

Yearly  Con- 
sumption 
(public  and 
private) 

Production  in 
excess  of  consumption 

A.  —  Before   the    war  43,000 

in  Millions  of 
Marks 
33,000 

43,000—  33,000=  10,000 

B.  —  Reduction  owing  to  the  war 
(1)   Losses  of  territories.  .5.5  1 
i  11,800 
(2)  Losses  of  capital.  ..  .6.5  j 
(3)   Restrictions  of  comforts  .  . 
C  —  After  the  war  31,200 

4,120  1 

1  10,120 
6,000  J 
22,880 

31,200—22,880=  8,320 

These  figures  are  significant  in  themselves,  but  they  do 
not  tell  the  whole  truth  for  the  two  following  reasons. 
Firstly,  because  the  foregoing  calculations,  based  on  Ger- 
man statistics,  have  been  worked  out  in  marks  and  the  sur- 
plus amounts,  which  they  show,  represent  surplus  quanti- 
ties of  products.  To  reckon  these  surplus  amounts  at  their 
real  value,  the  increase  in  the  price  of  such  products  in 
gold  must  therefore  be  added.  The  second  reason  was 
made  remarkably  clear  by  Lord  Cunliffe,  Governor  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  in  the  report  submitted  by  him  in  the 
name  of  the  sub-commission  of  the  Peace  Conference 
appointed  to  investigate  Germany's  capacity  to  pay.  Lord 
Cunliffe  therein  stated:  "Germany,  responsible  for  the 
destruction  caused  by  the  war,  must  impose  upon  herself 
restrictions  in  order  to  repair  it.  She  must  by  such  restric- 
tions maintain  herself  as  an  exporting  country  to  meet  the 
payment  of  her  reparation  debts."  What  does  this  mean 
except  that — for  so  long  as  her  debt  remains  unpaid — it  is 
but  right  and  necessary  that  Germany  should  stint  herself 
in  order  to  export,  or  in  other  words,  to  pay?  A  single 
example.  On  Sundays  there  are  more  suburban  trains 
running  from  Berlin  than  from  Paris.  This  state  of  things 
should  be  entirely  reversed.  The  quantity  of  coal  available 
for  export — that  is  to  say,  one  means  of  effecting  payment, 
— would  be  thereby  increased  by  just  that  much.  Similar 
abuses — which  the  Reparation  Commission  would  strictly 


328     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

forbid  if  it  closely  supervised  the  economic  life  of  Ger- 
many— are  noticeable  in  all  directions. 

Remember  also  that  in  May,  1920,  the  exports  of  Ger- 
many exceeded  her  imports.  And  then  notice  that  on  every 
page  of  the  German  newspapers  there  are  signs  of  an  indus- 
trial and  commercial  revival  to  which  the  advertisements, 
if  no  other  proof  were  forthcoming,  would  testify.  Every- 
where there  are  advertisements  for  managers,  department 
heads,  travellers,  engineers.  Everywhere  there  are  adver- 
tisements for  goods,  motors,  glass,  machinery,  tires,  trucks. 
The  business  advertising  of  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  is 
double  what  it  was  before  the  war.  Business  which  was 
slack  during  the  year  that  followed  the  Armistice,  is  reviv- 
ing from  one  end  of  Germany  to  the  other.  The  increase  of 
output  leaves  no  room  for  doubt.  Restrictions  are  at  pres- 
ent dependent  upon  the  will  of  the  consumer.  Germany 
now  has  in  hand  and  will  continue  to  have  in  increasing 
degree  the  necessary  means  for  the  payment  that  she  must 
make.  The  picture  she  drew  of  her  position  at  the  Inter- 
national Conferences  of  Spa  and  Brussels  is  a  camouflage. 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  Allies  to  re-establish  the  truth. 

What  conclusion  are  we  to  draw?  I  do  not  profess  to 
be  a  political  economist.  "When  I  quote  statistics,  I  put 
forward  no  claim  to  infallibility  of  interpretation,  indeed  I 
am  the  first  to  call  attention  to  the  co-efficient  of  error 
they  may  contain.  I  say  only  that  when  a  man  goes  so  far 
as  to  assert  that  Germany  cannot  pay  in  thirty  years  more 
than  2,000,000,000  pounds  (50,000  million  francs  at  par,  or 
120,000  million  francs  at  the  highest  1920  exchange)  he  over- 
steps the  limits  of  permissible  tomfoolery  and  is  only  mak- 
ing fun  of  Germany's  victims.'  The  war  cost  the  Allies 
1,000,000  millions.  Mr.  Keynes  would  ask  Germany  to  pay 
only  50,000  millions,  or  one-twentieth  of  the  total  cost. 
Count  Brockdorff  offered  twice  as  much.  That  alone  con- 
demns the  pro-German  scribe  of  Cambridge.  As  to  M. 
Helfferich,  busy  in  1920  controverting  the  statistics  he  him- 
self published  in  1913,  he  does  not  deserve  that  one  should 
pay  attention  to  his  contradictory  denials.  I  do  not  know 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  329 

and  nobody  knows  what  Germany  will  be  able  to  pay  in  each 
of  the  thirty  or  forty  years  that  are  to  come.  It  it  the  duty 
of  the  Reparations  Commission  to  fix  the  amount  every 
year.  But  even  now  it  is  permissible  to  assert  that  in 
thirty  or  forty  years  Germany,  which  alone  of  all  the 
European  belligerents  comes  out  of  the  war  without  any 
foreign  debt,  will  be  able  approximately  to  pay  enough 
(interest  and  sinking  fund  included)  to  about  cover  the 
actual  amount  of  damages  to  persons  and  property  and  of 
pensions.  This  fact  is  the  only  thing  that  counts.  The 
means  are  the  work  of  to-morrow.  The  principle  must  even 
now  be  asserted.  Germany  must  pay.  Germany  can  pay. 
How  can  she  be  made  to  pay?  How  will  what  she  pays 
be  divided?  These  last  two  questions  were  ones  which  the 
peace-makers  had  to  decide. 

II 

That  Germany  could  pay  had  been  proved  by  the  pre- 
liminary studies  I  have  analyzed  above.  That  Germany 
would  endeavour  by  every  possible  means  not  to  pay,  no  one 
for  a  moment  doubted  and  because  they  knew  this  to  be  so 
everybody  was  agreed  that  in  order  to  get  paid  the  Allies 
must  adopt  means  of  supervision  and  of  guarantee.  What 
kind  of  supervision?  What  kind  of  guarantees?  Here  is 
where  the  difficulty  began,  owing  both  to  the  nature  of 
the  problem  and  to  differences  of  opinion  that  manifested 
themselves. 

On  February  24,  1919,  the  special  sub-commission 
intrusted  with  this  matter  held  its  first  meeting.  It  was 
presided  over  by  the  British  delegate,  Mr.  Hughes,  Prime 
Minister  of  Australia.  France  was  represented  by  M. 
Klotz,  Minister  of  Finance,  assisted  by  MM.  de  Verneuil, 
de  Lachaume,  and  Chevalier.  The  task  was  unprecedented. 
If  former  treaties  had  instituted  for  the  supervision  and 
guarantee  of  the  financial  obligations  they  imposed,  condi- 
tions which  proved  efficacious,  none  of  these  precedents 
applied  to  the  present  case.  When  in  1871  Bismarck 


330    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

exacted  5,000  millions  from  us,  all  he  had  to  do  was  to 
occupy  for  a  few  months  a  certain  number  of  French 
Departments.  Thiers,  with  an  energy  for  which  France 
remains  ever  grateful,  collected  in  the  shortest  possible 
time  the  iniquitous  war  indemnity  exacted  by  the  aggres- 
sor and  freed  French  territory.  In  1919  the  situation  was 
entirely  different.  It  was  no  longer  five  or  ten  thousand 
millions.  For  damages  to  persons  and  property  and  for 
pensions  alone  Germany  owed  more  than  350,000  millions. 
Such  a  sum  could  only  be  paid  in  numerous  annuities.  So 
it  was  clear  that  methods  employed  in  the  past  to  supervise 
and  guarantee  payments  which  were  nearly  a  hundred 
times  less  could  not  be  applied  here.  Besides  this  stupen- 
dous accounting  was  not  between  two  Powers,  one  vic- 
torious and  the  other  vanquished.  There  were  more  than 
twenty  victorious  Powers  and  not  less  than  four  van- 
quished. For  these  two  reasons  it  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary, the  usual  methods  being  inadequate,  to  seek  a  new 
solution. 

The  sub-commission — whose  work  was  delayed  by  the 
necessity  of  awaiting  the  reports  of  two  other  sub-commis- 
sions, one  intrusted  with  the  evaluation  of  damages  and 
the  other  with  the  estimation  of  means  and  capacity  of 
payment — could  not  do  more  than  examine  suggestions, 
some  of  which,  however,  threw  light  upon  the  state  of  mind 
of  the  principal  delegations.  The  British,  American  and 
Italian  delegations  were  agreed  in  their  opinion  that  mili- 
tary occupation  could  not  be  continued  until  the  German 
debt  had  been  paid  in  full.  They  had  in  mind  a  maximum 
occupation  of  two  years.  Mr.  Hughes  although  fully  deter- 
mined to  make  Germany  pay,  for  he  insisted  that  she  should 
be  made  to  pay  not  only  damages  to  persons  and  property 
and  pensions  but  all  the  costs  of  the  war  besides,  said  on 
March  11: 

"The  Army  of  Occupation  can  only  be  a  provisional 
expedient.  It  is  a  means  of  supervision  which  can  only 
be  counted  upon  for  a  relatively  short  period." 

So  on  this  point  there  was  a  fundamental  disagreement 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  331 

between  France  and  her  Allies.*  On  the  other  points, 
however,  the  Commission  was  unanimous.  It  was  of  the 
opinion  that  taking  into  consideration  the  magnitude  of  the 
debt  and  the  necessity  of  its  payment  by  installments,  the 
principal  measures  to  be  taken,  as  suggested  by  Mr, 
Hughes,  were  the  following: 

1.  The  creation  of  an  International  Commission  whose 
duty  it  would  be  to  receive  the  payments  from  Germany, 
to  supervise  her  revenues  and  her  expenditures,  her  capi- 
tal, her  production  and  her  exports,  and  also  to  distribute 
between   the  various   creditors  the   amounts   received  in 
money  or  in  kind. 

2.  The  emission  by  the  German  Government  of  a  loan 
to  cover  the  total  amount  due  by  it  to  the  Allies,  this  to  be 
a  preferential  loan  taking  precedence  of  all  German  war 
loans  and  to  be  made  in  successive  issues. 

3.  Germany  to  be  forced  to  restrict  its  consumption 
and  its  expenditures,  especially  on  luxuries. 

4.  Control  of  all  German  imports  so  as  to  limit  these 
imports  to  raw  materials  strictly  necessary  to  her  economic 
existence. 

This  was  a  very  mild  and  conservative  programme.  Yet 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  certain  delegates  feared  that  even  this 
degree  of  supervision  would  restrict  the  productive  capa- 
city of  Germany  necessary  to  the  pajonent  of  her  debt.  Such 
being  the  starting  point,  what  was  the  result? 

At  the  time  that  this  discussion  was  in  progress,  the 
ruling  opinion  in  France  was  that  the  occupation  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Ehine  and  of  the  bridgeheads  would  not 
only  give  the  Allies  military  security,  but  also  insure  their 
being  paid.  This  was  the  opinion  expressed  on  May  6  at 
the  plenary  session  of  the  Conference  by  Marshal  Foch 
when  he  said: 

To  force  the  enemy  to  fulfill  his  undertakings  there  is  only 
one  military  means.  It  is  to  continue  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine. 
When  we  find  that  we  are  paid  and  that  we  have  suffi- 

*See  Chapter  V. 


332     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

cient  guarantees,  we  shall  only  have  to  withdraw  the  troops  and 
go  away. 

I  have  shown  with  what  energy  M.  Clemenceau  had  to 
fight  first  to  obtain  and  then  to  maintain  as  one  of  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty,  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  for  fifteen 
years  and  the  right  to  prolong  this  occupation  in  case  of 
non-fulfillment  of  Germany's  undertakings  or  of  the  inade- 
quacy of  guarantees  against  a  new  aggression;  the  right 
even  to  renew  occupation  in  case  after  evacuation  these  con- 
ditions were  not  fulfilled.  Twice  in  April  and  June  this 
demand  of  the  French  Premier  came  near  to  breaking  up 
the  Entente  of  the  Allies  and  even  the  Conference  itself. 
It  was  impossible  to  go  any  further.  Is  a  proof  needed? 
Every  time  that  we  had  to  cope  with  the  bad  faith  of  Ger- 
many— in  February  over  disarmament;  in  July  over  the 
article  of  her  constitution  which  in  violation  of  the  Treaty 
prepared  the  way  for  union  with  Austria ;  a  little  later  after 
the  sinking  of  her  fleet  at  Scapa  Flow — every  time  that  the 
French  Government  proposed  to  extend  the  occupation  and 
to  lay  hands  upon  the  Ruhr,  the  Allied  Governments 
opposed  an  absolute  refusal. 

Besides  this  extension  of  occupation,  even  if  Allied 
opposition  had  not  been  so  uncompromising,  was  subject 
to  objections  put  forward  by  the  very  people  who  advo- 
cated it,  or  developed  by  events  and  the  very  nature  of 
things.  When  in  February,  1919,  to  force  Germany  to 
disarm,  M.  Loucheur,  on  instructions  from  M.  Clemenceau, 
presented  a  plan  for  the  occupation  of  the  Ruhr,  it  was 
Marshal  Foch  himself  who  pointed  out  that  the  forces  nec- 
essary for  such  an  occupation — it  was  thought  that  ten 
divisions  would  be  necessary — were  out  of  proportion  with 
the  advantages  it  was  hoped  to  derive.  Also  people  are 
apt  to  forget  how  difficult  at  that  time  the  problem  of 
effectives  was  for  all  the  Governments.  The  British,  the 
Canadians,  the  Australians,  the  South  Africans  were  all  as 
anxious  as  the  Americans  to  return  home.  In  France  itself 
not  a  week  passed  in  which  all  parties  in  Parliament  did  not 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  333 

demand  immediate  demobilization,  which  moreover  was 
justified  by  serious  economic  considerations.  Was  it  pos- 
sible in  these  conditions  to  plan  and  carry  out  a  policy 
which,  every  time  Germany  failed  in  her  financial  under- 
takings, would  have  entailed  an  extension  of  occupation? 
Certainly  not. 

Besides  what  would  have  been  the  good  of  such  a  policy 
from  the  financial  point  of  view?  I  have  quoted  what 
Marshal  Foch  said  on  May  6  at  the  Peace  Conference  and 
I  have  said  that  the  bulk  of  French  opinion  was  with  him : 
"Occupy  the  left  bank  and  we  shall  be  paid."  But  what 
has  happened.  Ever  since  the  Armistice  the  left  bank  and 
the  bridgeheads  have  been  strongly  held.  We  are  in  the 
very  period  to  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Allied 
Armies  referred  when  he  said  at  that  same  meeting  of  May 
6,  "during  this  period  the  Treaty  gives  us  complete  guar- 
antees." Has  anyone  noticed  that  Germany  is  more 
disposed  to  fulfil  her  financial  undertakings  any  the  better ! 
In  March,  1920,  our  Armies  occupied  Frankfort  and  the 
cities  of  the  Mein.  Has  any  one  noticed  that  this  occupa- 
tion, fully  justified  under  the  Treaty,  brought  us  a  single 
additional  mark?  No.  In  other  words  occupation  has  a 
defensive  value,  and  that  is  why  M.  Clemenceau  made  it  a 
sine  qua  non.  On  the  contrary  its  financial  value,  notwith- 
standing the  illusions  cherished  in  1919  by  the  military 
authorities  and  by  public  opinion,  is  relative.  In  order 
to  force  Germany  to  pay  by  the  occupation  of  her  territory 
it  would  be  necessary  to  occupy  the  whole  of  her  territory 
for  more  than  a  generation.  No  one  would  have  consented 
to  that.  No  one  even  suggested  it.  Something  different 
had  to  be  found.  What? 

This  question  has  been  answered  by  people  who  delight 
in  foretelling  the  past.  They  assert  that  all  obstacles  would 
have  been  overcome  if  the  Peace  Conference  had  only 
thought  to  exact  financial  guarantees  from  Germany,  for 
instance  by  the  control  and  seizure  of  revenues  from,  cus- 
toms, mines,  railways  or  by  the  collection  of  taxes  in  the 
occupied  parts  of  Germany.  Thus  in  a  moment  the  prob- 


334    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

lem  of  indemnity  was  solved.  By  paying  one 's  self,  one  was 
sure  to  be  paid.  "Who  knows,"  as  Montaigne  would  have 
said.  The  question  was  carefully  studied  by  the  Confer- 
ence, and  its  examination  led  it  to  results  which  forced  a 
contrary  conviction.*  Control  public  utilities!  That  is 
easy  to  say.  But  who  can  fail  to  see  that  in  order  to  do  it 
an  enormous  personnel  would  have  been  necessary.  Under 
the  circumstances  control  would  have  meant  operation, 
otherwise  control  would  have  been  a  sham.  Who  can  fail 
to  see  that  such  a  method  adopted  because  of  the  debtor's 
refusal  to  pay,  that  is  to  say  with  the  ever-present  possi- 
bility of  conflict,  would  have  entailed  in  addition  to  the 
collecting  and  operating  personnel,  a  personnel  of  protec- 
tion— which  means  an  armed  force — thus  leading  inevitably 
to  that  total  and  prolonged  occupation  of  German  territory 
that  none -of  the  Allies  would  consent  to  and  which  was  out 
of  the  question  because  the  necessary  forces  were  not  avail- 
able. To  hold  the  ports,  the  customs,  the  railways,  the 
mines,  meant  supplying  custom  officials,  station  masters, 
engineers,  etc.,  and  called  for  military  police  everywhere. 
No  one  would  have  risked  such  an  adventure  without  the 
prospect  of  real  advantage.  But  what  advantage  would 
there  have  been?  That  is  precisely  what  the  peace-makers 
inquired  into,  and  what  those  who  heap  retrospective  criti- 
cism upon  them  seem  to  ignore. 

If  we  take  a  good  normal  year,  such  as  1913,  for  the 
revenues  in  question,  we  find  that  the  German  customs  pro- 
duced that  year  800  million  marks,  and  that  the  net  profit 
of  the  operation  of  the  mines  was  375  million  marks  and 
of  the  railways  1,000  million  marks,  or  altogether  some- 
thing over  2,000  million  marks.  Let  us  suppose  which  is,  of 
course,  not  the  case,*  that  the  war  has  not  reduced  any  of 
these  revenues  and  let  us  see  what  they  give.  These  2,000 
millions  of  revenue  in  paper  marks  are  equal  to  300  million 
marks  gold  at  the  present  (1920)  rate  of  exchange, — that 
is  to  say  just  enough  under  the  most  favourable  conditions 
to  pay  six  per  cent,  interest  on  5,000  million  marks  gold 

*The  German  Bailways  are  now  being  operated  at  very  considerable*  loss. 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  335 

loan  as  against  a  reparations  debt  of  about  350,000  million 
marks  gold.  As  to  the  collection  of  taxes  by  the  Allies  in 
occupied  territory  it  would  have  brought  them  an  annual 
income  of  500  million  marks  paper,  sufficient  to  secure  a 
loan  of  1,600  million  marks  gold  at  six  per  cent.  Here 
again  the  mountain  gave  birth  to  a  mouse.  The  makers  of 
the  Treaty  would  have  none  of  it. 

The  system  of  guarantees  which  they  adopted  consists 
— in  addition  to  occupation,  which  I  will  not  deal  with 
again — in  the  right  recognized  to  them  by  Germany  of 
supervising  the  economic  and  financial  life  of  Germany 
and  forcing  her  to  make  by  priority  either  in  money  or 
kind  the  payments  necessary  to  the  liquidation  of  her  debt. 
The  Reparations  Commission  for  this  purpose  is  the  agent 
of  the  Governments.  I  have  already  called  attention  to 
the  breadth  of  its  attributions.*  I  do  not  need  to  return  to 
this  subject.  I  note  only  that  when  a  group  of  Powers  has, 
as  is  here  the  case,  in  regard  to  another  Power  the  right 
not  only  to  supervise  its  revenues,  its  expenditures,  its  pro- 
duction, its  consumption,  its  commerce,  the  right  not  only 
to  be  paid  in  priority  to  all  interior  debts,  not  only  to  claim 
a  prior  lien  on  all  State  resources  but  also  to  insist  upon  all 
legislative  and  administrative  changes  which  may  be 
deemed  necessary,  and  the  right  to  place  in  circulation 
interest  bearing  bonds  representing  the  debt, — I  note  only 
that,  when  a  group  of  victorious  and  formidably  armed 
Powers  has  such  means  of  pressure  upon  a  beaten  and  con- 
senting foe,  it  requires  some  audacity  to  assert  that  guaran- 
tees are  lacking.  And  the  assertion  that  guarantees  are 
lacking  is  no  excuse  for  never  having  in  any  manner  or  at 
any  time  made  any  effort  to  enforce  them. 

The  Treaty  goes  even  further  and  after  having  given 
the  victors  these  many  grips  upon  the  financial  life  of  the 
beaten  foe,  it  gives  them  the  right  in  every  case  of  deliber- 
ate non-compliance  by  Germany  to  enforce  "economic  and 
financial  prohibitions  and  reprisals  and  in  general  such 
other  measures  as  the  respective  Governments  may  deter- 

*See  Chapter  IX,  page  317. 


336    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

mine  to  be  necessary."  Germany  further  undertakes  "not 
to  regard  such  measures  as  acts  of  war."  In  other  words 
by  the  Treaty  itself  the  Allied  Governments  possess  not 
only  a  system  of  financial  guarantees  such  as  no  other 
Treaty  has  ever  provided,  but  also  entire  freedom  in  the 
choice  of  military,  economic  or  other  methods  of  enforce- 
ment in  case  these  guarantees  are  not  sufficient.  There  is 
not  in  the  whole  history  of  diplomacy  a  single  instance  of 
terms  so  precise,  so  broad,  and  so  decisive.  The  only 
thing  is  to  make  use  of  them.  So  that  if  in  many  things 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  being  a  compromise  is  necessarily 
imperfect,  it  contains  on  the  other  hand,  as  far  as  guaran- 
tees and  enforcements  are  concerned,  everything  that  it 
ought  to  and  could  contain. 

Ill 

Besides  the  guarantees  of  payment  taken  directly  from 
Germany,  right  and  reason  suggested  others  based  upon 
the  unity  existing  among  the  Allies.  After  unity  in  war, 
unity  in  peace.  Could  not  sacrifices  borne  in  common 
include,  after  the  losses  in  lives  and  property,  the  costs  of 
settlement — the  richest  helping  the  less  rich  to  bear  their 
share  of  the  burden?  A  great  and  noble  idea,  the  well 
ordered  righteousness  of  which  appealed  to  the  French 
people  more  than  to  any  other,  not  so  much  because  of 
France's  enormous  obligations  as  because  of  her  love  of 
justice.  On  careful  analysis  of  the  problem  which  is  often 
presented  in  confused  form,  it  is  seen  that  the  financial 
settlement  of  the  war  entailed  inescapable  burdens  and 
possible  risks  for  the  conquerors.  An  inescapable  burden 
— the  cost  of  victory  (700,000  millions),  repayment  of 
which  was  not  demanded  by  the  Treaty.  A  possible  risk — 
the  non-payment  by  Germany  of  all  or  part  of  the  repara- 
tions debt  (about  350,000  millions),  which  she  was  called 
upon  to  pay.  It  was  to  these  two  factors — the  one  unavoid- 
able, the  other  uncertain — that  the  principle  of  unity  could 
be  applied  if  suitable  agreement  was  forthcoming. 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  337 

Nothing  more  simple,  it  would  seem,  or  more  just  and, 
without  reference  to  prejudiced  criticism  which  counts  for 
nothing,  many  impartial  minds  have  expressed  surprise 
that  such  an  agreement  was  not  reached.  Hence  in  a 
recent  report  to  the  League  of  Nations,  Professor  Charles 
Gide  wrote:  "The  favourable  opportunity  was  allowed  to 

slip  by ;  the  solution  would  probably  have  been  easy  if 

the  Powers  had  taken  it  up  between  themselves  during  the 
war.  When,  in  May,  1918,  they  resolved  to  have  only  one 
army  and  only  one  commander-in-chief,  it  would  have  been 
easy  to  persuade  them  that  they  should  have  only  one 
purse."  If  M.  Charles  Gide  had  gone  through  the  unheard- 
of  difficulties  of  one  and  the  other,  he  might  not  have 
written  the  foregoing  lines.  Unity  of  command?  It  took 
forty-five  months  of  warfare  and  the  menace  of  an  impend- 
ing catastrophe  for  it  to  be  theoretically  entertained.* 
After  it  was  once  adopted,  it  was  only  by  halting  and 
laborious  stages  that  it  was  put  into  practice,  and  I  might 
quote  certain  instances,  contemporaneous  with  the  Armis- 
tice, to  prove  that,  even  after  it  had  been  justified  by  victory 
certain  restrictions  were  still  applied  to  it.  If  when  he 
created  it,  M.  Clemenceau  did  not  think  it  wise  to  compli- 
cate the  discussion  by  demanding  unity  of  another  kind; 
if,  in  the  city  hall  of  Doullens  and  during  the  days  which 
followed  the  historic  morning  of  March  26,  1918,  he  said 
nothing  about  unity  of  finances,  it  was  because  he  knew 
too  well,  like  all  our  war  Governments,  that  he  would 
thereby  have  irremediably  compromised  the  demand  for 
unity  of  military  command  upon  which  the  issue  of  the 
battle  depended.  It  was  because  he  knew  that,  while  the 
Allies  were  individualist  as  regards  military  command, 
they  were  even  more  so  as  regards  financial  matters  and 
that,  until  the  end  of  hostilities,  the  treasuries  of  each 
country  should  remain  the  impregnable  castles  of  national 
individualism. 

I  cannot  tell  here  the  financial  history  of  the  war.  At 
least  I  may,  by  a  few  facts,  throw  light  upon  my  assertions. 


'See  Chapter  II,  pages  37-42. 


338    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Consider  France  and  the  United  States.  I  have  often 
reminded  my  fellow  countrymen  as  a  striking  example  of 
American  brotherhood  of  the  15,000  million  francs  (50,000 
millions  at  the  1920  rate  of  exchange)  lent  us  by  the  Fed- 
eral Treasury.  What  difficulties  had  to  be  overcome, 
however,  from  day  to  day  in  order  to  secure  this  generous 
cooperation!  Recollect  first  of  all  that  at  no  time  was  a 
fixed  credit  opened  in  advance  either  to  ourselves  or  to 
our  European  Allies.  An  advance  of  100  million  dollars 
was  granted  M.  Viviani  at  the  end  of  April,  1917,  without 
promise  of  a  renewal.  On  my  arrival  in  Washington,  on 
May  15,  of  the  same  year,  this  was  the  first  thing  I  had 
to  take  up.  Thereafter  at  intervals  of  a  month,  sometimes 
of  a  fortnight,  my  colleagues  and  I  obtained  the  necessary 
credits.  On  each  occasion  long  explanations  had  to  be 
furnished  as  to  how  these  credits  were  to  be  expended.  As 
far  as  France  was  concerned  part  of  these  credits  were  to 
enable  us  to  pay  for  the  purchases  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment in  the  United  States.  To  this,  of  course,  no  objection 
was  raised.  But  we  were  obliged  to  make  over  part  of  the 
credits  to  England  for  payment  in  dollars  which  she  was 
making  for  our  account  outside  of  the  United  States  and  to 
transfer  part  of  the  credits  to  the  order  of  the  Bank  of 
France  to  cover  the  difference  in  exchange  on  private  pur- 
chases. Until  the  end  of  the  war,  these  transfers  aroused 
uneasiness  and  called  forth  the  protests  of  the  Treasury. 
In  January,  1918,  the  fact  that  our  cash  balance  showed 
a  surplus  brought  down  severe  reproaches  upon  us.  A 
little  later  I  met  the  most  serious  opposition  to  the  repay- 
ment by  means  of  the  American  dollars  of  some  of  our  loans 
raised  in  1915  and  1916,  to  renew  which  would  have  been 
absolute  folly.  On  all  these  occasions  the  Treasury  im- 
pressed by  the  immensity  of  its  task  and  anxious  not  to 
exceed  the  appropriations  voted  by  the  Congress,  hesitated 
for  whole  weeks  to  authorize  on  behalf  of  the  Allies,  opera- 
tions which  were  in  the  interests  of  all.  We  were  working 
from  hand  to  mouth,  almost  always  obtaining  what  we 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID         .  339 

needed  but  without  being  able  to  count  upon  this  empiric 
and  cordial  assistance  to  build  up  a  general  plan. 

Then  came  another  matter — the  so-called  "purchase 
question."  America  had  purchased  from  us  a  certain 
quantity  of  war  material.  In  addition,  her  troops  becom- 
ing more  and  more  numerous  in  France  caused  her  to  be 
in  need  of  francs  (over  800  millions  in  May,  1918,)  which 
were  provided  by  the  French  Treasury  which  thereby  added 
heavily  to  its  circulation  against  payment  in  dollars.  Our 
Ministry  of  Finance  considered  that  the  dollars  derived 
from  these  two  sources  were  our  property,  and  that  for  our 
purchases  in  the  United  States  the  Federal  Treasury  should 
continue  to  loan  to  us  as  to  the  other  Allies  without  deduct- 
ing the  dollars  owing  to  us  for  purchases  either  of  material 
or  of  francs.  The  American  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  on 
the  other  hand,  contended  in  view  of  the  overwhelming  bur- 
den he  was  bearing  that  dollars,  no  matter  from  what  source, 
should  be  applied  wherever  they  were  required  without 
discrimination.  He  did  not  admit  that  France  was  entitled 
to  reserve  funds  for  future  use  and  receive  advances  at 
one  and  the  same  time.  He  considered  that  such  advances 
should  be  strictjy  limited  to  the  difference  between  the 
amount  of  our  purchases  in  America  and  the  available 
funds  representing  the  proceeds  of  sales.  This  disagree- 
ment gave  birth  to  an  extraordinary  discussion.  As  in  all 
cases  where  Americans  were  concerned  we  managed  to 
effect  a  working  compromise  without  ever  reaching  an 
agreement  in  principle.  We  obtained,  in  July,  1917,  an 
additional  credit  of  200  million  dollars  and,  in  the  follow- 
ing month  of  November  the  introduction  of  a  bill  into  the 
American  Congress  authorizing  certain  advances  for  our 
reconstruction  purchases.  However,  on  the  legal  point — 
"compensation"  or  "non-compensation"-— both  Treasuries 
invariably  remained  obdurate,  each  taking  its  stand  on  its 
own  doctrines  of  financial  autonomy,  each  doing  its  utmost 
to  win  the  war,  but  unwilling  to  give  up  any  of  its  cherished 
principles.  The  sincere  desire  on  the  part  of  the  Federal 
Treasury,  notwithstanding  the  splendid  assistance  which 


340    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

it  kept  giving  to  its  associates,  was  to  do  nothing  that 
might  be  construed  either  in  war  or  in  peace  as  a  general 
undertaking. 

Now,  let  us  make  no  mistake  about  this.  Stripped  of 
its  disguise  of  words  and  transformed  into  plain  figures, 
the  idea  of  financial  unity,  as  regards  the  settlement  of 
the  cost  of  the  war,  had  but  one  meaning — an  appeal  to 
the  American  Treasury  with  a  view  to  its  acceptance  of 
additional  liability.  The  facts,  which  I  have  mentioned, 
prove  that  such  an  appeal  before  the  Armistice  would 
have  had  no  chance  of  being  entertained ;  afterwards  it  had 
still  less.  The  war  had  just  cost  America,  who  claimed 
nothing  in  regard  to  reparations,  over  24,000  million  dol- 
lars. Congress  thought  the  price  high  and  did  not  want  to 
go  further.  After  the  elections  in  November,  1918,  the 
policy  of  non-participation  in  the  affairs  of  Europe  was 
prompted  both  by  a  spontaneous  desire  of  a  part  of  public 
opinion,  and  to  the  deliberate  determination  to  oppose  the 
President.  Moreover  any  financial  unity,  and  this  was  a 
mere  matter  of  arithmetic,  would  have  obliged  the  United 
States  to  pay  not  only  for  France,  but  for  Great  Britain  as 
well, — a  thing  the  Americans  were  not  disposed  to  do.  In 
short,  although  the  principle  of  financial  unity  had  justice 
and  logic  in  its  favour,  and  although  from  an  onlooker's 
point  of  view  its  failure  is  to  be  regretted,  I  venture  to  say 
without  fear  of  being  contradicted  by  any  of  those  who, 
like  myself,  belonged  to  the  Government  during  the  strug- 
gle, that  its  mere  enunciation  would  have  led  to  a  point- 
blank  refusal  which  might  have  had  disastrous  conse- 
quences. Furthermore,  if  the  confirmation  of  facts  is 
desired  for  this  opinion,  the  following  will  enlighten  the 
reader. 

From  the  very  start  of  the  Conference,  both  among  its 
members  and  outside,  the  question  of  unity  was  carefully 
studied  in  its  various  aspects.  I  can  scarcely  enter  here 
into  a  detailed  examination  of  these  different  proposals 
which,  as  will  be  seen  hereafter,  were  all  destined  to  meet 
the  same  fate.  It  must  also  be  noted  that  none  was  free 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  341 

from  serious  shortcomings.  In  each  case,  whatever  method 
was  applied  to  the  solution  of  the  question  of  financial 
unity,  those  who  were  called  upon  to  pay  for  the  others  or 
commit  themselves  in  their  stead,  maintained  the  doctrine 
of  financial  autonomy  so  jealously  adhered  to  during  the 
war.  Every  nation  must  meet  its  own  liabilities — such  was 
the  principle  invariably  maintained.  It  was  soon  to  be 
asserted  in  peremptory  manner. 

At  the  beginning  of  March,  1919,  it  was  rumoured  in 
Washington  that  the  question  of  the  pooling  of  liabilities 
had  been  approached  in  Paris  and  on  the  eighth  I  received 
from  M.  Edouard  de  Billy,  who  had  succeeded  me  as  High 
Commissioner  of  France,  a  cable  in  which  he  communicated 
a  letter  received  by  him  the  same  day  from  Mr.  Rathbone, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  United  States  Treasury.  This 
letter,  after  recalling  that  at  a  meeting  of  the  Commission 
M.  Klotz  had  supported  a  suggestion  to  divide  the  whole 
of  the  war  debt  among  the  Allies,  continued : 

I  must  inform  you  in  the  clearest  manner  that  the  United 
States  Treasury  which  as  you  know  has  been  invested  by  Congress 
with  full  power  in  the  matter  of  advances  made  by  it  to  Foreign 
Governments  will  not  consent  to  any  discussion  in  the  Peace  Con- 
ference or  elsewhere  of  any  project  or  agreement  having  for  object 
the  liquidation,  consolidation  or  repartition  on  a  new  basis  of  the 
obligations  of  Foreign  Governments  towards  the  United  States. 

You  will  also  understand  that  the  United  States  Treasury  could 
not  think  of  continuing  advances  to  any  Allied  Government  sup- 
porting a  scheme  which  would  result  in  making  uncertain  the  pay- 
ment at  maturity  of  advances  already  made  by  the  United  States 
Treasury. 

I  shall  be  obliged  if  you  will  communicate  this  view  of  the 
Treasury  to  your  Government  and  I  await  its  early  reply. 

As  the  Allied  Governments  were  all  in  great  need  of 
further  American  advances  and  none  of  them  was  in  a  posi- 
tion immediately  to  repay  former  credits,  they  could  not 
ignore  this  communication.  In  a  very  plain  answer  I 
asserted  on  behalf  of  the  French  Government  the  right,, 
after  the  immense  sacrifices  France  had  made,  to  have  and 


342    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

to  hold  any  opinion  we  thought  proper.  Mr.  Rathbone 
agreed  with  me,  and  the  matter  rested  there.  I  only  men- 
tion it  to  show  how  easily  and  to  what  extent,  both  before 
and  after  the  Armistice,  the  susceptibilities  of  the  Treas- 
uries were  aroused  whenever  they  feared  that  an  interna- 
tional agreement  might  aggravate  the  already  very  heavy 
burdens  assumed  by  their  Parliaments.  It  was  under  these 
circumstances  that  the  scheme  for  a  financial  section  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  very  properly  presented  by  M.  Klotz, 
was  referred  to  the  Executive  Council  in  a  somewhat 
vague  form  to  which  the  Brussels  Conference  of  1920  did 
not  succeed  in  giving  definite  shape.*  The  hour  of  financial 
unity  had  not  struck.  Any  pressure  designed  to  hasten  it 
would  have  precipitated  conflict  instead  of  bringing  about 
the  desired  unity.  Long  and  prudent  preparation  was  nec- 
essary especially  with  the  Americans  upon  whom,  as  I  have 
shown,  success  depended.  Plans  for  this  preparation  occu- 
pied a  goodly  part  of  the  time  of  President  Wilson  and  his 
co-workers,  who  well  knew  our  anxieties  and  our  desires, 
before  they  left  Paris. 

The  undertaking  was  difficult.  When  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  Rathbone,  a  true  and  devoted  friend 
of  France  as  he  had  proved  by  his  conduct  during  the  war, 
wrote  the  letter  of  March  8,  which  I  have  quoted  above,  he 
was  only  somewhat  harshly  stating  an  impossibility.  Let 
there  be  no  mistake  about  that.  If  to  share  the  burdens  of 
Europe,  the  Wilson  Administration  had  asked  the  Congress 
elected  on  the  fifth  of  November,  1919,  to  vote  credits,  it 
would  not  have  voted  a  cent ;  first  out  of  antagonism  to  the 
President,  then  from  a  feeling  of  Americanism,  and  finally 
because  it  was  not  possible  under  the  circumstances. 
Before  the  war,  Americans  were  not  used  to  Government 
bonds;  still  less  to  the  securities  of  foreign  Governments. 
Government  securities  were  in  the  hands  of  a  very  few 
men.  In  order  to  float  the  war  loans  tremendous  advertis- 


*It  is  right  to  remark  that  a  considerable  portion  of  the  powers  conferred 
by  the  Klotz  plan  to  the  Financial  Section  of  the  League  of  Nations  has  been 
effectively  conferred  by  the  Treaty  to  the  Separations  Commission, 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  343 

ing  campaigns  had  been  necessary.  Furthermore  the 
increase  of  taxation  while  making  investors  prefer  tax-free 
securities,  had  depressed  the  market  already  glutted  by 
these  loans  and  restricted  its  purchasing  capacity.  An 
appeal  for  money  to  pay  off  European  liabilities  with  the 
help  of  the  United  States  would  have  been  a  dismal  failure. 

President  Wilson  knew  this  better  than  anyone  and  that 
is  why,  anxious  as  he  was  to  help  his  European  associates, 
he  was  obliged  to  be  extremely  cautious.  I  have  told  the 
part  he  played  in  the  discussion  on  the  bonds  to  be  issued 
by  Germany.*  There  he  had  showed  his  desire  to  help 
Europe,  to  mobilize  the  German  debt,  and  to  associate  his 
country  with  the  financial  enforcement  of  the  peace.  It 
was  to  facilitate  the  sale  of  German  bonds  in  America  that 
he  asked  that  they  should  be  issued  only  gradually.  It  was 
with  his  consent  that  the  clause  was  inserted  in  the  Treaty 
authorizing  the  allotment  of  these  bonds  to  others  than  the 
Governments  of  countries  which  had  suffered  devastation. 
He  had,  in  a  word,  as  far  as  these  bonds  were  concerned, 
foreseen  and  accepted  the  participation  of  the  United 
States  in  two  ways.  First  by  discount  and  second  by  pur- 
chase. For  the  European  Governments  this  was  a  valuable 
asset  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  for  so  many 
months  they  never  sought  to  avail  themselves  of  it.  In  Mr. 
Wilson's  mind,  America,  if  properly  approached,  could  do 
even  more  and  better. 

In  the  beginning  of  May  one  of  Mr.  Wilson's  financial 
advisers,  Mr.  Lamont,  expressed  his  point  of  view  to  me  as 
follows : 

4 'The  President,"  he  said  to  me,  "understands  perfectly 
that  the  United  States  must  help  in  the  economic  reconstruc- 
tion of  Europe.  It  is  the  interest  of  America  as  well  as  its 
duty  to  hasten  the  end  of  the  financial  crisis  and  to  help 
Europe,  especially  France  and  Great  Britain,  to  pass 
through  it. 

"I  have  handed  Mr.  Wilson  at  his  request  a  long  memor- 
andum on  this  subject,  but  nothing  practical  can  be  done 

*See  Chapter  IX,  page  312. 


344    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

until  the  problem  has  been  thoroughly  explained  to  the 
American  people  who  have  no  conception  of  it,  and  as  far 
as  I  can  see  the  President  is  the  only  man  who  has  suffi- 
cient authority  to  educate  the  country  to  it.  But  he  will  not 
be  able  to  undertake  this  task  until  the  Treaty  is  ratified. 

"For  the  time  being,  we  must  have  patience.  If  we  go 
too  fast,  we  shall  only  be  giving  an  additional  weapon  to 
the  opponents  of  the  Treaty.  The  new  taxes  which  are 
being  introduced  by  M.  Clemenceau's  Cabinet  will  more- 
over be  an  indispensable  factor  in  the  campaign  to  be  con- 
ducted in  America.  For  they  will  give  confidence  to  many 
Americans  who  when  they  see  men  like  J.  P.  Morgan  paying 
seventy-five  per  cent,  of  their  income  in  taxes  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  are  astonished  that  France  has  not 
increased  its  taxation,  without  understanding  that  the 
devastation  of  your  richest  provinces  has  made  such  an 
increase  more  difficult  for  you  than  for  other  countries." 

During  the  month  of  June,  I  had  several  conversations 
on  the  same  subject  with  Mr.  House  and  Mr.  Lamont.  We 
knew  that  we  could  not  pass  from  theory  to  practice,  but 
we  were  preparing  possible  solutions.  It  is  thus  that  we 
considered  the  advantages  and  feasibility  of  a  solution  of 
which  Mr.  Keynes  in  his  overweening  pride  has  imagined 
that  he  is  the  author.  I  refer  to  the  cancellation  of  all  war 
debts.  This  cancellation  would  have  been  a  first  step 
towards  thoroughgoing  financial  unity.  Others  would 
have  followed.  America  unanimous  in  not  demanding  for 
the  time  being  either  the  repayment  of  our  debt  of 
$3,000,000,000,  or  even  the  interest  thereon,  was  quite  capa- 
ble of  taking  such  a  step,  if  its  consequences  had  been  fully 
explained.  That  is  what  Mr.  Wilson  intended  to  undertake 
immediately  after  his  campaign  for  the  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  We  all  know  what  happened.  The 
illness  of  the  President,  stricken  down  for  ten  months ;  the 
rejection  of  the  Treaty  by  six  votes;  the  triumph  of  an 
opposition  which  favours  American  isolation.  The  result 
is  that  in  1920  we  are  further  from  our  goal  than  in  1919. 
The  Allies  are  partly  responsible  for  this  by  having  omitted 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  345 

for  ten  months  to  enforce  upon  Germany  the  obligation  to 
issue  the  bonds  in  their  favour  as  provided  for  in  the 
Treaty  and  by  the  right  which  they  recognized  to  Germany 
at  Spa  to  issue  bonds  in  her  own  favour.  Between  France 
and  Great  Britain  the  situation  is  the  same.  The  French 
Government  having  neglected  to  issue  in  London  the  French 
loan  of  which  M.  Clemenceau  on  the  eve  of  his  retirement 
had  obtained  the  promise  for  March,  1920,  each  country 
works  for  itself.  The  idea  of  unity  which  the  peace-makers 
were  about  to  realize  is  in  eclipse.  Will  men  be  found  to 
restore  it  to  life  and  light? 

IV 

No  financial  unity.  So  there  remained  for  the  greatest 
sufferers — that  is  to  say  for  France — the  resource  of 
priority.  In  truth  this  resource  had  lost  its  importance  and 
its  chances  of  success  the  day  when  the  Council  of  Four 
had  decided  to  claim  from  Germany  damages  to  persons 
and  property  and  pensions,  but  not  the  costs  of  war.* 

It  had  lost  its  importance  for,  with  the  exception  of 
British  tonnage  sunk,  the  whole  of  the  claims  was  henceforth 
identical  with  the  French  claims  and  even  if  sea  losses  were 
considered  last — to  which  Great  Britain  would,  of  course, 
not  consent — our  country  would  have  derived  but  little 
advantage.  It  had  no  chance  of  success  because,  however 
ready  everyone  was  to  recognize  the  immensity  of  the 
losses  suffered  by  France,  no  Government  would  admit 
that  for  an  indefinite  number  of  years  France  alone  should 
receive  compensation,  the  others  coming  in  only  after  she 
had  been  completely  paid;  because,  furthermore,  nations 
like  Australia,  which  had  suffered  no  devastations  and 
could  show  only  losses  in  men,  would  not  admit  that  prop- 
erty losses  should  take  precedence  over  losses  of  life.  No 
matter  what  efforts  the  French  delegation  put  forth,  it  wras 
beaten  in  advance ;  for  it  was  in  a  minority-  of  one.  In 
these  circumstances  it  was  clear  that  the  basis  of  agreement 
would  have  to  be  percentages  taking  into  account  on  a  slid- 

*See  Chapter  IX,  pages  286-294. 


346    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

ing  scale  the  various  degrees  of  losses  sustained;  and  that 
even  on  this  basis  agreement  would  be  reached  only  after 
prolonged  discussions. 

The  discussion  began  in  March  before  the  Special  Com- 
mittee appointed  to  deal  with  financial  questions  and  before 
the  Council  of  Four.  It  was  a  painful  one.  Who  was  to 
have  the  largest  share  of  the  German  payments!  That 
really  meant  who  had  suffered  most;  who  had  worked 
hardest;  who  had  contributed  most  to  victory!  This  led 
to  a  discussion  of  respective  estimates.  As  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  said  on  March  25,  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of  the 
coincidence  but  of  the  competition  of  Allied  interests.  Pub- 
lic opinion  also  had  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  British 
Prime  Minister  dreaded  this  discussion,  because  he  knew 
how  imprudently  the  election  campaign  of  1918  had  aroused 
the  hopes  of  his  countrymen.  He  dreaded  it  also  because 
of  the  Dominions  which  had  played  an  admirable  part  in 
the  war  and  who,  already  obliged  to  forego  the  repayment 
of  their  war  expenses,  would  never  at  any  price  have 
admitted  that  damages  to  property  should  be  paid  before 
their  pensions. 

"By  what  right,"  they  asked,  "should  French  chimneys 
be  paid  for  before  British  lives!" 

Finally  influenced  by  advisers  like  Mr.  Keynes  and  also 
by  French  pre-war  publications  put  out  by  those  very 
economists  who  had  so  learnedly  proved  that  a  European 
war  could  not  last  more  than  three  months,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  was  of  opinion  that  the  French  claims  were 
excessive. 

"After  all,"  he  said,  "the  portion  of  your  territory  that 
has  been  devastated  is  very  limited  compared  to  your  whole 
country.  It  contains  no  large  towns.  Lille  and  Valen- 
ciennes were  occupied  and  more  or  less  looted,  but  not 
destroyed.  The  total  you  arrive  at  is  so  large,  that  it  nearly 
equals  your  whole  national  wealth,  which  was  estimated  at 
250,000  millions  in  1908.  If  the  amount  you  claim  repre- 
sents the  damages  in  so  limited  a  portion  of  French  terri- 
tory, France  must  be  very  much  richer  than  we  believed. 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  347 

"The  value  of  all  the  coal  mines  in  Great  Britain  was 
estimated  before  the  war  at  130,000,000  pounds  (3,250,000,- 
000  francs)  and  according  to  you,  your  mines  which  are  of 
secondary  importance  as  compared  to  ours  need  2,000,- 
000,000  francs  for  repairs.*  How  do  you  account  for  that? 

"If  you  had  to  spend  the  money  which  you  ask  for  the 
reconstruction  of  the  devastated  regions  of  the  North  of 
France,  I  assert  that  you  could  not  manage  to  spend  it. 
Besides  the  land  is  still  there.  Although  it  has  been  badly 
upheaved  in  parts  it  has  not  disappeared.  Even  if  you  put 
the  Chemin  des  Dames  up  to  auction,  you  would  find  buyers. 
What  France  claims  is  not  fair  to  her  Allies." 

Refuting  his  opponents'  arguments  inch  by  inch  M. 
Loucheur  replied : 

"France  has  no  intention  of  taking  a  dollar  more  than 
is  her  due.  She  is  ready  to  accept  any  verification  of  the 
figures  she  puts  forward.  But  you  are  very  much  mis- 
taken if  you  think  that  such  verification  will  lead  to  any 
marked  reduction. 

"You  produce  statistics  of  our  estimated  wealth  in 
1908.  I  repudiate  them.  They  are  merely  the  individual 
opinions  of  economists,  and  are  contradicted  by  the  facts. 
Just  think  what  real  estate  in  Paris  alone  is  worth.  Bear 
in  mind  that  after  most  careful  investigation  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  repair  of  our  coal  mines  in  the  North  will 
cost  at  least  2,000  million  francs.  Bear  in  mind  that  it 
will  take  ten  years  and  a  million  men  to  rebuild  what  has 
been  destroyed.  Bear  in  mind  that  in  the  Lens-Courrieres 
district  there  are  12,000  houses  to  rebuild  which  before  the 
war  were  worth  5,000  francs  apiece  and  are  now  worth 
15,000  francs. 

"You  say  that  we  exaggerate  the  rise  in  prices.  That 
is  not  true.  You  would  have  us  calculate  reconstruction 
of  buildings  at  one  hundred  per  cent. ;  and  yet  you  are  well 
aware  that  certain  materials  cost  three  or  four  times  as 


*This  French  estimate,  correct  in  March,  1919,  had  in  December,   1920, 
revealed  itself  as  less  than  half  the  actual  cost  of  reconstruction. 


348     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

much  in  1919  as  they  did  in  1914.  Anyhow,  just  take  the 
raw  material  stolen  or  destroyed  by  the  enemy.  The  wool 
taken  by  the  Germans  from  Roubaix  cannot  be  replaced  for 
less  than  five  times  its  1914  value. 

"France  asks  only  the  actual  cost  of  repairs,  neither 
more  nor  less. 

"Reference  has  been  made  to  the  drawbacks  of  a  public 
discussion.  We  do  not  fear  it  and  we  fear  still  less  the 
comparison  between  our  figures  and  those  proceeding  from 
the  arbitrary  estimates  of  more  or  less  competent 
economists." 

And  so  our  fundamentally  different  points  of  view  came 
into  sharp  conflict  again  when  reduced  to  figures.  To  sim- 
plify matters  Mr.  Lloyd  George  said : 

"Representing  what  Germany  will  pay  by  one  hundred, 
I  suggest  that  France  receive  fifty,  Great  Britain  thirty, 
and  the  other  countries  twenty.  This  proportion  will  give 
France  a  very  marked  preference.  But  I  cannot,  in  view  of 
British  public  opinion,  go  below  the  proportion  I  mean  to 
reserve  for  Great  Britain." 

At  once  M.  Loucheur  declared  that  this  proposal  was 
inacceptable.  He  recalled  that  France  had  already  made  a 
concession  in  not  insisting  upon  priority,  and  after  assert- 
ing that  he  would  accept  no  other  proportion  than  fifty- 
eight  for  France  and  twenty-five  for  Great  Britain,  he  said 
his  last  word:  fifty-six  to  twenty-five.  The  American 
experts  suggested  fifty-six  to  twenty-eight.  M.  Loucheur 
said  no,  and  in  agreement  with  M.  Clemenceau  declared : 

"On  my  conscience  I  cannot  agree  to  what  is  not  fair. 
I  am  sorry  to  seem  uncompromising,  but  I  have  already 
gone  further  than  my  instruction,  and  further  than  what  I 
honestly  believe  to  be  just  and  fair." 

The  discussion  ended  without  agreement.  Eight  months 
passed,  during  which  France  and  Great  Britain  both 
refrained  from  widening  this  discussion,  as  it  would  neces- 
sarily have  been  complicated  by  the  intervention  of  coun- 
tries which  either  had  not  taken  part  in  the  war  from  the 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  349 

beginning,  or  had  been  at  war  for  a  portion  of  the  time 
only  with  but  one  of  our  four  enemies. 

On  December  12,  1919,  in  London,  the  conversation  was 
resumed.  M.  Loucheur  recalled  its  origin  and  on  the 
ground  of  the  continual  rise  in  prices,  asserted  that  to 
obtain  a  fair  settlement,  the  ratio  of  sixty  to  twenty  would 
be  preferable  to  that  of  fifty- six  to  twenty-five,  which  he 
had  been  willing  to  admit  in  March.  He  added,  "We  are 
going  to  have  to  spend  125,000  millions  in  five  years  in 
order  to  rebuild  what  was  the  battlefield  of  all  the  Allies." 
M.  Clemenceau  also  recalled  that  in  the  course  of  the  debate 
on  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  the  French  Parliament 
had  complained  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  financial  repara- 
tions given  to  France.  He  himself  had  admitted  in  the  Sen- 
ate, on  October  11,  that  he  was  not  satisfied  and  returning 
to  his  first  demand  he  said: 

"I  have  been  told  that  British  lives  were  worth  more 
than  chimneys  destroyed  in  France.  I  know  what  your 
sacrifices  have  been,  and  no  one  respects  them  more  than  I 
do.  But  I  ask  you  not  to  forget  that  beneath  those  chim- 
neys there  lived  French  families  which  the  war  has  broken 
and  ruined.  Ten  departments,  the  richest  in  France,  have 
been  completely  devastated  and  for  many  years  will  pro- 
duce nothing.  That  is  the  essential  cause  of  our  financial 
and  economic  crisis.  So  I  demand  priority,  and  I  demand 
it  frankly  and  clearly.  Priority  such  as  was  given  to  Bel- 
gium. It  will  be  just  as  fair  in  the  case  of  France  as  it  was 
in  the  case  of  Belgium.  Priority  is  for  us  an  urgent  neces- 
sity. Above  all  you  must  safeguard  the  moral  value  of 
mutual  good  feeling  between  France  and  England." 

Mr.  Lloyd  George's  answer  was  full  of  dignity  and  of 
feeling.  He  said: 

"The  British  Government  cannot  concede  France's 
claim  to  priority.  If  it  cannot,  it  is  certainly  not  because 
the  British  people  do  not  realize  the  unequalled  sufferings 
of  France.  They  know  them  fully.  But  Great  Britain  is 
beset  by  serious  financial  difficulties.  Public  opinion  is 
overwrought  by  the  burden  of  heavy  taxes,  and  because  it 


350     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

has  not  received  a  farthing  from  Germany.  I  ask  the 
French  Government  to  look  at  the  matter  in  this  light. 

* '  France  has  put  in  a  claim  for  125,000  millions  and 
Belgium  for  25,000  millions.  If  priority  for  damages  to 
persons  and  property  is  granted  to  France,  it  will  have  to 
be  granted  to  Belgium,  which  amounts  to  saying  that  about 
175,000  millions  will  be  paid  before  the  British  taxpayer 
obtains  any  relief,  that  is  for  at  least  thirty  years.  I  can- 
not accept  such  a  thing. 

"And  the  Australian  Prime  Minister  will  not  accept  it 
either.  Australia  with  a  population  of  less  than  four  and 
a  half  million  inhabitants  has  lost  more  men  in  the  war 
than  the  United  States.  Australia  has  a  heavy  debt 
entirely  due  to  war  expenses  and  pensions.  New  Zealand, 
with  a  population  of  a  million,  had  more  men  killed  than 
Belgium  and  she  also  has  a  heavy  debt.  I  ask  you  to  take 
these  brave  young  nations  into  consideration. 

"In  the  Separations  Commission  we  must  not  have  dis- 
cussions between  France  and  England  on  every  question. 
France  and  Great  Britain  must  hold  together  and  act 
together.  Our  alliance  must  go  on  after  having  stood  the 
test  of  the  greatest  war  in  history. 

"To  settle,  we  accept  a  proportion  of  fifty-five  to  twen- 
ty-five. We  believe  this  proportion  is  too  low  for  us. 
However,  to  assert  and  safeguard  the  cordial  relations 
between  our  two  countries,  my  colleagues  and.  I  are  ready 
to  accept  it  and  we  on  the  other  hand  ask  that  France  do 
not  insist  upon  priority. 

"I  ask  this  of  you  above  all  so  that,  in  the  case  of 
another  conflict,  the  feeling  of  unity  of  the  Dominions  be 
not  less  keen  than  it  was  last  time." 

It  was  necessary  to  settle  and  some  of  the  English  argu- 
ments were  strong.  M.  Clemenceau  accepted.  To  save  the 
feelings  of  Allies  who  were  not  represented  at  the  Confer- 
ence at  London  the  proportion  of  eleven  to  five  was 
substituted  in  the  official  minutes  for  the  percentage  of 
fifty-five  to  twenty-five  which  remained  the  basis  of  the 
agreement.  Twenty  per  cent,  was  to  be  reserved  for  the 


HOW  THE  ALLIES  WILL  BE  PAID  351 

other  creditors  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George 's  orig- 
inal suggestion.  M.  Clemenceau  obtained  in  addition  to  this 
two  other  results  from  which  his  successors  have  not 
derived  the  benefit  they  might.  First  the  attribution  to 
France  of  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Eeparation  Commis- 
sion (it  is  common  knowledge  that  in  less  than  six  months 
the  chairmanship  of  this  all  important  Commission  has 
been  changed  three  times)  and  the  issue  in  London  in 
March,  1920,  of  a  big  French  loan  (it  is  common  knowledge 
that  this  loan  was  not  issued).  So  the  financial  problem 
as  a  whole  was  thus  settled  between  France  and  Great 
Britain.  Our  country  did  not  obtain  that  general  priority 
which  as  the  battleground  of  the  nations  it  had  a  right  to 
claim.  But  the  percentage  adopted  assured  it  more  than 
half  the  total  of  everything  Germany  was  to  pay. 

The  very  terms  of  the  Treaty  assured  it  of  even  more. 
First  everything  in  our  list  of  damages  that  could  be  recov- 
ered in  its  original  state  (money,  cattle,  machinery  or  mate- 
rials) did  not  enter  into  the  reparations  account  and  was 
not  to  be  included  in  the  percentage.  Nine  thousand  mil- 
lion francs'  worth  of  such  stolen  goods  have  been  already 
recovered  and  have  of  course  come  back  to  us  in  full  pri- 
ority. Well  conducted  search  would  increase  this  amount. 
On  the  other  hand  the  immediate  payment  promised  to 
Belgium  must  also  in  part  be  added  to  the  percentage 
allotted  to  France  by  the  agreement  of  London,  for  half  of 
the  amounts  loaned  to  our  friends  were  loaned  by  us. 
Finally  the  reimbursement  before  any  other  charges  of  the 
cost  of  the  Armies  of  Occupation  will  still  further  increase 
the  amounts  we  shall  receive,  for  of  the  costs  of  occupation 
it  is  not  fifty-five  per  cent,  but  more  than  eighty  per  cent, 
that  we  are  entitled  to. 

Since  then  at  Spa  the  bases  of  the  percentages  have 
been  changed.  In  order  to  increase  the  share  of  other  Pow- 
ers, France  and  Great  Britain  have  consented  to  reduce 
their  own  each  by  three  per  cent.,  France's  share  falling 
from  fifty-five  per  cent,  to  fifty-two  per  cent,  and  Great 
Britain's  share  from  twenty-five  per  cent,  to  twenty-two 


352     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

per  cent.  The  origins  and  character  of  this  agreement 
make  comment  of  mine  superfluous.  France,  after  having 
given  up  the  priority  which  her  role  as  battlefield  entitled 
her  to  claim  and  accepted  the  reduction  of  the  share 
allotted  to  her  of  the  total  German  payments,  is  doubly 
bound  to  insist  that  this  total  must  remain  exactly  as 
defined  by  the  Treaty.  A  reduced  share  of  a  full  total? 
Yes.  But  a  reduced  share  of  a  reduced  total?  No.  That 
is  the  whole  problem.  After  so  many  others,  it  is  an  addi- 
tional reason  for  France  to  refuse  the  onerous  changes 
improvised  and  suggested  in  various  quarters. 


CHAPTER  XI 

GERMAN  UNITY 

SINCE  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  strong  criticism  has 
been  directed  in  France  against  the  Government  of  Vic- 
tory. "You  have,"  it  is  asserted,  "retaken  Alsace-Lor- 
raine. You  have  freed  the  French  of  the  Sarre.  You  have 
occupied  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  You  have  imposed 
rigorous  military  and  financial  clauses  upon  Germany. 
That  is  all  very  well,  but  it  is  nothing.  Why?  Because 
none  of  these  guarantees  has  any  permanent  value  so  long 
as  you  have  allowed  German  unity  to  remain  untouched." 
Let  me  add  that  a  very  distinguished  American  writer, 
Mr.  W.  Morton  Fullerton,  asked  some  years  ago  and  in  the 
same  spirit  that  "France  be  permitted  in  the  name  of  civ- 
ilization to  proceed  to  the  vivisection  of  Germany,,  i.  e.,  to 
the  dismemberment  of  the  Germanic  tribes." 

Before  going  back  to  the  roots  of  the  matter  I  must 
first  present  the  answer  which  the  French  Government 
publicly  made  to  this  criticism  in  October,  1919.  M.  Cle- 
menceau,  attacked  in  the  Senate  by  two  members  of  the 
Right,  presented  the  French  view,  which  was  the  same  as 
that  of  the  Allies.  Here  is  what  he  said: — 

A  great  quarrel  has  been  thrust  upon  this  assembly, — the 
famous  question  of  German  unity.  On  that  I  do  not  agree  with 
you, — not  in  the  least.  Therefore,  it  is  a  question  on  which  we 
must  have  a  clear  explanation. 

On  what  was  this  disagreement?  Not,  of  course,  on 
the  interest  France  has  in  not  having  at  her  gates  sixty 
million  people  who  claim  German  nationality  and  whom 
history  has  taught  us  to  know:  but  on  the  possibility  of 

353 


354     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

destroying  their  unity  by  force.  All  Frenchmen  would 
prefer  not  to  be  exposed  to  the  risk  of  this  proximity.  But 
the  proximity  exists.  It  may  be  regretted.  We  all  regret 
it,  just  as  we  regret  that  France  has  not  the  protection 
against  Germany  which  the  ocean  affords  England.  But 
regret  cannot  alter  a  fact,  and  the  one  and  only  political 
question  for  Governments  is  whether  or  not  this  fact  can 
be  done  away  with.  That  is  what  the  French  Prime  Min- 
ister proceeds  to  discuss,  after  brushing  away  the  asinine 
criticism  which  a  certain  Press  had  levelled  against  him 
and  his  Cabinet  of  deliberately  seeking  to  maintain  Ger- 
man unity. 

"I  think  you  do  me  the  honour  to  believe  that  I  am  no  advocate 

of  German  unity,  that  I  desire  to  split  up  the  German  forces 

But,  just  what  is  it  that  we  have  to  deal  with? 

' '  Consider  a  minute !  There  is  a  nation  of  sixty  million  people 
•which  only  yesterday  had  seventy  millions.  People  whose  history 
goes  back  for  centuries.  By  one  of  those  contradictions  which  I  am 
not  called  upon  to  explain,  because  it  is  the  business  of  the 
Almighty,  the  Germans  have  gone  from  the  one  extreme  of  partic- 
ularism to  the  other  extreme  of  centralization.  I  cannot  help  it. 
It  is  their  nature.  They  are  built  that  way ! 

"At  certain  moments  in  history  attempts  have  been  made  to 
force  their  national  conscience.  Napoleon,  for  instance,  at  Leipzig, 
had  Saxons  with  him.  It  is  impossible  to  be  more  divided  than  the 
Germans  were  then;  for  they  were  using  shot  and  shell  on  other 

Germans  What  did  the  Saxons  do  at  Leipzig  ?  You  are 

not  without  knowing !  (Cheers.) 

"The  only  true  unity  is  that  of  the  heart  (Hear!  hear!)  and 
that  no  human  hand  can  touch. 

"Unity,  you  see,  is  not  a  matter  of  diplomatic  protocols.  Unity 
is  in  the  hearts  of  men.  Men  love  those  they  love.  Men  hate  those 
they  hate ;  and  in  times  of  danger  they  know  on  which  side  to  stand, 
and  in  times  of  battle  too.  (Hear!  hear!) 

"What  would  you?  There  are  there,  whether  we  like  it  or  not, 
sixty  million  people  with  whom  we  have  to  live.  In  olden  days  I 
don't  know  what  would  have  been  done  with  them.  The  Komans 
themselves  broke  their  sword  upon  them.  We  are  not  going  to 
throw  ourselves  into  any  such  adventure. 


GERMAN  UNITY  355 

"We  want  to  respect  their  liberty,  but  we  mean  to  take  the 
necessary  precautions  to  make  them  respect  ours."  (Cheers  and 
applause. ) 

And  M,  Clemenceau,  appealing  to  the  past,  recalled  how 
pregnant  with  disappointment  for  France  had  been  the 
theory  of  the  "two  Germanics." 

"I  remember  when  war  was  declared  in  1870.  One  met  journal- 
ists in  the  street — there  are  always  journalists  ready  to  say  any- 
thing (laughter) — who  said  'Bavaria  will  not  join.' 

"What  reasons  I  heard  given!  'The  Bavarians  are  Celts — 
Their  heads  are  not  the  same  shape  as  the  Prussians — They  hate 
the  Prussians.'  Two  days  later  you  know  what  happened. 

"And  in  1914,  was  not  Bavaria  precisely  in  the  position  where 
she  would  be  to-day  according  to  your  theory,  had  she  signed  the 
Treaty?  Did  she  hesitate  to  join?  No. 

"In  peace  time  I  used  to  believe  that  I  should  die  without  see- 
ing the  war,  but  I  knew  it  was  coming  and  I  made  it  my  duty  to  go 
every  year  either  to  Austria  or  to  Germany.  There  I  talked  with 
the  people.  I  saw  those  who  were  dissatisfied.  I  went  to  Munich 
and  talked  with  the  Bavarians.  When  I  said  harsh  things  of  the 
Prussians  they  approved.  They  even  went  farther  than  I  did. 
But  when  a  break  was  referred  to,  it  was  quite  another  matter. 

"And  beaten  do  you  think  they  are  going  to  think  differently 
than  if  they  had  won ?  Quite  the  contrary !  (Cheers.) 

"Defeat  has  brought  their  scattered  forces  together.  Never  in 
this  respect  had  the  situation  called  for  such  an  effort. ' ' 

If  it  be  possible  that  some  day,  under  the  impulse  of 
new  interests  and  new  ideas,  this  moral  unity  may  disap- 
pear and  give  place  to  particularism,  it  is  on  the  one  con- 
dition that  there  be  no  forceful  interference  from  without 
and  that  as  in  Austria-Hungary  the  evolution  be  a  spon- 
taneous evolution  which  we  can  help  along  but  which  we 
cannot  create. 

"You  see,  you  must  not  believe  that  things  will  remain  where 
the  makers  of  the  Treaty  have  left  them ....  The  situation  created 
by  the  Treaty  will  continue  to  develop.  We  shall  see  its  results. 
We  shall  watch  it.  We  shall  take  what  advantage  we  may. 


356     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

"That  will  depend  upon  the  Germans — which  some  are  trying 
to  convert  and  rightly  so — but  it  will  depend  upon  us  also. 
(Cheers.) 

"If  we  hope  that  the  Germans — I  do  not  want  to  use  a  harsh 
word — will  disintegrate  in  the  political  sense  of  the  word  so  that 
they  may  not  all  be  led  at  some  future  time  to  make  war  upon  us, 
it  by  no  means  follows  that  we  wish  this  disintegration  for  pur- 
poses of  dominating  them  as  they  dreamed  they  were  going  to 
dominate  us. 

"As  for  going  into  Germany,  as  for  conquering  Germany  as 
Napoleon  conquered  Spain,  it  is  a  waste  of  time  even  to  think 
about  it." 

In  other  words  take  advantage  of  political  disintegra- 
tion in  Germany,  if  it  takes  place  spontaneously;  but  do 
not  commit  the  mad  imprudence  of  imposing  this  disinte- 
gration by  force, — such  a  course  would  merely  strengthen 
the  spiritual  bonds;  for  "a  nation,"  as  Renan  said,  "is  a 
group  of  individuals  who  will  to  live  together"  and  this 
will  cannot  be  broken  by  force.  This  opinion,  held  in  com- 
mon by  all  the  Allied  Governments,  was  sustained  time 
and  time  again  in  the  Senate  by  M.  Clemenceau  and  in  the 
Chamber  by  myself.  It  was  an  opinion  so  natural  and  so 
clear  from  the  very  facts  that,  as  M.  Clemenceau  declared, 
in  his  speech  of  October  2,  1919:  "The  question  was  set- 
tled at  the  Conference  almost  before  it  had  been 
presented." 

II 

For  this  point  of  view  history — often  quoted  against 
it — affords  absolute  justification.  Much  has  been  said  in 
discussing  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  about  the  Treaties  of 
Westphalia  of  1648,  which  have  been  extolled  at  the 
expense  of  the  former.  Only  one  thing  has  been  forgotten, 
that  from  1648  to  1919,  Germany  continued  to  live  and  was 
profoundly  changed  in  the  course  of  those  two  and  a  half 
centuries.  "Whereas  in  Austria  historic  evolution  pre- 
pared and  produced  the  divorce  of  subject  nationalities,  in 
Germany  on  the  contrary  the  whole  process  of  evolution 


GERMAN  UNITY  357 

tended  towards  unity.  Not  the  slightest  tendency  toward 
disintegration  manifested  itself  during  the  war;  and  the 
overthrow  of  the  dynasties  has  dispelled  the  last  vestiges 
of  constitutional  particularism.  While  in  Austria  the 
wills  of  the  peoples  tended  to  diverge,  in  Germany  they 
constantly  tended  to  converge.  All  German  history,  since 
the  seventeenth  century,  illustrates  and  emphasizes  this 
phenomenon. 

Bismarck  created  German  unity — an  achievement 
which  gives  the  full  measure  of  his  genius.  But  Bismarck 
did  not  create  it  alone,  and  his  genius  does  not  account  for 
all  German  unity.  Bismarck  worked  not  on  an  untouched 
canvas  but  upon  one  into  which  had  been  woven  for  more 
than  a  century  a  state  of  mind  born  of  abject  misery  result- 
ing from  the  seventeenth  century  treaties — a  state  of 
mind  nurtured  and  trained  for  one  hundred  and  fifty  years 
by  all  German  writers,  inflamed  by  the  Napoleonic  wars, 
generalized  by  the  events  of  1848.  Bismarck  in  other 
words  utilized  with  marvelous  ability  an  aspiration — a 
need — that  existed  before  his  time;  a  need  that  Prussia 
succeeded  in  satisfying  and  in  exploiting;  a  need  whence 
German  unity  even  without  Bismarck  would  sooner 
or  later  have  sprung,  without  which  Bismarck  would  have 
been  unable  to  realize  it.  Destroy  Bismarck's  work?  An 
easy  thing  to  say,  but  a  vain  undertaking  if  what  is  the 
very  soul  of  his  work  be  not  first  destroyed.  Is  that 
destruction  possible  ?  That  is  the  whole  question.  To  that 
question  two  hundred  and  seventy  years  of  history — too 
often  ignored  by  those  whose  historical  inquiries  stop  at 
the  Treaty  of  Westphalia — give  answer. 

Germany  by  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  had 
reached  the  extreme  limit  of  disintegration.  More  than  a 
hundred  independent  States  side  by  side  led  a  miserable 
existence  under  powerless  princes — vassals  of  a  phantom 
empire.  Of  public  spirit  there  was  none — only  moral  dis- 
union worse  than  material  division,  only  economic  stagna- 
tion aggravated  by  intellectual  decadence,  emphasized  by 
boorish  manners  and  general  ignorance.  Only  the  lower 


358     THE  TKUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

classes  spoke  German.  This  political  system  had  a  name, 
the  "Germanic  Liberties."  In  order  to  understand  what 
modern  Germany  thinks  of  these  liberties  we  must  remem- 
ber what  they  stood  for  in  the  Germany  of  the  past. 

A  few  spirits  lost  in  this  darkness  retained,  by  personal 
effort,  their  individuality  shorn  however  of  all  national 
influence.  To  them  is  due  the  origin  of  the  movement 
whence  after  many  evolutions  was  one  day  to  come  the 
then  unsuspected  notion  of  a  German  Fatherland.  To  tell 
the  truth  this  notion  in  its  modern  form  was  foreign  to 
these  solitary  thinkers.  But  in  their  struggle  for  the  ad- 
vancement of  literature  and  science  they  held  the  torch  for 
future  generations.  Leibnitz  was  the  first  to  extol  intel- 
lectual activity  without  which,  he  said,  "the  downfall  and 
decay  of  our  nation  will  be  irreparable  for  a  long  time  to 
come. ' '  A  few  years  later,  appeared  the  first  review  pub- 
lished in  German,  to  the  scandal  of  its  contemporaries.  It 
was  followed  by  another  periodical,  The  Hamburg  Patriot, 
the  success  of  which  astonished  its  readers  and  even  its 
founders.  Local  awakenings  of  no  political  or  national 
importance,  but  which  showed  the  trend. 

The  eighteenth  century  sees  the  growth  and  expansion 
of  this  renaissance  whose  results  have  so  far  surpassed  all 
expectations.  Wolf,  "the  schoolmaster  of  the  German 
mind,"  as  Hegel  called  him  later;  the  mediocre  Gottsched 
ever  reacting  against  foreign  manners  but  stubborn  and 
popular  champion  of  German  science;  the  University  of 
Goettingen,  first  centre  of  culture  for  a  middle  class  hith- 
erto non-existent, — pave  the  way  for  Klopstock  and  Les- 
sing,  the  earliest  classical  writers  of  Germany.  Steeped 
in  the  philosophy  of  their  century,  they  share  its  human- 
tarian  and  cosmopolitan  spirit.  But  they  write  in  German 
and  for  Germans,  so  their  work  is  already  national.  The 
whole  scene  is  dominated  by  the  extraordinary  figure  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  resourceful  and  unscrupulous,  holding 
his  own  against  Europe.  Even  those  who  do  not  love  him 
are  proud  of  this  Prussian, — more  Prussian  than  German. 
His  victories  awake  echoes  beyond  his  kingdom,  all  over 


GERMAN  UNITY  359 

the  Holy  Empire.  The  young  generation  at  Frankfort 
worships  him.  Patriotic  writings  that  borrow  their  titles 
from  the  past  increase  in  number.  The  "Germanics" 
begin  to  discover  a  community  of  thought  and  feeling,  they 
thrill  with  a  new-born  desire  to  foster  it. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  century  the  movement  gains 
breadth  and  scope.  It  is  the  moment  when  Herder  pro- 
claims the  inward  character  of  the  German  spirit  and 
language.  "Awake,"  he  cries,  "0  slumbering  God!  awake 
0  German  People. ' '  Then  there  come  Goethe,  Schiller  and 
Kant,  initiators  and  masters  of  German  thought.  The 
Fatherland  of  which  they  speak  is  more  ideal  than  mate- 
rial. It  is  an  intellectual  community  whose  body  politic  is 
as  yet  unformed.  But  under  the  influence  of  the  French 
ideas  of  1789,  this  Fatherland  begins  to  crystallize  in  men 's 
minds  and  around  the  idea — thrilling  indeed  to  this  land  of 
poverty  and  misery — of  the  rights  of  man  and  of  the  indi- 
vidual. The  masses  still  remain  indifferent.  But  the 
Napoleonic  wars  are  going  to  awaken  them.  Eighteen  hun- 
dred and  six  sees  Jena.  Kant  had  died  two  years  before, 
bequeathing  to  his  countrymen  his  philosophy  of  duty. 
Fichte  takes  hold  of  it  and  makes  it  the  very  soul  of  a 
frankly  and  exclusively  national  propaganda.  He  declares 
himself  to  be  "German  and  nothing  but  German."  He 
speaks  for  "all  Germans  without  exception."  He  preaches 
that  all  their  misfortunes  arose  from  the  "Germanic  liber- 
ties" which  made  of  Germany  the  battlefield  of  Europe. 
He  denounces  the  princes  of  the  Rhine  Confederation  as 
"the  gilded  slaves  of  Napoleon."  His  patriotism  is  no 
mere  literary  concept.  It  is  a  thought-power.  He  has  a 
sense  of  national  unity.  He  is  not  afraid  of  the  word.  The 
French  Empire  by  its  militarist  policy  helped  to  bring  into 
the  world  the  modern  German  Fatherland.  And  Fichte  was 
its  prophet. 

And  then  in  the  Prussian  Government  a  minister — not 
a  Prussian  by  birth — Stein,  appropriates  this  idea  and 
translates  it  into  action.  Particularism,  there  is  the  enemy ! 
Unity,  there  is  the  need!  Napoleon  has  Stein  expelled 


360 

from  Prussia,  and  Stein's  authority  grows  greater  as  a 
result.  Against  humanitarianism  and  cosmopolitanism,  he 
clamours  for  the  rights  of  patriotism.  "I  have  but  one 
country  and  its  name  is  Germany. . . .  My  motto  is  unity. . . . 
Away  with  the  fatal  treaties  of  Westphalia."  His  voice 
carries  far.  On  the  retreat  from  Russia,  he  obliges  his 
hesitating  sovereign  to  launch  the  Appeal  to  My  People  of 
1813,  which  beyond  Prussia  is  intended  for  all  Germany. 
The  second  of  the  cards  that  Bismarck  is  to  play  fifty 
years  later  appears.  The  German  idea  is  marching  on! 
But  besides,  in  1813,  it  is  Prussia  which, — followed  but  lit- 
tle or  not  at  all  by  the  others, — fights  for  this  idea,  thereby 
gaining  an  unique  prestige.  Doubtless  for  many  years  yet, 
the  policy  of  reaction  expressed  in  the  Holy  Alliance  is  to 
retard  evolution.  Stein  is  in  advance  of  his  time.  The 
princes  do  not  support  him.  But  he  gives  an  impulse  to  the 
people,  and  his  political  testament  is  in  the  minds  of  all 
who  think — "To  be  strong,  Germany  must  be  united." 

From  1815  to  1848  the  outward  lines  of  politics  remain 
rigid.  But  minds  are  in  a  ferment.  The  courts — even  the 
Prussian  Court  draws  back  from  the  advantages  that 
await  it — repudiate  unity  as  revolutionary.  Professors 
and  writers,  however,  think  of  nothing  else.  They  seek  its 
distant  origin  in  the  history  of  the  Middle  Ages.  They  show 
its  present  necessity  by  the  risk  Germany  ran  of  being 
absorbed  by  Napoleon.  All  the  elite  helps.  The  university 
of  Berlin  becomes  a  centre  of  German  patriotism.  Theory 
is  abandoned  for  practice.  Heed  is  paid  to  frontiers.  The 
Rhine  is  not  enough,  some  demand  the  Meuse.  The 
Treaties  of  1815  are  denounced  as  a  spoliation,  for  which 
lack  of  unity  is  blamed.  Hatred  of  France  is  already  the 
favourite  food  of  this  raging  patriotism.  "Unity,  Unity," 
cries  Arndt,  "unity  as  energetic  as  possible  is  what  Ger- 
many needs;  that  is  what  is  essential  both  to  her  security 
abroad  and  to  her  prosperity  at  home."  And  Gorres  antic- 
ipating Bismarck.,  adds:  "It  must  be  realized,  if  need  be, 
by  blood  and  the  iron." 

From  this  time  with  ever  increasing  force,  the  idea  of 


GERMAN  UNITY  361 

unity  keeps  marching  on.  Having  suffered  overlong  from 
her  disintegration  and  proudly  confident  of  her  future, 
Germany  is  ready  to  make  good  the  words  of  the  Prussian 
Treitschke,  "We  have  no  German  Fatherland,  and  the 
Hohenzollerns  alone  can  give  us  one."  In  1830,  Bismarck, 
a  Prussian  junker,  meets  an  American  and  makes  a  bet 
with  him  that  before  another  generation  unity  will  be  an 
accomplished  fact.  The  Parliament  of  Frankfort,  under 
the  illusion  that  it  could  realize  this  unity  by  vote,  offers 
the  crown  to  Frederick  William,  who  refuses  it.  This  is 
the  last  blunder  before  the  battle  is  won.  Bismarck  comes 
into  power  and  henceforth  goes  straight  to  his  goal,  which 
is  not  that  of  the  German  princes  but  that  of  the  German 
people.  All  things  are  made  to  serve  his  purpose — the 
centuries  of  misery,  the  dreams  of  philosophers  and  of 
poets ;  the  memories  of  the  trials  of  1906 ;  the  avidity  of  the 
middle  classes  of  the  South  and  West — to  whom  by  the 
Zollverein  he  ensures  larger  revenues  than  those  they  get 
from  their  own  customs ;  universal  suffrage  established  as 
a  menace  against  Austria  and  the  princes;  the  war  of  the 
Duchies  and  the  Bohemian  campaign  which  excludes  the 
Hapsburgs  from  Germany  and  reconciles  them  to  this 
exclusion  by  leaving  them  their  boundary;  finally  the 
absurdity  of  Napoleon  III,  who,  by  his  policy  of  the  "  Three 
Germanics, "  supplies  Prussia  with  the  national  pretext 
from  which  war  is  to  come  on  the  day  of  her  choice. 

"From  the  moment  the  Confederation  of  the  South  is 
formed,"  said  Bismarck  on  April  10,  1867,  "and  Germany 
has  but  two  national  Parliaments,  no  human  force  can  keep 
them  from  uniting,  any  more  than  the  waters  of  the  Bed 
Sea  remained  apart  after  the  crossing  of  the  people  of 
Israel."  The  end  is  known.  Another  and  inexcusable 
error  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  III  in  connection  with  the 
Spanish  question;  the  cynical  Ems  forgery;  the  Franco- 
German  war;  Versailles;  the  King  of  Bavaria  bullied  and 
brought  to  terms — and  the  Empire  is  founded.  A  result  of 
opportunism  which  satisfies  neither  the  Conservatives,  who 
wanted  Prussia  to  absorb  Germany,  nor  the  Liberals,  who 


362     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

wanted  Germany  to  absorb  Prussia ;  a  patchwork  construc- 
tion of  give  and  take  designed  to  overcome  the  resistance 
of  the  princes;  without  standing  in  international  law;  but 
the  work  of  the  past  rather  than  the  work  of  Bismarck; 
the  tardy  fruit  of  the  combined  efforts  of  poets  and  people 
whereby,  for  two  hundred  years,  Germany  has  sought  to 
free  herself  from  those  alleged  " Liberties" — hated  for 
more  than  a  century — in  which  the  pretentious  verbiage  of 
some  contemporary  historians  seeks  to  find  compensation 
for  her  defeat.  The  people — "that  multitude  of  invisible 
souls"  of  which  Bismarck  speaks  in  one  of  his  letters — is 
won  over  in  advance  to  the  end  no  matter  what  the  means. 
It  shows  it  by  plunging,  North  and  South  alike,  into  the 
war  against  France,  which  is  to  cement  its  recent  unity. 
Bismarck  is  the  genius  who  directs  this  great  adventure,  but 
he  is  not  its  creator.  Unity  existed  before  him  in  the  souls 
of  the  people ;  he  set  it  free  rather  than  imposed  it.  Sooner 
or  later,  I  repeat,  even  without  him,  it  would  have  been 
achieved.  Fashioned  by  him,  its  principle  survived  him 
just  as  its  principle  had  preceded  him. 

Then  for  nearly  half  a  century,  this  Empire,  born  of 
blood  and  iron,  succeeded  in  giving  unequalled  satisfactions 
to  the  whole  of  Germany — to  the  Germany  of  thinkers  as 
well  as  to  the  Germany  of  doers.  For  the  first,  it  makes 
German  thought  radiate  through  the  world.  Upon  the  sec- 
ond, it  lavishes  the  material  benefits  of  which  these  people 
for  so  many  centuries  have  been  deprived.  Germany  estab- 
lishes herself  as  the  world's  school  master  and  commercial 
traveller.  She  flaunts  the  prosperity  of  her  factories,  for 
her  goods  challenge  those  of  England  in  all  the  world- 
markets;  of  her  banks,  for  their  net- work  spreads  over 
two  hemispheres ;  of  her  shipping,  for  the  lines  that  furrow 
the  seven  seas.  In  his  book  of  pride,  The  Welfare  of  the 
German  People,  Helfferich  proclaims  the  results:  popula- 
tion increased  by  sixty-three  per  cent.,  surplus  of  births 
over  deaths  as  high  as  thirteen  per  thousand,  deposits  in 
banks  and  savings  banks  tripled,  in  twenty-five  years 
reaching  a  total  of  38,000  millions;  wages  doubled  in 


GERMAN  UNITY  363 

twenty  years;  wealth  widely  distributed;  capital  values 
increased  fifty  per  cent,  in  fifteen  years,  compared  to  an 
increase  in  population  of  only  twenty-eight  per  cent. ;  aver- 
age production  of  wheat  increased  more  than  thirty  per 
cent,  per  acre;  horse-power  energy  increased  from  two  to 
eight  millions;  stock  companies  increased  from  2,000  to 
4,700.  A  prodigious  wealth  in  which  all  Germans  shared 
and  which  after  nearly  a  century  justified  Arndt's  words, 
"  Unity,  and  unity  alone  can  assure  our  security  abroad 
and  our  prosperity  at  home." 

We  are  far  from  the  philosophers  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  moral  unity  which  they  had  conceived 
flourishes — with  what  strength! — but  is  infected  by  its 
very  success  with  the  most  odious  materialism.  It  is  the 
German  patriotism  of  1914,  such  as  I  attempted  to  describe 
in  the  opening  pages  of  this  book,  with  faith  only  in  the 
brutal  might  of  the  mailed  fist,  cloaking  its  greed  beneath 
the  hypocritical  pretenses  of  a  mystical  mission  terrorizing 
Alsace-Lorraine  captive;  a  slave  to  the  sword;  gloating 
bestially  over  the  ignoble  violence  of  its  soldiery  at  Saverne. 
Nothing  can  be  baser,  nothing  more  depressing;  but  again 
nothing  could  be  more  real.  These  people  are  no  longer 
even  capable  of  regretting  the  principles  they  had  betrayed. 
Unity  for  them  is  no  longer  an  ideal,  but  a  source  of  profit. 
They  have  more  to  eat,  they  make  more  money  than  in  the 
time  of  the  ''Germanic  Liberties."  For  them  that  is 
enough.  And  because  it  is  enough,  the  whole  nation  is 
ready  for  aggression  without  a  qualm.  Not  a  party  hesi- 
tates, nor  does  a  single  State  and  this  unity  in  crime  is  to 
last  up  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Some  French  writers  have 
recently  asked  themselves  whether  Germany  is  really  a 
nation.  They  are  answered  by  our  dead.  A  nation  of 
prey,  yes,  but  a  nation  which  by  its  very  crimes  has 
proved  its  existence  all  too  well. 

It  is  true  defeat  has  come,  and  hopes  have  been  built 
upon  it.  It  has  been  thought  that  perhaps  Germany  over- 
whelmed by  defeat  would  lose  her  attachment  to  unity. 
Events  have  proved  the  contrary.  The  imperial  catas- 


364     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

trophe  has  broken  the  bonds  between  the  share-holders  in 
the  German  concern  and  their  director.  But  the  corporate 
relations  among  the  share-holders  themselves  have  only 
been  strengthened  as  a  result.  Defeat  has  not  revived  the 
1 1  Germanics  "  of  the  past.  It  has  inspired  united  Germany 
with  the  will  to  find  in  this  unity  the  instrument  of  her  own 
revival.  The  downfall  of  the  dynasties  swept  away  by  the 
autumn  gale  of  1918  laid  low  the  last  pillars  of  particular- 
ism. The  deputies  at  Weimar  in  framing  a  new  constitu- 
tion had  but  one  aim, — increased  centralization.  Does  this 
mean  that  striking  contrasts  do  not  still  persist  in  different 
parts  of  Germany?  I  do  not  say  so  and  I  shall  show  later 
the  advantage  to  be  derived  therefrom.  But  I  do  say  that 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  Nation,  whose 
birth  was  so  long  and  painful,  is  determined  to  live  on  as  a 
nation,  that  force  can  avail  nothing  against  this  will,  and 
that  separated  by  the  ax  of  the  conqueror,  its  roots  would 
soon  have  sought  and  joined  each  other  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  new  life  to  which  war  would  be  the  preface,  as  it 
was  fifty  years  ago. 

Ill 

This  obvious  fact,  on  which  so  much  discussion  has  been 
wasted  since  the  signing  of  the  peace,  was  never  challenged 
during  the  war,  and  the  disintegration  of  German  unity 
was  never  one  of  the  war  aims  of  the  Allies.  Really  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  it  could  have  been.  Victory  was  late  in 
crowning  the  flags  of  the  Entente.  In  March,  1918,  Gen- 
eral Gough's  British  Army  was  defeated.  In  May  came 
the  Chemin  des  Dames  and  Paris  bombarded.  To  have 
announced  at  that  moment  or  earlier  what  has  been  called 
the  " vivisection  of  Germany,"  would  have  been  a  terrible 
imprudence,  would  have  been  playing  into  the  hands  of 
German  propaganda.  As  it  was  not  announced,  the  Allied 
Nations  were  unprepared  for  it.  Moreover  to  them, 
grouped  as  I  have  shown  around  the  idea  of  nationality  and 
of  the  defense  of  national  liberties,  the  disintegration  of 
a  nation — even  of  an  enemy,  even  of  a  guilty  nation — 


GERMAN  UNITY  365 

would  not  have  appealed  as  a  war  aim.  Everybody  wanted 
to  destroy  German  domination.  Nobody  contemplated 
imitating  the  methods  of  that  domination.  The  common 
sense  of  the  people  was  quick  to  realize  the  existence,  only 
too  plain,  of  German  nationality.  To  break  up  that  nation- 
ality by  forcibly  reviving  its  former  parts  appeared  to 
everyone  impossible.  In  a  war  of  peoples,  which  can  be 
won  only  through  the  persistent  support  of  the  masses, 
certain  cynical  contradictions — common  in  the  time  of  the 
old  monarchies — become  not  only  impossible  but  dangerous. 
The  idea  which  gave  heart  to  our  soldiers,  and  led  them  to 
victory  could  not  be  repudiated  without  danger.  You  can- 
not tear  up  the  things  you  stand  for.  The  continuity  of 
Allied  war  aims  was,  in  large  measure,  the  expression  of 
this  impossibility. 

However  this  may  be,  it  is  a  fact  that  at  no  time  during 
the  war  did  the  Governments,  the  Parliaments,  or  even  the 
Press  demand  the  destruction  of  German  unity.  On  Decem- 
ber 30,  1916,  and  on  January  10,  1917,  the  Powers  of  the 
Entente  officially  made  known  their  views  as  to  the  condi- 
tions of  a  victorious  peace.  I  have  reproduced  these  docu- 
ments above.  Not  a  word  can  be  found  in  any  of  them  that 
directly  or  indirectly  makes  allusion  to  Germany's  disinte- 
gration. One  ingenious  spirit  has  thought  to  discover  such 
an  allusion  in  the  phrase,  ''The  Allies  repudiate  any  plan 
of  exterminating  'the  German  peoples.'  But  one  has 
only  to  read  the  text  over  to  see  that  this  plural  applies  to 
Germany  and  to  Austria.  To  this  proof  another  even  more 
decisive  may  be  added.  In  January  and  February,  1917, 
M.  Aristide  Briand,  the  French  Premier,  had,  in  confiden- 
tial letters  to  our  Ambassadors  at  Petrograd  and  London, 
expressed  his  views  on  peace.  These  were  secret  docu- 
ments in  which  the  head  of  the  Government  was  free  to 
say  anything — even  things  he  might  have  deemed  it  dan- 
gerous to  make  public.  Consult  these  two  letters.  They 
deal  in  turn,  with  the  questions  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  of  the 
Sarre,  of  the  demilitarization  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
of  its  occupation,  of  the  creation  of  an  autonomous  Rhine- 


366    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

land — all  war  aims  which  in  1919  were  upheld  by  M.  Cle- 
menceau  at  the  Conference,  as  they  were  in  1916  and  1917 
by  M.  Aristide  Briand.  But  of  Germany's  disintegration 
they  contain  not  a  word — not  a  word  mentioning  it  or  in 
any  way  even  suggesting  it.  On  the  contrary,  all  the  guar- 
antees demanded  are  demanded  against  a  united  Ger- 
many, because  this  unity  is  a  fact  and  politicians  have  to 
deal  with  facts ;  because — like  M.  Clemenceau — M.  Aristide 
Briand  evidently  held  that  "the  only  true  unity  is  that  of 
the  heart,  which  no  human  hand  can  touch." 

So  much  for  the  French  Government.  Now  for  Parlia- 
ment. I  have  quoted  the  solemn  resolutions  passed  on  June 
5  and  6, 1917.*  They  contain  no  word  either  with  regard  to 
imposing  disintegration  upon  Germany  by  the  terms  of  a 
Treaty,  or  of  any  interference  in  her  internal  affairs  what- 
soever. On  the  contrary,  we  find  in  them  the  assertion, 
twice  repeated,  that  France  is  averse  to  the  idea  of  ' '  enslav- 
ing foreign  populations,"  and  that  she  remains  "faithful 
to  her  ideal  of  independence  and  freedom  for  all  peoples. ' ' 
Fifteen  months  go  by  and,  on  December  2, 1918,  three  weeks 
after  the  Armistice,  the  Commission  of  Foreign  Affairs 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  by  the  unanimous  vote  of  its 
members,  formulates  the  peace  clauses  it  deems  essential 
to  France.  We  find  among  them,  as  in  M.  Briand 's  letter 
of  February  16,  1917,  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  Sarre,  the 
autonomous  Rhineland,  the  reparations,  but  not  a  line,  not 
a  word  about  destruction  of  German  unity,  or  refusal  to 
negotiate  with  the  Reich.  And  it  is  also  against  a  united 
Germany  that  are  directed  all  the  guarantees  demanded 
by  Marshal  Foch  in  his  reports  of  November  27,  1918,  Jan- 
uary 10  and  March  31,  1919,  as  well  as  in  his  declarations 
at  the  plenary  meeting  of  the  Conference,  May  6,  1918.  He 
refers  over  and  over  again  to  the  "German  population, 
naturally  united  by  a  common  language  and  therefore  by 
thought,  as  well  as  held  together  by  common  interest. ' '  It 
is  against  this  community  that  he  deems  the  occupation  of 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  indispensable. 

*|3ee  Chapter  III,  pages  81-82. 


GEEMAN  UNITY  367 

It  was  the  same  with  all  the  Allies.  Great  Britain  is  so 
hostile  to  the  disintegration  of  Germany  that  twice,  in 
November  and  December,  1917,  her  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Mr.  Balfour,  speaks  strongly  against  even  the  very 
limited  dismemberment  which  would  result  from  the  crea- 
tion of  an  autonomous  and  neutral  Rhineland.  He 
declared : 

It  is  pure  fancy. . .  Never,  at  any  moment,  has  such  a  scheme 
formed  part  of  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Government.  The 
Government  has  never  been  aware  that  any  such  scheme  was  seri- 
ously considered  by  any  French  politician. 

In  America,  about  the  same  time — December  14,  1917 — 
President  Wilson  had  said  without  provoking  a  single  criti- 
cism in  Europe,  where  his  speech  was  published  the  next 
day: 

"We  have  no  unjust  designs  against  the  German  Empire.  "We 
do  not  wish  to  interfere  with  her  internal  affairs.  Both  courses 
would  be  absolutely  contrary  to  our  principles. 

On  January  8,  1918,  he  read  a  message  to  Congress  in 
which  he  laid  down  the  Fourteen  Points,  the  identity  of 
which  with  the  European  war  aims  I  have  already  shown. 
Nothing  in  it  about  the  disintegration  of  Germany.  On  the 
contrary,  it  contained  this  clause,  which  also  met  no  objec- 
tion in  Europe : 

"We  do  not  pretend  to  suggest  to  Germany  the  alteration  or 
modification  of  her  institutions. 

From  then  on  the  only  internal  guarantee  that  the  Presi- 
dent wishes  to  exact  of  Germany  in  addition  to  the 
European  war  aims  is  the  suppression  of  the  military  and 
irresponsible  autocracy  of  the  Hohenzollerns  and  its 
replacement  by  a  representative  Government.  He  repeats 
this  on  April  6, 1918,  at  Baltimore,  and  on  July  4,  at  Mount 
Vernon,  insisting  upon  "the  necessity  of  not  negotiating 
with  an  arbitrary  Power  which  could  independently, 


368     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

secretly  and  by  its  sole  will  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world. '  ' 
But  he  speaks  neither  of  destroying  Germany's  unity,  nor 
of  refusing  to  deal  with  the  Reich,  and  no  one  in  Europe 
differs  with  him.  Finally  when,  on  October  12,  the  Armis- 
tice correspondence  begins,  there  is  no  question  even  of 
suppressing  the  Reich  or  of  negotiating  with  the  States 
composing  it.  Moreover,  all  this  correspondence  is  pub- 
lished from  day  to  day.  The  Parliaments  are  sitting.  Two 
important  additions  to  the  bases  of  peace  are  suggested, 
demanded,  obtained,  by  England  and  by  France.  And  no 
one  either  in  Paris  or  in  London,  in  the  High  Command  nor 
in  the  Governments,  nor  in  the  Chambers,  says  a  single 
word  of  that  disintegration  which  eight  months  later  is  to 
create  a  stir  in  the  Parliaments  and  in  the  Press. 

So  the  Armistice  is  reached  and  its  terms  are  read  in 
Parliament  the  very  day  it  is  signed.  It  is  with  the  ' '  rep- 
resentatives duly  accredited  by  the  German  Government," 
that  Marshal  Foch  was  authorized  to  treat  on  November 
5;  it  is  with  the  "Secretary  of  State,  Erzeberger,  President 
of  the  German  delegation  acting  in  accord  with  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor,"  that  the  Marshal  on  November  11  dis- 
cussed and  signed  the  Armistice.  The  Armistice  itself,  in 
Articles  9,  6,  29,  30  and  32,  mentions  six  times,  as  contract- 
ing party,  not  the  States  forming  the  Reich,  but  the  "Ger- 
man" Government,  or  "Germany."  Remember  that  the 
Armistice  is  not  only  military — that  it  was  discussed  and 
reinforced  at  Versailles  by  the  Governments — that  it  con- 
tains political  and  financial  clauses.  All  this  is  public 
property,  and  proves  conclusively  that  the  Allies  did  not 
demand,  and  had  no  intention  of  demanding  the  destruction 
of  German  unity.  Nobody  protested,  either  in  October  or 
on  November  11,  even  among  those  who  a  few  months  later 
were  to  denounce  as  criminal  the  action  of  the  Allies  in 
negotiating  with  the  Reich. 

The  Press  itself,  though  its  irresponsibility  gave  it 
greater  freedom  of  expression,  does  not  blame  the  Cham- 
bers for  accepting  what  the  Government  brings  to  them. 
It  had  one  very  legitimate  preoccupation,  namely  that  what 


GERMAN  UNITY  369 

was  left  of  Austria-Hungary  should  not  be  allowed  to  unite 
with  Germany.  Article  80  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  pro- 
vided for  this.  But  the  disintegration  of  Germany — the 
forcible  destruction  of  her  unity — does  not  at  all  interest 
the  papers.  On  October  28  we  read: 

As  for  imaginary  solutions,  such  as  that  which  consists  in 
believing  that  Southern  Catholic  Germany  could  hold  Protestant 
Prussia  in  check,  these  have  precisely  the  same  value  as  the  theory 
of  the  Three  Germanics.  M.  Rouher,  Napoleon  Ill's  minister,  also 
asserted  that  a  Germany  cut  up  into  three  pieces  would  never 
unite. 

On  October  29 : 

"We  cannot  establish  particularism  and  separatism  to  order  in 
Germany. 

On  November  4 : 

Let  us  not  be  deceived.  The  movement  of  Germany  unity  is 
not  yet  finished.  However  desirable  a  revival  of  particularism 
might  be  for  Europe,  it  is  not  in  that  direction  the  German  States 
as  a  whole  are  tending. 

On  November  5 : 

The  idea  of  a  Southern  Catholic  Germany  including  Bavaria 
and  German  Austria,  has  not  at  all  the  attraction  for  us  which  it 
possesses  in  certain  quarters.  These  combinations  always  possible 
on  paper  cannot  be  realized  at  will.  "We  cannot  knead  the  German 
dough  to  suit  our  fancy.  Besides  people  are  fooling  themselves  with 
regard  to  Bavaria  which  has  only  seven  million  inhabitants,  and 
with  regard  to  the  attractive  force  of  the  little  provincial  state  of 
Munich. 

Finally,  the  same  day,  we  find  expressed  almost  word 
for  word  the  contention  put  forward  by  me  on  September  2, 
1919,  in  the  Chamber,  and  by  M.  Clemenceau,  on  October  11 
following,  in  the  Senate,  on  the  subject  of  possible  particu- 
larism and  the  eventual  influence  to  be  exerted  in  that 
direction. 


370     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

In  general,  these  things  are  either  not  done  at  all  or  are  done 
badly  from  without.  Events  have  a  habit  of  presenting  themselves 
in  unexpected  guises  and,  if  we  attempt  to  anticipate  them,  we  run 
the  risk  of  interpreting  them  wrongly  and  taking  them  at  cross- 
purposes. 

I  could  give  quotations  of  this  sort  indefinitely.  I  have 
chosen  these  in  preference  to  others,  because  they  cannot 
be  suspected  of  democratic  idealism;  for  they  are  all  taken 
from  the  articles  of  a  Royalist  writer,  M.  Jacques  Bain- 
ville,  whose  party  has  made  itself  in  1920,  the  vehement 
advocate  of  the  disintegration  of  Germanys 

IV 

Such  the  conditions  in  which  the  Allies  were  placed  at 
the  Conference.  Such  the  reasons  for  which  they  felt  that 
they  were  faced  by  a  practical  impossibility,  by  a  moral 
factor  which,  in  M.  Clemenceau's  own  words  "no  human 
hand  can  touch,"  because,  as  history  has  shown  a  hundred 
times,  military  force  is  powerless  against  spiritual  force. 

The  French  Government,  especially,  was  convinced 
that  forcible  interference  with  this  state  of  affairs  would 
be  dangerous.  How  could  we  forget  that  the  victories  of 
Napoleon  and  his  policy  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine, 
inspired  by  that  of  Mazarin,  did  more  to  create  a  senti- 
ment of  unity  in  Germany  than  even  the  preachings  of 
Fichte?  How  could  we  forget  that  Napoleon  III,  with  his 
policy  of  the  "Three  Germanics,"  proclaimed  on  the  mor- 
row of  Sadowa,  gave  Bismarck  the  leaven  whence  four  years 
later  sprang  the  idea  of  Empire  I  How  could  we  refuse  to 
recognize,  with  the  Royalist  writer  I  have  just  quoted,  that 
such  things  are  generally  badly  done  from  without  and 
that  by  thus  attempting  to  destroy  a  nation,  we  are  certain 
to  strengthen  the  bonds  that  hold  it  together? 

Does  this  mean  that  there  is  no  hope  that  a  spontaneous 
awakening  of  the  particularist  spirit  may  some  day  oppose 
Prussian  preponderance  ?  The  French  Government  thought 
otherwise  and  has  proved  it  by  its  acts.  In  this  respect  the 


GERMAN  UNITY  371 

French  Government  was  in  accord  with  the  views  of  an 
American  writer,  Mr.  Baldwin:  "If  the  German  Empire 
broke  up  into  separate  states  (which  is  something  quite 
different  from  the  vivisection  of  the  German  Empire)  it 
would  be  an  incalculable  gain  from  every  point  of  view." 
M.  Clemenceau  and  his  colleagues  felt  that  it  was  at  once 
impossible  and  dangerous  to  impose  this  disintegration  by 
force — to  employ  what  M.  Hanotaux,  an  advocate  of  this 
method,  calls  the  "compelle  intrare" — but  whenever  at  any 
particular  point,  autonomous  tendencies  manifested  them- 
selves spontaneously  they  loyally  and  openly  tried  to  sup- 
port them.  I  may  add  that,  on  such  occasions,  the  Allied 
Governments  always  showed  the  greatest  hesitation — 
sometimes  even  the  plainest  opposition. 

One  early  instance  of  this  is  furnished  by  the  affairs 
of  Bavaria.  Kurt  Eisner  had  just  fallen.  The  economic 
situation  was  critical.  Relations  with  Berlin  were  strained. 
The  French  Government  presents  the  facts  and  offers  to 
send  supply  trains  direct  to  Bavaria.  Immediately  Lord 
Robert  Cecil,  Mr.  Hoover,  and  Mr.  Lansing  raise  objections 
on  the  ground  that  arrangements  have  already  been  made 
to  this  effect,  under  the  Armistice  of  November  11,  with 
the  German  Government  which  is  responsible  for  the  pay- 
ment. Mr.  Lansing  says: 

"I  have  not  the  slightest  confidence  in  an  expedient 
which  involves  interference  in  the  affairs  of  any  country 
whatsoever. ' ' 

It  is  decided  to  consult  the  Supreme  Economic  Council, 
which  replies,  "So  far  as  the  Council  can  judge,  the  pro- 
posed measures  from  the  point  of  view  of  food  supply  and 
finance  are  neither  desirable  nor  possible."  So  there  was 
unanimous  opposition  to  our  proposal. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  it  has  been  seen  how  Great 
Britain's  unswerving  refusal,  soon  followed  by  that  of  the 
United  States,  had  closed  the  door  to  the  policy  of  auton- 
omy recommended  by  France  in  the  only  region  where  it 
might  perhaps,  have  been  immediately  applicable.*  A 

*See  Chapter  V. 


372     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

significant  incident  proved,  a  few  weeks  later,  that  our 
Allies'  apprehensions  had  not  been  allayed.  On  Sunday, 
June  1,  1919,  Herr  Dorten,  a  former  magistrate,  without 
political  experience  or  authority,  put  up  posters  proclaim- 
ing himself  President  of  the  Ehenish  Eepublic.  The  same 
day,  Mr.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  received  from  the 
Commanders-in-Chief  of  the  American  and  British  forces 
two  reports  which  corroborated  each  other  and  gave  the 
impression  that  this  "comic  opera  incident"  had  been 
favourably  viewed  by  the  French  military  authorities.  It 
Was  the  moment  when  so  many  people  in  London  and  else- 
where were  dominated  by  the  fear  that  Germany  would  not 
sign.  The  next  day,  June  2,  in  the  afternoon,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  began  his  earnest  attempt  to  make  M.  Clemenceau 
give  up  the  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine — a 
hotbed  of  intrigues,  he  declared,  and  a  menace  to  the  peace 
of  Europe.  For  two  weeks  M.  Clemenceau  had  to  fight  step 
by  step  to  prevent  any  change  in  this  occupation  \\ithout 
which  the  most  determined  advocates  of  the  "Ehenish 
policy ' '  will  admit  that  this  policy  would  be,  to  say  the  least, 
difficult.  Once  again,  anticipation  of  the  future  had  come 
near  costing  us  our  hold  upon  the  realities.  What  hap- 
pened in  March,  1920,  at  the  time  of  the  occupation  of 
Frankfort,  throws  light  upon  the  history  of  the  preceding 
year. 

Even  where  matters  of  pure  form  were  involved  a 
similar  state  of  mind  had  revealed  itself.  On  May  2,  1919, 
the  French  Government  had  proposed  that  Bavaria  and 
those  of  the  German  States  which  had  signed  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort,  should  be  called  upon  to  sign  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles.  On  the  fourth,  the  Committee  to  which  this  pro- 
posal had  been  referred,  rejected  it ;  only  the  French  repre- 
sentative voting  in  its  favour.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is 
hard  to  see  just  how  authority  given  to  Count  von  Brock- 
dorff-Eantzau  to  obtain  the  signature  of  the  Bavarian  Gov- 
ernment could  have  altered  the  general  constitution  of 
Germany,  or  have  lessened  the  German  danger  for  France. 
So  the  refusal  of  the  Allies  was  not  a  serious  matter;  but 


GERMAN  UNITY  373 

nevertheless,  it  threw  light  upon  their  state  of  mind.  All 
that  France  could  obtain  was  the  insertion  in  the  preamble 
to  the  Treaty,  of  a  sentence  which,  in  spite  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Union  adopted  by  the  Assembly  of  Weimar,  author- 
ized the  resumption  of  diplomatic  relations  between  the 
Governments  of  the  Entente  and  the  self-governing  States 
forming  part  of  the  German  Empire.  In  accordance  with 
this  clause,  a  French  legation  was  re-established  at  Munich 
in  1920. 

It  must  be  confessed  moreover  that,  as  the  Conference 
progressed,  the  Allies  found  many  additional  reasons  for 
adhering  to  the  policy  of  non-interference  defined  in  their 
war  aims.  Everywhere,  from  January  15  to  June  28,  there 
was  anxiety  that  the  victors  might  not  find  a  German  Gov- 
ernment to  sign.  "Was  this  then  the  moment  to  reject  the 
one  which  had  come  legally  into  existence  as  a  result  of 
the  general  elections,  and  could  speak  in  the  name  of  the 
Reichstag?  The  financial  clauses  because  of  the  enormous 
sums  involved  led  to  a  long  and  difficult  discussion.  "Was 
it  possible  without  danger  of  giving  Germany  a  chance  to 
escape  from  the  responsibilities  contracted  by  her  as  a 
single  nation,  to  treat,  not  with  her,  but  with  Bavaria, 
Saxony,  Wurtemburg,  as  well  as  with  all  the  smaller  States 
composing  the  Reich — Hamburg,  Anhalt,  Saxe- Weimar  and 
so  many  others  besides  ?  For  the  Allies  to  obtain  payment 
it  was  necessary  that  Germany  should  again  begin  to  pro- 
duce and  to  export ;  but  would  this  be  possible,  if  the  organi- 
zation which  was  the  source  of  German  prosperity  were 
shattered?  And  again  how  can  force  prevail  against  a 
mental  attitude?  What  can  material  power  do  against  a 
1  'unity  which  is  of  the  heart." 

In  other  words,  every  aspect  of  the  war  which  the  peace 
was  to  bring  to  a  conclusion  showed  Germany  united  by 
long  and  complex  responsibilities,  and  therefore  it  was 
necessary — logically,  legally  and  practically — for  the 
Treaty  to  be  applied  to  that  Germany.  May  I  be  permitted 
to  add  to  the  recital  of  past  events  that  when  one  sees  the 
extremes  of  indulgence  which  at  times  such  or  such  of  the 


374     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Allies  have  for  the  duplicity  and  infractions  of  a  Germany 
surviving  united  in  all  her  responsibilities,  one  wonders 
what  would  have  happened  if  it  could  have  been  said,  if 
one  could  say  to-day,  that  by  the  very  terms  of  the  Treaty 
and  by  the  will  of  the  victors  responsible,  Germany  has 
ceased  to  exist. 

Thus  the  Conference  went  on  painfully  and  laboriously 
without  anything  ever  arising  to  modify  the  broad  vision 
of  M.  Clemenceau's  wisdom:  "The  only  unity  is  that  of  the 
heart  and  that  no  human  hand  can  touch."  Had  it  been 
otherwise,  had  not  this  unity  asserted  itself  as  enduring, 
Germany — need  I  insist  upon  it? — would  have  suffered  the 
same  fate  as  Austria-Hungary.  But  Germany  showing  no 
desire  for  dissolution,  the  head  of  the  French  Government 
was  determined,  as  were  his  colleagues,  not  to  "break  his 
sword"  in  a  vain  attempt  to  force  it  upon  her,  and  he  con- 
cluded in  full  agreement  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George : 

"We  all  know  very  well  that  the  best  way  to  work  for 
Germany's  disintegration  if  this  be  possible,  is  to  take  no 
hand  in  it." 

This  was  the  truth  yesterday.  It  is  the  truth  to-day. 
It  will  be  the  truth  to-morrow.  Disintegration  has  not  taken 
place  from  within.  Therefore  it  would  have  been,  as  M. 
Bainville  wrote  in  November,  1918,  imprudent  and  useless 
to  undertake  it  from  without.  If,  under  the  influence  of 
new  interests,  particularist  movements  some  day  arise,  they 
will  succeed  all  the  better  if  their  Prussian  adversaries 
cannot  point  to  foreign  complicity.  They  will  succeed  only 
on  that  condition.  For,  in  the  matter  of  nationality,  it  is 
as  impossible  to  create  by  force,  as  it  is  to  destroy  by 
force.  Alsace-Lorraine,  Poland  and  Bohemia  have  risen 
from  their  graves  because  their  souls  had  never  died.  The 
Allies  did  not  wish  by  the  use  of  violence  against  a  national- 
ity simply  to  build  a  fragile  edifice  upon  sand,  and  so 
expose  themselves  to  the  tragic  turn  that  has  overwhelmed 
the  Hapsburg  Empire. 

The  peace  did  not  break  Germany  into  bits,  not  only 
because  an  attempt  to  do  this,  which  never  had  any  place 


GERMAN  UNITY  375 

in  the  Allied  war  aims,  would  have  been  the  negation  of  all 
their  principles,  but  also  and  above  all  because  it  would 
have  been  impossible.  France  would  far  rather  not  have 
at  her  very  doors  and  bound  together  by  a  common  will 
and  consciousness  of  unity  a  people  from  which  she  has  so 
often  suffered.  But  the  danger  of  this  proximity  residing 
precisely  in  the  unity  of  these  consciences  and  of  these 
wills,  the  Peace  Conference  was  powerless  against  it.  If  it 
had  agreed  to  attempt  to  break  it,  it  would  have  only 
strengthened  it.  If  France  had  attempted  this  alone,  and 
in  spite  of  her  Allies,  there  would  have  been  no  Peace 
Treaty.  "We  all  hope  some  improvement  may  be  looked  for 
in  the  future,  but  it  is  on  the  one  condition  that  neither 
force  nor  intrigue  be  brought  to  bear  from  without.  As 
Marshal  Foch  wrote,  speaking  of  the  possibility  of  an  evolu- 
tion of  the  German  mind,  in  his  Memorandum  of  January 
10,  1919:  "We  shall  see  such  an  evolution  only  in  time — 
a  very  long  time,  no  doubt — determined  as  we  are  not  to 
hasten  persuasion  ~by  force  nor  to  interfere  in  the  settle- 
ment of  Germany's  internal  affairs." 

This  policy,  the  only  one  that  can  give  results,  will  find 
its  justification  in  the  future.  To  reduce  Germany  and 
Prussia,  the  Allies  preferred  practical  means  to  an  artificial 
disintegration  of  a  conscious  and  accepted  unity — a  disinte- 
gration pregnant  with  present  hatreds  and  future  revenge. 
They  forbade  that  union  of  Germany  and  Austria  which 
the  Socialists  of  both  countries  were  preparing  to  carry 
out  by  sleight  of  hand  and  which  a  third  only  of  the  Reichs- 
rath  voted  for  in  1920.  They  took  from  her  Poznan — the 
cradle  of  the  junkers — which  Bismarck  described  as  the 
backbone  of  the  Prussian  body.  They  took  from  her  the 
ore  of  Lorraine,  which  was  the  basis  of  her  war  industry 
— in  all,  84,000  square  kilometers,  and  8,000,000  inhabitants. 
They  deemed  this  solution  more  thoroughgoing  than  one 
which,  violating  their  principles,  would  have  given  them 
the  illusion  of  destroying  German  unity,  while  sacrificing 
to  this  illusion  for  the  sole  benefit  of  separate  States,  the 
whole  or  a  part  of  our  military  and  financial  guarantees. 


CHAPTER  XII 

RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE  OF  FRANCE 

GERMANY  attacked  France  to  dominate,  mutilate,  and 
ruin  her.  I  have  given  above  some  details  of  the  plan  of 
methodical  devastation  devised  by  Germany  in  February, 
1916.*  Victory  gave  us  back  our  frontiers  and  our  secur- 
ity. But  it  left  us  impoverished  to  an  extent  unparalleled 
in  history. 

Our  man  power  had  suffered  terribly.  Of  a  population 
of  37,797,000— of  which  9,420,000  were  men  between  nine- 
teen and  fifty  years — 8,410,000,  or  eighty-nine  and  five- 
tenths  per  cent,  of  our  potential  effectives,  had  been  called 
to  the  colours  and  for  nearly  five  years  withdrawn  from 
productive  labour.  Of  these  8,410,000  men  called  to  the 
colours,  5,564,000,  or  sixty-six  per  cent,  met  either  death 
or  injury;  1,364,000  killed;  740,000  mutilated;  3,000,000 
wounded;  490,000  prisoners.  Nearly  all  of  the  latter 
returned  from  Germany  ill  and  wasted,  one  man  in  ten 
tubercular  for  life.  Compared  to  the  total  number  of  men 
called  to  the  colours  (8,410,000),  the  killed  (1,364,000)  rep- 
resent sixteen  per  cent. ;  fifty-seven  per  cent,  of  all  French- 
men called  to  the  colours  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and 
thirty-two — the  young  generation  which  is  the  chief 
strength  of  a  country — were  killed.  In  order  to  grasp  the 
full  significance  of  these  figures,  apply  them  to  the  popula- 
tion of  the  United  States.  Had  American  losses  been  on 
the  French  scale,  it  would  have  meant  the  raising  by  Amer- 
ica of  about  twenty-six  and  a  half  million  soldiers,  of  whom 
four  millions  would  have  died. 

This  decline  in  man  power  went  hand  in  hand  with  a 
decline  in  financial  power.  The  net  cost  of  the  war — 

See  Chapter  IX,  page  281. 

376 


deducting  all  that  Germany  has  to  reimburse  (pensions 
and  allowances)  and  all  that  France  would  have  spent  had 
there  been  no  war — amounts  to  150,000  millions.  The 
grand  total  is  210,000  millions  paid  out  of  our  Treasury 
from  1914  to  1919.  For  example  our  artillery  and  aviation 
cost  us  46,000  millions ;  the  equipment  of  our  troops,  30,000 
millions;  separation  allowances,  19,000  millions;  food  sup- 
plies for  the  Armies,  18,000  millions ;  pay,  12,000  millions ; 
ocean  freight,  12,000  millions;  loans  to  our  Allies,  11,000 
millions.  As  the  taxes  during  the  war  brought  in  only 
34,000  millions,  it  is  evident  that  176,000  millions  had  to  be 
found  by  other  means  for  meeting  the  cost  of  the  struggle. 
Deducting  the  33,000  millions  lent  us  by  our  Allies,  this 
leaves  a  sum  of  143,000  millions  paid  by  France  from  her 
own  resources,  plus  34,000  millions  in  taxes,  a  total  of 
177,000  millions  in  all.  The  national  debt  which,  in  1914, 
amounted  to  35,000  millions  with  no  foreign  debt,  has  risen 
to  176,000  internal  debt,  and  33,000  millions  foreign  debt, 
(68,000  millions  at  the  October,  1920,  rate  of  exchange.) 
The  budget  has  risen  from  about  5,000  millions  in  1914  to 
22,000  millions. 

But  this  new  burden  coincides  with  an  enormous 
decrease  in  our  capital.  Lord  Derby,  Ambassador  of  Great 
Britain  in  Paris,  addressing  a  meeting  of  his  countrymen 
in  Liverpool,  in  1919,  said:  " Suppose  England  were 
deprived  of  Lancashire  by  an  earthquake;  then  you  will 
understand  what  the  ruins  of  war  and  German  destruction 
mean  to  France. ' '  A  few  figures  to  illustrate  this  compari- 
son which  though  striking,  is  probably  an  understatement : 

Inhabitants  driven  from  their  homes 2,732,000 

Lands  destroyed  by  battle 3,800,000  Hect. 

Villages   devastated 4,022 

Houses  completely  or  partly  destroyed 594,616 

Schools  destroyed   6,454 

Factories  destroyed  (completely  or  partly) 20,539 

Live  stock  carried  off 1,360,000  head 

Railway     lines     of     general     and     local     interest 

destroyed 4,789  km. 

Roads    destroyed 53,398  km. 


378    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Canals   destroyed 948  km. 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads  and  railroads ....        5,041 

Pre-war  production  of  the  devastated  zone  with  regard  to  the  total 
production  of  France. 

Coal    55% 

"Woolen  goods 94% 

Linen  thread 90% 

Ore    90% 

Pig  iron  80% 

Sugar     70% 

Cotton  goods 60% 

Electric  power   45% 

Sugar  beets  25% 

Oats    10% 

Wheat     9% 

Fodder  beets 9% 

Percentage  of  taxes  paid  in  1913  by  the 
devastated  zone  18.5% 

The  classification  by  departments  of  these  total  losses 
emphasizes  the  immensity  of  the  disaster.  It  is  given  in 
the  following  tables: 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NORD 

Population  of  the  war  zone  in  1914 1,862,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 758,000 

Villages    devastated   501 

Schools  destroyed  1,555 

Houses  completely  destroyed 50,010 

Houses  partly  destroyed 101,292 

Total  surface  ruined Ha  500,000 

Arable  lands  ruined II*  268,808 

Live  stock  carried  off 244,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 11,814 

Koads  destroyed Km  7,578 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 1,032 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km  540 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  PAS-DE-CALAIS 

Population  of  the  war  zone  in  1914 581,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 460,000 

Villages   devastated    367 

Schools    destroyed  554 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE  379 

Houses  completely  destroyed 70,634 

Houses  partly  destroyed 36,480 

Total  surface   ruined Ha  267,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha  138,082 

Live  stock  carried  off 124,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 1,560 

Roads  destroyed Km  7,840 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 133 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km  147 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  SOMME 

Population  of  the  war  zone  in  1914 281,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 280,000 

Villages  destroyed 448 

Schools  destroyed  596 

Houses  completely  destroyed 40,335 

Houses  partly  destroyed 18,766 

Total  surface  ruined Ha  400,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha  190,700 

Live  stock  carried  off 140,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 1,099 

Roads  destroyed Km  7,144 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 173 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km  220 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OISE 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 112,398 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 96,000 

Villages  destroyed    263 

Schools  destroyed  260 

Houses  completely  destroyed  8,745 

Houses  partly  destroyed 15,650 

Total  surface   ruined Ha  170,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha  107,332 

Live  stock  carried  off 78,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 283 

Roads  destroyed Km  2,688 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 152 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km  61 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  AISNE 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 530,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 290,000 

Villages   destroyed  814 


380 


THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 


Schools  destroyed   1,224 

Houses  completely  destroyed 55,268 

Houses  partly  destroyed 50,018 

Total  surface   ruined Ha       730,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha       432,000 

Live  stock  carried  off 251,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 1,966 

Roads  destroyed Km         6,391 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 761 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km            609 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MARNE 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 300,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 223,000 

Villages    destroyed 320 

Schools  destroyed  432 

Houses  completely  destroyed  30,612 

Houses  partly  destroyed 19,285 

Total  surface   ruined Ha       293,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha       136,639 

Live  stock  carried  off 116,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 913 

Roads  destroyed  Kra         6,183 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 132 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km            204 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARDENNES 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 324,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 180.000 

Villages  destroyed 443 

Schools  destroyed   789 

Houses  completely  destroyed  10,440 

Houses  partly  destroyed 14,205 

Total  surface  ruined H*        525,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha        125,000 

Live  stock  carried  off 185,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly 1,528 

Roads  destroyed   Km         3,621 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 600 

Railway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km            344 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MEUSE 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 180,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 135,000 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE         381 

Villages    devastated  398 

Schools  destroyed   520 

Houses  completely  destroyed 24,229 

Houses  partly  destroyed 12,457 

Total  surface   ruined Ha       320,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha       168,816 

Live  stock  carried  off 93,000 

Factories  destroyed  (Meuse,  Meurthe-et-Moselle  and 

Vosges)  completely  or  partly 1,376 

Eoads  destroyed Km          4,878 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 94 

Eailway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km             129 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MEURTHE-ET-MOSELLE 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 424,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 292,000 

Villages  devastated  ; 363 

Schools  destroyed  395 

Houses  completely  destroyed  11,796 

Houses  partly  destroyed 16,609 

Total  surface  ruined Ha       475,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha       185,700 

Live  stock  carried  off 90,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly   (total  for 

for  Meuse,  Meurthe-et-Moselle  and  Vosges) . . .  1,376 

Eoads  destroyed Km          4,630 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 55 

Eailway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km             111 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  VOSGES 

Population  in  the  war  zone  in  1914 82,000 

Population  driven  out  by  the  war 18,000 

Villages    devastated  105 

Schools  destroyed  129 

Houses  completely  destroyed 2,122 

Houses  partly  destroyed 5,663 

Total  surface  ruined Ha       120,000 

Arable  lands  ruined Ha           4,500 

Live  stock  carried  off 39,000 

Factories  destroyed  completely  or  partly  (total  for 

Meuse,  Meurthe-et-Moselle  and  Vosges) 1,376 

Eoads  destroyed Km          2,445 

Public  works  destroyed  on  roads 36 

Eailway  lines  of  local  interest  destroyed Km               20 


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382 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        383 

A  large  part  of  this  destruction,  carried  out  in  cold 
blood  behind  the  battle  lines,  was  so  thorough  as  to  ren- 
der reconstruction  a  matter  of  the  utmost  difficulty.  Take 
the  Lens  coal  mines  with  their  sixteen  mining  centres ;  their 
twenty-nine  pits;  their  16,000  workmen;  their  output  of 
four  million  tons  in  1913.  As  early  as  September,  1914,  the 
Germans  destroyed  all  the  pits  and  mining  apparatus,  cut 
the  cables,  dumped  the  cages  and  cars  into  the  pits,  and 
systematically  broke  up  all  the  machinery.  In  1915  explo- 
sives are  employed.  Props,  cylinders,  boilers,  even  their 
linings  are  blown  up  by  dynamite  and  the  galleries  are 
flooded.  Water  fills  the  mines  to  the  surface  level.  Before 
any  work  of  restoration  can  be  begun,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  pump  out  fifty  million  cubic  meters  of  water.  Take  the 
Arbel  plants  at  Douai,  covering  5,600  square  meters.  In 
a  report  dated  January  31,  1915,  the  German  Schroter 
boasts  of  having  destroyed  or  stolen  everything  they  con- 
tained. There  was  a  huge  steam  hammer  weighing  1,200 
tons,  the  only  one  of  its  kind  in  the  world.  While  the  Ger- 
mans were  removing  it,  they  taunted  the  French  manager 
who  had  stuck  to  his  post : 

"It  was  with  that  press  you  got  a  Roumanian  order  for 
one  hundred  petroleum  trucks  away  from  us,"  they  said. 
"We  are  going  to  carry  it  off  to  our  own  factories  and 
we'll  make  the  Arbel  trucks  ourselves  now." 

For  three  months  a  German  engineer  ransacked  the 
archives,  documents  and  correspondence  of  the  company 
to  complete  the  theft  of  the  machinery  by  that  of  the 
clientele.  Take  the  Homecourt  iron  and  steel  works.  All 
the  plates,  all  the  sheet  iron,  rolling  bridges,  motors  and 
machinery  are  removed.  A  special  destruction  staff  with 
headquarters  at  Metz  directed  these  operations  under  the 
name  of  "Administration  for  the  Protection  of  French 
Factories."  It  would  take  a  thousand  pages  to  describe 
this  vandalism  in  detail.  Ruthlessly  conducted,  it  achieved 
its  purpose.  No  trace  of  industry  left  in  these  ten  depart- 
ments, the  most  prosperous  in  France.  No  trace  of  agricul- 
tural life  either.  Fruit  trees  cut  down,  barns  blown  up, 


384    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

death  everywhere.  Take  at  random  the  Canton  of  Elbe- 
court  in  the  Oise.  Of  its  eighteen  communes  eight  saw  one 
hundred  per  cent,  of  their  houses  utterly  wiped  out.  The 
proportion  runs  from  eighty  to  ninety-five  per  cent,  in 
seven  other  communes  and  there  are  only  three  where  it 
falls  below  eighty  per  cent.  Of  nine  hundred  communes  in 
the  Department  of  the  Aisne,  only  nineteen  are  untouched 
by  war.  In  many  regions  after  the  Armistice  it  was  pos- 
sible to  drive  thirty  or  forty  miles  without  coming  across  a 
single  house.  It  was  so  between  Soissons  and  Saint- 
Quentin  (sixty  kilometers) ;  between  Armentieres  and 
Peronne  (ninety-five  kilometers) ;  between  Soissons  and 
Laon  (forty  kilometers).  "The  results  of  war,"  hypocriti- 
cally moans  the  beaten  foe.  No,  this  is  not  true,  and  take 
as  a  single  instance  the  Pas-de-Calais,  where  only  two  dis- 
tricts were  ruined  by  war  but  all  the  territory  behind  the 
lines  occupied  by  the  enemy  suffered  equally. 

So  much  for  the  ruin  directly  due  to  Germany.  Heavy 
as  it  is,  it  is  not  the  only  burden  borne  by  France  as  a 
result  of  the  war.  All  our  economic  means  have  suffered. 
Not  one  of  our  resources  is  whole.  Our  railways,  which  for 
nearly  five  years  carried  all  the  Annies  of  the  Allies,  were 
worn  out  by  the  strain  and  showed  in  1920  a  deficit  of 
2,400  millions.  Our  merchant  marine,  which  amounted  to 
three  million  tons  before  the  war,  lost  a  million  tons  by 
submarine  warfare  and  they  could  not  be  replaced  as  all 
through  the  war  our  naval  yards  were  busy  producing 
artillery  for  all  our  Allies.  Two- thirds  of  our  investment 
in  foreign  countries,  which  represented  37,000  millions  in 
1914,  became  unproductive.  Our  exports,  less  by  1,500  mil- 
lions in  1914  than  our  imports,  show  a  deficit  of  21,000 
millions  in  1919.  The  pound  sterling  in  1920  has  main- 
tained its  up  level  at  about  fifty  francs  and  the  dollar  at 
about  fifteen.  France,  at  the  very  moment  when  the  great 
field  of  reconstruction  opened  before  her,  was  in  the  situa- 
tion of  a  wounded  man  who  has  lost  so  much  blood  that  he 
can  scarcely  move  his  limbs  and  can  scarcely  raise  himself. 

France,  convalescent  France,  summoned  all  the  forces 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE         385 

of  her  will,  and  already  results  show  what  energy  is  hers. 
She  is  still  indeed  far  from  recovered  and  if  she  is  to  con- 
tinue as  during  the  two  years  which  have  followed  the 
Armistice,  without  execution  of  Treaty  by  Germany,  with- 
out efficacious  aid  from  her  Allies,  I  shudder  to  think  of 
the  number  of  years  it  will  take  her  to  recover.  And  yet 
without  undue  national  pride,  I  have  the  right  to  say  that 
France  may  justly  be  proud  of  what  she  has  already  done. 

Reconstruction  of  the  devastated  regions  began  without 
delay  and  has  been  carried  on  with  method.  To  under- 
stand the  extraordinary  problem  it  presented,  one  must 
have  seen  and  have  felt  it  on  the  ground  itself.  Not  a 
shelter,  not  an  ordinary  means  of  communication,  not  even 
a  soil  that  could  be  cultivated — everything  upheaved, 
pounded,  ruined,  killed,  by  four  and  a  half  years  of  destruc- 
tion. The  pioneer  who  comes  into  a  new  land  can  set  to 
work  to  plow  and  to  sow.  The  grain  will  grow.  On  the 
battlefields  it  is  first  necessary  to  remove  projectiles, 
uproot  wires,  fill  in  shell-holes,  level  the  ground.  Where 
was  a  start  to  be  made?  Men,  women  and  children  rushed 
back  to  their  recovered  villages.  But  of  these  villages  not 
one  stone  was  left  standing  on  another.  Where  were  people 
to  be  housed?  Houses  or  no  houses,  they  stayed.  How 
were  they  to  be  fed?  How  were  they  to  be  given  tools? 
They  answered  the  call  of  the  soil  and  as  clearing  up  began 
they  tried  to  cultivate.  How  were  live  stock  and  seed  to  be 
moved  ?  Where  were  they  to  be  put  ?  The  French  peasant 
solved  the  problem  instinctively,  for  he  thought  of  the  land 
before  he  thought  of  himself  and  though  he  lacked  labour, 
horses,  everything  in  fact — even  a  roof  over  his  head — he 
reaped,  even  in  1919,  a  harvest  from  the  battlefield.  Mean- 
while with  the  energetic  cooperation  of  the  Government, 
mines  and  factories  were  repaired  and  in  less  than  eighteen 
months  after  the  Armistice,  the  features  of  resurrected 
France  begin  to  appear  on  the  zone  of  death. 

Here  again  constructive  effort  must,  like  the  work  of 
destruction,  be  studied  region  by  region.  The  accompany- 
ing tables  give  the  relative  percentages  of  restoration  to 
September  1,  192Qa 


386  THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NORD 

Trenches  filled  up M3  11,300,000  =  94% 

Barbed  wire  removed M2  9,000,000  =  90% 

Land  cleared  IvI3  3,000,000   =  75% 

Population    of    the    devastated    region 

(October,  1920)    1,843,265  =  98% 

Municipalities  functioning  457   =  81  % 

Schools  open   1,539  =  86% 

Houses  repaired 79,000 

Temporary  houses  erected 11,000 

Houses  definitely  rebuilt 18,000  =11.8% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  492,000   =  98% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  490,000  =  98% 

Arable  surface   cultivated Ha  242,000  =  90% 

Live  stock  returned 127,828  —  52% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  2,190  =  18% 
Factories   under   reconstruction   and   in 

partial   operation 2,927  =  24% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 6,697   =  56% 

Koads  rebuilt Km  5,813  =  74% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 818  =  78% 

Railway   lines    of    local    interest    recon- 
structed      Kra  159  =  29% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  PAS-DE-CALAIS 

Trenches  filled  in M3  58,147,800  =  79% 

Wire  removed M2  54,989,800  =  73% 

Localities  cleared M3  4,689,400  =  52% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 344,851  =  59% 

Municipalities  in  action 170  —  81% 

Schools  in  action 492  =  88% 


Houses  repaired 18,515)  _ 

Temporary  houses  erected 18,924^  ~ 


21% 


Houses  definitely  rebuilt 2,000  =  1.8% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha        249,000  =93% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha        233,600  —  83% 

Arable  surface  cultivated Ha          56,868  =41% 

Live  stock  returned 41,321  =  34% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  324  =  20% 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        387 

Factories   under    reconstruction   and   in 

partial   operation 255  =  16% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 981  =62% 

Boads  rebuilt Km  2,411  =  307o 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 30  =  22% 

Bailway   lines    of    local    interest    recon- 
structed       Km  48  .=  32% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  SOMME 

Trenches  filled  in M3  39,066,600  =  65% 

Wire  removed M2  16,076,000  =  73% 

Localities  cleared M8  1,909,500  =  42% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 120,294  =  42% 

Municipalities  in  action 381  =100% 

Schools  in  action 490  =  78% 

Houses  repaired 8,401" 


_  24% 

Temporary  houses  erected 6,048  ( 

Houses  definitely  rebuilt 1,647  =  2.7% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  365,900  =91% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  298,500  =  74% 

Arable  surface  cultivated Ha  127,000  =66% 

Live  stock  returned 31,886  =  22% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  267   =  24% 
Factories  under  construction  and  in  par- 
tial operation 501   =45% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 331   =30% 

Boads  rebuilt Km  2,820  =  39% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 10  =     5% 

Bailway    lines    of    local   interest    recon- 
structed       Km  78  =  35% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OISE 

Trenches  filled  in M3  13,558,300  =  90% 

Wire  removed M2  14,601,600  =  91% 

Localities  cleared M3  1,081,300  =  54% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 88,917  =  78% 

Municipalities  in  action 201   =100% 

Schools  in   action 195   =  75% 

Houses  repaired 10,025)        _1  ^ 

Temporary  houses  erected ,  2,757 


388     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Houses  definitely  rebuilt 798  =  3.2% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  124,150   =13% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  116,280  =66% 

Arable  surface   cultivated Ha  80,468  =  74% 

Live  stock  returned 56,466  =  72% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  88   =  31% 
Factories  under  construction  and  in  par- 
tial operation 137  =49% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 58   =  20% 

Roads  rebuilt Km  1,263  =  46% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 26  =  17% 

Railway   lines   of   local    interest    recon- 
structed       Km  41   =  67% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  AISNE 

Trenches  filled  in M3  23,300,000  =  64% 

Wire  removed M2  26,200,000  —  65% 

Localities  cleared M3  2,600,000  =52% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 290,000  =  54% 

Municipalities  in  action ;  214  =  33% 

Schools  in   action 1,107  =  90% 

Houses  repaired 40,620] 


Temporary  houses  erected 12,582  C  ~ 

Houses  definitely  rebuilt 0  =     0% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  592,000  =81% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  555,000  =76% 

Arable   surface  cultivated Ha  325,000  =  54% 

Live  stock  returned 43,368  =  16% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  232  =11% 
Factories  under  construction  and  in  par- 
tial operation 253  =  12% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 1,481  =75% 

Roads  rebuilt Km  4,978  =  77% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 367  =48% 

Railway   lines    of   local   interest    recon- 
structed      Km  68  =  11% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MARNE 

Trenches  filled  in M3  23,177,000  =  79% 

Wire  removed ........... M2  41,253,300  =  95% 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE         389 

Localities  cleared M3  1,458,600  =  26% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 232,000  =  69% 

Municipalities  in  action 551   =  98% 

Schools  in  action 348  =  81% 

Houses  repaired 16,356 

Temporary  houses  erected 4,363 

Houses  definitely  rebuilt 825  =  1.6% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  246,740  =  84% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  214,700  =  70% 

Arable  surface   cultivated Ha  68,118  =  49% 

Live  stock  returned 18,989   =  16% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  96   =  10% 
Factories  under  construction  and  in  par- 
tial operation 420  =  46% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 397   =  43% 

Koads  rebuilt Km  3,041   =  49% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 25   =  18% 

Railway    lines    of    local    interest    recon- 
structed       Km  17  =     8% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARDENNES 

Trenches  filled  in M3  4,897,000  =  22% 

Wire  removed M2  12,353,300  =  77% 

Localities  cleared M3  3,575,700  =  51% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 204,104  =  69% 

Municipalities  in  action 503   =100% 

Schools  in   action 782  =  99% 

Houses  repaired 29,132)  __     r(y 

Temporary  houses  erected 4,236  ( 

Houses  definitely   rebuilt 3,016  =  12.2% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  480,720  =91% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  433,390  =82% 

Arable   surface  cultivated Ha  90,000  =72% 

Live  stock  returned 53,455  =  28% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation  396   =  25% 
Factories   under   reconstruction    and   in 

partial   operation 798   =  53% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 334  =21% 

Roads  rebuilt Km  1,373   =  46% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 332   =55% 


390    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Railway   lines   of   local   interest   recon- 
structed     Km  30  =     8% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MEUSE 

Trenches  filled  in M3     4,348,900  =28% 

Wire  removed M2   23,645,700  =  84% 

Localities  cleared M8     1,897,700  =  94% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 98,000  =  54% 

Municipalities  in  action 310  —100% 

Schools  in  action 486  =  93% 

Houses  repaired 8,738  \ 


Temporary  houses  erected 4,750  ( 

Houses  definitely  rebuilt 1,112  =     3% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha        264,800  =82% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha        264,800  =  82% 

Arable  surface  cultivated Ha          69,200  =40% 

Live  stock  returned 29,710  =  31% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation, 
composing  one  sector  with  Meurthe-et- 

Moselle  and  Vosges,  giving  total  of 224  =  16% 

Factories  under  construction  and  in  par- 
tial operation .      245  =  17% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 907  =65% 

Eoads  rebuilt Km            2,688  =  55% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 70  =  74% 

Railway   lines   of   local   interest   recon- 
structed     K1^                43  =  34% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  TEE  MEURTEE-ET-MOSELLE 

Trenches  filled  in M3   10,643,300  =  95% 

Wire  removed M2    32,175,400  =  58% 

Localities  cleared M3     1,900,700  =  95% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 314,902  =  74% 

Municipalities  in  action 132  =  43% 

Schools  in   action 386  =  97% 

Houses  repaired 7,743)  _      ._„ 

Temporary  houses  erected 4,363  ( 

Houses  definitely   rebuilt 3,995  =  14% 


EECONSTEUCTION  AND  THE  FUTUEE         391 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha  400,500  =  84% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha  400,500  =  84% 

Arable  surface  cultivated Ha  135,750  =  73% 

Live  stock  returned 37,245  =  41% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation, 
forming  only  one  district  with  Meuse 

and  Vosges,  giving  a  total  of 224  =  16% 

Factories  under  construction  and  in  par- 
tial operation 245  =  17% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 907  =65% 

Koads  rebuilt Km  2,867  =  60% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 17  =  30% 

Railway    lines    of   local    interest    recon- 
structed      Km  92  =  82% 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  VOSGES 

Trenches  fiUed  in M3  1,612,100  =  40% 

Wire  removed M2  4,379,900  =  62% 

Localities  cleared M3  372,000  =  37% 

Population  of  the  devastated  zone  (Octo- 
ber,  1920) 68,901  =  84% 

Municipalities  in  action 73  =100% 

Schools  in  action 126  =  96% 


Houses  repaired 3,149)  _ 

Temporary  houses  erected 225V  ~ 


61% 


Houses  definitely  rebuilt 1,321  =  17% 

Total  surface  cleared  of  projectiles Ha          85,440  =  74% 

Total  surface  levelled Ha          70,290  =  58% 

Arable  surface  cultivated Ha            3,300  =73% 

Live  stock  returned 4,343  =  11% 

Factories  reconstructed  and  in  operation, 

forming      only      one      district      with 

Meurthe-et-Moselle  and  Meuse  giving 

a  total  of 224  =  16% 

Factories   under   reconstruction    and   in 

partial   operation 245  =  17% 

Factories  not  yet  operating 907  =65% 

Roads  rebuilt Km               367  =  15% 

Public  works  rebuilt  on  roads 36  =100% 

Railway    lines    of   local    interest    recon- 
structed     Km                   4  =  20% 


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Population  of  the  dovastal 
»one  (October,  1920)  .  . 

d 

o 

1 

ja 

I 
.2 
^ 

£chools  in  action  

Temporary  houses  erected 

Houses  definitively  rebu 

Total  surface,  cleared 
projectile*  , 

Total  surface  levelled.  •  • 

Arable  surface  cultivated 

1 

i 

g 

•J 

Factories  reconstructed  s 
in  operation  

Factories  under  construct 
and  iu  partial  opcratiol 

'd 

1 

| 

8 

o 

i  ??  11  Ii  u  i 

2      a.51    "»§     ^2      "-     2 

1         „     Z-     7.1      >:5     2 
.     ^1      «S      «^     .2  *     3 

RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        393 

This  effort,  improvised  as  our  troops  advanced,  was 
carried  on  by  the  State  with  the  aid  of  private  assistance 
as  soon  as  the  ground  was  freed.  The  Government  services 
were  powerfully  organized.  On  January  1,  1920,  there 
were  195,000  on  their  payroll,  including  15,000  technical 
employees  and  180,000  labourers.  Transportation  by  them 
within  the  devastated  regions  represents  eleven  million 
kilometric  tons  per  month.  The  cost  to  October  1,  1920, 
amounting  to  about  20,500  millions,  divided  as  follows: 

Reparation  in  money  and  in  kind  for  damages.  .11,715,000,000  frs. 

Relief  for  refugees 1,015,000,000     " 

Labour  and  transportation  for  State  account. . .  3,915,000,000    " 
Restoration    of    railways,    roads,    canals,    tele- 
graphic lines,  reorganization  of  public  services  3,400,000,000    " 
Cost  of   administration 375,000,000    " 


20,420,000,000    " 

These  20,420  millions  were  supplied  by  the  French 
Treasury  alone.  The  German  Press,  which  might  show  a 
more  becoming  reserve,  has  never  ceased  to  denounce  the 
bad  organization  of  the  reconstruction  services,  squander- 
ing of  public  funds — excess  of  officials,  etc.  For  political 
reasons  a  certain  number  of  French  newspapers  have 
echoed  this  criticism.  It  is  therefore  interesting  to  note 
that  of  the  20,420  millions  spent  up  to  October  1,  1920,  by 
the  French  Government,  salaries  of  officials  have  only 
amounted  to  375  millions,  or  one  and  eight-tenths  per 
cent,  of  the  total.  If,  in  work  of  this  magnitude,  delays, 
imperfections  and  even  mistakes  are  inevitable,  the  fact 
remains  that  the  results  already  attained  are  more  than 
could  have  been  expected. 

The  above  tables  call  for  no  comment  in  this  respect.  I 
would  add  to  them  the  following  facts.  Agriculture,  which 
in  money  and  in  kind  received  3,500,000,000  francs  in  cash, 
loans  and  advances,  produced  in  1919  five  million  hundred- 
weights of  cereals.  In  1920,  the  cereal  production  of  the 
devastated  regions  was  11,500,000  hundredweights,  against 


394    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

20,500,000  in  1913,  or  fifty-six  per  cent,  of  the  pre-war  crop. 
The  1920  crop  was  sufficient  to  assure  the  bread  supply 
for  the  entire  population  of  the  ten  devastated  depart- 
ments. We  are  justified  in  the  expectation  that  with  few 
exceptions  the  whole  of  the  battlefields  will  be  under  culti- 
vation in  1921. 

There  were  in  1914,  in  the  regions  affected  by  the  war, 
20,539  industrial  plants  of  all  kinds.  The  Ministry  for  the 
Liberated  Regions  made  a  thorough  inquiry  into  4,190  of 
these  establishments  selected  from  those  employing  in  1914 
more  than  twenty  workmen.  This  investigation  gave  very 
interesting  results,  the  meaning  of  which  should  be  made 
clear.  The  figures  given  below  and  the  percentages  relat- 
ing thereto  do  not  refer  to  the  total  number  of  factories 
ruined  by  the  war,  but  only  to  one-fifth  of  them  (4,190  out 
of  20,539.)  In  other  words,  they  are  of  value  as  a  partial 
indication — not  as  a  complete  result.  They  express  propor- 
tions which — while  absolutely  correct  for  the  4,190  estab- 
lishments visited — may  well  be  correct  for  the  other  16,000, 
but  which  nevertheless  as  regards  the  latter  may  differ 
widely.  Subject  to  this  reservation  which  I  ask  the  reader 
to  bear  in  mind,  here  are  the  results  of  the  investigation : 

Out  of  these  4,190  establishments,  which  employed  over 
twenty  people  in  1914,  3,210  or  seventy-six  and  six-tenths 
per  cent,  have  resumed  operations  either  entirely  or  in 
part  as  follows: 

W  Illy      JLj      -Ll/-Lt7.  .  .  •  •  .  .««[<«•  •[.:...[.:•:.:.:.  .1.  .         I  UO 

October  1,  1919 »«....»:«...:««««..  1,278 

January  1,  1920........  ,„...:...;.....:..  1,806 

April  1,  1920 ,.,„....  2,412 

July  1,  1920 3,004 

August  1,  1920 3,106 

September  1,  1920 3,210 

These  4,190  establishments  employed  768,678  workmen 
in  1914;  on  September  1,  1920,  they  employed  366,930,  or 
forty-seven  and  seven-tenths  per  cent. 

The  comparative  percentages  of  reoperation  and  reem- 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        395 

ployment  in  the  ten  departments  based  upon  the  4,190 
plants  is  shown  by  the  following  table: 

Percentage  Applying  to  the  4,190  Factories  Investigated. 

Departments  Reopening    Returned  Employees 

Nord     81.7  52.2 

Pas-de-Calais 73.7  18.3 

Somme    58.9  37.8 

Oise     88.1  43.9 

Aisne    60.7  20.9 

Marne     72.5  32.3 

Ardennes    83.4  43.2 

Meuse     67.6     .  33.2 

Meurthe-et-Moselle     82.06  48.9 

Vosges 74.2  61.5 

Average    74.2  39.2 

If  we  apply  this  same  method  of  analysis  to  the  other 
departments  of  industry,  the  following  percentage  will  be 
established : 

Percentage  Applying  to  the  4,190  Factories  Investigated. 

Industries  Reopening    Returned  Employee* 

Mines  and  ore 76.4  21.9 

Quarries     82.6  53.6 

Food  supplies  59.04  23.7 

Chemical    industries   75.9  53.04 

India  rubber  paper 73.3  53.5 

Wool     83.3  53.1 

Textiles    69.1  49.6 

Materials    86.2  57.5 

Feathers  and  horsehair 100.  40.2 

Leather  and   skins 83.3  51.7 

Wood    83.9  41.5 

Metal    manufactures  72.5  35.6 

Ordinary  metals 86.7  48. 

Precious   metals  100.  51.2 

Cut  stone  for  building 73.9  59.1 

Earthworks   and   constructions..   92.5  47.3 

Brickyards     80.4  47.7 

Average    81.1  45.7 


396    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

The  share  of  certain  regions  in  these  statistics  deserves 
special  mention.  Thus  in  the  district  of  Lille,  which  heads 
the  list,  the  percentage  of  reoperation  of  factories  investi- 
gated is  eighty-six  and  two-tenths  per  cent.,  of  the 
reemployment  sixty-two  per  cent.  If  in  this  district  a 
special  table  be  drawn  up  for  the  textile  industry,  an  excep- 
tionally favourable  percentage  of  reoperation  calculated 
on  the  same  basis  will  be  found. 

Personnel  employed  in  the  textile  industry  of  Lille  in  the  plants 
under  investigation : 

Woolen    industry 93.8% 

Cotton   industry 78.8% 

Dyeing  and  preparation 65.1% 

At  Tourcoing,  fifty-five  factories  out  of  fifty-seven  are 
in  operation;  at  Roubaix,  forty-six  out  of  forty-eight.  At 
Tourcoing,  ninety-one  and  nine-tenths  per  cent,  of  the 
workers  have  been  reemployed ;  at  Roubaix  ninety-nine  and 
nine-tenths  per  cent.  In  the  metal  industries  results  are 
not  so  good  owing  to  coal  shortage.  The  percentage  of 
reoperation  for  investigated  factories  is  seventy-two  and 
five-tenths  per  cent. ;  of  reemployment  only  thirty-five  and 
six-tenths  per  cent. 

These  results  must  be  made  known  to  our  friends.  It 
is  the  only  answer  we  care  to  make  to  those  who  accuse 
France  of  sleeping  on  her  victory.  But  it  is  essential  that 
the  enormous  amount  that  still  remains  to  be  done  should 
also  be  made  quite  clear.  The  approximate  total  cost  of 
reconstruction  of  damages  is  143,000  millions,*  of  which  the 
chief  items  are  the  following: 

Eeal   estate 72,738  millions 

Agriculture    16,419  millions 

Industry    34,000  millions 

The  French  Government  alone  has  already  spent  20,500 
millions.  The  difference  of  120,000  millions  in  round  fig- 


*Plus  the  pensions,  i.  e.  58  billions. 


KECONSTBUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE         397 

tires,  indicates  what  remains  to  be  done  as  opposed  to  what 
has  already  been  accomplished.  If  Germany  were  not 
compelled  by  France  and  her  Allies — all  her  Allies — to  pay 
what  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  demands  of  her,  this  would 
beyond  a  doubt  mean  our  country's  living  for  half  a  century 
under  the  weight  of  an  intolerable  burden. 

The  population  of  the  devastated  region  in  October, 
1920,  was  seventy-seven  per  cent,  of  the  1914  population. 
France  has,  by  her  own  efforts,  placed  under  cultivation 
sixty-eight  per  cent,  of  the  arable  lands  in  these  regions. 
She  has  rebuilt  all  her  most  important  railways  and  fifty- 
two  per  cent,  of  her  roads.  But  she  has  only  been  able  to 
restore  to  the  farmers  thirty-two  per  cent,  of  the  live  stock 
stolen  by  Germany.  She  has  only  been  able  to  reoperate 
in  factories  to  the  extent  of  eighteen  per  cent  in  full, 
twenty-six  per  cent,  in  part ;  this  leaves  fifty-four  per  cent, 
of  her  factories  not  yet  in  operation.  Furthermore  she  has 
been  able  to  replace  destroyed  houses  by  temporary  con- 
structions and  repairs  only  to  the  extent  of  forty-nine  per 
cent.  Complete  reconstruction  of  buildings  has  only  been 
effected  to  an  extent  of  ten  and  seven-tenths  per  cent.  And 
this  very  low  percentage  expresses  in  striking  fashion  the 
limitations  imposed  by  lack  of  money! 

Living  conditions  in  houses  hastily  rebuilt  and  in  tem- 
porary barracks  are  appalling  in  some  districts.  Eeculti- 
vation — in  the  absence  of  that  slow  and  age-old  upgrowth 
which  had  carried  its  yield  to  the  maximum — meets  with 
countless  difficulties  and  the  crops  suffer.  Industries — 
except  in  the  important  northern  centers — have  only  had 
very  limited  means  with  which  to  start  again;  and  their 
productive  capacity  will  for  months  to  come  represent  only 
a  very  small  portion  of  pre-war  output.  I  would  add  that 
in  many  communes  the  moral  situation  is  affected  by  the 
material  conditions.  Health  has  an  influence  upon  charac- 
ter. The  promiscuity  of  improvised  living  conditions  has 
a  bad  effect  on  children,  which  further  aggravates  the  con- 
sequences of  invasion  and  enemy  occupation.  Whatever 
one  may  try  to  do  to  better  it,  this  environment  is  favour- 


398    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

able  to  physical  and  mental  deviations.  If  this  state  of 
things  were  to  continue,  it  would  be  in  every  way  dangerous. 
Yet  it  will  last  until  Germany  pays  what  she  owes.  Then 
and  only  then  will  France  cease  to  bear  alone  the  burden 
of  reparation  for  German  crimes. 

Let  me  sum  up.  The  France  of  the  devastated  regions 
and  the  other  France  behind  the  lines  have  put  forward- 
alone  and  unaided — an  immense  effort  of  reconstruction. 
Farmers  have  tilled  their  fields  and  work  has  been  started 
again  without  waiting  to  build  a  roof  over  their  heads.  All 
honour  to  them !  But  such  a  condition  cannot  last. 

II 

To  restore  the  ruins  was  our  first  duty,  it  was  not 
our  only  one.  I  have  shown  that  the  war  had  worn  out 
the  national  tools  of  France.  These  have  to  be  replaced. 
Reconstruction  costs  thousands  of  millions.  To  make  it  suc- 
cessful— possible  even — all  the  resources  of  the  country 
necessary  to  it — finances,  transport,  commerce — must  be 
renovated  and  revived.  Our  means  are  reduced,  our  bur- 
dens are  heavy;  yet  national  reorganization  cannot  wait. 

France  has  courageously  begun  financial  reorganiza- 
tion. I  insist  upon  this  because  of  the  criticism  so  often 
heard  in  America  and  elsewhere:  "You  have  military 
courage,  but  you  lack  fiscal  courage.  You  gave  your  all  on 
the  battlefield,  but  you  are  unwilling  to  submit  to  taxa- 
tion." That  this  criticism  is  justified  for  the  first  two 
years  of  the  war  I  admit,  yet  invasion  represented  for 
France  a  burden  equal  or  greater  to  the  excess  taxes  that 
other  uninvaded  countries  imposed  upon  themselves.  And 
it  was  believed  that  the  war  would  be  brief.  How  many 
errors  military  as  well  as  financial  resulted  from  this  fun- 
damental illusion.  At  least  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
France  was  not  slow  to  readjust  herself.  During  the  last 
year  of  peace,  she  had  paid  less  than  5,000  million  francs 
in  taxes.  In  1919  she  paid  more  than  9,000  millions.  In  1920 
thanks  to  new  taxes  introduced  by  the  Clemenceau  Cabi- 


EECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE         399 

net  and  voted  under  the  Millerand  Cabinet,  she  paid  22,000 
millions.  This  enormous  increase  is  quite  unprecedented. 
Remember  the  conditions  under  which  it  has  been  achieved 
and  you  will  better  understand  what  it  means.  The  France 
of  1914,  which  paid  less  than  5,000  millions  in  taxes,  had 
all  her  resources  untouched  of  which  the  ten  departments 
now  devastated  represented  nearly  one-fifth.  The  France 
of  1920,  which  paid  22,000  millions,  cannot  count  upon 
revenues  from  the  war  zone.  This  means  that  the  seventy- 
six  untouched  departments  with  their  capacity  very  con- 
siderably limited  by  shortages  of  fuel,  labour  and  trans- 
portation and  by  the  unfavourable  exchange,  will  have  to 
bear  the  whole  burden,  paying  in  1920  five  times  more  than 
in  1914. 

France  faced  the  situation  boldly  and  made  the  effort 
that  was  needed  to  place  her  finances  on  a  sound  basis. 
Her  budget  is  balanced,  permanent  expenditures  being 
henceforth  covered  by  equally  permanent  revenues.  The 
rest  of  our  expenditures  for  1920  are  exceptional,  partly 
on  account  of  war  liquidation  properly  met  by  loans,  partly 
on  account  of  reparations  which  in  equity  and  by  law  of 
victory  are  justly  chargeable  to  Germany.  It  is  scanda- 
lously unfair  that  these  last  should  still  burden  France, 

France's  debt  on  October  1, 1920,  consists  of: 

Consolidated  debt   (nominal  value) 113,250  millions 

Floating    debt 82,500        " 

Foreign  debt  (normal  rate  of  exchange) 34,125        " 


229,875  millions 

If  Germany  in  defiance  of  justice  and  right  does  not 
fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  Treaty  and  pay  what  she  owes, 
France,  in  order  to  continue  reconstruction  in  the  devastat- 
ed regions  and  to  pay  the  pensions  in  full,  would  be 
obliged  to  borrow  about  170,000  millions  the  interest  on 
which  would  represent  9,500  millions  or  an  increase  in  tax- 
ation of  250  francs  per  head  of  her  population  over  and 
above  the  416  francs  now  levied  by  the  National  Govern- 


400    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

ment  which  of  course  does  not  include  the  taxes  raised  by 
the  departments  and  communes.  These  figures  should  be 
borne  in  mind  by  our  Allies.  They  throw  light  on  how 
Frenchmen  (no  matter  what  their  party)  feel  when  they 
say  that  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  must  be  enforced  to  the 
full. 

On  its  enforcement  our  industrial  revival  largely 
depends,  for  we  lack  coal  and  under  the  Treaty  it  is  Ger- 
many who  must  deliver  it.  Here  again  it  is  the  attacked  and 
victorious  country  that  suffers  while  the  beaten  aggressor 
goes  free.  In  1920  Germany  had  sixty-five  per  cent,  of  her 
blast  furnaces  working.  France  had  forty  per  cent,  of  hers. 
Yet  Germany  planned  and  carried  out  the  destruction  of 
the  mines  which  supplied  us  annually  with  22  million  tons 
of  coal — a  quarter  of  the  total  French  production.  Ger- 
many under  the  Treaty  was  to  deliver  to  France  during 
the  seven  years  following  its  coming  into  force  2,200,000 
tons  per  month,  something  less  than  one-tenth  of  her  1913 
output.  At  Spa  in  July,  1920,  she  obtained  the  reduction  of 
this  monthly  figure  to  1,500,000  tons.  This  obliges  France — 
even  if  the  1,500,000  tons  be  delivered  regularly — to  import 
30,000,000  tons  a  year.  It  is  only  with  great  difficulty — and 
at  what  a  price — that  England  supplies  us  with  10,000,000 
tons.  So  20,000,000  tons  must  be  procured  elsewhere.  The 
rigorous  enforcement  of  the  Treaty  would  lessen  these 
forced  imports  by  8,400,000  tons.  The  security  of  French 
industry  really  depends  upon  such  enforcement.  If  it  is 
not  insisted  upon,  our  factories  will  continue  to  run  on  half 
time;  our  output  will  remain  low;  our  exports  will  not 
increase ;  our  exchange  will  keep  on  falling. 

If  the  Treaty  is  not  enforced  as  justice  demands  that 
it  be,  dark  years  await  us.  But  if  it  is  enforced,  we  can 
confidently  look  forward  to  the  brightest  future.  France 
has  in  her  soil  prodigious  potentialities  of  wealth.  Prop- 
erly cultivated  with  the  means  supplied  by  victory  it 
could  not  only  feed  her  people,  but  furnish  exports  also. 
Our  crops  fell  off  during  the  war.  Already  they  are  increas- 
ing again  and  we  have  the  wherewithal  to  grow  them  greater 


EECONSTEUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        401 

than  ever.  Since  we  have  ceased  to  manufacture  artillery, 
we  can  devote  to  agriculture  the  nitrogenized  fertilizer  it 
has  lacked  since  1914.  Besides  we  now  have  the  potash  of 
Alsace.  Equal  in  tonnage  to  the  German  deposits  there  is 
enough  potash  in  Alsace  to  supply  the  whole  world.  It  will 
permit  France  before  long  to  increase  her  crops  from  the 
eighty  million  cwts.  of  pre-war  days  to  125  million  cwts. 
and  to  sell  abroad  the  wheat  she  is  buying  from  foreign 
nations.  Our  colonies  too  will  share  in  this  prosperity. 
Morocco  alone  sent  us  100,000  cwts.  of  corn  in  1915  and 
235,000  the  following  year.  All  Northern  Africa  is  one  vast 
grain  field.  If  here  as  at  home  fundamental  improvements 
and  scientific  methods  are  introduced,  then  France,  seller 
of  corn,  will  build  up  economic  independence  upon  the 
soundest  of  bases. 

This  independence  in  industrial  activity  has  a  further 
certain  guarantee  in  the  very  clauses  of  the  peace.  Alsace- 
Lorraine  doubles  our  potential  production  in  ore  and  pig 
iron.  One  of  the  reasons  of  German  aggression  was  the 
greed  of  the  manufacturers  across  the  Rhine  who  lusted  for 
the  iron  ore  of  our  Briey  Basin.  Victory  leaves  us  Briey  and 
gives  us  back  the  basin  of  Lorraine  which  is  its  comple- 
ment. So  we  are  masters  of  the  situation.  For  twenty  years 
our  metallurgists  have  shown  that  they  can  face  difficult 
conditions  with  both  science  and  daring.  Thanks  to  them, 
our  production  from  1903  to  1913  showed  an  increase  of 
eighty-seven  per  cent,  for  pig  iron;  of  152  per  cent,  for 
steel  ingots  and  130  per  cent,  for  steel  plates.  During  the 
same  period  France  came  second  in  the  world  develop- 
ment of  the  steel  industry  with  an  advance  of  152  per  cent, 
against  154  per  cent,  in  Belgium,  118  per  cent,  in  Germany, 
115  per  cent,  in  the  United  States.  To-day  we  rank  second 
among  the  ore  nations  of  the  world.  The  most  splendid 
results  are  certain  on  two  conditions.  The  first  I  repeat  is 
that  Germany  deliver  the  coal  she  owes  us  and,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  we  are  freed  from  the 
pre-war  extortion  practised  upon  us  by  Westphalian  coal 
dealers  whose  interests  were  the  same  as  those  of  our  Essen 


402     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

competitors.  The  second  is  that  by  efficient  organization 
we  secure  the  foreign  markets  monopolized  by  Germany  in 
the  past.  These  conditions  are  both  feasible. 

Thus  favoured  by  exceptional  mineral  wealth,  French 
industry  possesses  other  valuable  industrial  resources.  I 
merely  mention  in  passing  bauxite  and  nickel  and  come  at 
once  to  the  most  important  of  all  our  future  assets — our 
water-power  which  at  average  flow  represents  eight  million 
horse-power.  By  the  end  of  1921  we  shall  have  developed 
twice  our  pre-war  horse-power.  By  continuing  this  de- 
velopment and  by  utilizing  all  power  of  the  Rhone  and  the 
Rhine;  by  electrifying  our  railways,  we  shall  be  able  to 
save  many  millions  of  tons  of  coal  every  year  and  free 
ourselves  from  a  heavy  bondage.  Such  an  economic  policy 
calls  for  the  whole-hearted  cooperation  of  our  great 
industries  and  associations  of  manufacturers,  not  only  of 
those  providing  similar  goods  but  of  those  making  comple- 
mentary articles  as  well.  It  calls  for  that  centralization 
which  Germany  so  splendidly  achieved  and  which  Helf- 
ferich  called  in  1913,  "the  systematic  cooperation  of  the 
great  masses."  Everything  permits  the  hope  that  equally 
efficient  organization  will  in  less  than  twenty  years  place 
us  in  the  front  ranks  of  the  exporting  countries. 

Our  friends  across  the  seas  must  not  forget  that  the 
unlimited  resources  of  our  colonial  empire  are  also  avail- 
able to  increase  the  wealth  of  our  metropolis.  Western  and 
Northern  Africa  will  furnish  cereals,  fruits,  vegetables 
and  meat  in  abundance.  Tonkin  possesses  coal,  zinc,  lead, 
tin  and  antimony.  Madagascar  has  graphite;  New  Cale- 
donia nickel;  Guiana,  gold;  East  Africa,  ore  and  copper. 
The  equatorial  forests  of  the  Congo  and  the  Cameroons 
harbour  in  their  140,000  square  kilometers  vast  quanti- 
ties of  rare  wood  and  essential  oils.  Indo-China  can 
export  rice,  jute  and  hemp.  Every  year  100,000  acres  of 
land  are  placed  under  new  cultivation.  Among  French 
ports,  Saigon  ranks  immediately  after  Bordeaux.  In  1920 
the  foreign  commerce  of  Indo-China  attained  4,000  million 
francs.  Doubtless  just  before  the  war  our  colonial  com- 


EECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        403 

merce  had  not  yet  reached  its  full  expansion.  Our  colonial 
produce  amounted  to  only  ten  per  cent,  of  our  total 
imports;  but  the  hard  years  of  war  have  strengthened  the 
virtue  of  initiative  in  the  French  business  world.  The 
moment  reconstruction  is  finished  and  the  enormous  sums 
it  now  absorbs  can  be  devoted  to  developing  new  enter- 
prises, the  colonial  Empire  of  France  will  assume  its 
rightful  place  among  the  producers  of  the  world. 

Our  railways,  not  satisfied  with  re-establishing  in  less 
than  a  year  the  main  trunk  lines  destroyed  by  war,  have 
completed  the  repair  of  their  locomotives  and  rolling  stock. 
Our  commercial  fleet,  very  inadequate  before  the  war  as 
it  amounted  only  to  5.20  per  cent,  of  the  world's  shipping, 
is  gradually  developing.  A  bank  has  been  created  with 
State  assistance  to  promote  foreign  trade.  Exports  in 
1920  already  show  an  appreciable  advance  over  those  in 
1919.  France — unless  she  is  allowed  to  be  crushed  beneath 
the  weight  of  the  burden  which  the  Peace  Treaty  justly 
imposed  upon  Germany — is  able  to  take  a  prominent  part 
in  that  intensive  production  which  Mr.  Herbert  C.  Hoover 
declared  in  1919  must  be  "the  first  and  fundamental  effort 
of  Europeans." 

Ill 

And  yet  another  reason  for  faith  in  the  future  of 
France :  the  virtues  of  her  race — virtues  that  showed  in  the 
war  and  are  just  as  clear  in  peace. 

I  know  full  well  that  it  is  not  always  the  best  that  strikes 
the  eye!  The  stranger  within  our  gates  sees  first  the  out- 
ward aspects  of  our  politics.  Here  as  elsewhere  they  too 
often  lack  elegance  and  grace.  I  know  full  well  for 
instance  the  harm  done  to  France  by  the  French  Parlia- 
ment when,  six  days  after  the  Treaty  came  into  force,  it 
drove  from  office  the  man  without  whom  the  war  would 
have  been  lost.  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  words  still  ring  in 
my  ears:  "It  is  Frenchmen  now  who  are  burning  Joan  of 
Arc."  I  still  have  before  my  eyes  the  scathing  comment 
of  the  American  Press.  On  January  17,  the  New  York 


404    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Times  said:  "The  representatives  of  the  French  people 
have  made  a  mistake  that  will  do  them  more  harm  than 
it  will  M.  Clemenceau;"  and  the  New  York  Herald: 
"Because  he  thought  only  of  the  good  of  the  State,  M. 
Clemenceau  incurred  political  hatreds  to  which  he  suc- 
cumbs." The  New  York  Post:  "In  his  unexpected  defeat 
M.  Clemenceau  remains  the  greatest  figure  of  the  war." 
The  New  York  World:  "The  old  Tiger  is  struck  down  at 
the  very  moment  when  France  would  have  added  to  her 
own  glory  by  calling  him  to  the  Presidency.  The  defeat 
of  Clemenceau  does  not  honour  France."  The  Philadel- 
phia Public  Ledger:  "All  the  reasons  given  will  not  excuse 
the  French  Parliament  for  having  acted  with  the  blackest 
ingratitude."  After  the  Eastern  Press  let  us  glance  at 
the  most  influential  local  papers.  The  Springfield  Repub- 
lican: "Americans  are  astonished."  The  Charleston 
Gazette:  "Clemenceau  did  not  need  to  be  president  to 
remain  immortal."  The  Cleveland  Plain  Dealer:  "Ameri- 
ica  refuses  to  admit  that  the  sentiments  which  animated 
the  Congress  of  Versailles  can  faithfully  reflect  the  opin- 
ion of  the  French  people.  Clemenceau 's  defeat  is  a  blot 
on  French  history."  The  Des  Moines  Capital:  "The 
defeat  of  the  old  Tiger  has  filled  most  Americans  with 
amazement."  The  Columbus  Despatch:  "The  Tiger's 
downfall  has  done  away  with  some  of  the  esteem  felt  for 
France."  Fair  enough  applied  to  the  few  hundred  men 
who  in  both  Chambers  gave  so  sad  a  display  of  ingratitude 
and  inability,  but  not  fair  to  the  country  as  a  whole  which 
sees  things  as  they  are.  The  parliamentary  system,  essen- 
tial safeguard  of  our  liberties,  has  its  weaknesses,  not  the 
least  of  which  is  the  premium  it  places  upon  mere  words. 
Our  political  world  counts  more  spell-binders  than  states- 
men. Some  of  these  orators  gave  the  full  measure  of  their 
inability  during  the  first  three  years  of  the  war.  To  save 
the  situation  it  was  necessary  to  scrap  them  and  to  seek 
a  man  of  another  generation,  a  man  of  another  kind, 
of  another  temperament  and  character,  a  man  who  in  less 
than  a  year  succeeded  in  squelching  treason  at  home,  ill 


BECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE        405 

creating  unity  of  command  at  the  front  and  in  bringing 
victory  to  our  banners.  This  work  done  and  well  done,  the 
angry  jealousy  of  those  the  Great  Old  Man  had  cast  aside, 
sounded  the  hour  of  revenge.  This  was  the  unsavoury 
and  dishonourable  work  of  a  lobby.  France  has  the  right 
to  expect  her  friends  not  to  judge  her  by  the  manoeuvres 
of  a  few  politicians  seeking  the  spoils  of  a  victory  they 
had  not  been  able  to  win. 

France  is  something  very  different.  France  is  first 
and  foremost  the  land  of  order  and  restraint.  A  few 
months  ago  in  the  early  part  of  1920,  Americans  arriving 
in  France  asked:  "What  about  Bolshevism?"  Fifteen 
days  spent  in  travel  along  French  roads  was  enough  to  con- 
vince them.  On  their  return  they  no  longer  asked  the 
question  and  one  of  them,  Judge  Gary,  president  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  coined  a  phrase  that 
will  endure:  "France  leads  the  world  because  she  leads 
in  order."  France  is  what  she  is  for  many  reasons,  the 
first  being  the  material  and  moral  health  of  her  peasant 
class.  In  Eussia  the  only  hold  the  Soviets  had  on  the 
peasants  was  the  promise  of  land.  Land !  The  French  pea- 
sant has  owned  it  for  more  than  a  century.  He  owns  it 
and  he  loves  it.  I  might  even  say  that  he  is  of  it.  No- 
where is  landed  property  more  thoroughly  divided  or  more 
equally  distributed  than  in  France.  Nowhere  has  this 
division  of  property  more  happily  contributed  to  the  for- 
mation of  national  character.  The  French  peasant  was 
the  vital  factor  of  our  victory.  He  forms  fifty  per  cent, 
of  our  population.  In  1916  he  supplied  over  sixty-five 
per  cent,  of  the  fighting  troops.  I  have  seen  him  at  work 
in  the  trenches  for  months  when  I  led  a  company  of  chas- 
seurs. His  physical  stamina  is  almost  without  limit;  his 
moral  stamina  is  equal  to  his  physical  endurance.  These 
peasants,  being  of  the  soil,  fought  for  their  soil  like  lions, — 
might  I  say  like  patient  lions  ?  They  gave  their  lives  with 
simple  faith  for  they  had  understood  that  the  future  of 
the  race  demanded  this  sacrifice.  Peace  won,  finds  them 
true  to  themselves,  ready  for  any  effort,  hardy  sons  of  toil. 


406     THE  TKUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

These  men,  who  proved  so  well  their  common  faith  and 
their  common  sacrifice,  are  extreme  individualists,  and 
this  individualism  is  the  very  basis  of  our  stability.  I 
know  that  this  is  a  trait  of  our  French  character  which 
British  and  Americans  often  fail  to  understand  and  to 
appreciate.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  hampers  somewhat 
the  rapidity  and  extent  of  our  economic  development.  But 
as  a  political  and  moral  safety  valve  it  is  unequalled.  If 
revolutionary  madness  was  able  to  make  headway  in  back- 
ward Eussia,  it  is  because  individualism  was  totally  lack- 
ing among  the  masses.  A  Russian  village  or  a  Russian 
factory  was  a  flock.  The  flock  followed  without  thinking. 
It  may  even  have  believed,  poor  docile  herd,  that  in  revo- 
lution it  would  find  happiness.  As  in  the  old  day,  even 
more  than  in  the  old  day,  it  moves  beneath  the  knout. 
Between  Plehve  and  Lenine  there  is  not  much  to  choose.  To 
such  an  appeal  the  men  of  our  French  fields  would  never 
respond.  They  would  remain  unmoved  for  they  have  a 
deep  sense  of  what  individual  effort  has  achieved  through 
the  centuries — for  they  know  what  long  and  patient  labour 
has  won  for  them.  The  French  peasant  is  distrustful  and 
hard  to  persuade,  he  has  no  faith  in  revolutionary  rhet- 
oric. His  own  experience  guards  him  against  the  illusions 
by  which  the  human  cattle  of  Russia  were  deceived.  He  has 
faith  in  the  conquests  of  brain  and  brawn,  protected  by 
laws  safeguarding  persons  and  property.  There  is  where 
he  looks  for  and  sees  possible  progress — and  not  in  com- 
munism— because  ordered  progress — material  and  moral — 
is  taught  him  by  the  story  of  his  own  life,  the  story  of  his 
family,  the  story  of  his  village.  He  knows  that  he  eats 
meat  oftener  than  his  grandfather,  and  that  he  is  better 
educated  and  wealthier  than  his  father — better  equipped 
against  the  surprises  of  nature  and  the  snares  of  men.  He 
knows  too  that  much  of  these  advantages  has  come  to  him 
as  a  result  of  the  general  progress  of  the  nation.  So  he 
is  patriotic  and  conservative  by  instinct  and  by  reason. 
He  willingly  shed  his  blood  in  a  war  of  self-defense.  He 
would  begin  again  to-morrow,  if  it  were  necessary,  because 


RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  FUTURE         407 

every  fiber  of  his  being  is  in  constant  communion  with 
the  voice  of  the  soil,  he  hears  the  great  call  for  common 
effort,  he  knows  that  the  strength  and  prosperity  of  the 
nation  are  essential  to  the  strong  and  prosperous  individ- 
ual he  feels  himself  to  be  and  is  determined  to  remain. 

The  industrial  worker  is  less  protected  than  the  peas- 
ant against  certain  poisons.  The  prisoner  of  his  factory 
during  working  hours,  badly  lodged,  exposed  to  the  temp- 
tations of  cities,  he  falls  an  easy  prey  in  all  countries  to 
the  poison  of  the  body  and  of  the  mind.  I  believe,  however, 
that  no  other  country  in  Europe  has  a  working  class  as 
wise  and  as  intelligent  as  ours.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  one  of  Germany's  most  cherished  hopes  was  the 
revolt  of  our  industrial  proletariat.  The  facts  gave  answer. 
All  workers  were  called  to  the  colours.  All  responded  to 
the  call.  Many  fell  at  Charleroi  and  on  the  Marne.  Later 
when  they  were  needed  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions 
they  were  called  back  to  the  factories.  There  they  worked 
with  a  will  and  the  figures  I  have  given*  tell  how 
great  the  effort  they  put  forth.  Not  a  strike,  not  a  disturb- 
ance, not  the  slightest  response  to  all  kinds  of  incitements 
some  of  which  had  their  origin  outside  of  France.  Peace 
came  and  with  it  a  general  relaxing  of  energies,  an  out- 
burst of  desires  prompted  by  the  belief  that  an  Armistice 
written  on  a  sheet  of  paper  could  transform  the  lot  of 
humanity.  Soviet  propaganda  developed.  With  what 
results?  On  May  1,  1919,  there  was  a  small  amount  of 
rioting  in  the  streets  of  Paris.  Read  the  list  of  arrests  and 
you  will  see  that  they  are  nearly  all  of  foreigners  brought 
from  all  over  the  world  by  the  great  upheaval  of  war,  but 
whose  abortive  violence  cannot  be  laid  to  the  French  nation. 
In  1920  there  was  a  railway  strike.  Only  a  minority  took 
part  in  it  and  after  a  few  weeks  the  extremists  who  had 
called  it  were  replaced  at  the  head  of  the  Federation  by 
moderate  unionists  whose  place  they  had  taken  on  the  eve 
of  the  movement.  A  little  later  in  September,  1920,  the 
Congress  of  the  General  Confederation  of  Labour,  at 


'See  Chapter  II,  pages  31-35. 


408     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Orleans,  supporting  a  policy  of  production  and  democratic 
reforms,  scored  a  victory  for  French  syndicalism  over  the 
champions  of  Muscovite  Sovietism  and  the  Third 
International. 

For  the  French  workman  as  well  as  the  French  peasant, 
though  perhaps  with  less  constancy  and  consciousness  and 
less  reflection,  displays  that  wealth  of  sound  sense  and  bal- 
ance which  is  the  soul  of  our  national  genius.  "Vive 
Lenine"  may  be  heard  in  a  public  meeting.  Lenine  will 
find  few  followers  in  our  midst,  for  we  are  neither  so  mis- 
erable nor  so  credulous.  An  old  farmer  of  my  district  once 
told  of  his  optimism  in  these  simple  and  lofty  words :  "Here 
we  have  faith,  for  both  soil  and  men  are  sound."  This  is 
true  of  all  of  France.  The  stranger  within  our  gates  may 
be  led  astray,  for  he  sees  mostly  the  scum  which  some  widely 
circulated  papers  (less  interested  in  truth  than  in  sensa- 
tion) show  him:  for  he  listens  to  parliamentary  debates 
which  the  absence  of  organized  leadership  too  often  lowers 
to  the  level  of  personal  disputes.  This  is  politics.  This 
is  not  France.  France  is  the  child  of  thirteen  who,  when  her 
father  left  for  the  Army,  made  and  sold  nearly  half  a  ton  of 
bread  a  day.  France  is  the  woman  who  drove  the  plough 
or  who  was  blacksmith,  carpenter  or  mason  or  who  made 
shells  as  664,000  of  them  did.  France  is  the  miners  of  the 
Pas-de-Calais  working  their  mines  under  shell  fire  in  the 
midst  of  battle,  falling  at  their  posts  but  in  one  year  pro- 
ducing at  Bruay  alone  four  million  tons.  That  was  the 
France  of  war-time.  And  the  France  of  peace  is  no  other. 
Her  qualities  are  the  same  now  as  they  were  then.  To  see 
the  rest  of  France,  you  must  have  vision.  France  is 
wounded,  but  her  wounds  are  healing.  France  is  a  land 
of  boundless  resources,  material  and  moral;  a  land  that 
loves  its  liberties,  and  respects  the  liberties  of  others;  a 
land  that  has  suffered,  but  is  determined  to  live;  a  land 
that  has  faith  in  the  future,  because  it  has  faith  in  its  work. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED 

THE  Treaty  of  Versailles  came  into  force  on  January 
10,  1920.  Since  then  the  Allied  Governments  have  on  sev- 
eral occasions  declared  their  common  determination  to 
enforce  it  absolutely.  I  reproduce  here  the  most  important 
of  these  declarations : 

1.  Ministerial  Statement  by  Millerand's  Cabinet    (January  22, 
1920}. 

2.  Speech  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  (March  25,  1920}  : 

My  right  honourable  friend,  Mr.  Asquith,  stated  that  the  time 
had  come  to  revise  the  terms  of  peace.  These  terms  need  no  revi- 
sion whatever First  of  all,  Germany  must  clearly  prove  that 

she  intends  to  carry  out  the  Treaty  to  the  full  limit  of  her  resources. 

3.  Resolution  passed  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  by  518 
votes  to  seventy  (March  27, 1920}  -. 

The  Chamber,  approving  the  statements  of  the  Government,  and 
relying  upon  them  to  secure,  in  agreement  with  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers,  the  strict  enforcement  of  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles 

4.  Declaration  of  the  Allied  Governments  at  San  Remo  (April 
26, 1920}  : 

The  Allied  Governments  have  unanimously  decided  fully  to 
maintain  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

5.  Speech  by  M.  Millerand  (April  28, 1920} : 

The  first  condition  for  the  Spa  Conference  is  that  any  idea  of 
revising  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  should  be  formally  excluded.  It 
is  not  a  matter  of  revising  the  Treaty,  but  of  applying  it. 

6.  Notes  sent  from  Boulogne  by  the  Allied  Governments  to  the 
German  Government  (June  22,  1920}  •. 

The  Allied  Governments  surely  and  simply  confirm  their 
former  decisions.  The  military  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
are  fully  maintained.  They  must  be  strictly  carried  out. 

409 


410    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

These  very  firm  declarations  have  been  persistently 
belied  by  subsequent  events.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  con- 
tained clauses  of  two  kinds.  Some  were  enforceable  forth- 
with and  they  were  all  enforced  absolutely  and  without 
delay,  thanks  to  the  preliminary  steps  taken  in  1919  by  M. 
Clemenceau.  Other  clauses  on  the  contrary  by  their  very 
nature  entailed  a  certain  delay  and  their  enforcement  was 
to  begin  in  January,  1920.  The  most  important  of  these 
clauses  dealt  with  surrender  of  war  criminals,  disarma- 
ment of  Germany  and  reparations. 

The  first  capitulation  of  the  Allies  which  prepared  and 
made  way  for  others  occurred  on  January  13,  1920.  It  was 
in  connection  with  the  delivery  to  the  Allies  of  the  war 
criminals  guilty  of  offenses  committed  in  violation  of  inter- 
national law  and  of  the  rules  of  warfare.  To  this  provision 
which  gave  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  the  character  of  a 
verdict  against  Germany  for  her  crimes,  no  Government  had 
attached  greater  importance  than  the  British.  It  was  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  who  in  1918,  in  a  series  of  impassioned 
addresses,  had  rallied  his  fellow-citizens  to  the  cry  of 
"Hang  the  Kaiser!"  a  fit  reply  to  the  German  "Gott 
strafe  England!"  It  was  the  representative  of  Great  Bri- 
tain, Sir  Ernest  Pollock,  who,  in  the  eleven  meetings  of 
the  Commission  on  Responsibilities,  from  February  3  to 
March  29,  1919,  had  uncompromisingly  maintained  the  full 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  war  criminals  which  was 
opposed  by  the  American  delegates.  It  was  the  British 
Prime  Minister  who,  at  seven  meetings  of  the  Council  of 
Four  from  April  1  to  May  5,  demanded  and  obtained  the 
strengthening  of  the  proposals  submitted  by  the  Commis- 
sion. It  was  Mr.  Philip  Kerr,  Secretary  to  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  who  on  June  16,  1919,  wrote  the  letter  in  reply  to 
Count  von  Brockdorff-Rantzau's  protests  stating  that  the 
Allies  maintained  their  decisions.  These  documents  ought 
to  be  quoted.  On  May  29,  1919,  Count  von  Brockdorff- 
Rantzau  wrote  as  follows: 

The   German   Government   cannot   agree   to   a   German   being 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       411 

brought  before  a  special  foreign  court  of  law ....  Nor  can  the 
German  Government  give  its  assent  to  a  request  being  sent  to  the 
Government  of  the  Netherlands  requesting  the  surrender  of  a  Ger- 
man to  a  foreign  Power,  with  a  view  to  unwarranted  proceedings 
being  taken  against  him ....  If  there  be  grounds  for  satisfaction 
by  the  punishment  of  certain  persons  individually  culpable,  the 
injured  State  should  not  inflict  such  punishment  itself.  It  can 
merely  demand  such  punishment  from  the  State  responsible  for 
the  guilty  party.  Germany  has  never  refused  and  declares  herself 
entirely  ready  to  take  such  steps  as  to  ensure  all  violations  of  the 
law  of  nations  being  prosecuted  with  the  utmost  rigour. 

On  June  16,  1919,  the  Allied  Governments  replied  as 
follows : 

The  Powers  consider  that  it  is  inadmissible  to  entrust  the 
trial  of  those  directly  responsible  for  offenses  against  humanity 
and  international  right  to  their  accomplices  in  their  crimes 

On  June  28,  1919,  Messrs.  Hermann  Muller  and  Bell 
signed  the  Treaty  which,  in  accordance  with  the  text  handed 
on  the  seventh  of  May  to  Count  von  Brockdorff,  provided 
for  the  trial  of  the  ex-Emperor  and  the  other  criminals  by 
an  international  court  of  law.  On  February  13,  1920,  the 
Allied  Powers  gave  up  their  demand  for  the  surrender  of 
the  Kaiser  and  authorized  the  Government  of  the  Reich  to 
bring  the  other  criminals  to  trial  before  the  Court  of  Leip- 
zig— that  is  to  say,  to  allow  them  to  be  tried  by  those  who, 
on  June  16,  1919,  they  had  called  "their  accomplices  in 
their  crimes."  Everybody  knows  that  at  the  end  of  1920 
not  a  single  one  of  these  criminals  had  been  tried.  Germany 
with  the  assent  of  the  Allies  had  torn  up  an  essential  clause 
of  the  Treaty.  This  was  the  reward  of  her  resistance  and 
an  encouragement  to  renew  it.  On  February  21,  1920,  I 
wrote:  "The  same  thing  is  going  to  be  repeated  either 
against  the  Military  Control  Commission  or  the  Repara- 
tions Commission."  This  is  precisely  what  happened. 

March  10,  1920,  marked  a  time  limit  of  capital  impor- 
tance for  disarmament.  Not  only  on  this  date  was  the  sup- 
ply of  munitions  to  be  limited  to  1,500  and  500  rounds  per 


412 

gun,  according  to  caliber,  in  the  few  strongholds  still 
retained;  the  disarmament  of  all  fortresses  in  the  demili- 
tarized zone  east  of  the  Ehine;  the  suppression  of  mili- 
tary schools.  But  also  and  above  all,  March  10  was  the 
date  on  which,  under  Article  169,  Germany  was  to  have 
delivered  up  to  the  Allies  for  destruction  all  arms,  muni- 
tions and  material  of  war  in  excess  of  the  quantities 
authorized,  besides  all  machinery  and  tools  used  in  their 
production.  On  the  same  date  she  was  to  have  given  up  all 
captures  effected  by  her  during  the  war.  April  10  marked 
the  expiration  of  a  second  time  limit.  On  that  date  Germany 
under  Article  163  was  to  have  reduced  the  total  of  her  effec- 
tives to  200,000  men.  The  meaning  of  this  obligation  was 
clearly  defined  in  a  note  from  the  Supreme  Council,  dated 
December  1,  1919,  signed  by  M.  Clemenceau,  in  which  Ger- 
many was  called  upon  to  suppress  immediately  on  the  com- 
ing into  force  of  the  Treaty  all  auxiliary  corps  (Einwolmer- 
wehren,  Nothilfe,  Sicherheitspolizei,  etc.)  which  Noske  had 
for  four  months  been  perfidiously  forming.  The  Allies 
intended  that  at  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  there  should 
remain  in  Germany  only  200,000  men  in  all,  without  camou- 
flage. Even  this  figure  under  Article  160  was  to  be  still 
further  reduced  three  months  later  to  100,000. 

History  will  ever  be  amazed  at  the  fact  that  for  four 
months  nothing  was  done  by  the  Allies  either  to  demand 
the  execution  of  these  two  measures  or  to  enforce  them 
when  the  time  came.  For  four  months  the  Council  of  the 
Allies  met  uninterruptedly  at  London.  On  two  occasions 
all  the  heads  of  the  Governments  were  present  together. 
Not  once,  however,  did  these  meetings  result  in  a  reminder 
to  Germany  either  by  word  or  deed  that  the  Allies  insisted 
upon  her  disarmament  and  would  not  permit  her  to  elude 
it.  Not  once  was  she  solemnly  and  publicly  summoned  to 
fulfill  the  undertakings  to  which  she  had  subscribed. 
Things  were  allowed  to  drift.  To  be  sure  the  Military 
Commission  which  M.  Clemenceau  had  sent  to  Germany  as 
far  back  as  November,  1919,  was  still  at  Berlin.  But  it  is 
clear  that,  alone  and  unsupported  by  those  who  sent  it,  the 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       413 

Commission  was  inevitably  powerless.  It  is  clear  that, 
forced  to  confine  itself  to  technical  discussions  which  the 
Prime  Ministers  never  once  raised  to  the  level  of  politics, 
it  was  condemned  in  advance  to  be  sterile.  The  Govern- 
ments did  not  bring  to  bear  the  united  pressure  which  they 
alone  had  power  to  exert. 

When  at  the  end  of  July,  1920,  the  Spa  Conference  met, 
the  Allies  were  able  to  see  the  effects  of  their  policy.  Ger- 
man military  legislation  had  not  been  changed.  No  law 
had  been  passed  either  to  abolish  conscription  or  com- 
ply with  the  obligation  concerning  reserves.  Under  guise 
of  Reichswehr  and  other  auxiliary  formations,  the  Army 
still  numbered  nearly  a  million  men,  instead  of  100,000.  As 
to  artillery,  more  than  15,000  guns  remained  to  be  delivered 
and  destroyed.  As  to  aviation,  only  900  aeroplanes  out  of 
10,000  had  been  delivered.  Allied  officers  assaulted  in 
several  German  cities  in  March  had  received  neither 
apology  nor  satisfaction.  Four  months  later,  in  November, 
1920,  some  progress  had  been  made  with  the  destruction  of 
artillery  but  the  Einwohnerwehren  and  Sicherheitspolitzei 
were  neither  disarmed  nor  dissolved, 

II 

This  also  encouraged  Germany  in  the  great  financial 
offensive  she  was  preparing  to  launch.  In  eluding  the  dis- 
armament clauses  she  was  prompted  mainly  by  sentiment ; 
for  she  could  not  possibly  hope  that  her  shortcomings,  no 
matter  how  numerous,  could  enable  her  to  begin  war  anew. 
But  on  the  contrary  in  regard  to  reparation,  every  breach 
of  the  Treaty,  every  month  gained,  every  clause  eluded,  was 
a  positive  asset  in  the  great  economic  struggle  by  which 
Germany,  her  means  of  production  untouched,  hoped  to 
achieve  future  victory.*  By  non-payment,  by  non-deliv- 
ery of  raw  materials,  Germany  was  sharpening  her  eco- 
nomic sword.  By  urging  acceptance  of  a  lump-sum,  that 
is  to  say  the  arbitrary  reduction  of  her  debt — she  lightened 

(1)     See  Chapter  X,  pages  320-321. 


414     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

her  liabilities  and  increased  her  assets.  By  concentra- 
ting her  efforts  against  the  Reparation  Commission  which 
was  to  force  upon  her  a  system  that  would  enable  her  to 
pay,  she  was  destroying  the  Allies'  means  of  action.  This 
plan  was  vast  and  obvious.  At  nearly  every  point  Ger- 
many, in  1920,  won  the  game. 

Although  by  the  nature  of  things  time  limits  for  Repa- 
rations were  longer  than  for  disarmament,  certain  things 
(and  not  the  least  important)  were  to  have  been  done  by 
Germany  either  immediately  the  Treaty  came  into  force  or 
within  a  time  limit  of  three  months,  i.  e.,  before  April  10, 
1920.  Here,  as  in  the  case  of  disarmament,  it  is  clear  that 
performance  could  be  counted  upon  only  if  Germany  were 
made  to  understand  that  she  would  not  be  permitted  escape. 
In  these  all  important  matters  the  Allies  displayed  the 
same  weakness  as  in  the  case  of  the  war  criminals  and  of 
disarmament.  For  months  nothing  was  done  or  even 
attempted.  Nothing  by  the  Governments,  nothing  by  the 
Reparations  Commission.  And  yet  the  Powers  in  1919  had 
made  known  their  will  in  the  most  forceful  and  clearest  pos- 
sible manner.  They  had  replied  to  the  German  counter  pro- 
posals as  follows: 

The  proposals  of  the  Allies  confine  the  amount  payable  by 
Germany  to  what  is  clearly  justifiable  under  the  terms  of  the 
Armistice 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  consistent  with  their  policy 
already  expressed,  decline  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  princi- 
ples underlying  the  reparation  clauses. 

The  categories  of  damages  and  the  clauses  concerning  repara- 
tion must  be  accepted  by  the  German  authorities  as  matters  settled 
beyond  all  discussion 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  will  not  entertain  argu- 
ments or  appeals  directed  to  any  alteration 

Beyond  this,  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  cannot  be 
asked  to  go.  The  draft  Treaty  must  be  accepted  as  definitive  and 
must  be  signed .... 

On  June  28,  1919,  Messrs.  Hermann  Muller  and  Bell 
signed  the  Treaty  which,  by  Article  232,  binds  Germany 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       415 

without  limitation  or  reservation,  either  as  to  amounts  or 
duration  of  the  payments,  to  make  full  reparation  for  all 
damages  to  persons  and  property  and  to  pay  the  total 
amount  of  pensions — that  is  to  say,  for  France  alone 
according  to  the  estimates  put  forward  in  May,  1920,  by  M. 
Millerand,  about  200,000  million  francs.  Despite  this,  on 
May  15,  1920,  it  was  announced  that  the  British  and 
French  Governments  had  agreed  to  consider  a  lump  sum 
which  made  impossible  the  full  payment  of  damages  and 
pensions  imposed  upon  Germany,  both  by  the  Armistice 
and  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace  itself.  Again  Count  von  Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau  had  his  revenge!  At  the  end  of  1920  the 
same  vacillation  in  principle  marked  the  Brussels  Confer- 
ence. 

And  what  has  been  done  on  the  other  hand  towards  the 
future  enforcement  of  the  financial  terms  of  peace  I  Here 
again  the  evidence  is  plain.  To  make  this  clear  I  repro- 
duce the  articles  of  the  Treaty  which  the  Reparation  Com- 
mission is  bound  to  apply  to  force  Germany  to  pay. 

Art.  236.  Germany  further  agrees  to  the  direct  application  of 
her  economic  resources  to  reparation. 

Art.  248.  A  first  charge  upon  all  the  assets  and  revenues  of  the 
German  Empire  and  its  constituent  States  shall  be  the  cost  of  repa- 
ration, etc. 

Para.  B.  Art.  12,  Annex  II.  The  sums  for  reparation  which 
Germany  is  required  to  pay  shall  become  a  charge  upon  all  her 
revenues  prior  to  that  for  the  service  or  discharge  of  any  domestic 
loan. 

Art.  260.  The  Reparation  Commission  may  within  one  year 
from  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty  demand  that  the 
German  Government  become  possessed  of  any  rights  and  interests 
of  the  German  nationals  in  any  public  utility  undertaking  or  in  any 
concession,  operating  in  Roumania,  China,  Turkey,  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Bulgaria. 

Art.  12.  Paragraph  B.,  Annex  II.  The  German  scheme  of  tax- 
ation shall  be  fully  as  heavy  proportionately  as  that  of  any  of  the 
Powers  represented  on  the  Commission. 

Annex  II,  Art.  12.     The  Commission  shall  have  all  the  powers 


416    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

conferred  upon  it,  and  shall  exercise  all  the  functions  assigned  to 
it  by  the  present  Treaty. 

Art.  240.  The  German  Government  will  supply  to  the  Commis- 
sion all  the  information  which  the  Commission  may  require  relative 
to  the  financial  situation  and  operations,  and  to  the  property,  pro- 
ductive capacity,  and  stocks  and  current  production  of  raw 
materials  and  manufactured  articles. 

Art.  241.  Germany  undertakes  to  pass,  issue  and  maintain  in 
force  any  legislation,  orders  and  decrees  that  may  be  necessary  to 
give  complete  effect  to  these  provisions. 

Art.  18,  Annex  II.  The  measures  which  the  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Powers  shall  have  the  right  to  take,  in  case  of  voluntary 
default  by  Germany,  and  which  Germany  agrees  not  to  regard  as 
acts  of  war,  may  include  economic  and  financial  prohibitions  and 
reprisals  and  in  general  such  other  measures  as  the  respective 
Governments  may  determine  to  be  necessary  in  the  circumstances. 

What  has  the  Reparation  Commission  done  with  all 
these  means  of  action  in  eleven  months?  Nothing  or  almost 
nothing. 

1.  Making  up  Germany's  account.    This  essential  func- 
tion of  the  Reparation  Commission  has  not  been  fulfilled 
and  despite  reiterated  demands   of  our  Parliament  the 
Reparation  Commission  has  declared  itself  incapable  of 
furnishing  this  account. 

2.  Means  of  payment,    (a)  CoaL    I  shall  show  below* 
that  as  a  result  of  the  Spa  agreement  coal  has  lost  its  value 
as  a  means  of  payment  because  for  the  24,000,000  tons  to 
be  delivered  a  year  the  Allies  have  to  disburse  4,170  mil- 
lions in  premiums  and  advances,     (b)     Live  stock.     The 
French  Minister  of  the  Liberated  Regions  informed  the 
Senate  on  December  16,  1920,  that  for  the  deliveries  under 
Paragraph  2  of  Annex  4  to  Chapter  8  of  the  Treaty  he  had 
forwarded  his  demands  to  the  Reparations  Commission  in 
March,  1920.  It  was  in  December,  1920,  that  the  Reparations 
Commission  "laid  down  the  conditions  under  which  these 
deliveries  would  be  made."     This  delay  is  all  the  more 
extraordinary    in    that    the    immediate    deliveries    under 


'See  pages  418-421. 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       417 

Article  6  of  Annex  4  had  been  regularly  made,  (c)  Tonnage. 
The  Finance  Commission  of  the  Chamber  wrote  in  its  report 
of  June  14,  1920,  ''as  far  as  we  are  aware  the  Reparations 
Commission  has  not  yet  notified  the  German  Government 
of  the  amount  of  tonnage  to  be  laid  down  in  the  first  two 
years  following  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Treaty." 
(Paragraph  5  of  Annex  3).  (d)  German  assets  abroad. 
These  assets  estimated  at  12,000  millions  at  least  are  a  val- 
uable means  of  payment.  The  Finance  Commission  in  its 
report  quoted  above  wrote,  "Germany's  capacity  to  pay 
by  means  of  assets  abroad  ought  to  be  immediately  inves- 
tigated by  the  experts  of  the  Reparations  Commission. ' ' 

3.  Supervision  and  modification  of  Germany's  econom- 
ic and  financial  systems.  This — as  I  have  said  and  as  I 
repeat — was  the  fundamental  task  of  the  Reparations 
Commission.  To  accomplish  it,  it  was  given  the  fullest 
powers  as  evidenced  by  the  text  I  have  quoted  above.  It 
was  armed  to  force  Germany  in  the  words  of  Lord  Cunliff e, 
Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  and  British  Delegate  to 
the  Peace  Conference,  to  "organize  herself  as  an  exporting 
nation  for  the  payment  of  her  reparation  debts."  It  was 
the  only  way  in  which  Germany  could  possibly  pay  a  debt 
of  more  than  300,000  millions.  To  this  end  the  Reparations 
Commission  was  given  the  right  and  entrusted  with  the 
duty  of  supervising  Germany's  budget,  her  revenues,  her 
expenditures,  her  production,  her  exports,  her  imports; 
the  right  and  the  duty  to  institute  all  measures  of  a  nature 
to  assure  payment.  What  has  it  done  with  this  right,  what 
has  it  done  to  fulfill  this  duty? 

Statistics  drawn  up  last  summer  by  the  League  of 
Nations  proved  that  the  individual  German  is  less  burdened 
by  taxation  than  the  individual  Englishman  or  Frenchman. 
German  interior  loans  continue  to  draw  interest — money 
that  belongs  to  the  Reparations  Commission.  The  prior 
lien  on  all  property  and  assets  of  the  German  States  has 
never  been  foreclosed.  No  change  has  been  insisted  upon 
in  the  German  legislation  to  give  effect  to  this  privilege. 
Germany  has  even  been  allowed  to  lend  money  to  neutrals. 


418     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TEEATY 

Quite  recently  M.  Guy  de  Wendel,  a  member  of  the  French 
Parliament,  startled  the  Chamber  by  showing  how  the  Ger- 
man Government  by  subsidizing  its  industries  managed 
instead  of  paying  its  debts  to  compete  with  its  creditors  by 
dumping  exports. 

Not  an  initiative.  Not  even  the  least  firmness,  for  firm- 
ness presupposes  some  effort — and  no  effort  has  been 
made.  If  things  are  thus:  if  the  Reparations  Commission 
which  is  composed  of  very  distinguished  men,  which  is  pro- 
vided with  a  numerous  staff,  liberally  paid,  and  is  sup- 
plied with  enormous  credits  has  displayed  such  impotence 
it  is  because,  expecting  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  from 
day  to  day,  it  has  had  no  heart  to  enforce  it.  Here  again 
politics  whose  present  results  I  have  described  prepares  the 
same  evil  consequences  for  the  future. 

To  these  concessions  by  omission,  further  concessions 
by  commission  were  added.  The  coal  problem  furnished  the 
pretext,  Spa  the  occasion.  The  quantities  of  coal  to  be 
delivered  by  Germany  had  been  fixed  by  the  Treaty  at  an 
average  of  3,500,000  tons  per  month.  The  Reparations  Com- 
mission taking  Germany's  difficulties  into  consideration 
had  agreed  to  reduce  this  quantity  to  2,400,000  tons.  The 
Spa  agreement  still  further  reduced  it  to  2,000,000 — about 
to  what  (within  about  300,000  tons)  had  been  proposed  by 
Count  Brockdorff-Rantzau  on  May  19,  1919.  The  reduc- 
tion thus  granted  is  forty-three  per  cent,  of  the  amount 
written  in  the  Treaty.  At  the  same  time  to  the  stipulation 
that  the  coal  delivered  by  Germany  should  be  valued  at 
German  pit  mouth  prices  the  Spa  agreement  substituted 
a  price  increased  by  fixed  premiums  and  variable  advances 
— both  equally  unwarranted.  The  premium  of  five  marks 
(gold)  per  ton  (francs  13.75)  was  granted  in  exchange  for 
an  alleged  right  given  the  Allies'  demand  "coals  of  spe- 
cific classified  qualities."  Now  they  were  already  enti- 
tled to  this  under  Paragraph  10,  Schedule  5,  of  Chap- 
ter 8  of  the  Treaty,  giving  the  Reparations  Commission 
power  to  decide  all  disputes  concerning  qualities.  Under 
this  paragraph  the  Allies  had  from  the  very  beginning 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED        419 

paid  the  sliding  scale  applied  to  the  various  qualities  of 
coal  and  did  that  according  to  the  German  interior  price 
scale.  Under  the  Spa  agreement,  they  are  to  pay  a  yearly 
increase  of  (francs  13.75  x  twenty-four  millions  tons)  or  330 
million  francs,  266  millions  of  which  is  France  's  share.  The 
advances  granted  were  still  more  onerous  and  had  more 
far-reaching  effects.  The  Spa  Conference  decided  that 
the  Allies  would  grant  Germany  "  advances  the  amount 
of  which  shall  be  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  Ger- 
man inland  market  price  plus  the  premium  of  five  marks 
(gold)  and  the  export  price  F.  0.  B.  German  port,  or 
F.  0.  B.  English  port,  and  in  any  case  the  lower  of  these  two 
prices.  '  '  The  cost  of  the  operation  was  as  follows  : 

English  export  price  .............................  Frs.  240. 

German  pit  mouth  price  ..........................  Frs.  70. 

Premium  fixed  at  Spa  ............................  Frs.  13.75 

Total  inland  price  after  Spa  Conference  ............  Frs.  83.75 

Difference  between  the  two  prices  .................  Frs.  156.25 

The  advances  therefore  represented  (francs  156.25x2,000,- 
000  tons)  or  312,500,000  francs  a  month.  As  under  the  Spa 
agreement,  France  was  to  furnish  sixty-one  per  cent,  of 
these  advances  she  was  obliged  to  appropriate  190,625,000 
francs  a  month  or  about  2,287  million  francs  a  year.  In  all 
taking  France  alone  into  consideration  she  found  herself 
charged  for  the  1,600,000  tons  she  was  to  receive  monthly 
with: 

German  inland  market  price  ...     1,600,000x70     =112,000,000 
Premiums    ...................     1,600,000  X  13.75=  22,000,000 

Advances  .............  61%  of    2,000,000x156.25=190,625,000 


So  to  obtain  valuable  consideration  to  the  amount  of 
112,000,000  francs  which  under  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  she 
was  to  receive  without  having  any  payment  to  make,  France 
was  thenceforward  to  pay  22,000,000  francs  in  premiums 
and  190,625,000  francs  in  advances  every  month. 

This  revision  of  the  Treaty,  onerous  as  are  its  imme- 
diate consequences,  has  an  even  more  serious  effect.    In 


420     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

the  first  place  it  runs  counter  to  one  of  the  essential  prin- 
ciples of  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  that  reparations  take  prec- 
edence over  German  needs  and  that  especially  in  the  case 
of  coal  Germany  is  bound  up  to  twenty  million  tons  yearly 
to  make  good  in  absolute  priority  the  French  shortage 
caused  by  the  systematic  destruction  of  French  mines  in 
the  North  by  the  German  Army.  On  the  contrary  the  Spa 
agreement  gave  Germany,  which  in  1920  was  satisfying  her 
own  coal  needs  to  a  greater  extent  than  those  of  France 
(sixty-eight  per  cent,  as  against  fifty-five  per  cent.),  the 
right  to  special  assistance  to  increase  her  industrial  pro- 
duction. In  other  words,  whereas  the  Treaty  specified 
that  deliveries  to  the  Allies  should  be  made  before  Ger- 
many's needs  were  attended  to,  the  Spa  Conference  author- 
ized Germany  to  serve  herself  first.  In  the  second  place 
coal  has  ceased  to  benefit  the  Reparation  Fund  as  a  means 
of  payment;  for  either  in  the  form  of  premiums  or  of 
advances,  the  Allies  are  obliged  to  make  for  every  ton  a 
cash  disbursement  exceeding  the  value  of  the  coal  received. 
Finally  the  increase  granted  to  Germany  has  resulted 
in  the  consolidation  of  British  export  prices.  During  the 
Paris  Conference  the  French  delegates  had  two  main 
objects  in  view  in  regard  to  coal.  The  first  was  to  put  an 
end  to  the  pre-war  situation  which  permitted  German 
industry  controlling  both  coal  and  coal  prices  to  blackmail 
French  industry.  That  is  why  after  long  discussions  they 
had  obtained  that  the  coal  to  be  delivered  by  Germany 
under  the  Treaty  should  be  reckoned  at  German  inland 
prices.  The  second  was  to  protect  France  against  the  rise 
in  English  export  prices,  which  had  just  begun  and  has  gone 
on  increasing  ever  since.  These  guarantees  were  provided 
and  agreed  to  after  much  opposition,  but  the  Spa  Conven- 
tion reversed  the  situation.  The  premium  of  five  marks 
(gold)  per  ton  has  handicapped  French  industry  as  com- 
pared with  German  industry  to  the  extent  of  ninety  per 
cent.  The  advances  calculated  on  the  English  export  price 
have  strengthened  the  latter  which  is  so  high  that  Great 
Britain  is  able  to  supply  her  domestic  consumers  at  less 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       421 

than  cost  price.  The  Spa  agreement  not  only  deprived 
France  of  the  right  to  pay  for  German  coal  at  the  same  rate 
as  German  industry,  it  bereft  her  also  of  all  means  of  reduc- 
ing the  price  of  English  coal  by  competition. 

So  revision — unmistakable  revision — revision  demanded 
not  only  by  Germany  but  by  one  of  our  Allies — a  revision 
at  first  implicitly  tolerated  and  afterwards  explicitly  ac- 
cepted has  been  the  policy  of  the  Allies  in  1920  notwith- 
standing official  talk  about  enforcement.  The  only  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  which  have  been  enforced  are  those  which 
went  into  effect  prior  to  its  coming  into  force  on  January 
10,  1920,  or  those  whose  application  in  every  little  detail 
had  been  prepared  by  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies  in 
1919  (Schleswig,  Upper  Silesia,  etc.).  For  the  rest,  care- 
lessness, party  spirit  and  lack  of  unity  have  played  into 
Germany's  hands,  encouraged  Pan-Gennanist  forces  and 
delayed  the  coming  of  the  new  order  of  which  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  had  laid  the  foundations. 

Ill 

To  excuse  this  failure  two  arguments  are  in  turn  em- 
ployed. At  times  it  is  said  that  the  peace  is  impossible  of 
execution ;  at  times  that  it  is  an  unjust  peace.  This  doctrine 
has  its  Bible  and  its  Priests — let  us  see  what  it  is  worth. 

An  impossible  peace!  It  was  enforced  in  1919  in  its 
essential  clauses.  The  reduction  of  German  territory  by 
84,000  square  kilometers?  Enforced.  The  return  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  France  free  of  all  charges;  the 
return  to  Poznan  to  Poland;  the  return  of  the  Walloon 
cantons  to  Belgium?  Enforced.  Enforced  also  the  rup- 
ture of  governmental  ties  between  the  Sarre  and  Prussia: 
the  plebiscite  of  Schleswig ;  the  installation  of  the  Plebiscite 
Commission  in  Upper  Silesia. 

Enforced  also  the  occupation  by  Allied  troops  and  the 
control  by  an  Inter-allied  High  Commission  presided  over 
by  a  Frenchman  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine  and  the 


422     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

bridgeheads;  the  dismantlement  of  the  fortresses  of  the 
neutral  zone;  the  surrender  of  the  fleet. 

Other  clauses,  it  was  true,  could  only  by  their  very 
nature  be  enforced  progressively  and  within  a  certain  lapse 
of  time.  But  what  do  we  see  ?  At  the  very  time  when  Ger- 
many was  declaring  these  clauses  impossible  of  execution, 
she  was  nevertheless  obliged  to  execute  them  despite  the 
weakness  of  the  Allies.  Let  us  take  the  period  of  the  finan- 
cial application  of  the  peace  which  opened  on  January  10. 
1920,  when  it  came  into  force  and  will  end  on  May  1,  1921. 
What  were  during  the  period  the  essential  obligations  of 
Germany? 

1.  To  return  the  money,  securities,  live  stock  and  goods 
of  all  nature  carried  off,  seized,  or  sequestrated  which  could 
be  identified,  this  restitution  not  being  credited  to  Ger- 
many in  the  reparations  account.     (Articles  238-239  and 
243  of  the  Treaty.) 

2.  To  pay  to   the  Allies   on  account   of  reparations 
20,000  million  marks  gold  either  in  gold,  in  goods,  in  ton- 
nage, in  securities  or  otherwise.  (Article  235  of  the  Treaty.) 

What  has  become  of  these  two  obligations? 

1.  Restitutions.  The  amount  of  securities,  moneys  and 
valuable  assets  identified  and  recovered  from  Germany 
totalled  8,300  million  francs  on  May  31,  1920,  to  which  were 
to  be  added  500,000  tons  of  machinery  and  raw  material. 
(Report  of  the  Finance  Commission  of  the  French  Cham- 
ber, June  14, 1920.) 

2.  Reparations.     On  July  20,  1920,  before  the  same 
commission   Mr.   Frangois    Marsal,    French   Minister   of 
Finance,  questioned  on  the  total  amount  of  payments  made 
by  Germany  on  account  of  reparations,  declared  that  he  did 
not  have  the  exact  figure.    He  added,  however,  that  in  his 
opinion  Germany  had  already  paid  about  10,000  millions. 
Since   then   the   Finance    Commission,   despite   reiterated 
demands,  has  been  unable  to  obtain  an  accounting  of  Ger- 
man payments.    The  most  competent  of  its  members  esti- 
mate the  total  at  about  12,000  or  14,000  millions  as  of 
December  31,  1920. 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       423 

What  conclusions  are  we  to  draw  from  this  T  Germany, 
with  grace  that  is  bad  and  faith  that  is  worse,  has  been 
obliged  by  the  mere  existence  of  a  Treaty  enforced  without 
conviction  by  its  beneficiaries  to  comply  with  her  under- 
takings to  an  extent  that  makes  it  extremely  probable  that 
on  May  1,  1921,  she  will  have  fulfilled  for  the  most  part 
the  financial  obligations  imposed  upon  her  up  to  that  date. 
Yet  this  is  the  very  time  that  Germany  chooses  to  declare 
the  Treaty  impossible  of  execution.  How  can  one  fail  to 
see  that  the  fear  of  having  to  execute  the  Treaty  is  respon- 
sible for  this  attitude  ?  If  Germany  clamours  so  loudly  that 
the  financial  clauses  of  the  Treaty  are  impossible  of  execu- 
tion, it  is  because  she  knows  that,  if  they  are  enforced,  they 
will  be  efficacious.  If  Germany  asks  that  the  Treaty  be 
changed,  it  is  because  she  knows  that,  in  its  present  form, 
it  obliges  her  to  pay.  If  Germany  decoys  us  to  revision,  it 
is  because  she  feels  that  without  revision  she  will  have  to 
pay  sooner  or  later.  A  hypothetical  statement?  No — 
although  our  experience  of  Germany  fully  warrants  it — but 
a  fact  based  upon  figures  which  the  Allied  peoples  have  not 
the  right  to  ignore.  The  intent  is  clear.  No  one  has  a  right 
to  be  duped  by  it.  And  yet  the  Allies  have  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  taken  in  by  it,  and  they  have  meekly  followed 
Germany  to  the  various  revision  meetings  in  which  she 
ensnares  them.  Better  still  Parliaments  and  Press  echo 
with  the  assertion — sweet  music  to  German  ears — that  Ger- 
many will  not  pay.  Instead  of  proclaiming  that  she  can 
pay,  that  present  events  prove  that  for  the  future  it  is 
enough  to  insist  that  she  can  pay — she  has  been  allowed  to 
have  her  way.  Facts  and  figures  which  upset  her  conten- 
tions and  confirm  ours  have  been  hidden. 

We  went  to  Brussels  in  December,  1920,  as  we  had  been 
to  Spa,  lured  by  an  axiom,  "made  in  Germany," — and  alas 
echoed  in  France  for  the  satisfaction  of  political  spite — 
that  the  Treaty  was  impossible  of  execution.  And  yet 
what  happened?  For  the  time  being,  that  is  to  say  for  the 
period  between  January  10,  1920,  and  May  1,  1921,  there 
is  every  probability  that  it  will  be  carried  out  almost  to  the 


424    THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

letter,  for  up  to  June  30,  1920,  Germany  had  already  paid 
more  than  half  of  the  20,000  millions.  That  for  to-morrow, 
that  is  to  say  for  the  payment  to  be  made  after  May  1, 1921, 
none  of  the  means  of  action  which  the  Treaty  provides  has 
been  either  utilized  or  even  prepared.  During  all  the  year 
1920,  the  givers  of  advice  have  flocked  to  Government  and 
newspaper  offices,  each  bringing  his  own  little  "plan  of 
reparations."  The  only  plan  that  counts  is  in  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles.  Facts  prove  both  that  this  plan  is  possible 
of  execution  and  that  little  indeed  is  being  done  to  execute 
it.  But  let  us  stick  to  it.  It  is  a  plan  which,  however  spine- 
lessly  applied,  has  already  made  Germany  give  back  9,000 
millions  of  loot  to  France  alone  and  pay  some  12,000  mil- 
lions of  reparations  to  the  Allies  as  a  whole.  It  is  better 
than  the  other  plan  under  which,  by  the  Spa  agreement, 
the  Allies  are  obliged  to  pay  Germany  more  than  4,000  mil- 
lions a  year. 

So  much  for  the  first  criticism  that  the  peace  is  an 
impossible  one.  What  shall  we  say  of  the  second :  that  it  is 
an  unjust  peace  which  violates  all  the  principles  of  the 
Allies  ?  Here  again  answer  is  easy.  A  peace  imposed  upon 
aggressor  nations  by  nations  attacked ;  a  peace  which  places 
reparations  to  the  account  of  the  guilty,  whose  responsibil- 
ity it  proclaims;  a  peace  which  liberates  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, restores  Belgium,  brings  Bohemia  and  Poland  to 
life,  and  emancipates  the  oppressed  populations  of  Tran- 
sylvania, Croatia,  Slovenia,  the  Trentino,  Istria  and 
Schleswig:  a  peace  which  conclusively  proves  that  mili- 
tarism does  not  pay, — such  a  peace  is  a  sound  peace,  such 
a  peace  is  a  just  peace. 

However,  let  us  not  be  deceived.  These  contentions 
whether  put  forward  on  political  or  on  economic  grounds 
are  always  pro-German  arguments.  "Capacity  of  pay- 
ment," put  forward  to  give  the  oppressor  the  benefits  of 
his  recovery;  "economic  solidarity,"  all  the  benefits  of 
which  go  to  the  beaten  foe;  and  "the  reorganization  of 
Europe"  which  makes  European  prosperity  dependent 
upon  German  prosperity — these  are  the  prize  pro-German 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       425 

arguments.  A  German  argument,  too,  that  relating  to  the 
uselessness  of  small  states  and  the  "law  of  concentra- 
tion!" An  argument  we  used  to  read  over  the  signatures 
of  von  Billow  and  Bernhardi,  before  meeting  it  again  over 
Mr.  Keynes'  name  in  connection  with  Dantzig,  Upper  Sile- 
sia, the  Germans  of  Bohemia  or  the  Hungarians  of  Tran- 
sylvania. An  argument  that  is  merely  the  German  motto : 
""Woe  to  the  weak!"  Millions  of  Allied  soldiers  fell  fight- 
ing against  it.  Should  the  makers  of  the  peace  become  its 
converts  after  victory!  Feigned  indignation  over  alleged 
violations  of  principles  will  dupe  those  only  who  wish  to 
be  duped,  it  will  not  bear  investigation.  It  is  quite  true 
that  there  are  Germans  in  Dantzig,  Upper  Silesia  and 
Bohemia,  but  who  did  not  know  beforehand  that  there 
would  be?  "Who  does  not  know  that  this  is  the  necessary 
consequence  of  two  centuries  of  German  oppression  and 
colonization?  Who  does  not  know  of  the  mingling  of  races 
throughout  Central  Europe,  due  not  only  to  long  centuries 
of  war,  but  also  to  the  systematic  policy  of  the  Prussian 
Government  ? 

And  so  there  have  been  established  by  force  and  by  ruse 
in  Polish  or  Czech  territory  those  German  colonies  which 
in  time  and  by  method  have  in  certain  places  passed  from 
minorities  to  majorities.  What  then  was  the  position  of 
the  victorious  Powers?  They  had  promised  in  solemn 
declarations  which  in  November,  1918,  became  the  very 
bases  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  to  establish  an  independent 
Poland  with  access  to  the  sea;  an  independent  Bohemia 
within  her  historic  frontiers.  These  promises  had  been 
approved  by  the  Parliaments  and  by  the  peoples.  They 
had  to  be  kept  and  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  leave  a 
certain  number  of  Germans  or  Magyars  in  Poland, 
Bohemia,  Roumania  and  Jugo-Slavia.  This  had  to  be,  for 
if  the  territories  in  which  these  Germans  lived  had  been 
cut  off  from  either  Poland  or  Bohemia,  neither  of  these 
nations  could  have  formed  a  state.  If  Dantzig  had 
remained  German,  Poland  would  have  had  no  seaport.  If 
the  Germans  of  Bohemia  had  been  separated  from  the 


426     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

Czecho-Slovakian  that  state  would  have  had  no  frontiers. 
So  unless  the  most  solemn  promises  were  to  be  repudiated, 
German  minorities  had  to  be  included  within  the  boun- 
daries of  the  emancipated  countries.  Were  these  minorities 
to  be  excluded?  Then  there  would  be  no  Poland  and  no 
Bohemia.  The  promise  would  have  been  broken  and  to 
whose  detriment?  To  the  detriment  of  those  who  forcibly 
deprived  of  their  liberty  had  for  centuries  awaited  the  just 
redress  of  their  wrongs.  And  who  would  have  profited 
thereby?  Those  who  for  centuries  had  professed  that 
might  makes  right. 

So  the  principle  was  unassailable.  Fault  has,  it  is  true, 
been  found  with  its  application,  and  it  is  said :  "  In  all  such 
cases  there  ought  to  have  been  a  plebiscite."  In  many 
cases  that  is  exactly  what  was  done.  In  other  cases  it 
could  not  be  done.  Why?  Because  the  plebiscite — while 
confirming  what  was  already  known  without  it — would  not 
have  altered  the  dilemma  I  have  just  defined.  No  plebiscite 
was  required  to  prove  the  existence  of  German  minorities 
either  in  Poland  or  in  Bohemia.  But  with  or  without  a 
plebiscite  the  same  difficulty  remained,  i.  e., — the  impossi- 
bility of  recreating  without  these  minorities  a  Bohemia  or 
a  Poland  likely  to  last.  With  or  without  a  plebiscite 
nations  long-enthralled  whose  emancipation  had  been 
sworn  would  have  been  annihilated,  and  annihilated  with 
refined  hypocrisy  by  refusing  them  the  means  of  existence 
just  when  they  were  being  given  a  new  life.  This  the  Con- 
ference refused  to  do  and  it  was  right  in  so  refusing. 
Nothing  was  left  undone  to  limit  an  evil  which  could  not  be 
entirely  avoided.  First  by  careful  inquiry  the  frontiers  of 
the  liberated  nations  were  so  defined  as  to  comprise  the 
smallest  possible  number  of  alien  peoples.  Then  whenever 
the  inclusion  of  districts  peopled  mostly  by  Germans  was 
not  vital,  recourse  was  always  had  to  a  plebiscite.  This 
was  the  case  in  Schleswig,  Upper  Silesia,  Marienwerder 
and  Allenstein,  where  as  events  have  proved  insufficient 
precautions  were  taken  against  German  fraud.  Finally, 
when  ethnic  minorities  were  placed  under  the  sovereignty 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  EXFORCED       427 

of  another  race  their  rights  were  surrounded  by  guaran- 
tees so  far-reaching  that  the  interested  Governments 
denounced  them  as  a  violation  of  their  rights.  Such  the 
bases  of  the  Treaty.  What  others  could  have  been  sug- 
gested without  betraying  the  war  aims  of  the  Allies,  with- 
out sacrificing  the  victims  of  centuries  of  German  might  to 
the  Germans  themselves,  without  strengthening  the  bond- 
age of  these  victims  to  their  tyrants  ? 

How  can  it  be  denied  moreover  that  after  a  war  which 
for  five  years  had  raised  national  aspirations  to  the  high- 
est pitch,  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  makes  a  praiseworthy 
effort  to  conciliate  the  appeals  of  the  future  with  the 
demands  of  the  past  ?  For  the  first  time  the  need  of  inter- 
national cooperation  is  recognized  whether  for  Colonial 
administration,  communications  by  land  and  water,  labour 
legislation  or  means  of  preventing  war.  For  the  first  time 
also  instead  of  attempting  like  the  Holy  Alliance  to  build 
for  all  time,  an  agency  was  created  by  the  Treaty  itself 
for  future  evolution  and  improvement.  I  shall  have  some- 
thing to  say  later,  with  special  reference  to  the  ratification 
of  the  Treaty  by  the  United  States,  about  the  League  of 
Nations.*  How  from  a  higher  standpoint  can  one  ignore 
the  fact  that  the  whole  world  looked  to  victory  not  only  to 
end  the  war  but  also  to  organize  peace  ?  How  would  it  be 
organized?  There  were  many  who,  without  even  suspect- 
ing it,  felt  the  necessity  for  such  an  organization.  As  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  said  after  visiting  the  battlefields:  "In 
presence  of  so  many  ruins  one  understands  that  after  all 
some  other  way  must  be  found  to  settle  disputes  between 
nations."  That  was  precisely  the  feeling  of  struggling 
humanity — the  aspiration  of  all  who  having  waged  war  did 
not  wish  it  to  begin  again.  It  was  President  Wilson's  sym- 
pathy with  this  aspiration  of  the  conscience  of  mankind 
that  accounted  for  the  immense  popularity  he  enjoyed  after 
the  Armistice.  Whatever  one  may  think  of  the  enactments 
embodied  in  Chapter  I  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles;  what- 


*See  Chapter  XIV,  pages  462-463. 


428     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

ever  one  may  think  of  the  terms  of  the  Covenant,  no  one 
can  deny  the  universal  aspiration  echoed  therein. 

What  does  the  result  amount  to!  France  though  often 
accused  of  systematic  hostility  to  the  League  of  Nations  has 
proved  by  her  acts  that  she  wanted  something  more  and 
something  better  than  the  Conference  gave.  France  it  was 
who  persistently  demanded  the  creation  of  an  international 
military  force,  the  organization  of  permanent  supervision 
over  national  Armies.  France  it  was  who  from  first  to 
last  urged  the  logical  and  clear  solution  without  which  the 
influence  of  any  League  of  Nations  is  necessarily,  restricted. 
The  French  proposals  were  rejected  by  the  very  Powers 
who  were  supposed  to  champion  the  idea  to  which  France 
was  represented  as  being  opposed.  To  tell  the  truth  the 
reception  accorded  by  the  United  States  Senate  to  a  milder 
Covenant  than  that  proposed  by  the  French  representa- 
tives, relieves  me  from  dwelling  upon  the  reasons  of  par- 
liamentary prudence  which  led  Mr.  Wilson  to  oppose  M. 
Leon  Bourgeois'  amendments. 

The  Covenant  is  a  timid  effort — though  thought  by  some 
to  be  too  daring — towards  an  improved  organization  of 
international  relations.  However  imperfect,  it  may  still 
serve  as  a  basis  for  future  solutions.  In  the  Sarre,  for 
instance,  it  has  already  given  positive  results.  To  be  sure, 
the  decision  of  the  United  States  Senate  deprived  the 
League  of  Nations  of  an  essential  element  of  authority; 
and  the  limitation  of  its  powers  justifies  M.  Clemenceau  in 
having  refused  to  look  upon  it  for  the  present  as  an  ade- 
quate guarantee.  But  the  way  is  clear  for  further  progress. 
In  what  direction  will  the  evolution  made  possible  by 
Article  26  of  the  Covenant  proceed?  It  would  be  rash  to 
form  a  judgment  in  advance.  But,  no  matter  how  real  the 
difficulty,  so  strongly  emphasized  by  the  policy  of  the 
United  States,  of  conciliating  a  supreme  international  law 
with  the  sovereignty  of  nations,  the  fact  remains  that  who- 
ever is  not  deaf  to  the  demands  of  the  future  must  by 
patient  labour  prepare  for  the  coming  of  such  a  law. 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  furnished  a  plan  which  though 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED        429 

incomplete  and  imperfect,  nevertheless  constitutes  the  first 
united  step  towards  world  legislation  taken  by  Govern- 
ments. This  also  emphasizes  the  liberal  tendency  which 
marks  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  It  has  been  said  that  this  ten- 
dency was  repudiated  at  the  very  moment  of  its  assertion 
by  the  fact  that  Germany  is  not  a  member  of  the  League. 
Who  does  not  feel  that  following  an  international  crime 
like  that  of  1914,  a  probationary  period  was  the  least  that 
could  be  demanded  of  its  perpetrator?  Not  one  of  the 
Powers  that  signed  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  but  hopes  to 
see  Germany  grow  worthy  by  reform  of  her  institutions 
and  of  her  mentality  to  become  a  member  of  the  league  of 
the  Nations  she  once  dreamed  of  enslaving.  But  that  time 
is  not  yet  come.  Two  years  after  the  Armistice  Germany 
showed  no  signs  of  repentance.  Bead  and  listen.  What 
do  we  find  ? 

Public  opinion  in  full  unrest,  dominated  by  skilfully 
nourished  hate  which  obstinately  hides  from  her  her  san- 
guinary responsibilities  and  the  nobility  and  value  of  vol- 
untary amends.  There  are  doubtless  a  few  men  here  and 
there  who  discern  the  abyss  of  disappointment  and  ruin 
into  which  Germany  will  be  plunged  by  the  survival  of  her 
detestable  warlike  spirit.  But  such  men  are  rare  exceptions. 
Doubtless  one  may  read  now  and  then  in  the  Sozialistichen 
Monatshefte  that  "the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France 
is  by  no  means  an  outrage  but  an  historic  act  of  justice," 
or  even  that  "it  is  only  right  to  call  upon  German  intellect- 
uals to  retract  the  famous  manifesto  of  the  ninety-three,  as 
irreconcilable  with  a  spirit  of  sincerity."  But  such  opinions 
are  lost  in  an  ocean  of  disappointed  ambitions,  passionate 
incomprehension,  and  bitter  jealousy.  Germany  is  in  the 
state  of  mind  of  a  gambler  who  is  a  bad  loser.  She  blames 
the  whole  world  for  the  fault  that  is  hers  alone.  France 
naturally  comes  in  for  a  goodly  portion  of  her  hate,  cen- 
turies of  history  are  behind  it.  Instead  of  trying  to  under- 
stand, she  is  satisfied  to  accuse.  There  is  no  place  in  such 
a  national  spirit  for  any  of  that  progress  which  might  be 
hoped  for,  if  a  little  light  could  penetrate  the  German  con- 


430     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

science.    This  nation  which  in  1914  believed  only  in  force 
now  believes  only  in  fraud. 

The  Treaty  recorded  this  and  was  framed  accordingly. 
Before  welcoming  Germany  those  who,  at  the  price  of  their 
blood,  averted  the  impending  danger  of  her  domination 
now  have  the  right  to  insist  upon  certainty.  And  in  such 
things  certainty  can  only  come  as  the  result  of  a  long  series 
of  acts.  The  key  to  Germany  *s  redemption  is  in  her  own 
hands.  It  is  only  fair  that  this  should  be  so.  The  justice 
of  the  peace  is  in  nowise  lessened  thereby. 

IV 

Such  are  the  political,  economic  and  social  bases  of  new 
France — of  that  France  who,  after  the  merciless  war 
waged  mainly  upon  her  soil,  wants  peace  and  work.  With 
these  she  is  sure  of  her  future — a  future  of  reconstruction, 
of  production  and  of  liberty.  But  it  is  not  enough  for  her 
that  that  future  be  assured,  she  needs  it  to  be  near.  And 
so  she  must  have  the  support  in  peace  of  those  who  stood 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  her  in  war.  I  add  that  the  unity 
she  demands  is  not  for  herself  alone,  but  is  essential  to  all. 

We  have  seen  for  months,  in  books  and  papers  published 
in  English — which  although  representing  only  a  minority 
in  their  respective  countries  form  nevertheless  a  noisy 
minority — an  accusation  against  France,  an  accusation 
of  imperialism,  so  vague,  so  indefinite,  so  venomous  and 
so  utterly  foolish,  that  I  blush  to  reply  to  it.  Imperialism  ? 
Where?  When?  Why?  France  is  the  oldest  of  European 
nations — the  nation  whose  moral  unity  is  strongest  and 
most  coherent.  And  so  she  has  no  need  of  artificial  stimu- 
lants, misused  by  others.  For  forty-three  years  she  pro- 
tested against  the  mutilation  of  1871.  Never  in  war  nor  in 
peace  has  she  dreamed  of  inflicting  such  mutilation  upon 
her  enemies.  France  victorious — I  ask  my  British  and 
American  friends  never  to  forget  it — has  placed  under  her 
sovereignty  no  single  human  being  who  was  not  French 
body  and  soul.  Within  the  frontiers  of  new  Europe  ethnic 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED       431 

minorities  have  here  and  there  been  included  for  reasons 
of  necessity  I  have  already  stated.  France  consented  to 
forego  any  such  tiling  and  in  a  district  like  the  Sarre,  con- 
siderable parts  of  which  had  been  French  for  centuries,  she 
accepted  a  plebiscite.  France  has  taken  no  undue  advan- 
tage of  her  power.  France  has  claimed  only  .her  rights. 
She  issues  from  Avar  bleeding  and  weakened,  but  true  to 
her  high  ideals. 

Imperialism?  The  threat  of  war?  France  more  than 
any  other  country  aspires  to  permanent  peace.  Those  who 
say  the  contrary  are  either  agents  of  Germany  or,  if  they 
speak  in  good  faith,  know  nothing  of  what  France  has  suf- 
fered. They  should  see  our  ruined  towns;  our  devastated 
fields ;  our  pillaged  factories ;  they  should  visit  our  French 
families  mourning  1,400,000  of  their  dead.  Then  they  will 
understand  that  a  nation  which  has  suffered  thus  from 
war  is  for  all  time  the  enemy  of  war. 

Imperialism?  People  say  this  because  French  troops 
are  to  be  seen  in  the  four  corners  of  Europe — not  only  on 
the  Rhine,  but  in  Schleswig,  Upper  Silesia  and  Carinthia. 
Let  those  who  make  this  reproach  in  England  and  in  Amer- 
ica consult  their  own  consciences !  The  Treaty,  because  it 
had  to,  provided  an  international  police  force  for  those  ter- 
ritories, the  future  of  which  was  to  be  decided  by  popular 
vote,  an  international  force  to  be  supplied  by  all  the  Powers. 
The  United  States  did  not  ratify  it.  Great  Britain  shirked, 
as  in  Upper  Silesia,  the  duty  she  had  undertaken.  France 
was  left  alone,  or  almost  alone  with  Italy,  to  perform  the 
ungrateful  task  of  policeman  of  justice,  thus  setting  an 
example  of  perfect  loyalty  to  their  pledged  faith.  To 
reproach  them  for  this  would  in  some  cases  be  even  more 
thoughtless  than  unjust.  France  has  taken  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  seriously,  just  as  she  took  the  war.  If  others  have 
done  otherwise  is  France  to  blame? 

Imperialism?  In  the  last  analysis  it  means  that  the 
French  people  demand  the  enforcement  of  the  Treaty  which 
put  an  end  to  the  war.  That  is  the  real  complaint  against 
France !  To  this  charge  of  Imperialism  France  can  proudly 


432     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

plead  "Not  guilty;"  for  it  is  France  who  here  stands  for 
justice  and  truth.  When  after  six  months  of  discussion  an 
agreement  has  been  signed  in  which  each  party  to  secure 
essential  unanimity  sacrificed  some  of  its  demands,  it 
would  be  doubly  immoral  to  go  back  on  the  pledged  word ; 
immoral  because  when  millions  of  men  have  died  to  insure 
respect  of  Treaties,  Governments,  for  whom  victory  was 
won  by  these  fallen  heroes,  cannot  adopt  the  "scrap  of 
paper"  attitude  without  dishonour;  immoral  because  sac- 
rifices made  to  the  principle  of  unanimity  would  be  worth- 
less if,  once  the  Treaty  came  into  force,  its  clauses  were  to 
be  open  to  discussion.  Two  instances:  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  on  June  28,  1919,  promised  France  their 
military  assistance  in  the  event  of  aggression  by  Germany. 
Neither  of  these  undertakings  has,  for  reasons  that  are 
known,  come  into  force.  Is  France  to  be  accused  of  Impe- 
rialism because  she  now  declares,  on  the  strength  of  Article 
429  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,*  that  under  this  circum- 
stance; she  will  not  evacuate  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine? 
All  the  Allies  have  promised  each  other  full  and  complete 
support  for  the  enforcement  of  the  financial  clauses  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace.  One  of  them  by  its  failure  to  ratify  the 
Treaty  is  not  officially  represented  on  the  Reparations 
Commission  and  another  from  month  to  month  suggests 
subversion  of  France's  rights.  Is  France  to  be  accused  of 
Imperialism  if,  holding  to  the  Treaty,  she  insists  by  every 
means  at  her  disposal,  that  Germany  shall  make  good  what 
she  has  destroyed? 

France  and  her  people,  which  some  of  our  Press  for 
political  reasons  depict  as  embittered  and  discouraged,  are 
at  work !  Since  1914,  the  real  France  has  been  made  clear 
in  the  eyes  of  men.  Alone,  almost  unaided,  she  halted  the 
Germans  at  the  Marne;  she  lost  1,364,000  killed,  740,000 
mutilated,  3,000,000  wounded  and  490,000  prisoners;  she 
had  at  the  front  in  the  fifty-second  month  of  the  war, 
350,000  more  men  than  in  1914;  she  contrived  despite  the 
loss  of  eighty-five  per  cent,  of  the  metallurgic  resources 


'See  Chapter  VI,  pages  209-212. 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFORCED        433 

of  the  country,  to  increase  the  output  of  war  material  by 
nearly  1,500  per  cent.;  in  two  years  since  the  Armistice, 
despite  the  burden  of  a  debt  increased  from  35,000  millions 
to  255,000  millions,  she  has  spent  20,000  millions  on  recon- 
struction and  returned  to  their  homes  seventy-five  per  cent, 
of  the  people  driven  away  by  invasion.  That  in  ten  lines  is 
what  France  has  done.  To  lack  faith  in  themselves  the 
French  would  have  to  forget  what  they  have  done.  So 
there  can  be  no  question  of  their  recovery.  France  will 
recover.  But  she  is  determined  to  recover  quickly  and 
not  to  bend  for  fifty  years  beneath  the  burden  which  a  just 
peace  has  placed  upon  other  shoulders.  It  is  of  vital 
importance  to  France  in  her  present  revival  to  gain  thirty 
or  forty  years.  It  is  this  vital  importance  which  makes 
essential  the  enforcement  of  the  peace ;  the  placing  of  Ger- 
many in  a  position  in  which  she  can  do  no  further  harm; 
the  payment  by  Germany  for  what  she  has  destroyed.  It  is 
this  vital  importance  which  in  honour  binds  the  Allies  of 
France  to  aid  her  in  these  things.  Will  it  be  difficult? 
Yes,  doubtless,  but  life  is  a  struggle.  There  will  be  resist- 
ance by  the  Germans!  Yes,  again.  But  is  the  past  so 
quickly  forgotten?  Is  the  last  fortnight  of  June,  1919,  for- 
gotten?* Is  Count  von  Brockdorff's  resistance  forgotten 
with  its  accompaniment  of  loud  protest  ?  Is  that  monstrous 
bluff  forgotten  which,  but  for  M.  Clemenceau,  would  have 
been  entirely  successful?  Forgotten  also  in  presence  of 
the  firmness  of  the  Allies,  first  the  hesitation,  then  the 
lowered  tone ;  and  soon  the  change  of  teams,  the  arrival  of 
MM.  Muller  and  Bell  and  finally  the  signing?  Germany 
will  always  be  ready  to  change  teams  if  the  Allies  do  not 
change  principles. 

Addressing  the  French  Parliament,  M.  Clemenceau 
made  a  statement  on  this  subject  which  all  the  victors  should 
read,  learn  and  digest. 

"A  cataclysm,"  he  said,  "has  overtaken  the  world You 

must  not  think  that  after  such  an  upheaval  we  are  going  to  bring 


*See  Chapter  III,  pages  120-122. 


434     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

you  pages  of  writing,  which  one  after  the  other  will  be  voted, 
approved  and  ratified  by  the  Chambers  and  that  that  will  be  the 
end  of  it  and  we  shall  all  be  able  to  go  home ;  all  wrongs  in  process 
of  being  righted,  all  precautions  taken  against  a  new  outbreak  and 
everybody  able  to  say:  Verily  we  have  a  paper!  Now  we  can 
sleep !  Well !  Nothing  of  the  kind !  The  life  of  mankind  is  not  a 
life  of  sleep ! 

"Life  is  but  a  struggle.  That  struggle  you  can  never  get  rid  of. 
My  idea  of  life  is  a  perpetual  conflict  whether  in  war  or  in  peace. 
I  think  it  was  Bernhardi  who  said :  'War  is  but  politics  pursued  in 
another  manner. '  We  can  reverse  the  aphorism  and  say :  '  Peace  is 
but  war  pursued  in  another  manner.' 

"When  a  treaty  comes  before  you,  a  treaty  which  has  I  don't 
know  how  many  hundred  clauses  dealing  with  all  kinds  of  ques- 
tions, you  must  not  forget  that  these  so  complex  provisions  will  be 
of  worth  only  by  what  you  do.  The  Treaty  will  be  what  you  make  it. 

"If  you  go  to  peace  joyfully,  as  our  men  went  to  war,  you  will 
give  it  life ;  you  will  make  it  worth  while,  you  will  make  it  of  serv- 
ice to  mankind. 

1 '  If  you  waste  time  thinking  of  things  which  may  never  happen, 
of  things  that  men  of  law  love  to  write  books  about,  what  will  hap- 
pen ?  You  will  discredit  the  Treaty,  you  will  discourage  those  who 
won  the  victory ;  you  will  make  them  believe  that  you  are  incapable 
of  realizing  a  peace  that  insures  safety. 

"When  you  will  have  done  this  fine  thing,  yeu  will  be  able  to 
praise  yourselves — nobody  else  will.  The  Treaty  will  be  voted  or 
will  not  be  voted.  But  you  will  have  given  your  country  a  thing  of 
death  instead  of  a  thing  of  life.  And  if  you  have  thought  for  a 
moment  that  we  have  been  able  to  make  a  peace  which  will  do  away 
with  the  need  for  watchfulness  between  the  nations  of  Europe 
which  only  yesterday  were  shedding  their  blood  without  stint  upon 
every  front,  well  then  it  means  that  you  are  unable  to  under- 
stand us ! " 

The  fundamental  truth  dwells  in  these  strong  words. 
We  have  no  choice,  nor  have  our  Allies.  If  we  want  the  war 
and  the  victory  to  bear  fruit,  we  must  cleave  to  the  soul 
of  the  Alliance.  This  is  not  alone  a  moral  duty;  it  is  an 
essential  fact.  Those  unwieldy  bodies  at  which  it  is  the 
fashion  to  scoff,  League  of  Nations,  Reparations  Commis- 
sion, Military  Supervisory  Commission,  are  the  means  to 


HOW  THE  PEACE  IS  BEING  ENFOKCED       435 

achieve  our  end.  They  are  the  concrete  expression  of 
essential  unity.  It  is  their  duty  to  bring  it  to  pass.  If  they 
do  not,  the  Treaty  will  not  be  enforced  and,  as  time  goes 
on  and  Germany  after  a  half  century  recovers  from  her 
defeat,  all  the  old  perils  of  before  the  war  will  arise  again 
for  all  of  us,  with  bankruptcy  into  the  bargain.  I  say  all  the 
old  perils  and  I  mean  it.  For  France  it  would  again  be  the 
direct  threat  to  her  national  independence.  But  for  Italy 
also,  and  Belgium  and  Great  Britian — even  for  the  United 
States — the  German  danger  in  all  its  insidious  and  pene- 
trating forms  would  soon  reappear  in  economics,  politics 
and  morals.  If  the  unity  of  the  Allies  be  broken,  Germany 
will  begin  again.  It  is  on  the  continent  that  Great  Britain 
must  defend  herself  against  the  German  danger.  It  is  in 
Europe  that  the  United  States  finds  its  safeguard  against 
the  same  danger.  Isolated  from  the  others  no  one  of  the 
victors  would  be  certain  to  overcome  the  resistance  which 
Germany  is  already  preparing.  Doubtless,  as  Koosevelt 
said,  it  is  simpler  for  each  to  live  at  home,  like  a  small 
tradesman  in  a  little  shop,  than  to  work  together.  But  the 
obligations  of  the  war  survive  our  military  triumph  and 
impose  the  same  duties. 

Consider  France  in  all  her  glorious  and  bloodstained 
history.  It  was  France  who  taught  the  world  justice.  And 
to  justice  she  remains  faithful.  Her  conception  of  the  rules 
governing  the  relations  of  individuals  is  that  which  the 
masses  aspire  to  see  extended  in  the  future  to  relations 
between  nations.  France  it  was  who  proclaimed  the 
higher  ideals  of  freedom  of  thought,  equality  of  citizens, 
abolition  of  privileges  and  respect  of  human  dignity.  Con- 
sider France  in  1914,  taken  unawrares  by  sudden  invasion, 
fighting  for  her  life  sans  peur  et  sans  reproche.  Con- 
sider her  people  standing  together  more  than  four  years  in 
the  most  desperate  struggle  of  all  history;  a  people  mild 
and  strong,  unselfish  to  excess,  capable  of  mistakes  costly 
to  itself  alone ;  industrious  as  none  other ;  liberal,  wise  and 
free,  above  all  loving  justice.  Foreigners  too  often  judge 
France  bv  the  excesses  of  isolated  individuals  who  do  not 


436     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

represent  the  nation.  The  nation  lives  on — eternal  in  its 
pure  and  noble  spirit.  France  is  a  democracy  which  has 
not  forgotten  what  autocracy  cost  it,  in  1815  as  in  1871. 
France  is  a  democracy  which  conscious  of  itself  is  deter- 
mined to  be  true  to  itself  and  often — as  very  truly  said  by 
an  American,  Mr.  Morton  Fullerton — expresses  as  French 
ideals,  those  general  ideals  which  civilization  could  not 
repudiate  without  danger. 

France  asks  one  thing  only — that  the  pledged  word  be 
kept.  While  demanding  it  and  refusing  to  abandon  hope  of 
obtaining  it,  is  she  idle  and  mourning,  a  prey  to  despair? 
No !  She  is  working,  without  outside  aid,  to  rebuild  and  to 
reorganize  after  the  unheard-of  ordeal  through  which  she 
has  passed ;  to  rebuild  and  to  reorganize  for  her  own  safety 
and  for  the  safety  of  the  whole  world.  This  country  is  my 
country.  Like  all  Frenchmen,  I  have  the  right  to  be  proud 
of  her,  lovingly  proud.  But  in  this  book  I  have  confined 
myself  to  facts,  to  figures,  to  documents,  the  stern  evidence 
of  which  I  place  before  the  consciences  of  the  British  and 
American  peoples. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

FRANCE,   GREAT   BRITAIN  AND   THE   UNITED  STATES 

FRANCE  and  Great  Britain  were  the  two  pillars  of  vic- 
tory. But  for  the  French  Army  and  the  British  Fleet,  Ger- 
many would  have  won  the  war.  That  is  the  dominant  fact 
of  the  age  in  which  we  live.  If  our  two  countries  ever  came 
to  forget  it  they  would  be  pulling  down  with  their  own 
hands  the  structure  cemented  by  their  blood. 

This  friendship,  so  strong  and  true,  is  at  times  difficult 
of  practice.  The  past  accounts  for  that.  History  has  now 
and  then  recorded  Franco-British  agreements.  But  as  a 
rule  they  have  had  no  morrow.  In  1801  the  people  of  Lon- 
don cheered  Bonaparte 's  envoy,  Colonel  de  Lauriston,  come 
to  ratify  peace,  but  a  few  months  later,  war  broke  out  again 
and  lasted  until  Waterloo.  In  1838  the  city  enthusiastically 
welcomed  Marechal  Soult,  the  Ambassador  of  Louis-Phil- 
ippe at  Queen  Victoria's  coronation;  but,  less  than  two 
years  later  came  the  crisis  of  1840.  Under  Napoleon  III 
English  and  French  troops  together  won  the  Crimean  war, 
but  this  alliance  did  not  last  and,  in  1860,  Queen  Victoria 
advised  "a  regular  crusade  against  France."  One  of  our 
historians,  Albert  Sorel,  wrote  thirty  years  ago:  "There 
may  be — there  have  been — understandings  between  France 
and  England  to  preserve  the  existing  order;  but  England 
never  has  been  and  never  can  be  an  ally  of  France  so  long 
as  France  does  not  renounce  expansion."  Lord  Chatham, 
a  century  earlier  had  expressed  the  same  idea  in  another 
form  when  he  said:  "The  only  thing  England  has  to  fear 
here  below  is  to  see  France  become  a  commercial  and  colo- 
nial maritime  power."  For  a  century  and  a  half,  from 
1688  to  1815,  sixty-one  years  of  war — the  war  of  the  Augs- 

437 


438 

burg  League  (1688-1697),  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succes- 
sion (1701-1711),  the  war  of  the  Austrian  Succession  (1742- 
1748),  the  Seven  Years  War  (1756-1763),  the  American 
War  (1778-1783),  the  wars  of  the  Eevolution  and  of  the 
Empire,  (1793-1815) — pitted  France  and  England  against 
each  other.  Wars  separated  by  periods  of  precarious 
peace,  and  in  peace  deep  and  mutual  distrust.  Such  was 
the  law  of  the  past. 

Circumstances  on  the  one  hand,  the  will  of  a  man  of 
genius  on  the  other,  modified  this  situation  which  seemed 
destined  by  historical  fates  to  last  forever.  After  a  cen- 
tury in  which  Algeria,  Tunis,  Western  and  Central  Africa, 
the  Niger,  the  Congo,  Madagascar,  Oceania,  Indo-China, 
Egypt,  Morocco,  had  in  swift  succession  brought  the  two 
countries  into  conflict,  less  than  ten  years  sufficed  to  estab- 
lish, consolidate  and  seal  their  entente  011  the  field  of  bat- 
tle. For  after  1870,  Great  Britain  understood  that  Germany, 
not  France,  threatened  the  British  Empire ;  for  Queen  Vic- 
toria, ever  respectful  of  insular  traditions,  had  been  suc- 
ceeded in  the  person  of  Edward  VII,  by  a  sovereign  who 
had  direct  experience,  and  personal  information  of  mod- 
ern political  developments.  Bismarck  after  his  victory  had 
tried  to  bolster  up  Anglo-German  friendship,  the  neces- 
sary complement  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  He  had  suc- 
ceeded. "I  am  English  in  Egypt,"  he  said  one  day.  And 
a  few  months  later,  he  added:  "England  is  worth  more  to 
us  than  Zanzibar  and  the  whole  East  Coast  of  Africa." 

William  II  and  Prince  von  Billow  were  less  prudent. 
Europe  was  too  small  for  their  ambitions  and  not  content 
with  territorial  gains  and  political  supremacy  there,  they 
were  determined  that  Germany's  future  should  be  upon 
the  sea.  In  a  few  years  under  their  impulse  cousin  "land- 
rat"  began  to  navigate,  to  trade,  to  conquer.  Germany's 
foreign  commerce  rose  from  7,000  millions  in  1892  to  15,000 
millions  in  1906 ;  her  naval  fleet  from  9  battle-ships  in  1898 
to  70  battle-ships  and  cruisers  in  1913.  Thus,  as  her  Chan- 
cellor said,  Germany  prepared  to  "go  forth  into  the  world, 
sword  in  one  hand,  spade  and  trowel  in  the  other. ' '  Thus, 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          439 

she  asserted  her  intention  to  create  a  "Greater  Germany." 
In  all  respects  and  with  extraordinary  rapidity  she  became 
a  world  power,  justifying  Treitschke's  proud  prophecy: 
"When  the  German  flag  protects  a  vast  Empire,  to  whom 
will  the  scepter  of  the  universe  belong?  Will  it  not  be 
Germany's  mission  to  assure  the  peace  of  the  world?" 
England,  which  in  1870  had  had  no  premonition  of  this 
peril,  now  saw  it  arising  at  her  doors.  German  expansion 
changed  the  fundamental  conditions  of  world  politics.  A 
new  era  was  opened  by  it. 

This  new  era  called  for  a  new  policy,  and  to  this  policy 
England  came  but  with  hesitation  and  in  a  roundabout  man- 
ner. It  was  in  1885  that  her  merchants,  then  little  heeded, 
for  the  first  time  called  attention  to  the  economic  menace 
of  Germany.  It  was  only  fifteen  years  later  that  seeing 
this  menace  invade  the  whole  world,  besiege  the  markets, 
cut  the  sea-lanes  and  add  political  pretensions  to  commer- 
cial ambition,  Great  Britian  or  more  accurately  her  king, 
felt  the  necessity  of  reversing  her  alliance. 

"We  cannot,"  said  Edward  VII,  "remain  indefinitely 
at  the  mercy  of  the  German  hold-up." 

This  phrase  is  the  birth-certificate  of  what  has  come 
to  be  known  as  the  Entente  Cordiale.  For,  once  it  was 
decided  to  oppose  German  plans  for  supremacy,  an  under- 
standing with  France  was  obligatory.  Paradoxical  from 
the  point  of  view  of  past  habits,  this  rapprochement  was 
unassailable  from  that  of  practical  politics.  The  Repub- 
lic, it  is  true,  had  given  our  country  an  immense  colonial 
empire.  But,  in  1904  any  alarm  felt  over  this  expansion  in 
England  was  a  thing  of  the  past  and  France's  peaceful 
intentions  had  too  often  been  proved  by  her  acts,  to  per- 
mit London  to  have  a  misgiving  as  to  the  future.  Eco- 
nomically, Anglo-French  relations  had  always  been  active 
and  cordial.  They  were  susceptible  of  still  further  develop- 
ment on  the  basis  of  complementary  exchanges.  Politically 
the  object  was  the  same — the  peaceful  organization  of  a 
well-balanced  Europe,  freed  from  German  hegemony. 
Despite  numerous  objections,  Edward  VII  had  the  courage 


440     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

to  play  his  cards.  In  May,  1903,  he  came  to  Paris — an 
imprudent  visit,  some  thought.  He  was  welcomed  and  in 
the  following  August  the  conversations  began.  It  was  not 
attempted  at  this  first  meeting  to  formulate  any  general 
policy  but  merely  to  settle  outstanding  controversies.  In 
April,  1904,  this  settlement  was  accompli  shed ;  Morocco, 
Egypt  and  Newfoundland  supplied  its  main  features. 

For  France  this  agreement,  no  matter  how  limited  in 
general  effectiveness,  came  at  the  right  time.  It  was  on  the 
eve  of  the  Eussian  defeat  in  Manchuria.  English  friend- 
ship thus  asserted  itself  at  a  time  of  semi-isolation.  There 
was  of  course  no  question  of  political  alliance,  still  less  of 
military  undertakings.  All  that  was  done  was  to  show  the 
world  that  we  could  converse  and  eliminate  local  points 
of  friction.  But  this  in  itself  changed  the  essential  fac- 
tors of  the  European  problem.  Bismarck's  hope  some 
day  to  see  a  collision  between  the  "English  and  French 
engines,"  was  dashed.  The  principal  instrument  of  Ger- 
man domination  was  broken.  By  the  Anglo-French  rap- 
prochement Europe  eager  for  peace  could  turn  in  peace 
towards  equality  and  equilibrium.  If  Germany  had  been 
willing  to  cooperate,  a  long  stability  would  have  ensued. 
But  Germany  was  not  willing  to  cooperate.  First  in  1905, 
in  Morocco,  then  in  the  Orient  she  began  her  threats  and 
her  bluster  which  by  pressure  and  counter-pressure  led  to 
the  war  of  1914.  I  have  given  at  the  beginning  of  this 
book  the  logical  sequence  of  events  and  will  not  go  over  this 
ground  again  here.  I  will  confine  myself  to  the  evolution 
and  strengthening  of  the  Anglo-French  relations  under 
this  German  influence.  Another  link  was  formed  in  1908 
after  the  Casablanca  incident.  Another  in  1909  after  the 
Bosnian  affair.  Still  a  third  in  1911  after  Agadir.  Then 
occurred  the  first  conferences  between  the  two  General 
Staffs,  which  as  I  have  already  shown  still  avoided  any 
positive  engagement.  The  two  countries,  fully  conscious  of 
the  necessity  of  an  agreement  but  keeping  free  from  all 
promises,  continued  thus  to  feel  their  way  down  to  1914. 
On  the  evening  of  the  very  day  when  the  first  Germans 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  441 

crossed  the  French  frontier,  Great  Britain  still  reserved 
her  decision.  The  next  day  she  merely  promised  to  bar 
the  Channel  to  any  attack  by  the  German  fleet  against 
the  French  coast.  The  day  following,  however,  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgium  brought  the  British  Empire  to  the  rescue 
of  the  scrap  of  paper  and  for  fifty-two  months  was  forged 
between  the  two  countries  that  complete  unity  whose  tri- 
umph was  crowned  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

Such  are  the  remote  origins  of  our  present  relations. 
They  shed  light  to  some  extent  on  the  difficulties  which 
beset  both  in  war  and  in  peace  this  indispensable  friend- 
ship. "England  is  an  island,"  said  Michelet,  "and  that 
explains  her  whole  history."  England  is  an  island  and 
that  island  for  centuries  has  accustomed  itself  to  fear 
everything  from  the  isthmus  to  the  shores  of  which  are  held 
by  France.  Royal  jealousies,  Napoleonic  wars,  colonial  con- 
flicts have  since  the  Middle  Ages  poisoned  the  atmosphere 
in  which,  for  the  salvation  of  the  world,  trust  and  friend- 
ship were  henceforth  to  flourish.  There  was  friction. 
There  were  collisions.  But  yet  together  and  for  five  and 
a  half  years  France  and  Great  Britain  bore  the  brunt  of 
the  hardest  of  wars  and  the  most  exacting  of  peaces. 
Together  they  defended  the  land  and  held  the  seas. 
Together  they  beat  Germany.  That  makes  it  worth  while  to 
continue,  and  when  incidents  arise  to  search  our  souls 
together,  for  that  alone  will  make  continuance  possible.  It 
is  as  necessary  to-day  in  peace  as  it  was  yesterday  in  time 
of  war.  What  would  this  peace  amount  to  in  the  present 
state  of  Europe  if  France  and  Great  Britain,  forgetting 
the  work  they  had  accomplished  in  common,  were  no 
longer  to  stand,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  to  assure  its  main- 
tenance and  enforcement? 

Great  Britain's  role  in  the  war  was  enormous.  Without 
speaking  of  the  courage  of  her  soldiers  who  from  month  to 
month  made  magnificent  strides  both  in  quantity  and  qual- 
ity, her  fleet  which  bottled  up  the  German  Navy  in  its 
ports,  enabled  the  Allies  to  live,  to  arm,  to  gather  strength 
and  to  win.  This  inestimable  service  Great  Britain 


442     THE  TBUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

crowned  by  transporting  in  her  vessels,  during  the  last 
eight  months  of  the  war,  seventy  per  cent,  of  the  American 
Army.  Throughout  the  war  France  and  Great  Britain 
adhered  loyally  to  the  declaration  of  September,  1914,  and 
were  always  united  as  to  the  end  to  be  attained.  But  as  to 
means  to  be  employed  what  disagreements  arose!  I  took 
part  in  most  of  those  discussions  and  I  remember  especially 
those  at  Versailles  and  in  London  in  the  summer  of  1918. 
If  I  recall  them  here,  it  is  to  throw  light  upon  more  recent 
discussion;  to  show  public  opinion  in  both  countries  that 
these  discussions  were  in  no  way  unprecedented  or  unex- 
pected; drive  home  into  English  and  French  brain  alike 
this  fundamental  idea  that  relations  will  never  be  easy 
between  the  two  peoples  because  we  neither  think  nor  feel 
in  the  same  way  and  also  because  the  difficulty  in  reaching 
agreements  lies  much  less  in  the  nature  of  the  problems  to 
be  solved  than  in  the  diversity  of  national  temperaments. 
The  history  of  the  war  proved  this.  And  how  much  more 
the  history  of  peace? 

The  preceding  chapters  have  hidden  nothing  of  the  heat 
of  our  discussions.  What  caused  this  heat  ?  Opposition  of 
principles?  No.  But  over  the  application  of  every  princi- 
ple arose  difficulties  due  to  differences  of  mental  pro- 
cess and  to  divergent  traditions.  Do  you  want  an  extreme, 
coarse  and  even  distorted  expression  of  these  divergences? 
Then  read  Mr.  Keynes'  book.  But  when  you  read  it,  do 
not  forget  that  the  contradictions  he  exaggerates  to  such  an 
absurd  extent  really  existed,  though  in  much  less  degree. 
The  Englishman  in  his  island  behind  his  walls  of  water  is 
incapable,  whatever  he  does,  of  grasping  the  point  of  view 
of  the  French  with  the  open  frontier  twice  violated  in  fifty 
years;  and  there  you  have — in  its  essential  causes — the 
long  discussion  over  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  The  Eng- 
lishman who  has  not  like  France  had  to  defend  himself  for 
fifteen  centuries  against  German  attacks,  treats  war  as  a 
sport  and  is  inclined  to  say  when  it  is  over,  " Let's  shake 
hands  and  make  it  up. ' '  Hence  the  serious  misunderstand- 
,ing  over  the  conditions  necessary  to  the  admission  of  Ger- 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  443 

many  into  the  League  of  Nations.  The  Englishman  who 
has  suffered  little  in  the  course  of  his  history  from  the 
troubles  brought  upon  Europe  by  German  ambitions,  hates 
the  Slavs  who  have  been  his  rivals  both  in  the  Balkans  and 
in  Asia :  the  Englishman  understands  nothing  of  the  instinc- 
tive policy  of  France  which,  from  Louis  XV  to  M.  de  Frey- 
cinet,  has  sought  in  Eastern  Europe  a  counter-weight  to 
German  power:  and  there  we  have  the  great  quarrel  over 
Dantzig  and  Upper  Silesia  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  deaf 
to  the  arguments  of  M.  Clemenceau  and  of  Mr.  Wilson, 
grudges  to  Poland.  The  Englishman  despite  the  heavy 
taxes  he  imposed  upon  himself  during  the  war,  despite  the 
election  promises  of  1913 — "Germany  will  pay  to  the  last 
farthing" — did  not  attach  the  same  supreme  importance  to 
reparations  as  did  devastated  France.  British  shipping 
sunk  has  been  replaced  by  new  construction  and  paid  for, 
in  large  part,  by  Allied  or  neutral  cargoes.  Not  a  foot  of 
English  soil  served  as  a  battlefield.  So  to  settle  a  monot- 
onous controversy  England  is  ready  for  lump  sum  solutions 
and  debt  reductions  which  represent  a  tolerable  bur- 
den for  her  but  mean  bankruptcy  for  France ;  and  here  we 
have  the  whole  gist  of  the  financial  discussion  which  I  have 
outlined  above  and  which,  beginning  before  the  Treaty  was 
signed,  has  continued  to  grow  once  it  came  into  force.  I 
might  give  other  instances  but  the  result  would  always  be 
the  same. 

These  problems  so  lengthily  discussed  in  1919  were  set- 
tled in  almost  every  instance  as  France  suggested.  I  have 
told  in  detail  of  the  two  great  Franco-British  crises  at  the 
Conference — the  first  in  March  before  the  Treaty  was 
handed  to  the  Germans,  the  second  in  June  after  that  event. 
I  have  quoted  in  full  the  French  Note  of  April  2,  in  which 
M.  Clemenceau  said  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George:  "If  you  find  the 
peace  too  harsh,  let  us  give  Germany  back  her  colonies  and 
her  fleet,  and  let  us  not  impose  upon  the  continental  nations 
alone — France,  Belgium,  Bohemia  and  Poland — the  terri- 
torial concessions  required  to  appease  the  beaten  aggres- 
sor. ' '  I  have  shown  that  a  fortnight  later  France  received 


444    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

full  satisfaction  on  all  these  points.  Why?  Because 
instead  of  entering  into  endless  bargainings,  she  had 
appealed  on  the  principle  itself  to  the  inner  conscience  and 
honour  of  the  British  delegates.  To  preserve  towards  Ger- 
many the  authority  of  the  Allies  by  continuity  of  their 
common  policy;  to  enforce  a  Treaty  which  appeals  to  all 
the  Allies  and  not  to  Germany  only  as  a  just  peace;  to 
remember  that  the  Treaty  being  a  compromise  no  one  of 
its  clauses  can  be  modified  without  jeopardizing  the  whole 
structure — such  were  yesterday  the  essential  conditions  of 
the  re-establishment  of  order  in  the  world ;  to-morrow  they 
will  be  just  as  essential. 

It  was  thus  and  thus  only  that  maintaining  Franco- 
British  friendship  and  even  sealing  it  by  an  agreement 
unparalleled  in  British  history  M.  Clemenceau  made  our 
French  contentions  prevail.  He  did  this  by  moral  influ- 
ence to  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  never  remained  insen- 
sible. The  British  Minister,  so  impulsive  and  at  times  so 
quick  to  take  offense,  was  often  swayed  by  his  French  col- 
league to  whom  he  bore  real  affection  and  respect.  In  the 
most  trying  days  of  the  Peace  Conference  it  was  never  in 
vain  that  M.  Clemenceau  reminded  him  of  the  trying  days 
of  the  war.  M.  Clemenceau 's  appeals  were  made  not  in 
official  discussion  rendered  formal  by  the  necessary  pres- 
ence of  an  interpreter,  but  man  to  man,  in  personal  talks 
where  plain  truths  forcefully  stated  mingled  with  appeals 
that  swayed  the  heart,  where  the  fire  of  the  old  Celt  melted 
the  stubborn  Welshman  out  of  his  British  prejudices  and, 
if  I  may  use  the  expression,  "disinsularized"  him.  Besides 
a  French  atmosphere  pervaded  the  discussion,  the  atmos- 
phere of  the  near-by  battlefields  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
frequently  visited.  Our  contact  with  our  Allies  was  direct 
and  permanent.  The  familiarity  of  long  effort  in  common 
permitted  us  to  approach  them  at  all  hours,  to  prepare  at 
dawn  the  work  of  the  day  and  in  the  evening  to  consolidate 
the  results. 

Laborious  and  difficult,  this  peace  was  made  and, 
despite  so  many  disagreements,  Great  Britain  and  France 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  445 

both  placed  their  signatures  to  the  Treaty  in  a  neutral 
spirit  of  abiding  and  warm  friendship.  Since  the  coming 
into  force  of  the  Treaty  what  has  become  of  this  cordial 
unity?  The  history  of  1920  must  answer  that  question! 

II 

This  history  is  all  contained  in  two  facts.  France, 
though  armed  with  the  Treaty,  accepted  in  1920  the  Eng- 
lish contentions  she  had  rejected  in  1919;  and  in  spite  of 
these  concessions,  repugnant  to  her  interest  and  to  her 
right,  she  has  not  retained  the  cordial  intimacy  which  M. 
Clemenceau  had  succeeded  in  giving  to  Franco-British 
relations  in  1919  while  firmly  refusing  the  things  his  suc- 
cessors have  consented  to.  Surrender  of  war  criminals; 
economic  memorandum;  occupation  of  Frankfort;  repa- 
rations; conferences  at  San  Remo,  Hythe,  Boulogne,  and 
Spa;  nearly  always  France  gives  way  but  every  time 
confidence  dwindles,  French  delegates  returning  from 
these  meetings  bitterly  exclaiming:  "We  were  undone!  Yet 
we  had  to  give  way  in  order  to  save  the  Entente."  And 
the  Entente  itself  for  which  so  much  had  been  sacrificed 
seemed  less  cordial  and  less  certain  after  each  meeting ! 

The  development  of  such  a  state  of  mind  is  a  dangerous 
thing!  Let  me  say  with  all  the  emphasis  at  my  command 
that  it  is  unfair  to  France,  unfair  to  Great  Britain  and 
harmful  to  both.  It  is  unfair  to  France.  The  splendour 
of  her  war  effort;  the  moderation  of  her  peace  demands; 
the  magnitude  of  her  sacrifices  entitled  France  to  make 
her  voice  heard  especially  when  she  is  in  the.  right.  It  is 
unfair  to  Great  Britain.  Obdurate  as  she  may  be  in  busi- 
ness matters,  selfish  as  she  often  is,  Great  Britain  for  five 
long  and  tragic  years  was  deaf  neither  to  the  appeals  of 
sentiment  nor  of  reason.  But  for  Great  Britain  to  hear 
she  must  be  spoken  to  in  a  way  she  understands.  If  we 
speak  to  her  face  to  face — as  friend  to  friend — we  can 
speak  strongly,  we  can  speak  "after  the  manner  of  the 
English,  in  straight  flung  words  and  few."  If  we  speak 


446    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

rightly  and  at  the  right  time  we  are  certain  to  make  our 
point  and  to  overcome  prejudice  and  egotism.  But  speak 
we  must.  Four  and  a  half  years  of  war  and  fifteen  months 
of  peace  negotiations  warrant  this  assertion.  Those  who, 
like  myself,  have  lived  through  those  six  eventful  years 
refuse  to  admit  that  in  a  few  short  weeks  the  respective 
situations  of  either  of  the  two  great  nations  or  of  their 
Governments  can  have  undergone  the  complete  change 
which  the  events  of  1920  would  seem  to  indicate. 

Difficulties  and  disagreements  between  France  and  Eng- 
land? There  have  been  many;  there  are  some  to-day  and 
there  always  will  be  some.  But  there  was  a  time  when  these 
differences  were  composed  by  reason,  far  from  the  enemy's 
sight  and  without  any  sacrifice  of  prestige  by  either  of  the 
principals.  When  in  1917  England  contemplated  the  evac- 
uation of  Salonica ;  when,  in  1918,  she  advocated  the  short- 
sighted policy  of  reducing  the  number  of  her  divisions  in 
France  from  sixty  to  forty ;  when,  at  the  beginning  of  1919, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  said:  "To  make  Germany  sign,  let  us 
humour  her,"  and  M.  Clemenceau  replied:  "It  is  not  for  us 
in  the  presence  of  a  defeated  aggressor  to  ask  pardon  for 
our  victory;"  when  England  would  agree  neither  to  the 
occupation  of  the  Rhine  nor  to  the  wresting  of.  Upper  Si- 
lesia and  Dantzig  from  Germany;  when  after  having 
declared  "Germany  shall  pay  for  everything,"  she  sug- 
gested in  the  following  month  of  June  the  fixing  of  a  cer- 
tain lump  sum  which  would  have  crippled  the  claim  for 
reparations ;  or  when  she  proposed  meeting  Lenine  's  dele- 
gates in  Paris,  was  it  at  such  times — I  ask — another  Eng- 
land ?  Was  it  another  Lloyd  George  ?  No,  they  were  the 
same.  France  managed  to  make  her  view  prevail,  because 
France  was  in  the  right. 

If  this  situation  has  been  changed,  I  do  not  hesitate  to 
place  the  initial  blame  upon  England.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
worked  very  hard  for  our  common  victory.  No  Frenchman 
has  the  right  to  forget  that,  nor  to  doubt  the  sincerity  of 
his  admiration  and  affection  for  France.  And  no  French- 
man can  take  exception  to  the  fact  that  his  first  thought  is 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  447 

always  of  England.    But  his  policy  in  1920  was  marked  by 
many  errors.    To  placate  British  labour,  he  countenanced 
too  many  concessions  both  to  the  Soviets  and  to  Germany. 
To  placate  British  trade,  he  mated  business  greed  with 
political  idealism.    Many  Frenchmen  believe  that  in  1920 
— quite  unconsciously,  perhaps — he  adopted  the  very  policy 
he  had  repudiated  in  1919, — the  policy  of  Mr.  Keynes. 
Commercial   interests    have    everywhere   been    put    first. 
The  hankering  after  immediate  advantage  has  blurred  the 
prospect  of  the  future.    Too  many  Englishmen  have  for- 
gotten that — however  great  and  decisive  the  part  played 
by  England  in  the  war — her  territory  was  neither  invaded 
nor  devastated.    Too  many  Englishmen  have  failed  to  rec- 
ognize that  France,  bleeding  and  plundered,  is  entitled  to 
something  better  than  daily  advice  to  renounce  her  rights. 
The  vast  majority  of  English  people  have  not  changed, 
nor  have   their  truly  fraternal  feelings   for  the   French 
people  varied.     But  they  have  been  told   so  often  that 
France,  and  France  alone,  has  retarded  the  coming  of  real 
peace  by  insisting  on  the  literal  execution  of  a  Treaty 
devised  to  bind  the  victors  together  as  it  binds  the  van- 
quished to  them,  that  moral  misunderstanding  has  ensued. 
So  little  has  been  done  to  explain  to  the  English  people 
our  absolute  need  for  full  reparation — to  make  them  see 
that  if  France  is  not  to  be  bowed  down  for  half  a  century 
under  the  crushing  weight  of  an  unjust  burden,  she  must 
have  full  reparation — that  a  political  cleavage  has  arisen 
which  irritates  men's  nerves  without  enlightening  their 
minds.    But  reduced  to  its  basic  elements  the  problem  is 
a  simple  one.    If  the  responsible  leaders  of  Great  Britain, 
if  those  who  control  British  policy  have  already  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  financial  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
— which  they  solemnly  signed  in  1919 — cannot  be  executed, 
it  is  their  duty  at  least  to  offer  France  a  guarantee  for  the 
minimum  they  would  have  her  accept  when  urging  her  to 
abate  her  just  demands.    This  they  have  not  done.    It  is 
a  serious  mistake,  fraught  with  danger  to  both  countries 
^alike.    Thus  the  campaign  for  the  revision  of  the  Treaty 


448    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

has  risen  from  lower  levels  to  the  highest  Government 
spheres.  The  surprise  and  sorrow  of  Frenchmen  are  as 
great  as  the  esteem  and  friendship  which,  after  our  com- 
mon victory,  they  entertain  for  our  Great  Ally  across  the 
Channel. 

This  is  the  truth,  but  it  is  not  the  whole  truth.  British 
efforts  against  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  have  had  a  disas- 
trous effect  and  yet,  by  an  unheard-of  paradox,  these  efforts 
have  found  supporters  in  France.  What  supporters!  The 
very  men  who,  when  the  Treaty  was  signed,  complained 
that  it  was  not  drastic  enough.  Complex  as  their  motives 
have  been,  their  efforts  have  been  convergent.  Some  have 
striven  to  show  that  the  Republic  is  incapable  of  negotiat- 
ing a  sound  Treaty;  others  that  the  bourgeoisie  is  incapa- 
ble of  establishing  a  lasting  peace ;  others  again  that  a  peace 
negotiated  by  M.  Clemenceau  must  necessarily  be  detest- 
able. All,  however,  have  worked  hand  in  hand  to  assail  a 
Treaty  already  subjected  to  many  foreign  attacks ;  all  have 
worked  to  weaken  a  contract  which  they  had  previously 
proclaimed  inadequate.  These  critics,  whether  they  in- 
tended it  or  not,  have  shaken  public  confidence  and  weak- 
ened the  Treaty  of  Peace.  Their  action  has  been  exerted  in 
successive  waves.  It  began  in  the  spring  of  1919.  It  con- 
tinued throughout  the  summer  and  its  manifestations  have 
grown  increasingly  frequent.  Look  at  the  American  papers 
and  you  will  see  how  unjust  and  unbridled  attacks  in  the 
French  Parliament  furnished  ready  weapons  to  those 
opposed  to  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty.  Read  the  Eng- 
lish papers  of  more  recent  date  and  you  will  see  how  these 
same  continental  criticisms  have  been  used  to  support 
the  growing  demand  for  the  revision  of  the  Treaty.  Exam- 
ine the  German  papers  and  you  will  see  how  Germany- 
interpreting  so  many  and  such  violent  attacks  as  an  indi- 
cation of  adverse  public  opinion  in  France,  has  conceived 
hopes  of  defeating  the  document  in  which  its  downfall  is 
recorded.  When  undermining  the  Treaty,  in  the  interest 
of  parties  and  of  individuals  in  our  internal  politics, 
French  critics  have  not  stopped  to  consider  that  they  were 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          449 

also  undermining  it  in  the  interest  and  to  the  advantage  of 
Germany  as  well.  Their  game  of  vying  with  one  another 
to  find  fault  has  been  Germany's  game.  They  have  not 
seen  the  encouragement  they  were  giving  to  Pan-German- 
ism and  this  blindness,  I  regret  to  say,  has  been  met  with 
even  in  the  highest  Government  circles. 

Simultaneously  M.  Clemenceau's  defeat  in  the  presi- 
dential election  altered  the  arrangements  which  had  been 
made,  in  December,  1919,  for  the  future  of  the  Conference 
and,  reversing  these  arrangements,  caused  the  inter-allied 
headquarters  for  the  execution  of  the  peace  to  be  trans- 
ferred from  Paris  to  London.  It  was  no  longer  the  French 
Prime  Minister  but  the  British  Prime  Minister  who  pre- 
sided over  and  directed  them.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  to 
confer  with  M.  Millerand  through  an  interpreter;  and 
intimate  understanding  was  impossible  in  brief  meetings. 
The  "diplomatic  channel"  with  its  Notes  and  Counter- 
Notes,  its  delay  and  quibbling,  again  became  paramount. 
Never  in  1920  did  Mr.  Lloyd  George  have  that  direct  view, 
that  physical  sensation  of  France  and  of  Europe,  which 
M.  Clemenceau  gave  him  in  a  few  words  at  decisive 
moments.  Those  few  Frenchmen  whose  long  collaboration 
enabled  them  to  discuss  things  freely  with  the  British 
Prime  Minister  likewise  disappeared,  following  M.  Cle- 
menceau into  retirement.  No  one  was  left  who  could  speak 
with  that  directness — may  I  say  that  sharpness — which  was 
so  often  necessary;  none  who  could  reduce  to  right  pro- 
portions the  personal  attacks  of  certain  political  writers 
who  unintentionally  have  done  France  so  much  harm  dur- 
ing the  past  few  months. 

At  the  same  time  France  employed  the  worst  possible 
method  of  negotiation — weakness  in  discussion  followed  by 
resounding  reactions  after  agreement  had  been  reached — 
that  is,  the  thing  most  repugnant  to  British  and  American 
minds.  Tell  them  beforehand  what  you  are  going  to  do, 
even  if  it  is  most  disagreeable  to  them,  they  will  acknow- 
ledge your  right  to  do  as  you  please.  Do  it  without  tell- 
ing them  and  the  displeasure  they  would  feel  in  any  event 


450     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

will  be  deepened  by  annoyance  at  being  treated  without 
candour,  and  this  feeling  will  endure.*  I  remember  one  day 
during  the  war  having  warned  an  American  Minister,  who 
in  perfect  good  faith  absolutely  refused  to  entertain  a 
request  made  by  the  French  Government,  that  I  intended 
in  a  public  speech  to  appeal  to  the  people  to  decide  between 
us.  Because  I  myself  told  him  what  I  was  going  to  do,  he 
regarded  as  correct  and  "fair"  a  step  which  would  have 
exasperated  him  if  he  had  first  heard  of  it  through  the 
papers,  and  when  he  saw  three  weeks  later  that  the  public 
was  on  our  side  he  gave  way  with  the  best  grace  in  the 
world.  In  dealing  with  Anglo-Saxons,  direct  hits  are  the 
ones  that  count.  Indirect  methods  are  dangerous  and  more 
dangerous  still  when  before  surprising  these  same  Anglo- 
Saxons  by  a  brusk  initiative  you  have  allowed  them  to 
think  for  months  that  you  do  not  dare  to  withstand  them. 
Insular  isolation  has  been  thus  re-established — commercial 
insularity,  electoral  insularity,  political  insularity — and 
the  movement  for  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  has  grown.  And 
if  it  be  objected  that  in  saying  this,  I  attach  too  great 
importance  to  the  personal  equation  in  politics,  I  would 
answer  that  politics  imply  actions  and  actions  imply 
individuals. 

These  things  must  be  recalled  if  it  is  to  be  understood 
why  every  decision  arrived  at  in  1920  lent  itself  to  bitter 
controversy ;  why  certain  solutions  repugnant  to  the  Treaty 
put  forward  and  rejected  during  the  original  negotiations, 
so  frequently  prevailed ;  why  in  the  absence  of  the  United 
States,  held  aloof  by  the  failure  of  the  U.  S.  Senate  to  ratify 
the  Treaty,  France  and  Great  Britain  have  so  often  as- 
sumed antagonistic  attitudes  and  jeopardized  their  mutual 
good  understanding  by  useless  haggling.  An  unhealthy 
atmosphere  created  by  malevolent  criticism  of  the  only  law 


*At  least  twice  in  1920,  the  French  Government  violated  this  rule.  It 
•was  by  the  French  papers  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  learned  of  the  occupation  of 
Frankfort.  As  to  the  recognition  of  Wrangel,  M.  Millerand's  Government 
informed  Great  Britain  on  a  Wednesday  when  on  the  Sunday  and  Monday 
preceding  a  conference  had  taken  place  at  Hythe  between  the  two  Premiers  in 
which  not  a  word  was  said  about  it.  In  both  cases  telegraphic  delays  were 
blamed  which  merely  added  ridicule  to  lack  of  tact. 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  451 

that  should  be  respected  by  all  alike;  a  faulty  method  of 
negotiation — due  on  the  British  side  to  a  serious  error  of 
psychology,  and  on  the  French  side  to  a  sudden  change  of 
administration — such  is  the  story  of  1920.  A  British  Gov- 
ernment which  forgetful  of  our  past  sufferings  urges  us 
to  pay  for  the  success  of  questionable  combinations  by  the 
sacrifice  of  our  rights ;  a  French  Government  which  in  Par- 
liament for  purposes  of  internal  politics  ridicules  the  very 
document  on  which  a  few  days  later  it  had  to  rely  in  dip- 
lomatic conferences.*  On  the  one  hand  unreasonable 
demands  harshly  formulated;  on  the  other  concessions 
granted  only  to  be  followed  by  vain  recrimination.  Mutual 
misunderstanding  aggravated  by  the  difference  of  language, 
by  the  impossibility  of  direct  contact;  a  series  of  recipro- 
cal lackings  of  consideration  producing  ever-increasing 
exasperation — such  are  the  characteristic  features  of  the 
story. 

Thus  a  great  deal  of  harm  has  been  done  and  unless  both 
parties  change  their  tactics,  this  harm  will  increase.  I  say 
what  I  think  and  I  hope  I  shall  be  believed.  Those  who 
helped  M.  Clemenceau  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  France  dur- 
ing the  last  fifteen  months  of  the  war  and  the  twelve  months 
of  peace  negotiations  cannot  be  suspected  of  under-estimat- 
ing either  the  material  power  or  the  moral  value  of  Great 
Britain.  They  never  lost  sight  and  they  never  will  lose  sight 
of  the  immense  services  rendered  by  England  during  the 
war,  of  the  fact  that  Franco-British  friendship  is  essential 
to  the  safety  of  both  countries  and  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 
So  they  have  the  right  to  recall  that  when  conflicting  inter- 
ests brought  the  police  of  these  two  nations  into  opposition 
they  succeeded  in  settling  their  differences  by  equitable 
agreements  which  did  not  place  the  burden  of  all  the  sacri- 
fices upon  the  shoulders  of  only  one  nation  and  that  in  this 
manner  they  safeguarded  the  intimacy  of  the  two  coun- 


*M.  Millerand,  the  French  Premier,  told  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on 
May  28,  1920:  "The  Treaty  of  Versailles  contains  more  promises  than  real- 
ities." 'He  added  on  July  20, "It  is  a  diplomatic  instrument  in  which 

all  things  are  asserted  and  nothing  is  settled.     So  it  is  necessary  to  interpret 
it  in  order  to  obtain  tangible  results." 


452     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

tries.  France,  it  is  only  too  evident,  cannot  break  with 
Great  Britain.  But  neither  can  Great  Britain  break  with 
France. 

Ill 

This  difficulty  must  be  overcome.  But  how?  First  by 
disregarding  resolutely  the  methods  followed  on  both  sides 
in  1920,  and  returning  to  the  franker,  broader  and  clearer 
methods  which  enabled  the  two  countries  to  win  the  war 
and  make  peace  in  common.  This  is  the  first  but  not  the 
only  thing.  During  the  war  France  and  England  viewed 
their  relations  plainly  and  practically.  France  knew  that, 
if  England  had  lost  control  of  the  seas,  the  Allies  would 
have  had  no  more  supplies  or  munitions.  England  knew 
that,  if  the  French  had  given  way  on  the  Marne  or  at  Ver- 
dun, the  English  coast  would  have  been  uncovered.  Is  it 
possible  in  peace — more  complex,  it  is  true,  than  war — to 
apply  to  Anglo-French  relations  a  similar  formula  and  thus 
set  up  above  contingent  considerations  a  permanent  goal 
for  the  minds  and  wills  of  the  two  nations!  I  should  like 
to  try  to  answer  this  question. 

France  knows  very  well  what  she  expects  of  England. 
What  she  expects  of  England  is  first  of  all  political — that 
is  to  say — moral  support.  We  are  face  to  face  with  a 
beaten  neighbor  who  prefers  hatred  to  repentance  and 
whose  population  is  twenty  millions  greater  than  ours. 
Notwithstanding  the  folly  of  certain  Frenchmen  intox- 
icated with  the  idea  of  solitude,  we  need  friends.  What 
form  should  this  friendship  take  ?  I  know  but  one  basis  for 
friendship  for  nations  as  for  individuals — loyalty  and 
unity.  Loyalty,  that  is  to  say  scrupulous  respect  for  all  en- 
gagements entered  into  after  free  discussion.  Unity,  that 
is  to  say  the  desire  to  understand  and  to  share  each  other 's 
aspirations.  In  the  present  state  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world  a  criterion:  if  France  is  not  to  doubt  England,  she 
must  feel  that  England  does  not  attach  less  importance  to 
the  enforcement  of  the  peace  than  she  herself.  Will  it  be 
said  that  this  enforcement  is  less  directly  indispensable  to 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          453 

Great  Britain  than  to  France?  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
Great  Britain,  precisely  because  she  values  France's 
friendship,  must  be  as  vigilant  as  France  herself  with 
regard  to  it.  Even  if  she  believes  that  France  is  making  a 
mistake  in  exacting  all  that  she  has  a  right  to,  she  is  bound 
as  a  friend  to  support  her. 

A  single  example.  When  England  publicly  disavowed 
in  March,  1920,  the  occupation  of  Frankfort  by  French  and 
Belgian  troops,  she  violated  this  fundamental  principle  of 
friendship.  And  I  quite  agree  that  there  might  well  be  a 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  this  step  which  I  myself  looked 
upon  as  both  justified  and  utterly  useless.  But  on  no 
account  should  the  enemy  of  yesterday  have  been  permitted 
to  see  that  there  was  a  division;  above  all,  an  attempt 
should  have  been  made  to  reach  an  understanding.  Sup* 
pose  that  on  the  pretext  of  policing  German  fishermen  what 
is  left  of  the  German  fleet  had  cruised  about  the  mouth  of 
the  Thames  and  fired  its  guns.  Do  you  believe  that  the 
British  Admiralty  would  not  immediately  and  on  its  own 
responsibility  have  taken  measures  of  reprisal?  This  is 
precisely  what  France  did  at  Frankfort  when  on  pretext 
of  strikes  the  Reichwehr  invaded  the  neutral  zone  which 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  had  forbidden  it  to  enter.  France 
on  this  occasion  would  have  liked  Great  Britain  to  feel  as 
she  felt,  as  Great  Britain  indeed  would  have  felt  in  her 
place.  France  would  have  liked  also  in  other  matters, 
reparations,  Poland,  etc.,  to  have  Great  Britain  make  an 
effort  to  agree  to  policies  which  have  always  been  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  solemn  undertakings  entered  into  on 
June  28,  1919.  That  is  what  I  call  moral  support. 

France  also  needs  the  material  support  of  Great  Brit- 
ain. She  needs  coal — coal  at  reasonable  prices  and  with 
priority  of  delivery  at  least  to  the  amount  which  France 
lost  defending,  over  her  destroyed  mines,  the  coast  of  Eng- 
land. It  is  not  fair  that  France  should  pay  more  for  that 
coal  than  the  English  pay  for.it  and  that  France  should  pay 
for  it  at  the  same  prices  as  the  neutrals  of  yesterday. 
Lord  Northcliffe  asserted  this  in  an  interview  in  November, 


454    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

1920 — I  in  turn  say  the  same  thing.  It  is  unfair  also  that 
in  order  to  maintain  her  export  prices,  England  should 
force  us,  as  she  did  at  Spa,  to  pay  more  for  German  coal 
than  the  price  fixed  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  France 
needs  shipping  and  here  I  am  not  one  of  those  who  under- 
rate the  immense  sacrifices  made  by  Great  Britain  for  vic- 
tory, but  I  ask  her  to  take  France's  sacrifices  also  into 
account.  I  know  full  well  that  submarine  warfare  de- 
stroyed seventeen  million  tons,  nine  millions  of  which  were 
British;  that  the  German  and  Austrian  fleets  together 
amounted  to  only  five  and  a  half  million  tons  and  that  Great 
Britain  replaced  only  thirty  per  cent,  of  her  losses  by  enemy 
ships.  But  Great  Britain  should  remember  that  our  arse- 
nals and  shipyards  were  busy  making  war  material  for  all 
the  Allies  and  that  France  did  not  build  a  ship  for  five 
years.  Great  Britain  should  remember  that  France  during 
the  war,  because  of  lack  of  tonnage,  paid  British,  American 
and  neutral  carriers  12,000  million  francs  in  freight 
charges.  Great  Britain  should  remember  France's  lack  of 
passenger  ships  and  that  she  is  not  even  able  to  run  the 
regular  pre-war  services  to  her  own  colonies. 

I  say  that  here,  as  in  all  other  things,  mere  commercial 
fair  play  is  not  enough,  that  what  is  needed  is  whole-heart- 
ed support,  the  kind  of  support  France  gave  in  the  tragic 
days  of  1918  when  Petain's  twenty-four  divisions  were 
rushed  in  a  few  hours  to  replace  Gough  's  Army.  Last  but 
not  least  France  needs  financial  support  and  here  again  I 
am  far  from  underrating  the  enormous  financial  sacrifices 
made  by  Great  Britain  in  the  war  and  the  thousands  of 
millions  she  lent  us.  But  I  ask  her  not  to  forget  Lord 
Derby's  words  already  quoted  that  "her  Lancashire  has 
not  been  destroyed."  In  France,  this  destruction  was  com- 
plete and  gave  to  the  Armies  of  Liberty  their  common  field 
of  battle  on  which  Alh'ed  victory  saved  English  soil  from 
the  horrors  of  invasion.  What  can  be  done  for  France? 
Financial  unity,  the  difficulties  of  which  I  have  already 
explained?  A  French  loan  in  England — promised  to  M* 
Clemenceau,  but  never  floated!  This  is  not  the  place  to 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U,  S,  A.          455 

discuss  ways  and  means.  It  is  sufficient  to  raise  the  ques- 
tions and  to  add  that,  no  matter  what  happens,  France 
must  be  able  to  count  on  Great  Britain  for  full  support 
when  she  demands  of  Germany  the  reparations  written 
in  the  Treaty  which  England  signed.  During  the  war  we 
bought  much  wheat,  steel,  coal,  explosives,  freights;  in 
return  we  freely  gave  the  best  of  French  soil,  and  1,400,000 
French  lives.  That  is  an  argument  which  tells  on  the  Eng- 
lish heart. 

That  is  what  France  expects  of  England  and  I  have  no 
reason  to  hold  any  of  it  back.  But  England  also  needs 
France  and  I  want  to  say  how,  with  equal  frankness.  Eng- 
land first  of  all  needs  France  for  her  safety.  The  last 
war  convinced  the  most  incredulous  of  this  fact.  If  some 
day  either  a  renewal  of  German  aggression  or  the  obscure 
development  of  Russian  forces  were  to  threaten  France  and 
Belgium  in  the  East,  then  and  for  the  same  reasons  Great 
Britain  would  be  threatened  too.  Without  Belgium  and 
without  France,  Great  Britain  has  no  battlefield  on  the 
Continent  to  deploy  her  forces  and  protect  her  coast.  When 
the  road  to  Paris  is  open  to  invasion  neither  Calais  nor 
Dover  is  safe.  Every  thinking  Briton  knows  that  and  is 
not  likely  to  forget  it.  But  Great  Britain  not  only  needs 
France  to  be  safe,  in  order  to  feel  safe  herself,  she  also 
needs  France  to  be  prosperous.  It  is  to  England's  own 
interest  that  France  should  rise  from  her  ruins  because  the 
twenty  million  bushels  of  wheat  which  cannot  longer  be 
grown  in  our  devastated  regions  force  us  to  compete  with 
British  buyers  in  the  grain  markets  of  the  world;  because 
the  ruin  of  our  mines,  no  matter  how  high  the  price  of  Eng- 
lish coal,  must  weigh  in  the  long  run  upon  the  reduced  pro- 
duction of  English  mines;  because  throughout  the  whole 
world  our  colonial  Empires  in  contact  are  affected  by  each 
other's  crisis. 

And  I  go  further  still.  Great  Britain  needs  France  as 
an  element  of  stability  and  restraint  in  world  politics,  espe- 
cially— and  I  say  it  plainly — in  Anglo-American  relations. 
The  war  revolutionized  these  relations.  It  created  ties 


456    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

which  I  trust  may  never  be  broken.  Yet  how  can  we  over- 
look that  often  the  past  weighing  upon  the  present  makes 
difficult  the  most  essential  collaborations!  How  can  we 
overlook  that  friction  which  may  arise  between  Dominions 
and  the  United  States?  How  can  we  overlook  that  in  the 
modern  world  material  and  moral  effects  of  economic  strug- 
gles cannot  be  foreseen  !  And  an  economic  struggle  is  even 
now  engaged  in  between  the  two  great  branches  of  the  An- 
glo-Saxon race.  British  and  American  shipyards  are  racing 
to  see  which  can  build  most.  In  the  markets  of  South 
America  and  of  the  Far  East,  British  and  American  firms 
are  struggling  for  supremacy.  For  this  healthy  competi- 
tion to  remain  a  healthy  stimulus  and  not  become  a  dan- 
ger, Great  Britain  and  America  both  need  France  as  con- 
necting-link and  compensator.  And  how  can- 1  avoid  the 
Irish  question!  I  remember  a  day  in  the  very  midst  of  the 
war  when  my  colleague,  the  British  High  Commissioner  in 
the  United  States,  asked  me  to  place  at  his  disposal  to  speak 
at  Catholic  meetings  one  of  the  military  priests  attached 
to  my  service.  America  will  need  to  be  informed  to-morrow 
— as  yesterday.  America  will  need  to  be  told — to-morrow 
as  yesterday — and  to  be  told  by  others  than  the  British 
themselves  without  reference  to  possible  solutions  of  the 
Irish  problem — that  during  the  war  the  Sinn-Feiners  har- 
boured and  supplied  German  submarines  and  took  German 
gold  to  pay  for  Casement's  treason.  Here  too  Great  Bri- 
tain needs  France — needs  France  on  whose  soil  was  sealed 
in  blood  the  Anglo-American  brotherhood  of  arms,  France 
best  qualified  and  most  authorized  to  recall  the  higher  in- 
terests of  democratic  unity  which  demand  of  the  three 
nations  ever  greater  faith  and  ever  greater  harmony. 

For  this  to  be,  a  loyal  effort  of  mutual  understanding 
is  essential.  I  have  the  consciousness  of  having  always 
worked  with  whatsoever  ability  is  mine  to  inform  my  coun- 
trymen of  the  permanent  factors  of  British  politics.  Offi- 
cial Great  Britain  must  also  learn  to  know  France  better. 
The  Foreign  Office  is  a  great  stronghold  of  traditions.  Of 
these  traditions  there  is  one  whose  possible  danger  I  would 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  457 

point  out.  It  is  that  which  has  always  led  Great  Britain 
to  look  with  favour  upon  the  second-rate  European  Powers 
and  with  distrust  upon  the  first-rate  Powers.  The  tra- 
dition fifteen  years  ago  led  to  the  Entente  Cordiale  against 
a  Germany  of  domination  and  so  this  tradition  is  sacred  to 
us.  Let  us  fear,  however,  that  ill-interpreted  it  may  now  be 
turned  against  the  very  achievement  which  is  its  greatest 
honour.  France  is  to-day  the  principal  Power  of  Conti- 
nental Europe.  That  is  enough  for  some  to  accuse  her  of 
Imperialism.  I  should  like  at  certain  moments  to  feel  sure 
that  it  is  not  enough  to  induce  similar  reflexes  in  the 
splendid  old  institution  which  in  Downing  Street  clings 
to  the  ways  of  bygone  days.  Such  reflexes  if  they  were 
possible  would  constitute  an  injustice  and  an  error.  For 
France  is  not  Germany  and  her  victory — I  think  I  have 
shown  it — is  a  victory  a  la  Frangaise  which  does  not  deserve 
to  be  insulted  by  comparison  with  Bismarckian  conquests. 
"Germany,"  said  M.  Clemenceau,  "enslaved  herself  to 
enslave  others.  France  frees  herself  to  set  others  free." 
A  great  lesson  in  political  psychology  is  contained  in  those 
few  words.  May  the  Foreign  Office  and  all  its  representa- 
tives, in  all  parts  of  the  world,  take  it  loyally  to  heart  and 
understand  that  Great  Britain  will  always  have  more  to 
fear  from  Germany  even  defeated  than  from  France 
victorious ! 

The  subject  is  vast.  I  do  not  flatter  myself  that  I  have 
exhausted  it.  I  have  tried — with  a  freedom  of  language 
to  which  twenty  years  of  political  activity  in  the  cause 
of  Franco-British  friendship  entitled  me — to  show  the  dan- 
ger spots  and  to  point  out  lines  of  action.  Between  British 
and  French  let  us  avoid  haggling.  Let  us  speak  with  the 
heart  and  appeal  to  plain  honest  principles.  I  have  seen 
M.  Clemenceau  succeed  by  this  method,  other  methods  have 
since  been  tried  out  with  unhappy  results.  I  am  deeply  con- 
vinced that  by  returning  to  it  the  two  peoples  will  make 
their  union  more  enduring  to  their  own  good  and  to  the 
good  of  mankind. 


158    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

IV 

The  problem  of  Franco-American  relations  is  no  less 
important  than  that  of  Franco-British  relations  with  which 
I  have  just  dealt  with  great  frankness.  I  want  to  be  equally 
frank  about  Franco-American  relations  because  democ- 
racies ought  to  be  told  the  truth;  and  also  because  having 
myself  been  one  with  the  American  nation  in  thought,  in 
heart  and  in  action  I  venture  to  believe  they  will  look  upon 
my  frankness  as  a  proof  of  affection  and  of  respect. 

The  basis  of  Franco- American  friendship  is  indestruct- 
ible; for  it  rests  on  the  memory  of  service  rendered  and 
received  without  thought  of  self.  This  friendship  has  lasted 
for  one  hundred  and  fifty  years.  The  statues  of  LaFayette 
and  Rochambeau  standing  before  the  White  House;  their 
portraits  hanging  in  the  Capitol  at  the  right  and  left  of  the 
Speaker,  are  the  symbols  of  a  living  force.  But  before  the 
war,  each  country  was  blissfully  ignorant  of  the  other.  The 
two  countries  loved  each  other  without  knowing  why.  They 
knew  little  of  each  other.  What  America,  to  speak  but  of 
the  United  States,  admired  in  us  was  our  charm  rather 
than  our  energy,  our  accomplishments  rather  than  our 
virtues.  It  was  neither  our  political  genius,  nor  our  prac- 
tical capacity,  nor  our  faculty  for  expansion  that  she 
admired;  but  our  elegance,  our  taste,  our  fashions,  our  lit- 
erature, our  art.  And  this  admiration  was  directed  more 
to  the  past  than  to  the  present.  We  were  in  a  way  to  become 
like  unto  a  work  of  art  in  a  Museum.  We  suffered,  in  the 
eyes  of  America  as  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  from  the  dread 
fact  that  in  Europe  we  were  the  last  of  the  vanquished. 
Sedan  dominated  our  modern  history,  as  Jena  had  long 
dominated  that  of  Prussia.  We  ourselves  were  in  a  way 
responsible  for  this  situation.  When  Frenchmen  went  to 
America  to  talk  of  France,  they  seldom  spoke  of  modern 
France,  her  ideas,  her  resources,  or  her  industries.  When 
Americans,  like  Barrett  Wendell,  spoke  of  France  as  a  coun- 
try capable  of  action  and  by  no  wise  stricken  with  national 
anemia,  their  words  were  received  with  a  certain  skepti- 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          459 

cism.  We  were  looked  upon  as  an  old  nation  resigned  to 
secondary  rank.  The  clear-sighted  continuity  of  our  for- 
eign policy  and  the  breadth  of  our  colonial  policy  were  alike 
unknown.  Our  religious  conflicts  angered  the  Catholics 
and  astonished  the  rest  of  America  incapable  of  conceiving 
normal  relations  between  Church  and  State  other  than 
those  of  cordial  separation.  Our  charm  was  felt,  but  we 
had  little  prestige  or  authority. 

The  war  came.  In  the  United  States  as  elsewhere  every- 
one at  first  believed  in  German  victory.    The  overwhelm- 
ing majority  of  the  United  States  favoured  neutrality.    In 
July,  1914,  Democrats  and  Republicans,  Roosevelt  and  Wil- 
son, were  agreed  about  that.   A  few  understood  from  the 
very  start  the  enormous  importance  of  this  fight  which  was 
just  beginning  and  came  to  join  our  ranks, — these  men 
were  exceptions.  The  great  mass  did  not  know,  did  not 
move.     As  late  as  1917,  I  met  educated  people  in  New 
York  who  were  smilingly  skeptic  about  German  atrocities. 
Inquiry  into  the  responsibility  for  the  war  was  avoided, 
and  it  was  not  only  in  his  own  party  that  the  President  won 
that  expression  of  prudent  gratitude:  "He  kept  us  out  of 
war. ' '    The  Marne  came  as  a  shock  to  this  apathy  and  shat- 
tered the  belief  that  Germany  was  invincible.    Then  as  the 
war  went  on  and  fighting  settled  down  in  earnest,  another 
belief  received  its  death-blow:  the  belief  in  French  light- 
ness, capable  of  sudden  effort  but  not  of  patient  endur- 
ance.   Months  went  by.    America  was  making  much  money 
by  selling  raw  materials  to  the  Allies.    But  war  profits  all 
went  into  a  few  hands  and  everyone  was  feeling  the  rising 
cost  of  living.    In  1916,  people  began  to  wonder  if  it  would 
not  be  wise  to  stop  the  European  war  by  cutting  off  sup- 
plies.   As  the  presidential  election  drew  near  the  question 
of  entering  the  war  became  an  issue  between  opposing  par- 
ties.   The  great  majority  of  the  people,  however,  still  fav- 
oured neutrality  and  a  "peace  without  victory." 

Germany  it  was  that,  under  pressure  of  circumstances 
and  with  her  usual  lack  of  psychology,  forced  war  upon 
America.  At  an  early  stage  she  had  worked  towards  this 


460    THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

end  by  attacks  on  American  shipping ;  but  that  did  not  sat- 
isfy her.  By  a  series  of  provocations  which  grew  worse 
month  by  month,  by  obstinate  persistence  in  unheard-of 
absurdities,  by  blind  contempt  for  the  clearest  warnings, 
the  Imperial  German  Government  dug  its  grave  with  its 
own  hands.  Tirpitz  got  the  upper  hand  of  Bernstorff ,  and 
Bernstorff  being  beaten  proceeded  like  a  true  German  to 
go  Tirpitz  one  better.  While  the  logical  development  of 
diplomatic  correspondence  was  daily  making  it  more  and 
more  inevitable  for  the  United  States  to  pick  up  the  gaunt- 
let, the  German  Embassy  in  Washington  was  organizing  a 
vast  conspiracy  on  the  very  soil  of  America.  The  Ameri- 
cans, who  are  naturally  confiding,  unraveled  the  threads 
of  this  intrigue  with  stupefaction.  The  general  sympathy 
which  German  immigrants  had  enjoyed  gave  way  to  alarm 
and  suspicion.  The  United  States  had  borne  the  first  tor- 
pedo attacks  without  severing  relations.  But  the  last,  com- 
bined with  this  interior  plot  which  was  felt  at  work  every- 
where, awoke  the  war  spirit  which  for  thirty  months  had 
slumbered.  It  was  recognized  that  the  danger  against 
which  Western  Europe  was  fighting  might  also  reach  the 
New  World.  The  protection  of  the  ocean  began  to  appear 
doubtful.  On  April  6,  1917,  the  United  States,  directly 
threatened,  declared  war  on  Germany. 

This  war  which  it  entered  for  purely  American  reasons 
was  fought  by  the  United  States  in  a  splendid  spirit  of 
union  with  Europe.  They  put  into  it  all  their  power,  all 
their  will,  all  their  heart.  The  United  States  lent  its  Allies 
— when  in  April,  1917,  they  could  get  no  more  money  in 
New  York — the  sum  of  15,000  million  dollars.  They  raised 
five  million  men,  nearly  half  of  whom  were  in  France  on 
the  day  of  the  Armistice.  By  voluntary  and  self-imposed 
restrictions  they  were  able  to  feed  Europe.  They  subor- 
dinated all  individual  interests  to  the  general  interest  by 
adopting  a  policy  of  production  and  distribution  which  set 
a  standard.  Their  soldiers  fought  bravely,  and  France 
holds  their  memory  sacred.  The  part  played  by  the  United 
States  in  the  war,  though  short,  was  tremendous.  With- 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          461 

out  France  which  saved  the  world  at  the  battle  of  the  Marne, 
the  United  States  could  not  have  fought.  But  without  the 
United  States  the  Allies  could  not  have  conquered.  It  was 
the  presence  of  American  troops  that  enabled  them  to 
establish  their  numerical  supremacy.  And  it  was  the  pres- 
ence of  American  troops  that  enabled  Marshal  Foch  to 
plan  and  carry  out  the  final  offensive  of  victory.  America 
came  into  the  war  late.  But  she  came  in  time.  France 
knows  what  her  aid  was  worth  and  will  be  forever  grateful. 
The  hour  of  defeat  sounds  for  the  Germans  at  the  end 
of  1918.  Peace  sued  for  at  the  same  time  as  the  Armistice 
finds  the  Allies  in  accord  on  general  principles.  I  have  told 
above  the  story  of  the  frank  exchange  of  views  which 
efforts  have  at  times  been  made  to  misrepresent,  but  about 
which  neither  then  or  now,  the  slightest  shadow  of  ambigu- 
ity exists.*  The  Conference  began.  After  so  many 
distorted  versions  this  book  tells  the  truth  about  the  peace. 
At  the  Conference  the  United  States  proved  its  disinterest- 
edness by  asking  nothing  for  herself  but  the  right  to  pay 
for  and  keep  the  700,000  tons  of  German  shipping  interned 
in  her  own  ports.  Like  all  the  Allies  she  defended  her  con- 
tentions vigorously  but  not  in  the  overbearing  manner 
sometimes  ascribed  to  her  representatives.  Some  of  these 
contentions  France  did  not  accept.  To  reach  agreement 
the  United  States,  like  other  nations,  had  to  accept  amend- 
ments. It  was  the  law  of  the  four-nation  peace,  as  it  had 
been  the  law  of  a  four-nation  war.  But  it  is  equally  unjust 
to  assert  either  that  the  United  States  "put  it  over"  on  the 
Allies,  or  that  the  Allies  "put  it  over"  on  the  United  States. 
The  Conference  was  laborious;  at  times  painful.  I  have 
explained  why.  But  from  first  to  last  all  discussions  were 
marked  by  a  sincerity  and  restraint  which  do  them  honour. 
The  irreconcilables  of  the  two  extremist  parties,  the  Ger- 
manists  and  the  Imperialists — must  bear  the  responsibility 
for  fables  with  which  they  slandered  the  makers  of  the 
Treaty  in  order  to  discredit  the  Treaty  itself.  When  signed 
the  peace  appeared  to  its  makers  an  imperfect  but  honest 


'See  Chapter  II,  pages  43-76. 


462     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

compromise — an  unprecedented  attempt  to  regulate  the 
future  relations  of  peoples  on  a  basis  of  security  and  justice. 

The  Treaty  thus  drafted  was  not  ratified  by  the  United 
States  Senate.  The  Treaty  of  Guarantee  with  France 
although  favourably  reported  by  the  Commission  was  not 
even  discussed.  I  shall  not  refer  to  the  details  of  the  ten 
months'  battle  that  ended  thus.  The  vote  of  the  Senate 
pained  France.  Painful  in  itself,  for  like  all  the  Allies  we 
had  made  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  agreement  and  the  final 
abstention  of  America  robbed  these  sacrifices  of  their 
counter-benefits.  Painful  too  in  its  consequences,  for 
beyond  a  doubt  it  encouraged  Germany  in  her  policy  of 
non-execution  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  I  say  frankly  that 
France  did  not  consider  the  Treaty  clauses  as  justifying 
the  angry  struggle  to  which  they  gave  rise.  Senator  Lodge 's 
reservations  seemed  to  France  neither  indispensable  nor 
inacceptable.  She  felt  that  no  Treaty  could  possibly  affect 
parliamentary  prerogatives  which  are  the  very  basis  of 
democratic  institutions  and  that  there  was  no  need  of  so 
many  glosses  to  reserve  what  in  practise  and  in  theory  are 
inalienable  rights,  for  war  cannot  be  waged  without  money, 
and  money  is  in  the  hands  of  legislatures  and  war  cannot 
be  waged  without  the  support  of  public  opinion  and  public 
opinion  is  free.  The  French  remembered  that,  no  matter 
how  formal  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  a  vote  of  the 
French  Parliament  on  August  3,  1914,  would  have  sufficed 
to  make  it  inoperative ;  and  they  concluded  that  no  matter 
what  the  wording  of  the  Covenant — a  wording  easily 
amended — the  Congress  of  the  United  States  would  have 
retained  all  its  rights. 

My  country  has  maintained  a  fitting  reserve  in  dealing 
with  these  events.  It  could  not,  however,  refrain  from 
noting  their  consequences.  In  the  spring  of  1920,  M.  Alex- 
ander Redlich,  editor  of  the  Gazette  de  Voss,  said  to  me : 

"Germany  is  not  complying  with  the  Treaty;  that  is 
true.  But  if  she  does  not  comply  with  it,  the  chief  cause  is 
the  vote  by  which  the  United  States  Senate  refused  to 
ratify  it." 


FEANCE,  BKITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          463 

Germany  readily  believes  what  she  wishes  to  be  true, 
and  she  has  never  wished  for  anything  more  than  for  divi- 
sion among  the  Allies.  She  flattered  herself  that  she  could 
bring  it  about  during  the  war  by  the  Czernir  offer  and  the 
Lancken  proposals.  She  thought  she  had  achieved  it  in 
1919  and  Count  Brockdorff  on  his  arrival  at  Versailles 
made  no  attempt  to  hide  the  fact.  How  could  the  secession 
of  the  United  States  have  failed  to  encourage  her  hopes  and 
illusions — have  failed  to  strengthen  her  determination  not 
to  give  up  the  war  criminals,  not  to  disarm,  and  not  to  pay? 
And  I  know  full  well  that  none  of  the  men  who  rejected  the 
Treaty  sought  such  a  result,  nor  desired  to  precipitate  it. 
But  at  times  results  outstrip  intentions,  and  this  was  here 
the  case.  The  legal  controversies  to  which  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  led  in  the  Capitol,  the  party  struggles  it  revived, 
and  the  personal  antagonisms  it  engendered  are  expressed 
in  Europe  by  greater  difficulty  in  enforcing  the  Treaty. 
We  must  in  the  mutual  interests  of  France  and  of  the 
United  States  face  the  facts  of  this  situation  and  seek  to 
remedy  it. 

V 

It  calls  for  serious  effort,  not  for  displays  of  temper. 
Our  mutual  affection  is  not  endangered.  The  hearts  of  the 
two  peoples  still  beat  together.  The  American  Government 
has  not  so  far  called  upon  France  to  pay  back  the  thou- 
sands of  millions  it  lent  her,  nor  even  the  interest  thereon. 
Everyone  feels  that  the  situation  is  difficult  and  calls  for 
careful  handling.  Everyone  has  the  same  aim:  peace  and 
friendship. 

We  cannot,  however,  blind  ourselves  to  the  fact  that, 
if  it  is  to  endure  and  develop,  Franco- American  friendship 
must  be  given  more  care  than  in  the  past.  During  the  last 
century  we  loved  each  other  at  a  distance,  without  much 
knowledge  of  each  other,  and  absence  of  contact  made  fric- 
tion impossible.  Our  relations  were  pleasant  but  of  life  in 
common  we  knew  naught.  War  has  changed  all  this.  More 
than  two  million  American  soldiers  came  to  France.  They 


464     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

lived  there  in  times  of  great  stress.  Nearly  eighty  thou- 
sand of  them  now  sleep  their  last  sleep  in  her  soil.  Those 
who  returned  learned  to  know  something  of  French  courage. 
But  many  of  them  did  not  know  or  did  not  understand  how 
awful  was  France 's  plight  after  four  years  of  war.  Some 
complained  of  living  conditions  and  of  profiteering,  forget- 
ting that  the  French  soldiers  had  the  same  troubles  and 
that  profiteering  was  not  unknown  in  America.  Others 
were  over-impressed  by  the  comforts  and  flattery  they 
found  in  occupied  Germany,  forgetful  that  the  miserable 
condition  of  our  poor  villages  and  the  weariness  of  our 
people  were  but  an  added  reason  for  their  sympathy.  All 
were  at  times  taken  in  by  absurd  tales,  such  for  instance 
as  that  France  made  America  pay  rent  for  the  trenches !  In 
vain  we  denied  this  again  and  again.  In  vain  we  showed 
that  the  so-called  renting  was  merely  the  taking  over  of  the 
material  of  the  trenches  which  was  done  in  every  sector  of 
the  front  whenever  a  new  relief  arrived,  not  only  between 
one  Allied  Army  and  another,  but  also  between  the  various 
units  of  the  same  Army.  I  should  not  be  surprised  if  many 
a  doughboy  went  home  with  the  idea  firmly  tucked  away  in 
the  back  of  his  head  that  he  paid  for  the  privilege  of  fight- 
ing. Finally,  the  warmth  of  appreciation  rightly  shown  by 
the  grateful  French  made  many  an  American  forget  that, 
even  if  it  did  save  the  Allies,  the  United  States  entered  the 
war  to  defend  the  rights  and  liberties  of  America. 

I  do  not  want  to  be  charged  with  dotting  every  "i"  and 
crossing  every  "t" — yet  we  must  be  plain  if  we  are  to 
understand  each  other.  The  war  brought  us  into  direct 
contact.  This  contact  must  be  maintained.  Let  us  neglect 
nothing  that  touches  the  souls  of  our  two  peoples — let  us 
never  grow  tired  of  explaining  ourselves  to  each  other. 
For  three  years  I  have  acted  on  this  principle.  Though  my 
first  duty,  as  French  High  Commissioner,  was  to  obtain 
material  results,  in  the  shape  of  money,  steel,  wheat,  ships, 
powder,  explosives  and  countless  other  things,  I  constantly 
strove  to  develop  in  each  country  an  understanding  of  and 
love  for  the  customs  and  character  of  the  other.  Thou- 


FEANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  465 

sands  of  times  with  the  valuable  help  of  the  Committee  on 
Public  Information,  my  fellow-workers  and  I  talked  to 
Americans  about  France.  We  furnished  facts  and  figures 
to  the  efficient  Association  of  American  National  Lec- 
turers. We  created  enduring  ties  between  the  similar 
social,  religious  and  professional  groups  in  the  two  coun- 
tries. By  our  efforts,  the  Catholics,  Protestants,  Jews,  his- 
torians, scholars  and  business  men  of  America  and  France 
were  brought  into  close  relations  which  continue  despite 
the  non-ratification  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  Thanks  to  the 
cordial  cooperation  of  General  Pershing,  I  succeeded  in 
1918  in  giving  seven  thousand  officers  and  soldiers  of  the 
American  Army  a  six  months'  course  in  our  Universities 
and  Technical  Schools.  To  every  American  soldier,  when 
he  left,  we  gave  a  little  booklet  which  in  a  few  pages 
expressed  the  gratitude  of  France  and  told  her  position  and 
the  part  she  played  in  winning  the  war.  M.  Clemenceau 
sent  a  memorial  souvenir  signed  by  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic  to  the  family  of  every  dead  soldier. 
Trifling  incidents  perhaps,  but  not  without  interest  in  the 
moral  history  of  the  two  nations.  Now  that  the  war  is  won 
we  must  continue  and  as  it  has  proved  feasible  to  pave  the 
way  for  complete  union  by  bringing  together  correspond- 
ing elements,  the  same  policy  should  be  pursued.  It  is  the 
best  way  of  killing  in  America  the  many  untrue  stories  con- 
cocted against  France  by  cunning  hands  we  know  only  too 
well:  the  story  that  France  pays  no  taxes:  the  story  that 
France  is  not  reconstructing:  the  story  that  she  is  militar- 
ist, that  she  is  rich  and  discontented. 

So  much  for  the  general  conditions  by  which  we  may 
reach  a  good  understanding  based  not  upon  propaganda — 
I  hate  the  word;  the  thing — but  upon  exact  information. 
How  can  our  political  and  economic  relations  be  adjusted 
for  the  greatest  good  of  the  two  countries?  One's  first 
impulse  is  to  speak  of  material  aid  which  America  could 
furnish  to  France ;  but  however  valuable  this  aid  might  be, 
it  is  not  the  most  essential  thing.  Besides,  up  to  now,  with 
the  exception  of  private  and  philanthropic  initiative,  it  has 


466 

been  non-existent.  Immediately  after  the  Armistice  a  num- 
ber of  American  business  men  came  over  to  offer  us  their 
help.  At  the  same  time  at  my  request  Mr.  McAdoo,  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  asked  Congress  for  authority  to  open 
us  credits  which  would  have  enabled  us  to  take  advantage 
of  these  offers.  Nothing  came  of  it.  The  endeavours  to 
keep  French  workmen  employed  and  to  provide  work  for 
our  war  factories  created  a  protectionist  policy  of  recon- 
struction which  reduced  foreign  participation  to  almost 
nothing.  Even  if  this  was  a  mistake,  it  was  a  very  natural 
one.  Since  then  many  American  banks  have  established 
branches  in  France.  Corporations  for  developing  interna- 
tional commerce  have  been  founded.  Special  short  time 
credits  have  been  negotiated.  But  the  great  current  of 
Franco-American  business  has  not  yet  begun.  Burdened 
with  war  loans  and  income  taxes,  America  has  no  liquid 
funds  available.  Even  if  her  condition  were  normal,  her 
aid  would  not  suffice  to  solve  the  problem  France  must 
face  to-day. 

I  have  already  given  figures.  We  have  a  debt  of  255,000 
million  francs,  at  the  exchange  rate  of  October,  1920,  or 
227,000  millions  at  par.  We  have  to  pay  pensions  repre- 
senting a  capital  of  55,000  millions.  We  have  spent  22,000 
millions  on  reconstruction  and  must  spend  at  least  120,000 
millions  more.  No  material  aid  from  America  can  meet 
such  a  need.  The  only  possible  way  out  is  for  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  to  be  enforced  and  Germany  made  to  pay 
what  she  owes.  The  only  real  help  therefore  that  can  be 
of  definite  assistance  to  France  is  that  which  will  enable 
her  to  enforce  the  Peace  Treaty  and  obtain  payment  of 
Germany's  debt.  In  other  words  what  France  needs  is 
political  support.  Political  support  that  may  entail  finan- 
cial aid  later ;  if  Germany  pays  and  issues  bonds  the  United 
States  could  buy  or  discount  them,  but  now  the  only  pos- 
sible aid  they  can  give  is  political  and  moral,  by  backing 
France  when  she  makes  her  just  demands.  Here  we  have 
the  problem  in  all  its  complexity,  for  it  is  not  easy  for 
America  to  demand  the  enforcement  of  a  contract  which 


FKANCE,  BEITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  467 

she  has  not  even  ratified.    Again  I  am  dotting  my  "i"  and 
calling  a  spade  a  spade. 

I  know  that  in  saying  this  I  am  contradicting  an  opinion 
which  great  American  business  men  have  often  expressed. 
I  know  for  example  that  in  a  booklet  published  by  Mr.  Otto 
Kahn  in  1920  he  maintained  that  the  help  America  could 
give  Europe  and  especially  France  was  not  political  but 
economic.  I  think  my  statistics  have  proved  that  at  least 
as  far  as  France  is  concerned  this  is  a  fundamental  error. 
America  will  not  and  cannot  bear  the  cost  of  our  reconstruc- 
tion. The  only  way  she  can  be  of  real  help  to  us  therefore 
is  to  unite  with  us  politically  and  morally  in  forcing  Ger- 
many to  pay.  The  offer  of  economic  support  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  political  support  carries  with  it  a  clear  implication 
of  iniquity,  for  in  the  form  in  which  it  has  been  proposed  it 
would  profit  as  much  to  the  vanquished  but  uninjured 
aggressor  as  to  the  victors,  victims  not  only  of  aggression 
but  of  systematic  destruction  as  well.  Worse  still,  to  secure 
payment  from  Germany  for  her  purchases,  all  her  liquid 
assets  which  should  go  to  reparations  would  be  earmarked 
for  the  sellers.  In  discussing  this  purely  business  ques- 
tion people  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Germany  in  order  to 
pay  must,  as  Lord  Cunliffe  pointed  out,  subject  herself  for 
purposes  of  reparation  to  a  special  system  of  production, 
restriction  and  exports.  Financiers  like  Mr.  Otto  Kahn, 
who  deal  with  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  en  bloc,  forget 
that  the  ruins  to  be  rebuilt  are  not  alike  either  in  origin,  or 
extent,  or  location.  Their  location: — all  the  ruins  are  in 
Allied  countries — none  in  Germany.  Their  extent: — how 
can  Germany's  economic  crisis  be  compared  with  those  in 
France  or  Belgium  which  are  aggravated  by  the  loss  of 
one-fourth  of  the  national  capital?  Their  origin: — who 
does  not  know  that  Germany  alone  is  responsible  for  the 
disaster,  from  which  she  also  suffers,  though  less  than  the 
others?  The  plan  of  Mr.  Otto  Kahn,  whose  friendship  for 
France  no  one  appreciates  better  than  I,  unfortunately 
comes  back  to  the  system  of  Mr.  Keynes, — much,  I  feel 
certain,  against  its  author's  intentions.  As  a  plan  it  is 
not  only  impractical  but  unjust. 


468     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

And  I  return  to  my  conclusion :  if  America  wishes — and 
I  know  she  does  wish — to  give  France  material  help,  let 
her  begin  by  helping  her  politically,  for  that  is  the  key  to 
everything.  How  can  this  political  aid  be  given!  That  is 
hardly  for  a  foreigner  to  say.  By  a  majority  of  six  the 
United  States  Senate  refused  to  ratify  the  Peace  Treaty 
because  the  Covenant  alarmed  it.  That  is  the  Senate 's  own 
affair  and  I  do  not  question  its  motives.  But  I  venture  to 
say  that  when  they  voted  thus,  the  United  States  Senate 
had  no  intention  of  repudiating  the  principles  for  which 
America  fought.  The  United  States  Senate  had  no  inten- 
tion of  repudiating  the  right  of  self-determination  of  peo- 
ples, the  right  that  freed  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  Walloon 
districts,  Schleswig,  Bohemia,  Transylvania,  Trente  and 
Trieste,  the  Croats,  the  Slovenes,  and  the  Greeks  of  Thrace 
and  Asia  Minor.  The  United  States  Senate  had  no  inten- 
tion of  repudiating  the  right  of  those  attacked  to  be  paid 
damages  for  losses  inflicted  by  the  aggressor — a  right 
under  which  the  victors  who  had  been  unjustly  attacked 
confined  themselves  to  demanding  from  the  vanquished 
merely  actual  damages  sustained  and  pensions,  but  remitted 
the  whole  of  the  700,000  millions  the  war  had  cost  them. 
Certainly  the  United  States  Senate  and  all  America  recog- 
nize the  justice  of  this  to-day  as  they  recognized  it  in  the 
past.  If  they  do,  if  they  really  wish  to  see  justice  done,  I 
insist  that  it  is  their  duty  to  find  some  way  to  make  Ger- 
many understand  their  wish  and  their  will;  for  just  now 
Germany  with  her  usual  treachery  affects  to  believe  that 
the  United  States  Senate  and  the  American  people  think 
otherwise.  Germany  is  using  the  political  controversy,  the 
meaning  of  which  she  cunningly  distorts,  to  make  it  appear 
that  the  United  States  disapproves  not  only  of  a  part  of 
the  Covenant  but  of  the  entire  Treaty.  America  owes  it  to 
itself  to  answer  this  perfidy  by  an  act  that  will  prove  to 
the  world  that  the  United  States  is  faithful  in  peace  to  the 
immortal  principles  which  guided  her  in  war. 

And  what  is  this  act  to  be?  That  is  for  America  herself 
to  decide.  It  goes  without  saying  that  pure  and  simple 


FEANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  469 

re-establishment  of  peace, — according  to  the  resolution  of 
Senator  Knox,  would  have  just  the  opposite  effect  of  that 
for  which  France  hopes.  But  between  the  Knox  resolution 
and  ratification  there  are  other  ways.  America  may  ratify 
the  Peace  Treaty  either  with  Senator  Lodge 's  reservations 
or  after  asking  the  Allies  to  amend  the  Covenant.  America 
may  declare  the  changes  she  desires.  There  are  a  thou- 
sand means  of  reaching  a  satisfactory  conclusion.  There 
are  a  thousand  means,  but  there  is  only  one  end.  That  end 
is  to  help  re-establish  order  in  Europe  by  helping  to  enforce 
the  peace.  Without  law  there  can  be  no  order,  and  the  only 
possible  law  is  the  Treaty  which  Germany  has  signed.  The 
United  States  by  the  part  it  played  in  the  war  made  vic- 
tory possible.  By  the  part  it  will  play  in  enforcing  the 
peace,  the  United  States  will  remain  true  to  her  war  aims. 
American  support  is  essential  to  force  Germany  to  respect 
the  Peace  Treaty.  Nothing  else  can  make  a  conquered 
and  rebellious  Germany  understand  the  necessity  of  ful- 
filling what  she  has  signed.  Nothing  else  can  bring  about 
the  financial  settlements,  without  which  France  cannot 
live.  Nothing  else  can  confirm  the  military  guarantee 
which  the  United  States  promised  to  France,  the  far- 
sighted  justice  of  which  no  one  disputes.  American  sup- 
port now  can  as  nothing  else  ever  will,  ensure  that  future 
peaceful  cooperation  between  France  and  America  about 
which  everyone  is  enthusiastic  in  principle  but  for  which 
no  one  furnishes  the  means.  For  this  to  be  possible  Ger- 
many must  pay,  she  must  pay  in  every  sense  of  the  word. 
She  must  pay.  She  can  pay.  She  will  pay — as  soon  as  she 
sees  that  all  her  conquerors — without  exception — are  deter- 
mined that  she  shall  pay. 

Let  there  be  no  mistake;  such  a  policy  though  of  pri- 
mary interest  to  France  is  the  only  one  which  can  be  of 
real  and  lasting  service  to  Germany.  Germany  is  untouched 
and  will  recover  quickly — but  on  one  condition.  That  essen- 
tial condition  is  that  she  does  not  fall  back  into  the  hands 
of  the  militarists  who  would  drag  her  and  the  rest  of  the 
world  into  a  new  war.  German  militarism  lives  in  the 


470     THE  TEUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

spirit.  Ludendorff  and  Hugo  Stinnes  are  the  leaders  of 
one  and  the  same  party.  If  this  party  prevails,  Germany 
instead  of  working  in  peace  will  waste  herself  preparing 
for  revenge.  Germany  will  know  peace  and  she  will  give 
peace  to  others  only  if  she  mends  her  ways,  and  she  will 
not  mend  her  ways  unless  she  is  forced  to  by  a  firm  hand. 
The  policy  of  renunciation  bred  by  the  Allies  in  1920  was 
of  no  benefit  to  anyone  except  the  German  reactionaries. 
Fehrenbach  replaced  Muller.  Spa  marked  the  arrogant 
return  of  Stinnes.  The  more  we  yield,  the  bolder  these 
men  will  become  and  the  less  will  be  our  chances  of  peace. 
Germany  will  not  turn  towards  fresh  ideals  until  she  knows 
that  the  Allies  are  determined  to  prevent  her  doing  to-mor- 
row that  which  she  did  yesterday.  The  first  proof  of  thLs 
determination  must  be  enforcement  of  the  peace.  For  this 
determination  to  be  effective  it  must  be  unanimous.  The 
United  States  has  here  a  duty  to  fulfill  to  save  humanity 
and  Germany  herself  from  danger  of  another  war,  a  war 
which  will  be  sought  by  the  Pan-Germanists  all  the  more 
eagerly  as  they  discern  indecision  and  lack  of  unity  in  our 
ranks. 

I  can  understand  how  after  the  storm  many  Americans 
weary  of  the  intricacies  of  European  affairs,  may  well  ask 
themselves  whether  after  all  it  would  not  be  the  part  of 
wisdom  for  the  United  States  to  reduce  its  relations  with 
the  Old  World  to  a  minimum.  That  is  an  instinctive  move- 
ment. In  the  spring  of  1908,  Roosevelt  said  to  me : 

"What  the  United  States  lacks  most  is  an  understand- 
ing of  the  fact  that  we  have  interests  all  over  the  world.  I 
wish  every  American  felt  that  American  policy  is  a  world 
policy  and  that  we  are  and  shall  be  identified  in  the  future 
with  all  great  questions.  Some  of  us  are  aware  of  this. 
But  the  American  people  as  a  whole  must  be  accustomed 
to  the  idea,  they  must  learn  to  understand  the  meaning 
of  our  world  interests." 

Two  days  later  Mr.  Lodge,  to  whom  I  had  mentioned 
this  conversation,  made  a  reservation. 

"Let  us  understand  each  other,"  he  said.    "Our  policy 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.          471 

is  a  world  policy  in  so  far  as  commerce  is  concerned.  But 
I  hold  that  we  should  not  intervene  in  purely  political 
questions  outside  of  America.  It  is  neither  our  interest 
nor  our  tradition.  My  policy  and,  I  think  I  may  say,  the 
policy  of  our  Senate,  is  the  policy  of  George  Washington." 

And  Senator  Lodge  added  with  a  smile: 

1  'You  see,  we  support  our  President.  We  like  him.  But 
we  are  more  constitutionalistic  than  he  and  more 
conservative. ' ' 

I  have  recalled  these  old  memories  because  they  shed 
light  on  the  present.  Events  stronger  than  principles  or 
traditions  threw  the  United  States  into  a  European  war. 
But  the  war  over,  the  conservative  spirit  of  the  Senate  has 
re-asserted  itself  and  throughout  the  country  some  regret 
has  been  felt  for  the  old  isolation.  "Keep  off!"  Experi- 
ence itself,  that  proved  how  impossible  such  pleasant 
ataraxia  is  at  times,  could  not  overcome  force  of  habit. 
Americanism,  in  its  negative  and  self-sufficient  form, 
found  many  converts. 

It  is  to  these  that  my  words  are  addressed.  I  quite 
understand  their  aversion  to  undertakings  binding  the 
United  States  to  intervene  in  every  Balkan  or  Eastern  con- 
flict. The  generalized  and  abstract  character  of  the  Cove- 
nant explains  many  of  the  objections  raised  on  this  point. 
But  the  events  of  yesterday  proved  that  there  are  European 
situations  from  which  America  cannot,  whether  she  wishes 
it  or  not,  remain  aloof.  The  events  of  yesterday  prove  that 
no  doctrine  or  principle  of  isolation  can  keep  apart  those 
who  are  united  by  common  ideals  and  common  interests. 
So  just  as  long  as  the  American  people  hope  never  to  live 
again  through  an  emergency  such  as  led  two  million  of  their 
soldiers  to  the  Marne  and  the  Meuse,  there  is  only  one 
policy  worth  while,  a  policy  that  will  prevent  its  recur- 
rence. Now,  whence  comes  the  danger?  Not  from  France 
certainly,  who  has  suffered  too  much  from  the  war  not  to 
have  an  earnest  desire  for  peace.  From  Germany  then? 
And  the  name  of  the  danger  is  German  militarism.  To 
defend  ourselves  against  militarism  and  its  consequences 


472     THE  TRUTH  ABOUT  THE  TREATY 

we  waged  war  and  we  made  peace.  If  we  want  the  peace 
to  last — Germany  must  be  made  to  understand  that  peace 
is  a  sacred  thing.  If  Germany  does  not  understand  this,  if 
we  do  not  force  her  to  understand  it,  sooner  or  later  we 
shall  see  the  same  causes  produce  the  same  effects,  and 
once  more  the  " doughboy"  will  have  to  cross  the  ocean. 
To  avert  this,  the  united  action  of  the  Allies  of  yesterday 
is  necessary.  To  avert  this,  the  United  States — now  and 
not  later — must  take  her  stand  against  Germany.  Every 
weakness  that  encourages  German  Imperialism  stimulates 
complications.  Every  division  among  the  Allies  sows  the 
seed  of  future  war.  And  as  France  and  America  both  want 
peace,  America  must  help  us  to  enforce  it — there  is  no  other 
way  of  making  the  world  safe.  So  long  as  America  remains 
aloof,  her  power,  whether  she  wills  it  or  not,  will  play  into 
the  hands  of  those  she  fought  against  in  the  war. 

"Was  I  wrong  when  I  said  that  the  problem  is  political, 
and  that  the  economic  plans  of  financiers  cannot  solve  it? 
To  make  war  impossible  we  must  all  join  in  strengthening 
the  Peace  Treaty,  which  has  too  long  been  a  ''scrap  of 
paper."  And  if  the  United  States  hesitates  and  seeks  her 
way,  let  her  thoughts  turn  to  the  valley  of  the  Argonnej 
where  thirty  thousand  white  crosses  bear  witness  to  what 
America  stood  for  in  times  of  danger.  America  has  not 
changed.  America  must  make  good  the  things  she  stood 
for,  and  she  is  free  to  choose  her  means.  That  is  the  prob- 
lem of  to-day.  If  it  is  not  solved,  peace  of  any  kind  will 
be  unsafe.  The  dead  will  have  died  in  vain. 

The  union  of  the  three  democracies — France,  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States — is  the  fundamental  guaran- 
tee of  world  peace.  That  is  reason  enough  for  each  of  them 
to  make  all  necessary  sacrifices  to  maintain  this  union.  At 
times  England  or  America  find  France  too  uncompromising 
in  her  demands  for  her  rights!  Let  them  ask  themselves 
what  they  would  do  if  they  were  placed  in  her  position. 
Then  they  will  understand  our  state  of  mind.  At  times  they 
accuse  us  of  Imperialism.  If  France  obtains  the  repara- 
itions  which  are  her  due — and  she  can  obtain  them  only  by 


FRANCE,  BRITAIN  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  473 

the  support  of  her  Allies — she  will  devote  herself  wholly 
to  work  and  to  progress  in  peace.  It  is  only  if  she  feels 
that  she  is  abandoned  by  those  who  are  pledged  to  support 
her  that  she  might  in  her  disappointment  become  the  prey 
of  extremists.  Peace  has  not  settled  all  problems.  Peace 
to  be  finally  established  calls  for  the  means  which  war  and 
victory  demanded.  France,  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  still  have  duties  to  fulfill.  These  duties  cannot  be 
fulfilled  unless  the  union  of  the  three  nations  endures. 


Note : — The  events  of  the  first  three  months  of  1921  have  not  modified  this  con- 
clusion. The  Conference  of  Paris  of  January,  1921,  agreed  on  a  reduction  of 
Germany's  debt  to  France  of  sixty-five  per  cent.  The  refusal  of  Germany  at 
the  London  Conference  in  the  following  month  of  March  to  sign  this  agreement 
fortunately  prevented  the  coming  into  force  of  this  unjust  reduction.  In  spite 
of  the  economic  sanctions  taken  at  that  time  by  the  Allies,  the  mutilatioa 
inflicted  in  January  upon  the  clauses  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  has  not  been 
rectified.  Miscomprehension  continues. 

THE  END 


A     000  656  762     2 


y  of  CalHorrua 


